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Summery 
How could one oversee the monumental modern landscape that has been created by 
continuous technological innovations? Notwithstanding a few students of international 
relations who have insisted in taking notice, technology has remained an exotic subject 
matter in International Relations theory (IR). While the interest in technologies is 
recently growing most IR scholarship remains silent: the fact that we live in a fully 
integrated and interconnected technological world is absent from textbooks and 
introductions to IR. Neither exists theoretical approaches and paradigmatic debates that 
are concerned with technologies; nor a specific intra-disciplinary subfield. Against this 
background, this book explores how technological innovations could be theorized and 
integrated into IR theories. Revisiting the inroads of theoretical approaches to 
technologies, it highlights the lightness of IR scholarship. I argue that the general 
framework of IR is untenable because it looks at the world as if there were no materials 
or rather, as if the pervasive presence of artifacts and infrastructures would have no 
theoretical relevance for conceptualizing and examining world politics. Drawing on 
ontological and epistemological understandings from anthropology, innovation 
economics, and science and technology studies, I take issue with the philosophical 
foundations of the discipline. The notions, concepts and practices, which ultimately 
sustain and legitimize this lightness, are interrogated. It is shown that the neglect of 
technological innovation does not merely result from coincidental intellectual moves. It is 
rather the result of the “Cartesian complex”—the foundational commitment that renders 
IR a purely social science that deliberately excludes non-humans and hybrid material 
modes of agency. A radical refashioning is therefore required to the extent to which IR 
theory aims to accommodate the highly complex and elusive subject matter of 
technological innovations. This conceptual catharsis does not primarily touch upon 
epistemological concerns. What is at stake is the limitation of ontological parameters that 
sustain IR theories. To make sense of the messy technological landscapes, the material 
agency, and the technologically mediated practices, the prevailing logocentric wisdom 
needs to be transcended. Against premature metaphysical closure, this book thus 
contributes to the task of ontological expansion. Firstly, it develops an alternative meta-
theoretical foundation coined “explorative realism”. A new meta-theoretical matrix is 
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proposed that renders wider ontological parameters intelligible. Especially, the “double-
mixed” zone encourages ontological expansion via notions of heterogeneous agency and 
process philosophy. This implies that IR scholars avoid treating time, space, knowledge, 
artificial objects, and built environments as constants but as always croproduced. A 
coproductive commitment opens up new empirical issues and concerns as well as 
radically different theoretical puzzles. It also implies overcoming Cartesian dualism, 
abandoning intentionality-based notions of agency, and forgetting the “level of analysis” 
assumption. Secondly, this book advances a theoretical toolbox consisting of the 
interrelated concepts of “assemblages” and “creative destruction”. The former term 
signifies actor-networks entailing both humans and non-humans. The latter captures the 
ways in which technological innovations alter or destabilize assemblages across all levels 
through a process of translation. This theoretical vocabulary also reconceptualizes the 
meaning of “power”, “authority” with reference to technological innovations. Three 
open-ended classifications and three models of creative destruction enable the mapping 
of magnitudes of translations, the changing size and topologies of assemblages and the 
shifting power and authority. These efforts to theorize technological innovations, then, 
support empirical research about global transformations and processes of emergence with 
a set of conceptual tools that allows locating and systematizing cases, puzzles, and scales 
in relation to assemblages. The study of technological innovations leads to the discovery 
of novel empirical landscapes and inspires a creative questioning of IR’s foundations. As 
such, while responding to the dearth of theoretical approaches in IR that make sense of 
technological innovations, this study contributes to the articulation of both a materialist 
and a post-Cartesian version of IR. 
  
	   6	  
Metaphorical teaser. A breeze from the ocean. Imagine a beautiful village, located at an 
infinite coastline, the home of proud Fishermen. Day by day, these brave men and women 
catch a share of the abundant sea life. Not having invented boats yet, they use dip nets 
that are perfect tools for the shallow waters along the beach, the Laguna, and in a pond 
further inland. The families are consumed with their fishing routines. The community 
does not spend time pondering the possibility of fishing at sea. You can’t hear them 
lamenting the enclosed realm of their world. Fishing offshore is an anathema since “the 
blue ocean is the holy domain of the gods. The sea”, as the priest of the village says, “is 
improper for us humans.” It must remain restricted, inaccessible, and mysterious 
because it is a dangerous web where “the fish gods, unknown monsters, and the evil 
forces that cross humans and animals are dwelling”. After all, the very idea of a ship is 
absent, the maritime is diet rich, and the open sea uncharted anyway—why should these 
villagers want to set sail at all? Instead, their intense concern—and sometimes bitter 
quarrels—lies with the methods of getting a better catch out of the designated areas: 
some fishermen investigate the water quality or marine environment in general; some 
compare the exact nature and behavior of maritime species; others focus on the 
interactions among these species. Indeed, even though their critical attention 
encompasses a rather narrow world around their village, it easily keeps them busy till the 
evening. Now, imagine what this community refuses to do. How about exploring the open 
sea, and meeting gods or monsters? Think about this weird anti-social domain, murky 
and shiny, ungraspable and stormy. A sacred area that the community has left untouched 
for good reasons. A space unmapped and unlimited, it seems, in extension. Certainly, the 
fishermen, if they nonetheless decide to depart from the shore, would have to craft new 
tools. Something akin to boats or rafts, as it were, first of all. But the richness and 
diversity of sea life would also render their dip nets useless. Going to sea would strongly 
challenge their know-how of fishing and requires from them to deepen their knowledge 
about maritime life. Perhaps, they would quickly discover that other fellow humans are 
shipping as well. They would see large cargo ships, huge drilling platforms, or tiny 
submarines. Beyond the horizon entire civilizations might loom. Leaving the ponds near 
their village would alter the fishermen's working methods radically. It would reframe 
their purpose and identity as a community. Imagine a village and fishermen setting sails.  
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1. Introduction: technological innovations and International Relations 
The planet is crisscrossed with tunnels, traffic and communication channels, monitoring 
and surveillance infrastructures; the space and the atmosphere are dotted with flying 
artifacts; roughly 15.000 passenger aircraft are in service, and 900 operational satellites 
are currently in orbit. Worldwide, 435 nuclear power plants, 40.000 large dams, and 
over 2300 coal power plants deliver energy for industrial production, transport and 
urban life; 1.054 cities have a population exceeding 500.000. Globally, more than 4.700 
ski resorts offer their services. Around 30 billion plastic water bottles are sold, of which 
only 15% get recycled. The systematic ‘betonization’ of living environments alone 
consumes 15 billion tons of sand per year, making it a scarce resource. An estimated six 
billion subscribers use mobile phones while governments are concerned with the supply 
of rare earth minerals necessary for any computing devices. Mathematical algorithms 
are responsible for 60-70% of the stock market trade in New York and Frankfurt, 
replacing traders by automatic orders happening within one-thousandth of a second. As 
France’s central bank warns of the dangers arising from the digital currency Bitcoins, 
Internet access, online banking and social networks spread quickly even in the most 
deprived and unstable African countries. Through distribution of various sensory and 
digital devices and systems, both civilians and solders tend to become cyborgs. Cyber 
space has turned into the signature battlefield of the new millennium with unknown 
strategic and security ramifications while NGOs and the UN campaign against the 
development of “killer robots”. Meanwhile, the World Bank, OECD and other powerful 
institutions call for constant improvements in education, research activities and 
innovation capacities. Economists, probing into the consequences of technological 
change, reconsider their entire standard model of economic development. Inventions are 
carried out across fluid transnational networks, as research laboratories and companies 
fiercely compete for super-computers, nanotechnologies, genetically modified substances 
or battery systems. International climate negotiations rely upon simulation models that 
treat the diversity of cultural, political, technological, economic and physical processes 
as a set of integrated equations. Nobel Prize winners envision large-scale technological 
fixes for pressing environmental problems such as climate change, food supply and 
desertification. Armies around the world employ autonomous squadrons and equip 
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soldiers with the simulacra of augmented realities; though nuclear arsenals, by now, 
seemingly prevent great power warfare, keep governments alarmed more than ever due 
to risks of uncontrolled spread and nuclear accidents. Multinational companies, after 
testing their newest genetically modified plants on remote islands like Hawaii, subjugate 
farming activities on a planetary scale to conditions of monoculture. The increased 
production of biofuels causes price turbulence and a change in regional crop cultures. 
Novel deep-sea drilling and hydraulic fracking technology enable oil firms to drill 
themselves out of the prospects of finite fossil reserves. British, German and US citizens 
revolt against plastering rural landscapes with wind turbines. Following the construction 
of major oil pipelines, traffic and transport connections are planned to link Central to 
South and East Asia. During the social media-fueled Arab spring, Al Jazeera’s English 
voice was available in over 260 million households across 130 different countries. 
Digital warehouses worldwide use roughly 30 billion watts of electricity equivalent to the 
electric output of 30 nuclear power plants. Through Facebook 955 million active users 
have been linked globally in a time span of less than a decade. Data center traffic now 
totals 3,3 zettabyte and up to 35 Million netizens follow individual accounts on Sina 
Weibo or Twitter. US and British intelligence agencies track every single mobile phone in 
real time, as they record the worldwide data streams. Internet surfing and 
communication seems to change brain structures, national identities, and the struggle for 
political freedom. The stability of virtual data processing and highly precise time 
standardization is of utmost concern, vital to banking, communications, commerce, 
traffic, energy, defense, media, and health systems. The anticipation of errors in 
computer systems, such as the assumed millennium bug, leads governments and 
enterprises to spend billions on digital infrastructures, while the interplay of corruption 
and oversight failure enables a global shadow industry to move approximately 50 million 
tons of electronic waste and illegally discard the equipment in the developing world per 
year. Myriads of microscopic chemical particles and radioactive substances have 
traveled as products, waste and emissions to the most remote corners of the planet. The 
toxic imprints of techno-scientific civilization reach anywhere from the highest mountains 
and the polar regions to subterranean and deep-sea areas and the cells of human bodies. 
As the European commission fights the interception of private data by Google, Apple’s 
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map service reveals secret Taiwanese missile silos and Microsoft secretly provides the 
NSA direct access to costumer email accounts and chat data. The US space command 
wants to conquer to the Lagrange points in outer space, US congressmen want to 
establish a National Historic Park at the moon, and China and India prepare for 
indigenous missions into outer space while private space companies invest into a multi-
planetary human civilization. 
This book attempts to theorize technological innovations as an integral part of global 
politics. It is motivated by two observations. First, as the above canvas indicates, ours is a 
“technological civilization” (Dant 2005); a reality permeated by myriads of technologies 
and technical systems. Ever since a series of scientific and technological revolutions set 
in, the political, the social and the international are thoroughly interweaved, mediated, 
and made of machines and complex artifacts (Mumford 1966, Adas 1990, Woolgar 1991, 
Latour 1987). Given the related socio-technical transformations, any international or 
transnational issue likely entails technological aspects. The second observation, which 
stands in a certain tension with the first, concerns the way in which scholarship on 
international relations deals with the pervasiveness of science and technology. Most 
international relations (IR) theories are surprisingly indifferent to the emergence and 
consequences of new technologies. While some students of international relations have 
insisted in taking notice, the “classical” schools and canonical theories in IR regard 
technology as an “esoteric” issue at best—as Charles Weiss (2005, p. 309) points out. For 
instance, few IR scholars have ventured to make sense of the contradictory ways in which 
technologies actually sustain a highly interconnected and interdependent human life, and 
yet, at the same time, threaten the survival of human civilization (Luke 2003, Linklater 
2009, Deudney 2014). If one acknowledges that everything from mundane private life 
and foreign policy to the macro-level of world politics is mediated by technologies 
(Frosch et al. 1999), then it is curious to see how much this reality is left under-
researched and under-theorized by scholarship on international relations. 
It seems that the inquiry into technological innovations does not capture something 
fundamental about international politics and therefore has not become a distinct research 
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field (Mayer et al 2014a).1 The fact that global politics unfold in a fully interconnected 
industrial civilization embedded in dynamic technological transformations is almost 
entirely absent from textbooks and introductions to IR. There are no paradigmatic debates 
concerned with science and technology as such. A specific subfield and dedicated 
journals have not been stablished. Though certain technologies feature in scholarly 
debates about sovereignty, power or governance, they are neither treated as coherent 
empirical subject matter, nor as theoretical puzzles in their own rights (Deibert 1997, 
Eriksson and Giacomello 2006, Singh 2008, Herrera 2003, Fritsch 2011). Efforts to 
develop theoretical frameworks remained limited and without impact on the broader 
theoretical debates within IR. Notwithstanding the pervasive public debates over 
information-, gene-, bio-, and nano-technologies and the growing political attention 
towards emerging technological opportunities and risks, International Relations 
(henceforth IR) scholarship has remained by and large remarkably silent about 
technological innovations. 
This book proposes that technological innovations are a significant ‘blind spot’ that 
needs to be examined. This omission can be utilized productively in two ways. First, 
probing into innovation as a form of technological change questions IR’s systematic 
biases. As the growing ‘neo-materialist’ literature points out from different angles, IR 
suffers from a fixation on social, subjective and ideational factors.2 Tying into this 
literature, I suggest reconstructing the theoretical framework of IR by interrogating the 
omission of technological innovation as a subject for research and theorizing. How could 
IR theories oversee the monumental landscape that has been created by continuous 
technological innovations? Why do technologies not feature more prominently within the 
discipline of IR? Chapters 4 and 5 advance the claim that traditional theorizing in IR, 
despite its immense richness and diversity, shares a common meta-theoretical framework. 
Thus revisiting the explicit and implicit assumptions of existing theoretical approaches 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hypothetically, we could assume that if the literature on technological innovations relates to something 
fundamental about international politics—as for instance the research about regimes, democratic peace, or 
international organizations—it would speak back to the mainstream theoretical debates. Yet, thus far, is has 
not occurred to many scholars to conceive of a domain of “global techno-politics” that requires a distinct 
mode of inquiry and is different from other fields at the conceptual level (see Mayer et al. 2014a). 
2 See e.g. Cole (2013), Barry (2013a), Connolly (2013), Squire (2014) Schouten (2013), Acuto (2014), 
Grove (2016), Burke et al. (2016). 
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about technology helps reveal the “lightness” of IR scholarship. The “Cartesian complex” 
(see Chapter 4) reinforces a perspective such that there are no material artifacts; or, such 
that the pervasive presence of technologies would remain without relevance for our 
theorizing, conceptualizing and examining world politics. As this book will demonstrate, 
the paradoxical phenomena induced by technological innovations, therefore, usually 
overstretch the common binaries, instrumentalist notions, and state-centric analyses. 
Against this backdrop, the second step is to develop a theoretical model that makes 
sense of the global politics of technological innovations. Attempts to theorize 
technological innovation, while calling into question essential categories, meta-
theoretical distinctions, and ontological foundations shared by theoretical “mainstream” 
approaches, do not merely amount to adding yet another IR approach. How can we 
accommodate to and conceptualize the pervasiveness and consequences of technological 
innovations for global politics? How to bring back the “missing mass”? To begin this 
effort, this introduction discusses the different academic and political concerns with 
technological innovations (1.1), and how they tend to lead to paradoxical theoretical 
puzzles (1.2). Theorizing innovations requires more than just adapting existing concepts. 
A good starting point is to cope with the diversity of technological transformations that 
continues to change politics and society (1.3). In this line, the last section of this 
introduction lays out the overall structure of the book (1.4). Conceptually, the book 
develops three models of “creative destruction”: assembling, reassembling, and 
disassembling. Based on the notion of assemblages, this theoretical framework elaborates 
on the link between two ideas that study the juxtaposition of transformation and political 
order: the “maelstrom of modern life” of ongoing technological progress and renewal, as 
Berman (2010, p. 16) put it on the one hand, and the idea of “coproduction” (Jasanoff 
2004a), that is, social and political order arising at the nexus of epistemic, cultural and 
material realities on the other. 
1.1 Technological innovations as political and academic concerns 
Technological innovations attract enormous attention in political circles. The idea of “the 
race to the top” permeates policy discourses all around the world. Political elites 
understand economic competitiveness and investments into research and development as 
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closely interrelated trends. Technological innovation is univocally seen as paramount for 
progress, wealth, and power, at least in the OECD countries and the newly industrializing 
economies (Slaughter and Rhoades 1996, Barry and Slater 2002). The outlook of Graham 
R. Mitchell, former United States’ Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Technology 
Policy, is indicative for the widely shared positive expectations: “Time after time, in 
epoch after epoch and country after country, technological advance has produced higher 
wages and living standards, not mass unemployment. This is exactly what we expect to 
happen in the 21st century.” (Mitchell 1999, p. 214) Likewise, politicians and academics 
in emerging economies are concerned with the pitfalls of technological backwardness and 
how to overcome it with policies for education, science, research and development. 
India’s government has proclaimed that it will become a knowledge superpower by 2050. 
China’s leaders are pushing hard for homegrown innovations (Below et al. 2012, Segal 
2010) while Chinese enterprises now apply for more patents than companies in any other 
country. As India, China, Brazil and South Africa pursue explicit “catch up” strategies, 
transnational companies are fiercely competing for the latest patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks and for the brightest engineers, and researchers within these countries 
(Frietsch and Schueller 2010, Parayil and D´Costa 2009). 
States and markets became intimately entangled in the race for technological 
innovations. Whatever one prefers theoretically or normatively, state-company 
collaborations in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Israel, or Taiwan were quite successful 
(Castells and Hall 1994, Breznitz 2007). This is not only due to subsidies, trade 
regulations, market barriers or other hidden forms of support and subsidies that blur the 
state-market distinction. National policies also became increasingly crucial for 
innovations through the networked activities of patent offices (Drahos 2010). Although 
these practices have economic disadvantages for developing economies, they help create 
a landscape of emerging multinational corporations, increasingly sprinkled with firms 
that are intimately intertwined with national bureaucracies, the military or party interests. 
ZTE, Suzlon, HTC, Sinopec, Petrobas, Huawei, Samsung, Tencent, Gazprom and others 
eagerly compete with their Western peers by extending their market shares by means of 
patent lawsuits, lobbying, and, of course, increased research and development 
investments (Taplin and Nowak 2010, Yu 2012, Mahlich and Pascha 2012). Rhetorical 
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references to neoliberal ideology notwithstanding, the conceptual separation between 
markets, companies and states with respect to innovational dynamics is much less clear 
than textbooks would suggest. 
To govern technological innovations through centralized research funding and 
tailored policies and administrative regulations, however, is a fairly recent occurrence. It 
took governments in Europe and North America until the Second World War to seriously 
consider comprehensive science and technology policies for the first time (see Chapter 
2). Today’s governments and armed forces have, in contrast, engineered close and often 
seamless collaborative networks between universities, research labs, and enterprises—
redefining the role and functions of universities first and foremost as birthplaces of 
commercially relevant technological innovations (Robertson 2005). Mainly as a 
byproduct of the Cold War, national policies came to systematically intertwine scientific 
research in various with both civilian and military technology, as well as commercial and 
public activities in order to control and to fuel technological innovations especially in 
nuclear physics, nuclear energy, space technology, and computer science (Dickson 1988, 
Krige 2006). The same blurring of categorical binaries such as state and market or 
technology and society, that are constitutive of many social theories, is even more 
characteristic of the ongoing informational revolution driven by digitalization and 
datafication (Castells 2000, Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons 2001, Cukier and Mayer-
Schoenberger 2013). In short, innovations are processes of hybridization in which 
scientific, commercial, military, and bureaucratic contexts became intermingled. 
Besides profound strategic and military interest in cutting-edge weapon 
technologies, additional factors account for the current acknowledgement of the centrality 
of technology. Shifts in intellectual history, in particular novel economic theories, 
became instrumental for attributing social and economic changes to technological 
innovations. New research fields such as New Growth Economics and Evolutionary 
Economics provided a strong scientific backbone to the perceived relevance of science 
and technology (Machlup 1962, Griffin 1974, Freeman 1974, 1987, Abernathy and Clark 
1985). Robert Solow, who won the Nobel Prize in 1987, lamented that “computers are 
everywhere in the economy except in the productivity statistics” (cited after de la Mothe 
2004, p. 524). The strange disconnect between technologies and economic theory was 
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coined “Solow Paradox”. Responding to these observations, an emerging economic 
paradigm characteristically placed technological innovations at the center of economy 
and society (de la Mothe 2004, pp. 524-525, Russell 1997). Technology was thereby 
elevated to a critical driving force behind growth, wealth inequalities, trade relations, and 
boom and bust cycles (OECD 1996, Freeman 2007). Slowly but steadily, evolutionary 
economics is making inroads into mainstream economics.3 For instance, in recognition of 
his non-perfect competition model that turns economic theory from a static affair into an 
evolutionary process (Romer 1990), Paul Romer was among the 2011 Nobel Prize 
candidates. 
Sociologists similarly began considering the role of knowledge for production 
processes, stressing the dematerialization of economic activities (Bell 1973). Sociological 
and economic ideas, emphasizing the role of technological revolutions and evolving 
know-how, underpinned new metaphors such as the “knowledge-economy” and the 
“network society” (Stehr and Moldaschl 2010, Peters 2004). Progressive commercially 
driven innovations were deemed to have led to massive shift in the organization of 
production chains and trade networks (Willke 1998, Stehr 2001). In addition, the 
burgeoning field of innovation studies produced a treasure of comparative analysis on 
innovational competitiveness and historically evolving institutions governing, and at the 
same time affected by, technological change.4 These academic discourses tend to render 
the achievement of technological innovations into a political imperative as “human 
capital” and novel technologies are by now seen, philosophically and practically, as the 
main driving forces of economic growth. Consequently, one default policy advice is to 
create “national innovation systems”, by consistently fostering education, research and 
development, in order to harness the economic fruits of knowledge economies (Fagerberg 
1987, Dosi, Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg, and Soete 1988, Freeman 1995, Lundvall 
1992/2010).  
The contemporary emphasis on knowledge and technology therefore is as much a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Schumpeter’s idea of “creative destruction” is perhaps its single-most important intellectual source (see 
Balabkins 2003, Diamond 2006, Freeman 2007). 
4 See Fagerberg and Verspagen (2009) for a comprehensive overview how the field has developed during 
the last three decades. 
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description of emerging patterns, as it resembles the enactment of related theories and 
perceptions (Godin 2002, 2006, Robertson 2008). This generic mix of prescriptive 
council and descriptive analysis is characteristic, too, of international organizations 
including the OECD, which reinforces the same message by means of an apparatus of 
rankings, statistical studies, and manuals to comparatively measure innovation (Godin 
2002). In turn, a certain circularity of knowledge arises because innovation policies and 
expertise about innovation processes are increasingly mutually constitutive. 
Scholars in the field of international relations instead mainly link technological 
innovation to the study of security and power. Realist scholars in particular have seen 
changes in material circumstances as critical for national security and peace (Herz 1959, 
Gilpin 1981, see also Deudney 2014). “The value of science and technology has 
enormously increased in the calculus of national power”, noted Hans J. Morgenthau, 
because military power became primarily measured by “scientific breakthroughs and 
technological innovations” (1964, p. 1393). Consequently, realist theories assume that 
inventions in weapons technology and shifting technological gaps can lead to territorial 
conquests and, ultimately, may unleash hegemonic wars (Kennedy 1987, Gilpin 1981). 
The unpredictable progress of technical inventions compels states to be permanently 
concerned, anticipating and adapting to the moving ground of sudden innovations in the 
hand of rivals or enemies. This explains why, according to a realist perspective that 
assumes Darwinian competition for survival as the inescapable mode of existence of 
nation states, governments sacrifice a considerable share of their budgets to remain, if 
even symbolically, ahead of their rivals or, conversely, to catch up with leading powers 
(Buzan 1987). Political elites and foreign policy pundits have stressed the importance of 
investing in the “technological edge” in a recurrent pattern (Paarlberg 2004). 
From the perspective of International Political Economy (IPE), Susan Strange 
similarly argued that modern state power is mainly based on technological leadership 
(Russell 1997b). Her structural approach replaces the primacy of security concerns with 
the premise that “global knowledge structure” has become the central arena of 
international competition: 
“The competition between states is becoming a competition for leadership in the 
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knowledge structure. The competition used to be for territory, when land and natural 
resources were the major factor in the production of wealth and therefore the acquisition of 
power for the state. Then the competition was for industrial ‘sinews of war’ provided by 
the manufacture of steel, and later for chemicals, and petroleum and electric power. Today, 
the competition is for a place at the leading edge (as the jargon has it) of advance 
technology. This is the means both to military superiority and to economic prosperity, 
invulnerability and dominance.” (Strange 1988, p. 136) 
Since the 1980s, observers have predicted global economic shifts and stiffer 
technological competition due to Asia’s rise. While Japan initially appeared destined to 
overtake the global leadership position, it is the huge number of graduates from Chinese 
and Indian universities that are now seen as indicative of declining European and US 
innovativeness.5 Additional indicators including patent applications, research funding, 
publications, or high-tech exports suggest that India, China, and other emerging 
economies are eagerly catching up with the OECD world (Altenburg, Schmitz, and 
Stamm 2008, Royal Society 2011, Mahmood and Singh 2003).  
“A central finding of economics over the past fifty years has been that technological 
advancement is critical to long-term economic growth (…) we predict that one of the 
twenty-first-century’s biggest transitions will occur when both China and India begin to 
make dramatic contributions to global science and technology and thereby dramatic 
contributions to the welfare of the world. When this happens, the structure of the world 
economy will change in new and promising ways.” (Sachs and McArthur 2002, p. 183) 
Sachs and McArthur have not ventured to explain precisely which kind of “new and 
promising” changes they expect though. Their vagueness results from our limited 
comprehension of these phenomena, since the alleged shifts are less clearly measurable 
than one would think. The very nature of technological transformation renders aggregate 
indices and rankings unreliable. Systematic statistical data can be easily misleading (see 
Archibugi and Coco 2005, Castellacci and Archibugi 2008, Leydesdorff and Zhou 2005), 
thus mirroring what Rosenau has noted in Turbulence in World Politics: “uncertainty is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Peters (2004) traces the awareness of technological competition back to the 1980s. Particularly, the issue 
of technological backwardness as compared to Japan became a serious concern in the United States (Singh 
2002). Of course, this sort of concerns is not unprecedented; see the second chapter for a historical 
overview. 
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prime characteristic of turbulent politics” (1990, p. 8). On balance, it is fair to say that our 
knowledge of whether the OECD countries can still be regarded as the leading 
“knowledge powers” is incoherent conflictive.  
Consider China’s alleged rise for the problem of conceptualizing and measuring 
shifts in knowledge power and technological leadership. Analysts stressing the 
significance of technological factors (which actually constitute a minority) advance 
claims that, apparently, are highly contradictory. China has almost eliminated illiteracy in 
less than one hundred years, producing hundreds of millions of educated people and 
dozens of millions of excellent engineers, researchers, and scientists. But the astonishing 
numbers often reflect more quantity than actual quality of graduates (Gereffi, Wadhwa, 
Rissing and Ong 2008), thus leaving one puzzled about the true extent of Chinese 
capacities. So, is China overtaking in technological leadership—or is it just approaching 
the circle of first-tier innovators, or rather is it actually lagging behind—because it is 
trapped in a mode of intensive production with low innovation activities?6 The important 
point that we have to recognize is not the striking discrepancy of these claims per se. 
Truly intriguing is that the underlying question makes little sense in the first place. 
Because the Chinese case resembles a combination of the two big puzzles described 
above, it shows that we are at least empirically unable to conceive, at a general level, in 
which ways technological innovations have led to increases or decreases of “national 
power”. It is therefore not by accident that an eminent expert such as Adam Segal (2008, 
p. 423) remarks that he is “perplexed about the actual status of American, Chinese, and 
Indian technological capabilities.” The paradoxes of China’s rise hence cause realist 
framings and instrumental understandings of technology to collapse: 
“There is evidence to support two different views: that China and India will soon emerge as 
technological superpowers, and its opposite, that they will continue struggling to overcome 
major challenges. As a result, both policy makers and engaged citizens lack a clear sense of 
where their country stands relative to its competitors and what policies should be 
implemented in response.” (Segal 2008, p. 423) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 These contradictory claims are made in various studies and reports (see Segal 2003, Preeg 2005, Wang 
2006, Adams, King and Ma 2009, Sainsbury of Turville 2007, Simon and Cao 2009, Segal 2010, Breznitz 
and Murphree 2011, Lampton 2008, Wadhwa 2010, Mayer 2012b). 
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But even if the precise ranking of national economies remains unclear, the paramount 
importance of technological innovation is seen as common sense. Technological 
advances, the global skill revolution, and economic dynamism appear strongly 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing (OECD 1996, Archibugi and Michie 1997, Dicken 
2007). 
The intimate relationship between innovation and security is discernible from the 
political discourse in Europe and North America, characteristically rife with rhetoric 
reminiscent of the Cold War. Many observers respond to the emerging economies’ 
eagerness to “climb the ladder” with genuine fear (Segal 2004). Surely, the restless 
lobbying effort focused on selling high-tech arms such as stealth fighters and frigates, 
drones and robotic platforms reinforces, if not often creates, popular threat perceptions 
concerning the catch up of countries in the global East and South in terms of innovation 
and research capacities.7 Politicians, often indirectly, point towards security ramifications 
of commercial technology races. Alarmist overtones are omnipresent as exemplified by 
this British expert commission’s dramatic statement: “We can be one of the winners in 
‘the race to the top’, but only if we run fast.” (Sainsbury of Turville 2007, p. 8) In his 
2011 State of the Union Address, US President Obama even embraced the renewal of the 
“Sputnik moment”: 
“Half a century ago, when the Soviets beat us into space with the launch of a satellite 
called Sputnik, we had no idea how we would beat them to the moon. The science wasn't 
even there yet. NASA didn't exist. But after investing in better research and education, we 
didn't just surpass the Soviets; we unleashed a wave of innovation that created new 
industries and millions of new jobs. This is our generation's Sputnik moment. Two years 
ago, I said that we needed to reach a level of research and development we haven't seen 
since the height of the Space Race.” (White House 2011) 
This rallying call indicates the seamless intermingling of security and economic 
considerations typical of the contemporary US defense imagination and digital 
surveillance practices. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 These threat perceptions are in no small part resulting from public relation and entertainment activities of 
the US military-industrial-media complex (see Der Derian 2009). Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and thousands 
of smaller companies have a strong interest that the Pentagon, the Congress, and the White House 
relentlessly pursue global “full-spectrum” dominance. 
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This cursory overview has made clear that technological innovations obviously are 
critical for international affairs. However, the work of IR scholars already suggests that 
there are non-trivial obstacles to elaborating the theoretical puzzles arising from our 
subject matter. Information networks are not merely instrumental in expanding national 
“capacities”. They rather “reconfigure, constitute, or reconstitute identities, interests, and 
institutions” (Singh 2002, p. 13). The ubiquity of information technologies rather implies 
a meta-power that is different from the coercive forms of power usually assumed in IR 
(JP Singh 2013). In addition, the blurring of common boundaries such as those between 
‘states’ and ‘markets’ or between ‘economy’ and ‘security’ as well as the misfit between 
path-dependency and instrumentalist treatments of technology considerably complicate 
matters. Numerous studies of innovation demonstrate the long-term effects of 
technologies that challenge instrumentalist assumptions. As state agencies attempt to 
command or steer the occurrence of novel weapons, infrastructures and communication 
systems, they have to cope with macrostructures and cumulated by preexisting technical 
systems as well as unevenly distributed ownership of expertise and practical knowledge. 
The next section, then, further systematizes the conceptual obstacles to theorize 
technological innovations. 
1.2 Paradox puzzles for IR and the destabilization of concepts 
Insights from from innovation studies and science and technology studies (STS) elucidate 
how entire building-blocs of IR theories run into unsolvable paradoxes because of the 
complex consequences of technologies. The aforementioned concerns can be 
systematically organized around three topics: “the state”, “power-politics”, and 
“rationality”. What are the limits of conceptualizing technologies as instruments of states, 
serving the pursuit of national interests? How do the unintended and unruly aspects of 
technologies affect our understanding of the “inter-national” and presumptions of human 
agency? The crucial problem, I argue, lies at the level of meta-theoretical presumptions 
that render theoretical puzzles in IR intelligible. To phrase it differently, the foundational 
framework underpinning most approaches to IR is incapable of taking account of the 
significance of the non-linear transformations tied to technological innovations. 
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First, the complexity of technology and related forms of knowledge makes it 
difficult to pinpoint the conceptual place of the “state”. For one thing, there is the 
problematic attribution of agential effects: Governments can promote innovation-friendly 
institutions, technical standards, and regulations for IPR that profoundly impact processes 
of knowledge creation (Juma et al. 2001, Fagerberg and Srholec 2008), as the enormous 
success of the “Asian Tigers” exemplifies (Evers, Menkhoff and Wah 2010, Hornidge 
2008). Yet innovations cannot simply be called forth by means of top-down regulations 
or incentives as will be argued below. For another, the preeminent role of private 
companies remains difficult to account for: IPE has for long shown that technological 
changes usually tend to favor large companies and private actors at the expense of states. 
This is because the latter are either incapable of regulating newly emerged activities or 
constantly lag behind in their efforts to do so (Strange 1996, Russell 1997b, Gill and Law 
1989).8 Internet corporations, recently, have initiated a powerful wave of privatization of 
authority (Deibert 2013). IR studies therefore point to a diffusion of power as privatized 
information-flows potentially undermine national security, sovereignty, and state capacity 
(Rosenau and Singh 2002, Aronson 2002, Nye 2011).  
Second, the problem of the longue durée: effective educational policies can produce 
more and better-qualified human capital over several generations. To establish a full-
fledged educational system including world-class universities may require decades or 
centuries; a period which seems, however, well beyond the horizon of reasonable 
foresight and state-led planning. “Large technical systems” are another long-term force 
that develops inherent “momentum” and “styles” which are stable and can become, at 
times, a constraining force for all involved actors, including governments (Hughes 1983). 
Given such long-term trends or trajectories, a short-term view on the position of the state 
inevitably leads conceptual difficulties. 
Third, it has been pointed out in studies of global governance, that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Archibugi’s (2010) conclusion that the current IPR are in the interest of a small number of multinational 
enterprises, yet not necessarily conducive for the national economies as a whole, corresponds with earlier 
assertions that the accelerating development of technologies is a “prime cause of the shift in the state-
market balance of power.” (Strange 1996, p. 7) The balance of the global knowledge structures appears to 
increasingly tilt towards the big corporations at the expense of states. For others patents and copyrights are 
unnecessary for innovation to happen at all (see Boldrin and Levine 2008). 
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reconciliation of the reality of networked governance and homogenous notions of the 
state (or international organizations) is impossible (Slaughter 2004). Information 
technologies, satellites, containers, or social media have enabled large networks, 
connecting a plethora of non-state actors across the globe and different scales. 
Technologically mediated governance typically invests various actors with considerable 
power over and authority for governance, regulation, and standardization (Litfin 1999, 
Nye 2004, Murphy and Yates 2009). Rosenau’s response to this sort of diagnosis was 
theoretical bifurcation. As the “combination of dynamic technologies and global 
decentralization” has given rise to a “postinternational” situation, IR has to cope with two 
coexisting worlds—a world of sovereignty-bound and a world of sovereignty-free 
actors—in which states have become “both indispensible and inadequate.” (Rosenau 
1990, pp. 247-249) To put it differently, simplified assumptions about the “state” are 
outdated. 
Historically, power was embedded in organizations and institutions, organized around a 
hierarchy of centres. Networks dissolve centres, they disorganize hierarchy, and make 
materially impossible the exercise of hierarchical power without processing instructions in 
the network, according to the network’s morphological rules. Thus, contemporary 
information networks of capital, production, trade, science, communication, human rights, 
and crime, bypass the nation-state, which, by and large, has stopped being a sovereign 
entity (Castells 2000, p. 19). 
Digital communication networks allow for swift and unhindered flows of information, 
expertise, and scientific knowledge while mobile communication technologies empower 
entrepreneurs worldwide, leveling the playing field for companies from developing 
countries (Castells et al. 2007, Friedman 2009). “The state”, according to Manual 
Castells, “reacts to its bypassing by information networks, by transforming itself into a 
network state. In so doing, its former centres fade away as centres becoming nodes of 
power-sharing, and forming institutional networks.” (2000, p. 19). It has been 
demonstrated consistently that state apparatuses and sovereign practices become 
disaggregated as governments have entirely reorganized their decision-making 
procedures (Slaughter 2004, Grewal 2008).  
These empirical insights have hardly been channeled back into theorizing in order 
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to unpack the ‘state’. The main research focus of IR scholarship on information 
technologies remains rather restricted: the primary concern revolves around the question 
of whether the recent rise of information technologies leads to a demise of the territorial 
nation state.9 On the other end of the spectrum, notions of “network” and “assemblage” 
have become powerful metaphors in the research of sociologists and STS scholars who 
focused on processes in which prevailing forms of social organization, such as nation-
states and national economies, are increasingly substituted or transformed (Castells 2007, 
2010, Passoth and Rowland 2010). The question of how the state can be lodged 
conceptually within puzzles arising from networks, digital revolutions and technological 
reorganization remains unanswered. It is in this sense, that Rosenau’s distinction between 
“postinternational” and “international” domains is still valuable. For it demonstrates a 
sensibility for complexity (or “turbulence” in Rosenau’s terms) and offers a way to 
articulate the state as an actor, whereas mainstream IR has a long way to embrace the 
variety and the scope of diverse technological transformations that change fundamental 
parameters of human life, politics, and statehood.  
Besides destabilizing unitary actor assumptions, the analysis of power is another 
“casualty” when we take technological innovations seriously. Paradoxes emerge at the 
theoretical level as the following stylized puzzles about the interplay between power-
seeking strategies and technological change illustrate. 
Innovativeness and paradoxes of late development: While the diffusion of 
technologies and the access to technical know-how is thought to close the gap between 
wealthy post-industrial and emerging developing economies—many hope that thereby 
the medical treatment and the education possibilities of the planet’s poor populations will 
be quickly improved as well (Juma et al. 2001)—emerging states such as India, Brazil 
and China aim at establishing strong national innovation systems. This agenda, 
governments believe, will foster indigenous innovation capacities and put companies into 
a better market position while reducing the increasing dependence on foreign 
technologies, if not rendering “their” economies technologically more autonomous. On 
the other hand, these governments resort to neo-mercantilist policies, parts of which are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See e.g. Krasner (1991), Keohane and Nye (1998), Eriksson and Giacomello (2006), Hanson (2008) and 
Mueller (2010). 
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especially weak intellectual property regimes, in order to foster infant industries and copy 
foreign designs. Yet the very weakness of IP regulations hinders the emergence of strong 
indigenous innovation abilities exactly because companies lack the incentives and the 
institutional framework to innovate. In addition, they are hardly able to hedge against the 
huge financial risks involved with innovational activities (cf. Breznitz and Murphree 
2011). Paradoxically, emerging economies as a whole may benefit from counterfeiting 
and cheap imitated goods whereas entrepreneurs and companies, by engaging in the 
lower strata of global production chains, are prohibited from becoming truly innovative 
(e.g. Wang 2006). Hence, emerging economies risk falling into the “middle income trap”. 
They decisively fall short of developing innovation-based competitive strength in rapidly 
advancing world markets—that has been, as it were, the original goal of governments. 
Innovation, diffusion and paradoxes of dominance: For strategic reasons and 
pressured by private enterprises, powerful states try to prevent the proliferation of critical 
technologies. At the same time, governments lobby for the implementation of a strict 
global intellectual property regime so that companies can fully exploit their monopolies 
on new technologies and their countries’ technological leadership can be sustained (see 
Gilpin 1981). Yet these goals are sometimes contradictory. Introducing stronger and 
stricter intellectual property regulations globally has given rise to “patent warming” and 
to the multiplication of “patent dwarfs“, hampering innovation processes rather than 
supporting their acceleration (Weißbach 2010). Furthermore, to maintain innovative 
capabilities requires absorption and adoption abilities. The idea of autarky denies the 
reality of global division of labor imminent to transnational productions networks. The 
latter automatically spur the worldwide diffusion of know-how and technologies. As a 
consequence, this means in on the one hand complex interdependencies between firms or 
their subsidiaries across national borders and on the other hand increasing concerns by 
firms (and politicians) that do not want to lose technologies. Governments also fear the 
proliferation of dual-use technologies to enemies or rivals. Militaries are facing a similar 
dilemma: they are major drivers and funders for R&D yet faster innovation cycles render 
their own weapon systems obsolete quicker. In addition, they are threatened by attacks 
using dual-use technologies. At the same time, however, their combat and 
communication systems increasingly depend on foreign innovations because of 
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widespread practices of outsourcing within global production networks. Here again, we 
are full circle, since the attempts to preserve dominance through preventing homegrown 
technologies from diffusing must be undermined by companies and the military 
eventually. 
If we accept for the moment a highly simplified treatment and analyze 
technological innovations through the lens of classical power politics, then the results are 
confusing. Logical plausibility and empirical evidence suffices to undermine the premise 
implicit to many IR theories that governments exert command, control, and hence, 
predictive power over evolving technologies (Singh 2002, p. 6ff). It leads us not only to 
doubt the merits of instrumentalist narratives, including the “race for technology”, but 
also to scrutinize the presumptions underpinning instrumentalism: To assume humans are 
generally capable of controlling emerging technologies (and thus easily supportive for 
specific policy goals) is naïve at best and ignorant at least.  
The history of technological innovations is full of examples that elude both 
instrumentalist understandings of technology and simple rational actor assumptions 
despite politicians, scientists, or generals portrayal of new technologies as mere tools 
(Woolgar 1991, Winston 2007). Even tiny technological artifacts or small systems can 
have far-reaching and unforeseen consequences as they are interconnected to the larger 
world through myriads of, usually hidden, entanglements and logics (Furlong 2011). A 
superficial look at the surprising outcomes of recent technological innovations is 
illustrative: scientific applications, initially developed for the military, translate into 
massive changes of commercial and political collective activities (e.g. Internet and Web 
2.0); large-scale computer modeling, initially funded to study Cold War strategies, 
enables and legitimizes the peaceful vision of alternative global identities and 
transnational political agendas (e.g. Club of Rome report, global warming); public 
infrastructures for civil transport empower marginal actors to pick a fight against a 
superpower (e.g. Al Qaida); advances in computer technology, robotics and automation 
that have improved macro-economic productivity also, for the first time, lead to a 
worrying decoupling of productivity and job growth and contradictory economic wisdom 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011); the National Security Agency with a estimated staff of 
30.000 can monitor and access data streams from computers, mobile phones and cloud 
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services in real time and on a global basis, but a single person was able to leak 
information shattering US foreign policy for years.  
Numerous additional examples make the same point: emerging artifacts and 
technical systems are always open-ended, evolving alongside new practices and 
expertise. Inevitably, they have unexpected and unintended consequences (Wynne 1988, 
Tenner 2004, see also Winner 1977). The unaccountable elements of technologies have 
not just both social and technical origins. They rather arise though the coupling and 
interplay of political, cultural, technical, and ecological factors. Charles Perrow (1984), 
for instance, stressed the immensely increased potential for devastating disasters as a 
consequence of proliferating high-risk technologies with a generic degree of “interactive 
complexity”. Global catastrophes such the nuclear meltdown in Fukushima, Japan, 
illustrate the fragile institutional structures, biased organizational cultures, and selective 
expertise Perrow examined. Paul Virilio proposed that a specific sort of accident and 
engineering failure would be inherent to every new technology (see Crogan 2000). The 
daily experience of lurking dangers and harm from technological innovations, ranging 
from localized to planetary scales, reflects life within a “global risk society” (Beck 2012). 
STS scholars explore the public controversies, which characteristically accompany the 
emergence new artifacts and systems, chemical products or genetic test trials (Nelkin 
1979, Jasanoff 2011). Their work on sociotechnical and political constructions of 
technologies similarly refute instrumentalist frameworks, showing in addition that 
technical systems are not determinants of individual behavior and social institutions but 
rather subject to social, cultural and institutional designs (MacKenzie 1990, Pinch 1996, 
Bijker 1995). The empirical phenomenon of unintended consequences, to phrase it 
differently, is thus not in any way suggestive of technological determinism, the polar 
opposite of instrumentalism.  
The ultimate riposte against instrumentalist assumptions is that we have our most 
serious concerns with, more often than not, the lack of control, the breakdown of 
oversight, and unstable epistemologies underlying public reasoning and legal and 
political decision-making. Technological innovations are not easily reconcilable with 
conventional approaches that treat nation states as homogeneous actors. Neither do novel 
technologies simply function as resources for, or capabilities of, state power. It can be 
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concluded that maintaining a rationalist and state-centric vocabulary in IR must 
inevitably produce theoretical paradoxes. Even if we frame technologies so as to fit into 
an instrumentalist framework, we are confronted with conflicting evidence in defiance of 
theoretical explanations—a troubling experience that many scholars who council policy 
makers share. It is therefore not surprising that the sporadic engagement with 
technologies stands at odds with standard IR theories and conceptual notions. Theoretical 
schools and paradigmatic debates have either eschewed technologies as a subject matter 
or simply taken an instrumentalist stance, defining technologies as mute sources of state 
power (see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion). Presented with such impenetrable 
obstacles, I suggest taking a step back: why are the politics of technological innovations 
so hard to grasp? The inability to capture technological transformations in their diversity 
and scope as well as the aforementioned puzzling theoretical paradoxes require us to turn 
our attention, for a while, from theorizing to description. Perhaps we need to choose an 
entirely different methodological starting point and a different understanding of 
technology that encompass the complexity of the concept. The first question, then, is how 
to comprehend and collect empirical data about technological innovations anew. 
1.3 Human life transformed 
The simplest option to cope with the diversity of technological innovations is to fabricate 
a list of items as I did at the beginning of this introduction. Museums, encyclopedias, and 
databases contain huge quantities of artifacts and do not suffer from “lightness” (see 
Ferraris 2013). Catalogues and cataloguing are not trivial as knowledge apparatus. 
Diderot’s and d’Alambert’s monumental Encyclopedia reminds one that the work of 
collecting, filing, and forging taxonomies remains central for comprehending the 
multiplicity of reality (Creech 1982). Today, in the age of “big data”, such formations of 
knowledge are more than ever key to practices in business, science, and governance, 
though few people suggest a single universal “map” akin to what Diderot had in mind.10 
As such, lists, charts, and catalogues are indispensable for recognizing the sheer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Most databases are sectional, organized on the basis of semiotic categories, encompassing classifications 
of crops, germs, plants, cells, genetic material, languages, personal information, web content, images, credit 
accounts, traffic flows, the human genome, weather data, video footage, indigenous knowledge, patents, 
and so on. 
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magnitude, vastness, and pervasiveness of machines, tools, infrastructures, systems, 
components and devices that have become integral and unquestioned parts of our lives. 
Type of 
transformation 
Scientific 
revolutions 
Military 
revolutions 
Controver-
sies about 
technology 
Converging 
trends through 
technology 
clusters 
Enclosures Emerging new “actors” 
Example of 
technologies 
and processes 
Quantum 
science 
System 
theory 
Nuclear 
weapons 
Drones 
Cyber war 
Military 
robots 
Chemical 
weapons 
Acceleration 
Datafication 
Hybridization 
Commodifi-
cation of 
emissions 
Commodific
ation of deep 
sea materials 
Engineers, 
Hackers 
Simulation 
models  
Cyborgs 
TABLE	  1.1	  INDICATORS	  OF	  GLOBAL	  TECHNOLOGICAL	  TRANSFORMATIONS	  ©AUTHOR	  
An alternative option to describe technological transformations is to outline overarching 
trends and global evolutionary processes related to emerging clusters of technologies 
(Russel 1997). Table 1.1 offers a set of indicators and examples for the transformative 
effects of technological innovations. Archeologist Marcia-Anne Dobres understands 
technology as “an ongoing and unfinished process through which people, society and 
things weave (…) the meaningful conditions of everyday life” (2000, p. 4). New 
technologies inevitably have transformative aspects and unexpected ramifications. What 
is at stake lies in the fluid and ambiguous character of technology itself. Although 
technological innovations often build on prior existing artifacts and practices, the above 
mentioned processes are nonlinear and cannot be easily understood (Hughes 1991, 
Moldaschl 2010). Moreover, there is no single driving force or master variable; neither 
can a single causal factor explain them. On the other hand, artifacts or systems such as 
the Internet do not simply determine collective interactions or political institutions. “Most 
historians”, writes Thomas Hughes “consider a descriptive narrative that ignores the 
interacting technical, economic, political, and social components of technological change 
reductionist and distorting. New modes of research and presentation take the 
technological, or the sociotechnical, system rather than individual artifacts as the unit of 
study. Deterministic dynamos have given way to seamless-web systems.” (Hughes 1991, 
p.22) Theorists from diverse research fields and disciplines have, observing the 
emergence of technology clusters, conceptualized larger trends with variegated effects on 
all aspects of human civilization including automatization, urbanization, time-space 
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compression, electrification, commodification, digitalization, cyborgization, 
miniaturization, and datafication.11 
In The World is Flat, Thomas L. Friedman eloquently lays out the transformative 
effects of a set of interacting recent technological innovations. In what is a sweeping 
Schumpeterian account of creative destruction, Friedman explains that the convergence 
of technologies (that he coins “the tens flatteners”) with new business practices and the 
entrance of hundreds of millions of new entrepreneurs and corporations into world 
markets have produced a leveled playing field. Against his critics who point to the 
economic gaps between the traditional technologically leading countries and the 
emerging economies—not to mention other developing nations—Friedman argues that 
this “triple convergence” created a new economic reality that is barely captured by 
classical macro-economic indicators (Friedman 2009). 
Acceleration is another example of the combination of overarching trends of 
convergence. The growth rates in computer storage capacity, the output of technical 
applications, and the increase in scientific knowledge follow (grounded in Moore’s law) 
almost exponential trajectories (Kurzweil 2006). In the same vein, Philippe Morel’s work 
on “Computationalism” stresses that computers are not just traditional labor saving 
machines but “an ever expending block of both abstract knowledge and concrete physical 
(nanoscale) constructions, calling for more and more discoveries” (Bava 2012). Probing 
into the accelerating pace of life, Hartmut Rosa among others assumes that the very 
stability of our social and economic systems came to depend on constant acceleration. 
Politics, here, are turned into a “speed game” (Rosa and Scheuerman 2009). Social 
acceleration and a growing interconnection of technological systems have immediate and 
far-reaching implications. The current use of drones illustrates insights raised earlier by 
James Der Derian (1990): in order to document multiple “revolutions in military affairs”, 
the researcher has to come to terms with massive alterations in both the speed and the 
space of international politics (Beck and Crosthwaite 2007). Indeed, the technical shifts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See e.g. Dicken (2007), Hughes (1983), Pfaffenberger (1992b), Lemonnier (1992), Kaplan (2004), 
Feenberg (1999), Jasanoff (2004b), Jasanoff et al. (1995), Kaplan (2004), Hughes and Pinch (1987), 
Hackett et al. (2008), Cutcliffe and Mitcham (2001), Smith and Marx (1994), Bell (2000), Killick (2004), 
Aronowitz, Martinson, and Menser (2006), Gray (1995), and Dobres (2010). 
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from the air-age, to the nuclear age, and now to the drone- and cyber-age have immensely 
changed the shape of offensive and defensive strategies. This understanding stresses 
fundamental historical re-articulations of warfare and security (Freedman 2003, 
Manjikian 2012, C. H. Gray 2004, Sanger 2012).  
With the rise of the Internet, for instance, cyber security has suddenly become a 
highly dynamic issue of great power politics, national defense, and military strategy 
(Dunn Cavelty 2013, Lagerkvist 2010). At the same time, the proliferation and ubiquitous 
use of mobile devices and satellite based mapping services brought fourth, Benjamin H. 
Bratton suggests, the “unlikely compatibility” between Jihad and Google as in the case of 
the Mumbai bombings in November 2008 (Bratton 2009, p. 335). The creative 
application of technologies speaks to Manuel Delanda’s (1991) analysis, which puts the 
changing logistics of circulation, resource supply, and governing are at the core of 
military strategy and practices of violence. In sum, the network- and information 
technologies-based military revolution leads to a “blurring of almost every geopolitical 
dimension” (Ek 2000, p. 862). Imagined once erroneously as a network for liberating 
communication and free virtual exchange,12 the Internet is now dominated, in Ron 
Deibert’s words, by “black code”. An increasing criminalization and militarization of the 
Internet seems almost irresistible (Deibert 2013), while the blossoming industry of digital 
war games powerfully contributes to the idea of perpetual war fostering the normalization 
of a militarist culture (Power 2007). 
Long before the advent of the Internet, electronic media technologies in the service 
of mass propaganda and public relations have fundamentally changed public opinion and 
(global) political discourses as extensively examined in the works of Marshall McLuhan 
(1989) and Noam Chomsky (2002). High-speed transmission of images afforded constant 
real-time news coverage, transforming global power projection and framing of war and 
public politics:  
“Aside from the familiar technological innovations already recounted, I believe that IT has 
given rise to a new digital media based on a moving image of the world. In both senses of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 At the same time, former Liberal Democrat leader Lord Ashdown warned that the employment of 
surveillance technologies is “out of control” – undermining the very ideas of privacy and civil liberties 
(Hopkins and Taylor 2013). 
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the word, this multi-media is e-motive, a transient electronic affect conveyed at speed. At 
the emotional level, this means image-based sentiments of fear, hate, and empathy now 
dominant word-based discourses of ideas, interests, and power. At the electronic level, the 
speed of the transmission—with real-time currently the gold standard of media—matters as 
much as the content of the message. Paul Virilio, urban architect and social critic, has spent 
a lifetime demonstrating how this media-driven acceleration has produced what he calls an 
‘aesthetics of disappearance’, in which the political subject, be it the accountable leader, 
participatory citizen, the deliberative process itself, is diminished and quickly engulfed by 
a growing ‘infosphere’”. (Der Derian 2003, p. 444)  
Not only have all-encompassing simulation capacities and cyber networks added new 
domains within which international relations operate. The rapidly increasing influence of 
scientific expertise and experts on agenda-setting and decision-making also mirrors the 
transformative power of technologies (Haas 2004, Edwards 2006). Knowledge has been 
turned into a precious resource and tool for policy making both at the international and 
national level. In turn, the capacity to produce research results and simulations becomes 
important to the choices and influence of actors in international decision-making in all 
major policy fields (Sachs 1991, Hajer 2005). What is more, technologies themselves—
such as gigantic simulation models, super computers, or satellite-based navigation 
systems—become participants and agents in issue framing, decision making, and warfare 
on the national and global level (Miller 2004, DeLanda 1991, Luke 1994). In the 
emerging transnational fields of governance such as forest protection and management, 
climate mitigation, sustainability that get added to the existing policy fields of 
environmental and development policies, scientific expertise and complex technological 
measurements and monitoring is the sine qua non (Litfin 1999, Mayer 2012a).  
Yet understanding “expertise” requires an even more comprehensive analytical 
perspective. The vast globe-spanning infrastructure that has been built—and needs to be 
maintained—connects planetary ecosystems with data storage and digital information 
systems (Bratton 2015). It is a complex and constantly evolving entity that comprises 
physical infrastructures, digital protocols, and multiple interfaces connecting the earth’s 
surface with the sky, large computing power, programming, data storage, and 
interdisciplinary research practices (Edwards 2010, Ribes and Lee 2010, Bowker et al. 
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2010). As such, information infrastructure adds yet another layer to the previous 
technological systems and infrastructures from the nineteenth and twentieth century 
(Winseck and Pike 2007, Müller 2012). In short, our civilization is not merely depending 
on technologies. It is literally made of the intertwining and superimposing of software 
and hardware within global infrastructures such as channels, train systems, airports, 
electric grids, satellites, cloud computing and so on. As information and knowledge thus 
are never floating freely, they are never isolated from social, physical, and increasingly 
digital elements and carriers. The increase of algorithm-based high-speed financial 
transactions, in this sense, is an example of the trend of acceleration while it embodies 
this generic infrastructural interweaving. The merging of what is human and non-human 
on the one hand, and of the “real” and the “virtual” on the other, is most tangible through 
the enlargement and confluence of ubiquitous computing and virtually augmented 
realities present in warfare and metropolitan environments (Der Derian 2009, Graham, 
Zook, and Boulton 2012, Kendall 2004). 
While the transformative power of technologies domesticates the globe by 
mastering geographic distances, another crucial dimension lies in their involvement in 
processes of commodification. Marxist analysis especially stresses how technologies 
enable and intensify processes turning “raw materials” into goods for capital 
accumulation (MacKenzie 1984a, Clack and York 2005). With accelerating pace, new 
stuff is produced, consumed, and circulated: for instance, through global waste and 
recycling processes, as chemical particles in food, as manufactured products, and so on 
(Appadurai 1986, Jackson 1999, Castree 2004). The relentless introduction of new 
commodities, in turn, adds new components to the “world of stuff” (Leonard 2010) that is 
rendering our material civilization ever more complex. Academic research coupled with 
bureaucratic standardization and the global implementation of intellectual property rights 
plays a central role in the ongoing process of the commercial appropriation of what has 
been left of the natural environment (May 2009).13 Particularly, “smart” objects from cars 
and cell phones, to toothbrushes, e-readers and forks posses an incredible potential for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Science-based political solutions for global environmental problems such as CO2 emissions, 
deforestation, or biodiversity often lead to further commodification (Brand 2010, Methmann 2011, Stephan 
and Paterson 2012). 
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commodification of information about human activities: 
“Essentially, the ability to insert a sensor and an Internet connection into everything, 
including our body, makes it possible to commodify everything and to attach a price on the 
information generated in the context of its use. Sensors and ubiquitous connectivity help to 
create new, liquid markets in such information, allowing citizens to monetize self-
surveillance” (Morozov 2013) 
Finally, the fact that technological innovations often lead to fierce public controversies 
also indicates their deeply political nature. Technological controversies that happen 
despite a largely instrumental and technology-friendly public and academic discourse (cf. 
Forman 2007, Sveiby, Gripenberg, and Segercrantz 2012), leave visible traces 
illuminating the interests and concerns of differently-affected actors. In this line, chapter 
2 illuminates how novel weapon systems and infrastructure have remained essentially 
contested in their meanings and consequences. The evolving intellectual and practical 
apprehension of new technologies is not only relevant for defense and security, but also 
for energy and gene-technologies. Studying the forms of resistance against technological 
“progress” leads one to refute two misleading perspectives: on the one hand, Sachs 
(1991) and Escobar (1995) convincingly criticize development discourse because it 
systematically depoliticizes technologies under the ideological guise of economic 
development and social progress. On the other hand, scholars such as Vandana Shiva 
carve out how deterministic renderings of technologies silence the variety and legitimacy 
of public contestation.14 The mapping of technological controversies, hence, illustrates, 
against instrumentalist and determinist approaches, that concrete technologies are 
contingent upon various cultural influences and political rationalities. Temporary 
stability—or structures—is an effect of collective “bargaining” among human and non-
human actors while essential categories of life and humanness often had shifted (Latour 
2005, Jasanoff 2011, Barry 2012).15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The global extension of Western-style intellectual property rights prompts resistance, backlashes, and 
creative re-appropriations (May 2009). Shiva’s work (1994) exemplifies how the perspective of 
contestation, analytically, reveals the global politics and the networked power, which are involved in 
modern technologies.  
15 Another noteworthy approach, which will not be followed here, would be to rely on scenarios that 
simulate the breakdown of major technological infrastructures such as electricity supply of communication 
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The development of autonomous lethal military robots offers an interesting 
example of the destabilizing nature of technological controversies. As the Pentagon 
premiered the “first openly declared national policy for killer robots“ in 2012,16 the actual 
employment of semi-automatic weapon such as robots and drones, which increasingly 
complement or supplant human soldiers, has stirred fierce debates within the USA 
(Marchant et al. 2011). Meanwhile, both nongovernmental organizations (Human Rights 
Watch 2012) and the UN call for a strict ban against the development of “killer robots” 
(Crossette 2013). Even outspoken supporters of self-controlled weapon systems (or 
whole combat units) warn against a seemingly irresistible trend of dehumanizing warfare. 
Writes retired lieutenant colonel and military strategist Thomas Adams: 
“Once this progression of ever more capable machines began, the US armed forces, and 
those of other advanced countries, started down a road that will probably remove warfare 
almost entirely from human hands. (...) More and more aspects of war fighting are not only 
leaving the realm of human senses, but also crossing outside the limits of human reaction 
times. The effect of these trends is already being enhanced by the emergence of directed 
energy weapons with their capacity for engagement at the speed of light. In short, the 
military systems (including weapons) now on the horizon will be too fast, too small, too 
numerous, and will create an environment too complex for humans to direct. Furthermore, 
the proliferation of information-based systems will produce a data overload that will make 
it difficult or impossible for humans to directly intervene in decision making” (Adams 
2001, p. 2) 
At stake are the unmanageable intermingling of humans and robots on the one hand and 
the cyborgization of humans on the other are (Singer 2009). The understanding of the 
tactical and the strategic possibilities and consequences of these cutting-edge weapons is 
still very limited, whereas pressing ethical and political questions are already on the table 
(Asaro 2008, Jenks 2010).17 The very definition of war is changing: Peter Singer 
concludes that the use of inappropriate vocabulary signifies “we can’t yet conceptualize 
exactly what these technologies are and what they can do. It is also because their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
systems. The politics of technological breakdowns perhaps could be modeled to offer insights about real-
world dynamics. 
16 See http://thebulletin.org/us-killer-robot-policy-full-speed-ahead.  
17 A parallel controversy arose about the predominance of algorism-based computer trading that counts for 
up to 75 percent of stock market trading (Steiner 2012).   
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nonhumanity sums up their difference from all previous weapons. It is why their effect on 
war and politics is beginning to play out in such a new and revolutionary manner.” 
(Singer 2009, p. 430) 
If one takes these transformations into account, as well as their relevance for 
security, political decision-making, and governance, then it becomes clear that most 
standard explanations and models of IR are unable to capture their complexity. The fuzzy 
politics inherent to electricity grids, social networks, or virtual money leave an unsettling 
impression—entailing unpredictable interconnected processes, unorthodox linkages 
between all kinds of actors, and contradictory policy trade-offs. Even at a superficial 
glance, the puzzles arising from this can hardly be framed in dichotomies such as high 
versus low politics or state-market and state-society binaries. Not only do state-centric 
explanations seem inadequate, but even the distinction between humans and non-humans 
is called into question. Against this background, it becomes clear that the conceptual 
language and theoretical framework needed for technological innovations have to render 
intelligible, broadly speaking, hybrid processes of becoming, and should not privilege 
any actor in advance. 
1.4 Outline of the book 
My argument is structured into four consecutive components. The first part of the book 
(Chapters 2 and 3) advances a historical view of the connection between technological 
innovations and international relations. Chapter 2 utilizes the metaphor of “technological 
dramas” (Pfaffenberger 1992a) to further elucidate the paradoxes of technological 
innovations that spring from an IR point of view. By elaborating three puzzles it becomes 
obvious that both technological determinism and social constructivism cannot 
comprehend the ambiguous politics of technological innovations. The history of global 
power shifts, modern state formation, and twentieth century security practices 
demonstrate that emerging technologies are neither mute, passive instruments nor 
determinative forces but, can enable, constrain, or undermine social practices and the 
exercise of power. The puzzle of the “great divergence”, for instance, illustrates the 
process-character and long-term consequences of innovations. Their effects are 
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characterized by complex feedback loops and diffusion dynamics that are at the same 
time technical, political, commercial and cultural. The ability of governments to 
anticipate how certain technological innovations change warfare and security is almost 
nonexistent—not to mention the incapability to control weapons systems effectively from 
evaporating. Chapter 3 turns to eminent theorists such as Karl Marx, Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, and Harold A Innis who explained the elusive consequences of waves of 
technological revolutions in illuminating ways to inform theorizing agency and change 
within IR confines. 
The second part (Chapters 4 and 5) interrogates the “lightness” of IR. In Chapter 4, 
I trace how technological change, after a phase of intense attention paid to it during the 
1950s and 1960s, vanished from the radar of the discipline. It became, in what constitutes 
a unique drift away from other social sciences, inconsequential for theorizing in IR: 
neither established as an epistemic field commanding its specialist community, nor a 
distinct set of empirical concerns and theoretical assumptions. A close examination 
reveals that IR scholarship assigns technological innovations, if anything at all, a merely 
implicit or exogenous role. Subsequently, it is argued that the silence about technological 
innovation is not merely due to coincidental moves on the conceptual level but rather the 
result of the “Cartesian complex”—that is, a combination of logocentric bias at the 
ontological level, dualism at the conceptual level, and academic compartmentalization at 
the practical level explaining much of IR’s lightness. As a result, IR operates as a social 
science that deliberately excludes non-humans, materials artifacts, technologies, and 
hybrid modes of agency. Thereby a foundational neglect is perpetuated that legitimizes 
the discipline’s generic lightness. Despite a celebration of theoretical diversity, this 
‘monocultural’ condition has remained largely hidden because the foundational debates 
in IR were mostly preoccupied with the intricacies of epistemology. The fixation on 
men’s minds and ideas, and their arcane “social” interactions, norms and “discursive” 
articulations is well in line with a continental European philosophical tradition (Braver 
2007). It results in research designs that ignore the existence of materiality—material 
agency, technological practices, and the opalescent, networked emergence of bodies, 
artifacts, and ideas stressed by science studies. Only recently has the logocentric onto-
politics become disputed. Work on technological politics attempting to escape IR’s 
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ingrained Cartesian framework that follow the idea of “coproduction” are the most 
promising option to frame alternative theoretical puzzle. 
The third part of the book (Chapters 6 and 7), building upon historical materials 
and the literature review, turns to a fundamental level, pondering how to replace notions 
that render a ‘massless’ version of the world self-evident. Drawing on ontological and 
epistemological understandings from anthropology, innovation economics, and science 
studies, I put fourth a post-Cartesian meta-theoretical approach. This program of 
“explorative realism” does not primarily touch upon epistemological concerns, many of 
which have attracted undue attention during recent scholarly debates. What is at stake is 
rather the recognition of the limited ontological parameters of disciplinary thinking in IR. 
The question arises which onto-politics would enable us to capture, comprehend, and 
conceptualize transformative properties of technology. Hence, Chapter 6 highlights an 
explorative function of theories. Theories are, among other things, “foundational 
collectors” that enable researchers to discover uncharted territories rather than only 
“explaining” known puzzles. Only after the work of assembling—by means of 
ethnographic methods and foundational collectors—follows the theoretical 
comprehension of the distribution of agency and group formations. Against premature 
metaphysical closure, explorative realism hence challenges the philosophical foundations 
of the discipline that ultimately sustain and legitimize the lightness of IR. 
Epistemologically, scientific knowledge is not seen as an independent academic product. 
This view abandons correspondence models of scientific knowledge (that usually seek to 
establish causality or the objective constitution of social facts) and embraces the view 
that exploring, knowing and writing, in practice, is always related to collective activities 
within and outside the scientific community.  
This meta-theoretical move aims at linking two progressive hotspots within 
contemporary IR: On the one hand, it rallies for ontological expansion, specifically in 
terms of processes. Despite the work of James N. Rosenau, John Ruggie, and Patrick T. 
Jackson among others, the process-character of technological innovations is difficult to 
discern because much of the discipline—even when discussing changes and shifts—
relies, by and large, on stylized equilibrium models, static notions, and stabilized sets of 
actors. On the other hand, this book advances the agenda of a nuanced “materialism” in 
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studying global politics (Braun and Whatmore 2011, Connolly 2013, Squire 2014). In 
particular, making sense of the messy material landscapes implies transcending both the 
conventional logocentric bias and dualism. Under conditions of coproduction, the 
domains of reality that have been separated by the Cartesian tradition are reconciled; the 
technical, the natural, the cultural and the political apparently converge. Drawing, on STS 
(Mitchell 1998, Hecht 1998), the umbrella term of “techno-politics” replaces the binary 
opposition often invoked when IR conceptualizes technological agency (Mayer et al. 
2014a). The development of a post-Cartesian IR, in this sense, does not seek to strike a 
better balance between “material” and “ideational” factors,” as critical realists propose 
(Wight 2006). It rather subscribes to a monist view (Jackson 2011) in that technology is 
neither external to the construction and stabilization of political order, nor is “politics” 
and the interaction of political collectives comprehensible without its material 
components or technological mediation (Matthewman 2011, Law 2004, Jasanoff and Kim 
2015). 
Chapter 7 sets out a substantial program of ontological expansion that is at the heart 
of explorative realism. Revisiting the limitations of IR understandings of technological 
innovations, ontological expansion is made intelligible through a framework that maps 
theories (or rather “foundational collectors”) onto four quadrants: the first axis 
distinguishes between dualist and non-dualist approaches to IR. The second axis 
distinguishes between ontological notions with prefixed entities and levels versus 
ontological notions that stress emergence and stabilization of collectives. Approaches 
located in the “double mixed-zone”, which transcend both static assumptions and the 
mind-matter-dualism, are especially promising to explore technological innovations. The 
“double-mixed zone” is intended to support empirical research about processes of 
emergence and symmetrical inquiry into heterogeneous agencies (cf. Coole 2013, p. 465). 
It also embodies a relativist paradigm, implying that IR scholars avoid treating time, 
space, knowledge, artificial objects, and built environments as constants. Such a relativist 
commitment of explorative realism, then, allows for the discovery of new empirical 
landscapes and alternative puzzles about the politics of technological innovations and to 
develop a post-Cartesian.  
The fourth part (Chapters 8 and 9) operationalizes these meta-theoretical 
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considerations, suggesting a conceptual framework for the study of technological 
innovations. It outlines the notions of “assemblages” and “creative destruction” in order 
to capture the transformative effects of technological innovations. The former term 
signifies heterogeneous actor-networks entailing both humans and non-humans that have, 
as analytical units, a mid-range size. The latter conceptually sheds light on the ways in 
which technological innovations alter or destabilize prior group formations across all 
levels through interrelated processes. Employing a series of illustrative empirical cases, 
Chapter 9 outlines a three-part theoretical model consisting of assembling, reassembling 
and disassembling. In developing this tripatide model, I particularly draw on two 
theorists. With Joseph A. Schumpter, I stress the significance of human creativity, 
temporary monopolies, and non-linear shifts in the context of non-equilibrium changes. 
Complementarily, I employ sociologist Bruno Latour’s work on actor-networks and 
translation to acknowledge the need for a symmetrical methodology and a flat ontology 
to make sense of a collective agency always mediated by artifacts. 
Explorative realism, in sum, implies conceptual reconstruction writ large. To 
conceptualize creative destruction requires rearticulating central IR concepts such as 
power, authority and agency and offers novel socio-technical topologies, forms of 
knowledge and domination, accounts of emergence and disappearance. The very nature 
of technological innovation that involves controversies about group formations, agency 
and actuality explains some of the fundamental problems complicating comprehension. 
But questions of collective action, agential power, and the construction of political order 
do not simply “dissolve into thin air”. They rather turn into empirical questions for 
research. The idea of creative destruction does not only move one beyond disciplinary 
routines of IR scholarship. It also tries to uncover the unspeakable, especially in 
processes of disassembling where our conceptual apparatus are unable to express the 
ambivalent and elusive phenomena we encounter. 
From the outset, this undertaking constitutes a daunting task. Chapter 10 discusses 
the advantages of taking artifacts, technical system and the coproduction of order 
seriously within IR. In particular, it would not just render IR relevant as a critical 
“public” science, employing a strong sensibility to postmodern political concerns. It also 
opens up alternative research puzzles and conceptual tools, widening the one-sided 
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metaphysics of IR. However, such an endeavor inevitably leaves many traits untraced and 
posits novel questions without being able to answer or address them. In addition, the 
price that one must accept to pay for removing IR’s “lightness” is considerable. 
Acknowledging the complexity of technological associations cuts across conventional 
conceptual and meta-theoretical delimitations that are the firm ground upon which many 
IR theories and schools rest. Various concepts of IR theories are in need of refashioning. 
For example, the notion of assemblages requires an elaboration of the “productive” 
character of power beyond what has been attempted thus far. Disencumbered from its 
Weberian heritage, the term refers to the ability to “act in concert”, entailing as many 
actors and elements as empirically discernable, and creating not only subjectivities but 
giving rise to entire modes of existence. Similarly, to take materials seriously renders IR, 
even more than before, into a process-oriented effort of theorizing while it leads to 
alternative mappings of the world that may seem far-fetched. 
Yet I believe that this meta-theoretical stance of explorative realism offers a 
promise for theory building in IR. It supports a methodological move to recognize and 
explore the real multiplicity of the world. Against the inclinations of an “applied social 
science”, my considerations deliberately propose “grand” questions, touching upon the 
limitations of disciplinary knowledge production. In line with Michael Williams “willful 
Realism” (2005), explorative realism as a methodology is inherently critical to the extent 
to which it reveals how the preponderance of epistemological concerns translates into 
ontological closures disrespectful to the multiplicity of actors, agencies, and processes 
that perform world affairs. So, while it is not my goal to offer concrete policy 
recommendations or to immediately call for critical intervention, this research suggests 
de-emphasizing epistemological struggles within IR. 
Moreover, a symmetrical reading of world politics rejects, on the one hand, the 
various forms of technological determinism (see Hughes 1991, Wajcman 2002) that are a 
recurring feature of popular discourse, and avoids, on the other hand, the logocentric 
reductionism that still characterizes most IR literature. The model of creative destruction 
developed here opens up the material or heterogeneous forms of agency to empirical 
research and advances a distinctive way for IR to speak back to STS. This move also 
bears on the politics of knowing a technologically mediated world. If IR were to serve the 
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public good, it would be dangerously a-political then to treat technologies—as global 
technocratic, scientific, and bureaucratic elites with their yearning for “technological 
fixes” often tend to do—in a purely instrumental way. My research perspective sheds 
light on the negative sides of the popular hype with “disruptive technologies” (see 
Harvey 2006), while gesturing at options for democratic participation in decision-making 
processes concerning technological innovation—a pertinent issue that is increasingly 
crucial for global economic and environmental governance.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Beck (2012), Jasanoff (2003) and Demeritt (2006). 
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2. Global technopolitics: the drama with technological innovations 
This chapter explores how the transformative effects of technological innovations 
mentioned in the introduction are intimately connected with international and global 
affairs. In The Global Transformation, Barry Buzan and Geroge Lawson (2015) point out 
that massive technological and political changes have reconfigured the entirety of global 
politics during nineteenth century. Although this period of history has put into place the 
key aspects of current international relations, it has not been given much systematic 
though in IR. While Buzan and Lawson aim for conceptual simplicity and impose a 
systematic approach to study the effects of this great transformation, I follow here a 
different and more cautious path by employing the metaphor of “technological dramas”.  
The notion of “technological dramas” captures the characteristics of technological 
innovations: the interplay and mutual constitution of politics and technology—that is, 
global techno-politics—are complex and paradox processes to understand and theorize. 
For technological innovations display a high degree of fluidity and contingency. It 
implies that the implementation and the usage of technologies are not merely limited to 
overcoming technical obstacles or developmental gaps. The “drama” implies going 
beyond instrumentalist understandings: new techniques, instruments, machines, or 
weapon systems involve full-fledged political struggles, appropriations, counter-
significations and so on (Pfaffenberger 1992a). This is similar with the view of Marshall 
McLuhan and Bruce R. Powers (1989) who also stress that new technologies stay 
unpredictable because they may always have various counter-intuitive consequences: 
„What will the technology extend, enlarge or enhance? What will it erode or amputate? 
What will it reverse or flip into when pushed to its limits? What will the new technology 
retrieve that earlier technologies had rendered obsolescent?” (Duvall and Havercroft 2008, 
p. 771) 
After appreciating the sensibility for conceptual dichotomies (2.1), the drama of 
technological innovations is subsequently explored in four parts. Upon studying 
empirical cases and thematically organized three broader IR puzzles, I emphasize core 
characteristics of technologies on the one hand while interrogating varieties of 
technological determinism on the other. The paradoxes raised in the introduction are 
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thereby reexamined by interweaving historical and contemporary reflections about links 
between technological innovations and Europe’s hegemony as well as the emergence of 
the “great divide” (2.2), developmental policies by rising industrial powers (2.3), 
controversies about security, defense and warfare (2.4). These historical examples 
illustrate how practitioners and observers, just as scholars today, have faced immense 
difficulties in grasping the interplay between new technologies, power shifts, states, and 
security. They challenge the conventional wisdom of IR because technological 
innovations display an almost impenetrable ambivalence and dynamic throughout their 
evolution. In brief, the following subchapters set the stage for developing the analytical 
framework that put forward some basic considerations on what sort of conceptual toolbox 
may we will have been provided to replace dichotomist and determinist understandings 
without totally losing analytical rigor and explanatory strength. In order to clarify in 
which ways their theoretical vocabulary and conceptual approach escaped determinist 
models of thinking, Chapter 3 will come back to this theme and interrogate three classical 
theorists of socio-political and economic change.  
2.1 Technology and the material-social dualism 
As this chapter attempts to set out more clearly the actual difficulties for theorizing 
technological innovations, it probes into the reductionist enigma at the heart of all the 
involved political and philosophical controversies. It is contentious whether technology 
shapes, produces—if not determines—social institutions, interests, and norms, or vice 
versa. Indeed, the attribution of social change to technology (or its denial) has attracted 
scholarly attention for a long time and has provoked a vast ensemble of diverging 
arguments and debates in several social sciences (see Heilbronner 1994, Matthewman 
2011, Mitcham 1994). To navigate through this epistemic labyrinth is not easy. Usually, 
scholars in social science have distinguished between two larger groupings, each of 
which belongs to a distinct philosophical tradition: technological determinism on one side 
and social reductionism on the other (Hughes 1994, Bijker 1993, Fritsch 2011). In the 
following, these common philosophical positions are though confronted. I argue that this 
seemingly contradictive, yet mutually reinforcing and dichotomist constellation shall be 
renewed for reasons that become obvious below. 
	   46	  
“Technological determinism” comes in varieties. In general, it views the historical 
evolution of social formations and international power distribution as an expression of 
underpinning material conditions (Smith and Marx 1994, Deudney 2000a). Bimber 
(1994) distinguishes between three versions: Technologies cause or determine social 
relations (“hard determinism”). Or they constrain, enable or necessitate social relations 
(“soft determinism”). Finally, technological determinisms can also affect society as a 
form of powerful ideology that embraces technical changes as inexorable (“discursive 
determinism”). Social constructivist approaches, by contrast, construe technology (and by 
extension the entire range of material objects) as without direct effects upon society and 
politics. Intentional actors, rather, collectively assign functions to technologies, shape 
their properties, and utilize them for social purposes (cf. Woolgar 1991, Brey 2003).19 
The central tenet of social constructivism is that if technologies affect collective 
intentionality, meaning, or norms this is never due to their intrinsic qualities and always 
in a socially mediated manner, for example, through the attribution of symbolic meaning 
(Searle 1995, Collin 1997). 
Do we have to accept this common dichotomy and, hence, choose one side? The 
historical puzzles presented within this chapter support a different view. Highlighting the 
dynamic and elusiveness of emerging technology, the point is that these conflicting 
choices both are mistaken. Approaches reducing everything relevant to the “social” or the 
“technical” are similarly flawed. When we deconstruct the two specific forms of 
reductionism, their interconnection too becomes unearthed. Notably, both camps have 
fundamental notions in common. At stake is the deep-seated sociological distribution 
“between people on the one hand, and machines on the other. Or between 'social 
relations' or 'social structure' on the one hand, and the 'merely technical' on the other.” 
(Law 1991b, p. 8) Our conundrum therefore consists in finding appropriate conceptual 
tools that do not rely on a dualist matrix.20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Radical constructivists even do not view technological artifacts as instrumental. They rather claim that 
material and social reality totally depends on intellectual or textual acknowledgement (see Chapter 3). 
20 Scrutinizing alternative abstractions is therefore not identical with denying the need for theoretical 
abstraction in general. I believe that we can and should abstract from history and the empiric world we 
explore. It follows that a certain degree of reductionism makes sense, however flexible and open our 
concepts may be. Otherwise we would agree to completely abandon explanatory rigor (cf. Bijker 1993, p. 
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“Sociologists (...) tend to switch registers. They talk of the social. And then (if they talk of 
it at all which most do not) they talk of the technical. And, if it appears, the technical acts 
either as a kind of explanatory deus ex machina (technological determinism). Or it is 
treated as an expression of social relations (social reductionisms). Or (with difficulty) the 
two are treated as two classes of objects which interact and mutually shape another.” (Law 
1991b, p. 8) 
According to John Law, this unbridgeable divide stems from “the absence of a method 
for juggling simultaneously with both the social and the technical.” (Law 1991a, p. 8) It 
is precisely the theoretical abyss between the “social” on the one hand, and “technology” 
on the other, that the usual categorical order presupposes—and then leaves 
unexamined—is the location where this investigation directs the research focus. Of 
course, Law exaggerates in making the distinction so sharp. It does not fully cover 
scholarly diversity as different types of technological determinism such as “hard” and 
“soft” approaches can be distinguished. In addition, many scholars aim at partly leveling 
the playing fields between machines and humans, an issue I will revisit below. 
Nonetheless, most social science approaches to technology and particularly within IR are 
shaped by the division between an inanimate machine or natural world governed by 
causality and the subjective domain of human activities. This divide and the Cartesian 
complex of determinism, externalism and logocentrism (see Chapter 3) 21  that has 
hampered IR’s comprehension of technological innovations are mutually reinforced. 
2.2 European dominance, path-dependencies and global flows 
This section reconstructs the technological dramas that evolve around the puzzle of a 
large-scale power shift, the ascent of European empires. It thereby sheds light on three 
main characteristics of global techno-politics: complex path-dependencies, dynamic, non-
linear flows and feedback cycles, and the real yet contingent power effects of different 
technologies for the expansion and competition among European empires. To begin with, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128). But, as will be argued throughout this thesis, to retain enough analytical sensibility is absolutely 
paramount in this regard. 
21 This commonality also points to another chasm which is discussed in Chapter 5: the fundamental 
distinction that springs from dualist understandings of ontology and monist forms of ontology (see Wight 
2006, Jackson 2011). 
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many historians, sociologists, and economists came to understand that technology figured 
a central factor within global power shifts and divergent socio-economic trajectories 
across societies.22 Most of them, however, have not agreed upon explanations of how and 
to which extent novel technologies have shaped historical events, and the rise of Europe 
in particular. For instance, Jared Diamond’s, Germs, Guns, Steel attempts to explain 
power differences. He pictures various technologies as significant for diverging societal 
developments: military and maritime technology, centralized political organization, 
written information and archived knowledge are, to him, “proximate factors, which also 
enabled modern Europeans to conquer people and other continents” (Diamond 1999, pp. 
80-81). Ultimately, however, technical differentials and technological gaps, according to 
Diamond’s analysis, are due to geographical and environmental conditions. 
Many scholars do not agree with this understanding. Europe’s superior 
technological trajectory, in their view, is not just ephemeral, ultimately stemming from 
favorable geographical factors akin to a geopolitical notion of longue durée.23 Against 
structuralist explanations, they trace the principal causes of Europe’s comparative 
advantages to ingenious individuals and pluralistic societies that were mastering natural 
science, empirical research and progressive inventions. The central point advanced by 
these authors is that the achievement of technological leadership ultimately explains 
Europe’s later ascent to a dominant position (Ferguson 2011, Mokyr 2002, Goldstone 
2009, Allan 2009, Landes 1969, Parker 1988). This view, of course, is not new. It mirrors 
the prevailing discourse of the nineteenth century when Europeans referred to India, 
China and Africa as backward regions (Adas 1990, pp. 153-210). Technological 
innovations and scientific artifacts figured as the most powerful indicator of this 
asymmetry.  
“European observers came to view science and especially technology as the most objective 
and unassailable measures of their own civilization’s past achievement and present worth. 
In science and technology their superiority was readily demonstrable, and their advantages 
over other people grew at an ever increasing pace. This was particularly true after Europe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See e.g. Sombart 1911, Schumpeter 1934/2008, Landes 1969, Cipolla 1967, and Innis 2007, Headrick 
2009, Hugill 1999. Roland (1993) discusses the recent renaissance of historical appraisals of the crucial 
role played by technological changes for historical developments. 
23 See Kinser (1981, p. 67). Braudel’s framework will be discussed in more detail in 3.1. 
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and its North American progeny entered a new phase of industrial development based on 
steel, electrification, and chemical production in the last decades of the nineteenth century. 
Prominent social theorists and policymakers drew varying, often conflicting, conclusions 
from the undeniable fact of Europe’s material mastery and its concomitant global 
hegemony, but few disputed that machines were the most reliable measure of humankind.” 
(Adas 1990, p. 134) 
So, can we explain the expansion of European empires merely by their superior 
technologies? It is safe to say that the “prime movers” of at least 200 years of global 
economic integration (and domination) have been invented and commercialized in 
Europe and the United States (Smil 2010), although, as will be discussed in a minute, 
European innovators indeed have greatly benefited from imported knowledge. Among 
the most impressive inventions that have been employed in modern Europe are 
shipbuilding, mechanical clocks, steam and gas engines, global communication networks, 
aircrafts and electric power systems (Headrick 1991, Rosenberg, Landau and Mowery 
1992, Nickles 2003). Long before the scientific and industrial revolutions, Europeans had 
already seized the technical edge in shipbuilding and artillery. Carlo Cipolla pictures in 
his magisterial work Guns, Sails and Empires the Caravels and Galleons with their 
powerful canons as the crucial instruments that enabled rapidly expanding colonial 
empires via sea. At the same time, European land armies were repeatedly defeated, for 
instance, by Indians or the Ottoman Empire, showing Europe’s still only partial 
advantage (Cipolla 1967).  
It is important to notice that Cipolla’s narrative does not confirm an instrumentalist 
understanding of technology. Assuming merely the application of devices makes little 
sense if one considers the daunting challenges at that time. Portuguese sailors, for 
example, could not have solved the most daring navigational challenge, the passage down 
the south Atlantic passing Cape Bojador, by using the superior firepower of their 
Galleons. This innovation rather required a fascinating networking process that lumped 
together shipbuilding, sailing skills, navigational practices, the enactment of rivaling 
spatialities and “fluid technologies”, not to mention immense courage (Law 1987, 2002). 
Against this networking process, linear-determinist accounts of Europe’s ascent, not 
surprisingly, are manufactured on shaky epistemological grounds.  
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The main reason is the elusiveness of why and how inventions occur and 
innovations cluster locally. Although they have undeniably lasting and powerful 
consequences, the majority of individual innovative developments made sense only in 
retrospect. Preexisting “demand” was only in very few cases the origin of innovative 
activities, whereas the opposite is the rule. Inventions that turned out to have 
groundbreaking implications, or to yield huge profits, such as for instance the steam 
engine, light bulbs, the combustion engine, long-distance communication, and so on, 
were initially often deemed economically adventurous. In addition, numerous inventions 
faced fierce political, religious or social opposition (Mokyr 2002, Usher 1954). In sum, 
technological progress has not occurred in a linear fashion and does not display recurrent 
patterns. Simple explanations for innovational dynamics are thus implausible (Mokyr 
1990, Pomeranz 2000), while the non-linear features of technological innovation 
challenge linear narratives that link Europe’s ascent to technological mastery. 
To put it differently, explanations for innovations are thus mostly restricted to the 
ex-post facto mode. The peculiar nature of novelty renders anticipative impact 
assessment of innovations impossible as a matter of principle (Witt 1996, p. 124). For the 
magnitudes and peculiarities of an invention’s political and social effects are often 
emerging unexpectedly. Innovations have often opened up a new world that only few 
have entertained in their wildest dreams and speculations. The history of petroleum—
often seen by scholars as seminal example of the global impact of technological change 
(Buchan 1972)—is a case in point. Its pioneers kept a “low profile”, as Daniel Yergin 
notes in the The Prize, for they preferred concealing that they were “involved in so 
speculative a venture.” Actually, nobody could have foreseen the cascade of scientific 
and commercial innovations, which led to a development that today predominates our 
societies, economies and politics (Mitchell 2011, Mayer and Schouten 2012). In the 
1850s, very few people imagined large oil deposits beneath the surface; very few saw in 
“rock-oil” the coming source for illuminating the world’s home and factories; very few 
understood that “drilling” rather than “digging” was the way to exploit crude oil; many 
were opposed to pipelines in the 1880s; nobody seriously considered petroleum as fuel 
for combustion engines in cars before 1900; in 1911, Churchill had to be convinced to 
shift the British fleet from coal to oil; at the start of World War II, few foresaw the 
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central role of petroleum; the US military did not even have records of its oil use 
supplies; by the end of the war, the US oil production was up from 40,000 barrels per day 
to 514,000 barrels per day of high quality 100-octane. By then, various technical 
innovations had helped to meet a “demand” that was simply inexistent prior to the first 
“war of motion” (Yergin 1993, pp. 19-113; 153-156; 382-384). Later, however, US oil 
production was in decline for decades despite constantly rising demand. 
The sequence of the discovery, the exploitation, and the usage of petroleum 
illustrate the restricted explanatory power of “demand models”. Most innovations, 
regardless whether incremental or radical, did not stem from preexisting needs. Yet, as 
Wiebe E. Bijker’s work on the decades-long formation of bicycles and light bulbs shows, 
these innovations require a group of social engineers to envision and pave the way for 
their actual use. During a process, they eventually have “created” their economic 
necessity as well as new social practices (Bijker 1997, Bijker and Law 1992). 
Analytically, such a historical understanding also multiplies the assumed motivations of 
innovative behavior. Myriads of different motivations for innovation are possible, while 
pressing demand structures, profit incentives, or technical lacks can neither force nor 
constrain innovations to become real. Theoretically speaking, the often contra-factual and 
stubborn agency of innovators (and pioneer users) is a crucial aspect of techno-dramas. 
It is contested as to which explanations for the origins of technological innovations 
follow from their contingent occurrence and sequence. If we reason to one extreme, we 
could claim that success of inventions is coincidental. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1956), for 
example, proposed that the breakthrough of technological developments and 
consequential societal transformations couldn’t be attributed to certain cultures (or races). 
Regardless of their whereabouts they would have developed essentially along familiar 
lines: “We can therefore be sure that, if the industrial revolution had not begun in North-
Western Europe, it would have come about at some other time in a different part of the 
world” (Lévi-Strauss 1956, p.152). On the contrary, others claim that the uniqueness of 
local conditions is absolutely pivotal for inventions to be put into practice and to gain 
momentum. As such, technological innovations require peculiar legal, economic, and 
cultural settings in order to materialize and, in turn, to become powerful enablers of 
social change up to the scale of industrial revolutions (Pomeranz 2000). 
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By implication, and going beyond a set of environmental conditions, we can also 
differentiate between, on the one hand, the path-dependency of specific types of 
technologies, which clearly exists as the accumulation of technological innovations 
cumulatively builds on earlier stages of the same or related technologies. Path-
dependency, in this context, is understood as co-evolution of technological systems and 
artifacts.24 On the other hand, the existence of other, previous unrelated, technological 
systems, applications, and artifacts is also an important precondition (Mitchell 2009, 
Misa 1994, p. 122). For example, while the proliferation of automobiles often preceded 
the necessary traffic infrastructure, leading to high death tolls and traffic jams, the “car” 
is only fully realized with the extension of highways, streets, cheap fuel and a 
comprehensive availability of gas stations and repair shops (Volti 2008). 
The effects of path-dependency, however, are limited. The state of existing 
technologies is a necessary stage for new inventions, yet not a sufficient one (Ayres 1961, 
Lawson 2008). Against expectations of incrementalism, innovations and their complex 
interactions and entanglements are often evolving abruptly. Inventor and futurologist Ray 
Kurzweil (2006) sees their pace even accelerating and partly exponential in momentum. 
Indeed, the entire process of creative destruction (which is elaborated in Chapter 9) 
hardly follows an undetermined and thus incalculable path. In fact, another crucial 
limitation of path-dependency is that a technological progress is not inevitable so as a 
technological superiority is neither irreversible.  
In this line, the case of the China empire has provoked Joseph Needham’s famous 
question of why a society, given its highly advanced development stage during the Tang, 
Song, and Ming Dynasties, did not turn into a hotbed of industrialization and scientific 
revolution (Landes 2000, Perdue 2006). After all, it would have been much expected that 
global travelers such as Marco Polo or Ibn Battuta between the thirteenth and fifteenth 
centuries could arguably strike the industrial revolution in Imperial China, which at then 
had a long record as a technological frontrunner and produced far more advanced 
weapons, transport techniques and astronomic and medical knowledge as well as strong 
engineering and science (Mokyr 1990, pp. 209ff.). But, despite China’s earlier 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Many scholars point to commonalities between technological and biological evolution (Mokyr 1990, p. 
283, Lem 1981, pp. 25ff). 
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technological edge, European empires, trading companies and later nation-states have 
managed to catch up and, employing their superior weapons for example during the 
Opium war, even achieved a dominant military position. 
We need to be cautious for, to the extent that technological catch-ups are reversing 
earlier technological dominance, they are always embedded in global flows and feedback 
processes. In this vein, recent scholarships qualified the premises of Needham’s problem; 
they rejected a simplistic narrative that reduces Europe’s technological trajectory to a 
linear matter, as Europe’s emerging scientific and technical hegemony was a messy 
process. Andre Gunder Frank stressed, in contradiction to euro-centric perspectives, that 
western exceptionality and superiority has not unfolded with a preordained trajectory 
(Frank 1998, see also Goldstone 1993, Watson and Bull 1984). To begin with, well into 
the eighteenth century, Europeans had a hard time integrating into a then Asian-
dominated global trade system because of economic and technical gaps.25 While getting 
wealthy through the exploitation of abundant resources and cheap labor from the 
Americas, European merchants and the first joint stock companies experienced worrying 
trade deficits with their Asian counterparts up until the eighteenth century. The reason 
was that artists, mines and manufacturers had—aside from silver and mechanical 
clocks—few products at their disposal that were interesting to foreign consumers and 
sophisticated enough to prevail on Indian, Arab, Japanese, or Chinese consumer 
markets.26 As a consequence, the French, Spanish and British rulers erected trade barriers 
to slow down the imports of Asian textiles, silk and other manufactured goods (Adas 
1990, pp. 26ff., Cipolla 2011, pp.100ff.).  
On a larger perspective, the European continent remained a backwater until the late 
eighteenth century. European economies remained technologically and institutionally 
inferior compared to subregions in India, Imperial China or even Southeast Asia where 
vibrant centers of manufacturing, trade, and craftsmanship were thriving. For instance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Inside Europe, already by the end of the fourteenth century, the innovative abilities had shifted from the 
Mediterranean area to middle European kingdoms and city-states, as observers warned the Byzantine 
emperor of a growing technological margin (Cipolla 2011, p. 24). 
26 This does of course not mean that European craftsmanship was generally inferior. Instead, as Zilsel 
(2000) has pointed out, without sophisticated European craftsman, professionals and manual labor, no 
modern science could have come alive. Yet until the eighteenth century most European products remained 
excluded from “global markets” except in the Americas. 
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drilling technology had been used for over fifteen hundred years in China, but was 
largely unknown outside. It was only imported to Europe around 1830 (Yergin 1993, p. 
25). The British Navy copied Indian missile technology in order to apply it for the attack 
on Copenhagen in 1807 (Fridlunt 2011). Even the rise of modern capitalism was not 
solely confined to Europe since both India and China had enormous capitalist enterprises, 
advanced manufacturing, and cutting edge technologies (Frank 1998, Das Gupta 1994, 
Pomeranz 1993). Neither did the retreat of Chinese fleets after Admiral Zhenghe’s 
voyages end Chinese maritime dominance in Asia.27 The European attempts to colonize 
the “East Indies” were at first uneasy enterprises. “Conquer”, as Fernand Braudel put it, 
“is too strong a word. Very often, they were not even able to trade on equal terms.” 
(Braudel 1992b, p. 221) In short, the exploration of how Europe’s technological 
preponderance has occurred demands a truly global approach.  
This complicates linear accounts of the early expansion of European empires. If 
homegrown ingenuity and indigenous scientific progress plays a role, then the 
technological rise of Europe must be seen primarily as a consequence of transcontinental 
flows of expertise and techniques. Most indefatigable, Braudel pictures the constant ebb 
and flow of “world economies”, areas of intense exchange that, as it particularly was the 
case with the Mediterranean, "bestrode the political and cultural frontiers”. He contends 
that “the economy, all-invading, mingling together currencies and commodities, tended to 
promote unity of a kind in a world where everything else seemed to be conspiring to 
create clearly-distinguished blocs.” (Braudel 1992c, p. 22) In fact, a continuous process 
of mutual learning was the rule—including the diffusion of technologies between cultures 
and societies across the globe, which our current imagination perceives as separated, or at 
least not well connected (Cipolla 1965, Braudel 1992a, pp. 385ff). 
Scientific and philosophical knowledge traveled directly from Arabic civilizations 
to the relatively backward kingdoms and Italian city-states, igniting early European 
research and humanistic philosophies and enabling the enlightenment movement. Arabic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The Dutch East Indian Company, for instance, lost its profitable colony Zeelandia on the island of 
Taiwan. Dutch troops had to retreat to Batavia because of a crushing defeat against Chinese forces under 
the command of pirate-turned-admiral Koxinga in 1667. On an equally weak footing lived the Portuguese 
settlement in Macao, which was absolutely dependent on the permission of and food supplies by Chinese 
Imperial authorities (Andrade 2011). 
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philosophers, mathematicians and technicians, who for centuries incorporated ancient 
Greek philosophy, sciences and know-how, were far more sophisticated in terms of 
navigation, math, astronomy, irrigation, or urban infrastructure for a long period (Freely 
2009). The same can be said about Sino-European exchanges. On the one hand, several 
Jesuits had become leading figures at the Imperial court in Beijing in charge of the 
Chinese calendar; on the other hand, Chinese artwork, gardening techniques, textiles, and 
architecture had been eagerly imported by European elites. The latter appreciated the 
two-way communication with the Ming Empire for mutual benefits. For instance, 
German philosopher Gottfried W. Leibniz, publishing his Novissima Sinica in 1697, saw 
the middle kingdom as a highly developed civilization with thriving philosophy, technical 
expertise, and superior political organization (Lach 1945, Perkins 2004). 
The transatlantic explorations of Portuguese and Spanish conquistadores, 
merchants, and missionaries were quite different from the relatively selective and short-
lived Sino-European encounters. They brought yet another twist in terms of technological 
progress as both consequence and facilitator of colonial expansion. The collection, 
systematization, and dissemination of knowledge about non-European cultures, societies, 
and environments spurred multiple philosophical and scientific responses. Novel 
collaborative practices within empirical science, engineering, and governance emerged 
from challenges of infrastructural projects in the Americas, spreading to other research 
institutions (Bleichmar et al. 2009, Barrera-Osorio 2010). The application of academic 
systems of knowledge—sometimes in form of “cultural manuals”—were also hugely 
influential in colonial societies for they often underpinned the production of new 
ethnicities, classes and other social cleavages. Meanwhile, European publics and elites 
largely came to understand their distinctiveness and historical mission through the prisms 
of “Orientalism” (Said 1976)—of which different registers had, as mentioned above, 
technological differences at their core.  
Obviously, it was not merely military superiority that had led to the dominance of 
European colonial powers and later Japan and the US (Howard 1984, Headrick 1979, 
Buzan and Lawson 2015). The modern sciences and engineering involving the 
construction of technological systems, the production of expertise, and the use of novel 
technical artifacts were at the heart of the colonial (and imperial) enterprises (Palladino 
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and Worboys 1993, MacLeod 2000, Mizuno 2009). Inevitably, “western scientific 
knowledge has been co-constituted with colonialism” in many ways (Seth 2009, p. 274). 
It is often overlooked, though, that through these expanding networks, technologies and 
practices moved in both directions. Long before the European powers created 
international organizations to facilitate industrial processes and enable technological 
infrastructures (Murphy 1994), this two-directional traffic had begun not only 
fundamentally altering the lives of Amerindians and colonial elites, but also 
transforming, for example, the territorial practices and sovereignty discourses of 
“international” relations on the European continent.28  
To sum up, technological innovations are in multiple and complex ways related to 
the historical rise and demise of civilizations, to power shifts among empires, and to the 
current distribution of power and prosperity amongst core and periphery states. The 
global dominance of European powers rests upon a large technological infrastructure and 
technological superiority (Buzan and Lawson 2015, pp. 67ff). But historical evidence 
suggests that path-dependency can be qualified in two important ways: first, 
technological innovations have not, strictly speaking, determined the outcomes of power 
shifts; neither have they singled-handedly caused economic divergence. Second, 
technologies as such have never functioned as mere instruments but emerge from various 
global flows and lead to unexpected interactions. Typically vested in a mutative 
performance, they were anything but easily controllable tools at the hands of conquerors, 
statesmen, or entrepreneurs. Clearly, to make sense of these developments from an IR 
perspective we need to refine conceptual lenses through which we understand 
technological aspects of power shifts in international politics. But we have first to 
broaden our understanding of the relationship between technological innovations, 
authority and state regulation. After all, the question why the Europeans have not just 
managed to catch-up, but become champions of technological innovation needs further 
elaboration. This, then, involves the co-constitution of technological innovations and 
modern statehood. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For detailed discussions of the “peripheral” sources of European modernity see Jahn (2000), Branch 
(2012) and Anderson (1996). 
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2.3 Modern states, creative destruction and developmental policies 
The following empirical puzzle highlights the complex and intimate interplay between 
modern state formation and cycles of technological innovations. The technological drama 
unfolds through unsolvable tensions between the enormously difficult efforts of modern 
states in fostering, governing, and harnessing technological innovations on the one hand, 
and the social and political consequences of the maelstrom of modernization that 
recurrently reshuffles the socio-technical fabric of society on the other. Innovation 
processes, in addition, put firms and entrepreneurs in the driver seat, while state agencies 
often only can respond to non-linear processes that remake the very economic patterns 
and technological structures with which state power is entangled—sometimes over night 
(Chandler 1977). What renders our understanding of states so precarious, in brief, is their 
intricate entanglement and historically specific co-constitution with evolving 
infrastructures, techniques of calculation and measurement, and social technologies 
(Foucault 2007, Scott 1998). 
The intractably close connection between the “state” and technological innovation 
is a particularly modern appearance (Oakeshott 1975). As van Crefeld (1999, p. 377) 
concludes: “the rise of the state is inseparable from that of modern technology.” 
Scientific and economic rationality increasingly overrode religious beliefs as the 
foundation of political legitimacy. At the dawn of the Enlightenment era scholars, 
engineers and craftsmen began to cooperate in order to collectively work on machines, 
and to understand as well as to control nature (Zilsel 2000). From another angle, 
Anderson (1996, p. 41ff.) shows how the use of the printing press, and consequently the 
proliferation of books and newspapers as the first truly modern mass products, has 
changed the inter-subjective perceptions of belonging. At the same time, nascent 
European nation states became occupied with ‘social order’, which became a top-down 
project of deliberate engineering. States, in turn, were shaped and reproduced, among 
others, by jurisprudents, natural scientists, and different technical experts including their 
calculations, laws, and principles working towards the realization of a rational 
organization of the entire society (Bauman 1991, Scott 1998). Enlightenment sciences 
and technologies were constitutive for the manner in which societies, landscapes and 
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places became simultaneously both manufactured and governed in modern Europe, with 
the effect that states emerged as an outcome of “of heterogeneous practices that 
objectified and invested socio-corporeity and socio-material space.” (Carroll 1996, p. 
162)  
This unfolding co-constitution of technological and social order also became the 
paramount focus for scores of sociologists and historians. Their assessments of its 
consequences have produced widely different viewpoints. Technical expertise and 
technological devices were, according to Max Weber (1964, pp. 716ff.) the decisive 
advantage of modern bureaucratic forms of rule over all others. He diagnosed the related 
process of instrumentalist rationalization—a defining aspect of modernity—as having 
resulted in living conditions, which he circumscribed with the metaphor of the “iron 
cage” (Scaff 1989). By this Weber refers to the practice of increasing central control and 
calculation—namely, a social order “bound to the technical and economic conditions of 
machine production, which today determine the lives of all the individuals who are born 
into this mechanism.” (Weber 1958, p. 181) The impression, which Weber advanced, 
indicates the inescapable totality produced by technological modernization.  
Students of innovation stress, contrary to this view, the enormous uncertainty and 
openness involved in innovative processes, challenging the assumption of iron totalities. 
Even if the innovation of new machines, devices, and organizational modes of production 
is conditioned by prior existing technologies, among other things, the involved process as 
a whole leads to often unexpected and large-scale restructuring of economic 
arrangements and social circumstances. This fluidity that defied determinism is what Karl 
Marx’s singled out when he emphasized the evolving social chaos and upheavals during 
industrial modernization. His gloomy vision captured the turbulent personal experience 
of modernizations: 
“Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all relations, 
everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier times. 
All fixed, fast-frozen relationships, with their train of venerable ideas and opinions, are 
swept away, all new-formed ones become obsolete before they can ossify. All that is solid 
melts into air, all that is holy is profaned (…)” (Marx, Communist Manifesto, p. 338, cited 
in Berman 2010, p. 95) 
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Joseph Schumpeter went a step further, claiming that the historic flow of innovations is 
the real essence of capitalism for it created a process of “creative destruction,” which was 
the engine of economic development. In line with Marx, Nietzsche and Sombart, he 
stressed the primacy of processes (Elliot 1980, Reinert and Reinert 2006). This dynamic 
understanding led Schumpeter to refute static, equilibrium presumptions about economic 
activities such as those embodied in the models by Smith and Ricardo. Instead, especially 
“revolutionary changes” constitute the actual “problem of economic development” 
(Schumpeter (1934, p. 63).  
“Development in our sense is a distinct phenomenon, entirely foreign to what may be 
observed in the circular flow or in the tendency towards equilibrium. It is spontaneous and 
discontinuous change in the channels of the flow, disturbance of equilibrium, which 
forever alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing.” (Schumpeter 1934, 
p. 64) 
Schumpeter assumed that the dynamic of creative destruction, by virtue of its own 
success, would stop the evolution of capitalist civilization as a whole. According to his 
logic, constant revolutions of economic structures, in turn, are slowly eroding the 
political and legal institutions—in Schumpeter’s (1947, pp. 131ff.) language the 
“protective political strata”—that, necessarily, must be in place to leave room for 
entrepreneurs who translate inventions and ideas into profitable business. Whereas this 
prediction has not materialized, Schumpeter’s broader points hold some truth. Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012, pp. 76ff.) concluded that politically and economically “inclusive” 
institutional settings remain the key to economic progress. Their study of economic 
performance in over hundred countries, informed by Schumpeter’s ideas, showed that the 
absence of extractive elites and the permissive social institutions, allowing for creative 
destruction largely determined wealth inequalities among nations over the long term 
(Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti 2006). The global comparison also revealed, perhaps, it 
is less European ingenuity that was unique rather than the cultural and political 
conditions of permissiveness for the application of novel techniques or procedures 
(Vanberg 1992). 
There is an interesting paradox here. Schumpeterian accounts granted a central role 
to the human creativeness and the individual ability to “get things done”—in accordance 
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to Schumpeter’s phrase. Yet, “technological determinism” arguably acted at the same 
time as the most powerful ideology, buttressing the process of creative destruction. For it 
rendered “the artifacts of technological innovation (…) to signify progress, as well as the 
ever-receding goals towards which we are said to be progressing.” (Smith 1994, p. 38) 
Writes historian Joel Mokyr: 
“To create a world in which ‘useful’ knowledge was indeed used with an aggressiveness 
and a single-mindedness that no other society had experienced before was the unique 
Western way that created the modern material world. It is this useful knowledge that first 
unlocked the doors of prosperity and threw them open (…) Even today resistance to and 
concerns about technology are still rampant, but the institutional setup of the world is such 
that holdouts that reject modern technology or cannot adopt it will eventually have to 
change their minds and somehow limp through the doorway.” (Mokyr 2002, p. 297) 
Here it raises a complicated question: if, in the modern world, technological innovations 
are not only nearly irresistible but also largely carried out and shaped by private 
economic actors, what does this mean for the narrative of state-led development? For 
instance, the difficulties to predict trajectories of innovational dynamics hamper the 
ability, by companies and nations, to secure technological leadership. Conversely, late-
developing states possess real chances to catch-up, although state agencies cannot simply 
engineer economic development. Because the evolution of technological innovation is 
not simply linear, unfolded in global production networks, and is driven by transnational 
companies (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000, Breznitz 2010, Dicken 2007). In short, no 
ready-tailored toolbox approach exists that guaranties innovation-based growth.  
 The enormous success of Germany, the US, Japan, and the Soviet Union is 
indicative for institutional diversity. These countries surpassed Great Britain based on the 
very different national “systems” or “cultures” (Nelson 1993, Hall and Soskice 2001). 
Drawing the lessons from success and failure, it becomes clear that governments cannot 
merely unleash technological innovation as they please, because the historical and sector-
specific global environments are instable, hard to predict, and constantly evolving (see 
Breznitz 2007). In addition, the moving “technological frontier” is another important 
reason for the increasing divergence of economic policies (Fagerberg and Verspagen 
2002). Fagerberg and Srholec argue that, 
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“it is asserted that [development] is mainly a question of successfully ‘westernising’ the 
political system, e.g., adapting to the institutional arrangements that have proved to be 
successful in the United States and other western democracies. This study (…) finds the 
support for these assertions to be rather weak. On the contrary we show that it is among the 
richer economies that a political system of the Western type is shown to be conducive to 
growth. For the poor countries it is, if anything, the other way around. In fact, among the 
countries that over the years have succeeded in catching up there are several examples of 
countries with institutional arrangements that differ a lot from western ideals.” (Fagerberg 
and Srholec 2008, p. 1427) 
Consider for a moment the discussions in the nineteenth century. During the golden age 
of liberalism, commentators and scholars had not even taken into consideration state-led 
innovation (cf. Polanyi 1977, pp. 192ff). On the theoretical level, it appeared to laissez-
faire economists absurd and reactionary to relate the abstract concept of the “nation state” 
to a set of actors and processes that create scientific knowledge, invent new methods or 
production, and push forward technological innovations. When Schumpeter published his 
otherwise revolutionary work The Theory of Economic Development in 1911 he had not 
parted with the mainstream thinking of his contemporaries with regard to the “state”: 
regulations and policies got almost no attention in his theoretical account of “creative 
destruction”. But, as Polanyi (1977) demonstrates, the rise of markets that evolved 
through an even and combined development on a global scale—to use Leon Trotsky’s 
phrase—was anything but a natural process. It was the effect of deliberate political 
decisions and essential, often violent, transformations of human life and societal 
organization (van der Linden 2007).  
 It is also important to notice the rise of comprehensive economic planning in the 
wake of the First World War which created in the first place “national economies”. 
National economies only emerged out of a “series of political implosions, social 
disintegrations, financial failures, and worldwide conflicts.” (Mitchell 2002, p. 5) So 
when Schumpeter and earlier economists wrote about the “economy” they had a different 
object in mind than we usually imagine today. 
“The idea of the economy in its contemporary sense did not emerge until the middle 
decades of the twentieth century. Between the 1930s and 1950s, economists, sociologists, 
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national statistical agencies, international and corporate organizations, and government 
programs formulated the concept of the economy, meaning the totality of monetarized 
exchanges within a defined space. The economy came into being as a self-contained, 
internally dynamic, and statistically measurable sphere of social action, scientific analysis, 
and political regulation. (…) The economy did not come about as a new name for the 
processes of exchange that economists had always studied. It occurred as the 
reorganization and transformation of those and other processes, into an object that had not 
previously existed. The crises and forces that brought about this transformation (…) made 
possible new forms of value, new kinds of equivalence, new practices of calculation, new 
relations between human agency and the nonhuman, and new distinctions between what 
was real and the forms of its representation.” (Mitchell 2002, pp. 4-5) 
The German economist and activist Friedrich List was an interesting exception in that he 
thought differently about the organization of “innovativeness”. Almost one hundred years 
before Schumpeter, he observed the stagnant situation of German Laenders’ economic 
development in the 1830s, and opted for massive state “interventions”. Specifically, he 
imagined a certain set of central policies and institutions to foster national economic 
progress (List 1841, cf. Garbe 1977). In general, he claimed it to be unquestionable that 
all nations would need to improve the educational skills of their citizens—or what 
contemporary jargon would label as “national innovation systems” (Freeman 1995, 
Lundvall 1992/2010). Against the liberal credo of his contemporaries who believed in 
minimal government intervention and open markets,29 List preferred a “National System 
of Political Economy”, though he certainly did not understand the “nation state” as we 
presently do (Mitchell 2002). But his conviction that entire nations need to “climb the 
ladder of development” let him to criticize Adam Smith. It also set him apart from liberal 
thinkers such as John Stuart Mill or Wilhelm von Humboldt, though both similarly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Against common misperception, neither European states nor the US were champions of free trade and 
open markets. Across the board, governments without exception have applied—over different periods, but 
typically in conditions of economic inferiority (Braudel 1992c, p. 53)—all sorts of measurements such as 
mercantilist trade laws, property regulations, research and development subsidies, and even covered 
programs of industrial espionage. Depending on their relative backwardness or edge, governments aimed at 
prohibiting the free flow of skilled workers and technological theft on the one hand, and to protect infant 
industries and indigenous technologies as well as to attract an educated workforce and scientists on the 
other hand (Chang 2002, Polanyi 1977, p. 203). 
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thought education to be central for the development of individuals and the society as a 
whole (cf. Valls 1999, Winch 1998).30  
List’s arguments were not merely based on theoretical pondering, but rather on 
detailed accounts of the historical developments, among others, in the Venetian to Dutch 
metropolitan economies. Perhaps most crucial was his critique against resource-focused 
approaches to economic development (that solely dealt with land, capital, and unskilled 
labor). Instead, he pointed to “productive power” as the crucial force that explains the 
wealth of nations (List 1841). Having experienced the debates about protectionist US 
policies first hand, List pleaded for the state to occupy systematic functions via market 
interventions, trade barriers, and first and foremost state-financed education and science 
(Levi-Faur 1997a, Freeman 1995, p.6). 
Despite the aforementioned economists’ denial, kings and royal bureaucracies have 
sponsored research and science, while practitioners have tried to forge intimate 
connections between “governments”, science, and education. For instance, the foundation 
of the Royal Society in 1660 was not only reflective of the integration of English 
scientists and experimenters into lively debates and impressive advances of scientific 
knowledge on the continent (Hall and Hall 1968), but also the starting point for a 
powerful history of “imperial science” that enabled British world dominance (McLeod 
1993, pp. 127ff.). While the pre-revolutionary absolutist monarchs of France invested 
heavily in scientific education, the eighteenth century Bourbons on the Spanish throne 
and Portugal’s kings likewise strengthened modern scientific procedures in order to retain 
control over their colonial territories in the Americas through the establishment of 
academies and research institutions (Green 1995, Goodman 2009, p.17, Figueirôa and da 
Silva 2000).  
By the turn of the nineteenth century, the Prussian reform efforts were indicative of 
a wave of bureaucratic, military, and educational institutionalization that intertwined state 
agencies, national interests, and objective sciences more intimately than ever before. In 
particular, in the decades following the Franco-Prussian war, all European governments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For a detailed examination of the Marxian critique of List’s ideas, stressing his anachronism of “national 
economies”, see Szporluk (1988). 
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ruled in systematic ways—although with diverging approaches and based on different 
cultural and ideological understandings. The creation of scientific knowledge, technical 
inventions, and innovations moved into the focus of the state. Ministries, committees, and 
public institutions aimed at improving the school and university systems. In addition, 
they installed new mechanisms in order to fund basic research and far-flung expeditions. 
Equally, governments were concerned with building central institutions to organize and 
steer science and the foundation of prestigious research centers and well-equipped 
laboratories (Paul 2002, Clark 1993, Green 1995). By the mid-nineteenth century, the 
scientific environment became increasingly competitive and a matter of national pride 
among the great powers in Europe, resulting in increased political support for 
technological progress. 
However, the governing of innovations have not become merely top-down issues. 
Scientific progress remained a complicated, multi-stakeholder matter. For example, the 
“French” chemists feared to fall behind their German colleagues between 1830 and 1880. 
Their struggle to secure higher funding and political support inevitably involved 
questions of methodology and ontology, namely the acceptance of the reality of “atoms” 
that constituted a highly innovative proposition by “German” chemists (Rocke 2001).  
Similarly puzzling is the outstanding case of Japan’s rapid appropriation of foreign 
technology between 1850 and 1910. Nearly in complete isolation from the West for 
centuries of Shogun’s rule, a widening rift occurred between the technical and scientific 
capabilities of Japan and neighboring Russia and China very suddenly (Morishima 1982). 
Japanese reformers were aware of the paramount importance of superior foreign 
technological capabilities. They appreciated shipyards, railways, precision instruments or 
weaving machines not in a pure instrumental sense. Because these and other new 
imported technologies were believed to possess a value as a symbol of being on par with 
the imperial powers. Modernizers in the government simultaneously tried to foster a 
modern-style techno-culture among Japanese citizens while creative and controversial 
processes of adoption and unfolded reconfiguration were at the heart of modern state 
formation in the Meiji period (Wilson 2005, Mayer and Petrulewicz 2012). 
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Differentiating Weber’s understanding of rationalization, several scholars have 
explored the consequences of technological and scientific progress. They stress that 
emerging (social) technologies yield productive power, fundamentally altering the scope 
and dimensions of state power in practice (Oakeshott 1875a). For some, in contrast to 
Weber’s pessimist stance, the emancipatory overtones of scientific procedures have 
diffused an enlightenment worldview calling for individual equality and a deliberative 
logic far beyond the official academies, philosophical clubs and experimental sessions. In 
short, experimental science became a contagious role model for emerging designs of 
early modern democratic institutions (Ezrahi 1990). Michel Foucault’s work has 
highlighted yet another twist. The gradual transformation of traditional monarchic rule 
into forms of governmentality and, later, bio-politics framed personal subjectivities in the 
context of a new inescapably discursive reality. Rulers no longer exercised repressive 
power. Rather, complex layers of assembled techniques, tools, and binary logics started 
to deeply reshape peoples’ behavior and thinking through self-disciplining their bodies on 
a daily basis. This extended the regulatory power of prior often-inexistent bureaucracies 
in hitherto unthought-of dimensions through knowledge-power (Collier 2009). The 
“state” and the “economy” were massively transformed through railways, telegraphs, 
microbes, newspapers, and steam engines. Technology became, in Pfaffenberger’s words 
(1992a, p. 282), “politics constructed by technological means.” The character of these 
relational forms of power were, as Foucault sees it, productive to the extent to which 
sense it created new subjectivities at the individual level and new territorial sites of 
contestation (Foucault 1977, 1983).  
So while nineteenth-century state power by means of engineering, science and 
infrastructures became closely connected with daily live, bodies, territory and individual 
subjectivity (Carroll 2011), this does not mean that, simply, the coercive power of states 
also became multiplied. In fact, the expansion of technological infrastructures seemed to 
constitute and, at the same time, undermine external sovereignty. The “Janus face” of 
technologies, as van Crefeld puts it, renders power effects to reshape statehood and 
“power” itself. On the one hand, telegraphy, railways, and airplanes enabled another 
round of colonial expansions and deepened the control over and management of far-flung 
territories (Yang 2011, Headrick 1991). Myriads of innovations have made the modern 
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world small, highly interactive, and densely interconnected (Bayly 2003). The 
infrastructures strengthened the colonial centers and finally dwarfed all remaining 
competitors, both state entities and ancient empires. On the other hand, large 
technological infrastructures such as the optical telegraph or railways put in place during 
and after the industrial revolution, or in the twentieth century computerized weather 
monitoring (Edwards 2006, p. 249, van Crefeld 1999), forced governments to coordinate 
more coherently their regulations even though this required a cooperation that may 
effectively limit their sovereign rights (Howland 2016). Science and innovations did not, 
as many have envisioned during the heyday of nationalism, supported self-contained 
units or autonomous organisms. Whereas technologies embodied the extension, in both 
scope and depth, of regulative state apparatuses, they undermined at the same time 
national borders, ultimately by “turning them into obstacles to progress” (van Crefeld 
1999, p. 378). 
“In theory each state was, and still is, free to exercise its sovereignty and build its own 
networks to its own standards, however idiosyncratic, while at the same time ignoring 
those of its neighbors and refusing to integrate with them. In practice, states could do so 
only at the price of incurring a tremendous technological and economic cost. (…) The 
precise cost of isolation varies with circumstances and also depends on the size of the 
country in question. However, even in the case of the largest ones, it is still substantial – 
not for nothing has the United States, as the country with the largest economy of all, been 
switching over to the metric system. To avoid this cost, states had to gain access to 
international networks, which in turn forced them to grant foreigners access to their own.” 
(Van Crefeld 1999, p. 380) 
Van Crefeld’s description comes close to determinism because technology seemingly can 
thrust states into collaboration against their will—but can we trust a macro-historical 
account which puts the self-propelled expansion of technical infrastructures into the 
driver seat of political changes? One could, for instance, examine the viewpoints of 
contemporaries. If we asked the French mathematician and engineer Henri Poincaré, he 
would stress the conventional nature of technological systems. Particularly, he saw, in 
line with Einstein, time as “convention” (Galison 2006, p. 324). Poincaré’s assessment 
bears considerable weight because it was not developed in the ivory tower. He rather had 
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first-hand scientific and political experiences as negotiator and organizer of France’s 
participation at the interlinked processes of national and international standardization of 
time (ca. 1870-1900). Poincaré, who embodied the confluence of theoretical and practical 
abilities and experience, believed that large technical systems were outcomes of political 
practice, expertise, and first of all consensus-brokering (Galison 2006, pp. 73-81ff). For 
others it would make sense to foreground the “social”, or rather negotiated, nature of 
global infrastructures.31 
Several crucial insights follow from this. To travel in reverse order, we can 
conclude that diverging national policies matter for the occurrence of innovation 
processes. First, institutional permissiveness for novelties is important in addition to 
education and research funding (Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti 2006). However, 
governments often fall short of effectively controlling or fostering innovations, which 
have already been flourished in the hands of inventors, entrepreneurs and companies. The 
ability of states to shape the cyclic waves of creative destruction and infrastructural 
advances that made certain populations wealthy, while threatening others with immediate 
poverty, is limited. Second, technological innovations involve the reconfiguration of 
particular state ensembles entailing revolutionary impact on society, statehood, and 
national sovereignty. It is quite reasonable to assume with Sheila Jasanoff (2004b) that a 
process of mutual “coproduction” of social order, science, and technology works at the 
core of modern state formation. Hence, theoretical notions and empirical analysis of the 
“state” which do not feature technologies prominently lack plausibility. 
2.4 Controversies about technology, defense, and security 
If we accept the co-constitutive nature of technology and political order as a general rule, 
then the question arises whether military technologies are the exception. As the matter of 
fact, states have effectively maintained, developed, and used arms appear to contradict 
the elusiveness of innovations and the non-instrumentalist notion of coproduction. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This multi-directional change also concerned time consciousness, which predated the rise of industrial 
capitalism as much as it was its consequence. The project of standardizing time posed an extraordinary 
organizational and technical challenge and equally it was an enormous social and political struggle, not to 
mention a profitable business proposal (Sauter 2006, Stenger 1997, pp. 176-211). 
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other words, this section then investigates whether high-tech weapons contradict the 
notion of technological dramas because they appear to preserve instrumentalist 
perspectives. The following may explore a set of puzzles—all situated in the field of high 
politics—including several techno-political controversies, the often-protracted 
indetermination concerning novel weapon systems, and finally the instable security 
dynamics in the aftermath of the nuclear revolution. 
During the 1930s in many countries, an instrumentalist consensus was under way 
that might seem implausible in the light of the above discussion. But in a time that 
brought to life so many (secret) research programs, and especially through the highly 
symbolic atomic bomb, it was obvious that technological innovativeness, warfare, and 
security were inseparably interwoven (Krige 2006b, Krige and Barth 2006). 32 
Governments appeared to successfully steer innovation processes. For instance, “coming 
at the tail end of a war in which science-based technology had been crucial”, the report 
Science—The Endless Frontier, commissioned by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, called 
to perpetuate public funding for “basic research”. Cementing “government patronage of 
scientific research in policy discourse”, the report successfully promoted the creation of 
the National Science Foundation in 1950 (Pielke 2010, pp. 922-3).  
“Vannevar Bush, by defining science as a new frontier, played on an historically sensitive 
chord to persuade the federal government that the patronage of science in peacetime was 
now its responsibility. The nation’s security, health, economic wellbeing, and cultural 
progress depended on strengthening basic science in academic and research institutions. 
And what was true for America was true for Europe. Its long-term economic and industrial 
strength, its political will to stand firm against Communism and to defend democratic 
institutions and values, and its ability to share in the defense of the West and to contribute 
to the Atlantic alliance—all these things depended on its having a strong scientific base.” 
(Krige 2006a, p. 256) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 It must be briefly remarked here that today’s common sense, which takes for granted the innovation-
friendliness of militaries, historically is a complete turn-around. Generals and officers have traditionally 
been reluctant towards inventions and the introduction of novel weapon system. Though wars have 
sometimes affected technological changes (Nishiyama 2007), if anything, it is safe to say that military 
leadership were a harbinger of conservatism, avoiding innovations. In a way, this appears to diverge from 
the historically anti-innovation attitude of armies. Though always not against warfare, generals used to 
have good reasons to resist novel technologies and were slow in their adaption (cf. Rose 1994). 
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Offering a ready policy description on both sides of the Cold War technological 
innovations and science were unanimously perceived and framed as the critical tools in 
the service of national security (Dickson 1988, Morgenthau 1964). In 1957, the 
successful Soviet space mission revealed that the US-led nations were technologically 
lacking behind the communist camp. In immediate response to the surprise launching of 
Sputnik, the US administration established the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and a centralized research agency (today’s Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, DARPA) and quadrupled the annual funding for the national 
science foundation (Divine 1993). 
Consequently, the two super powers were locked into a scientific and technical 
battle with massive state investments in the build-up of research cities, monitoring 
systems, and space programs (O’Mara 2004, Dickson 1988). Under the auspices of 
NATO and various other organizations, the Western alliance put stress on strengthening 
its scientific base (Krige 2000). The military “dominated the US federal R & D budget” 
between 1960 and 1990—only three years saw less than 50 percent for this cause 
(Mowery 1992, p. 136)—while the most cutting edge technologies became central to US 
war planning, strategy and actual warfare (Adas 2006). The Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) became a stern promoter and developer of the newest technical applications for 
surveillance, ears dropping, espionage and so forth (Richelson 2001). Military spending, 
particularly under the umbrella of DARPA, has produced some tangible results. Defense 
related research in the US gave not only birth to the invention of computer chips, the 
internet and the following shift to network-centric warfare, but also spurred the scientific 
and technical race towards virtualization (Der Derian 2009, Singer 2009). 
There is more to the role of big science than merely fostering military power 
projection. “Scientific prowess has become”, Paarlberg notes, “the deep foundation of 
U.S. military hegemony” (Paarlberg 2004, p.122). The turn to ever-larger installations 
and facilities for “basic research” such as in quantum physics, chemistry, and electronics 
was a cross-alliance project (Galison and Hevly 1992, Krige 1993). In the form of 
“scientific internationalism”, it has constituted a central transnational element of the 
“coproduction” of the new consensual American empire after WWII (Miller 2001, Krige 
2006a). The restoration and funding of the European research capacities became integral 
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to the Marshall Plan and the US alliance policy towards Europe in the two decades after 
1945. “In conjunction with its economic, military, and industrial strength,” US scientists 
tried “to shape the research agendas, the institutions, and the allegiances of scientists in 
Western Europe in line with U.S. scientific, political, and ideological interests in the 
region” (Krige 2006a, p. 4). Washington’s policies for technology transfer, particularly in 
the nuclear field, were also marked by attempts to manage competition amongst allies for 
the most prestigious fruit of modern science. John H. Perkins’ study (1997), on the other 
hand, showed that even the “green revolution”, seemingly belonging to “low politics” of 
agriculture, was as much a result of technological innovation as stemming from the 
securitization of food supplies during the Cold War. 
Remarkably though, one thing has not changed as politicians and generals paid the 
closest attention towards the ever-evolving industrially and scientifically contrived 
techniques of warfare: every single new weapon system remained subject to controversy. 
None of the subsequent “revolutions” in military affairs followed a prescribed, 
determined pathway. Ambiguity contradicted the instrumentalist underpinnings of 
official rhetoric and propaganda. The interrelatedness of war, security and technological 
transformations was never straightforward (Roland 1985). Suffice it to illustrate this with 
a few prominent examples.  
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, new transport and communication 
infrastructures crucial to the second industrial revolution were interconnected with 
successive revolutions in the practice of warfare and strategic thinking. Communication 
and transport technologies were among the first. The decisive importance of telegraphic 
transmission was experienced during the US civil war and the Franco-German war of 
1871. In addition, strategists increasingly realized the value of railway lines for fast troop 
movements and tactical maneuvers (McNeil 1982, van Crefeld 1999). A central 
observation that has been put forward in retrospect emphasized acceleration: the pace of 
all activities reaching from public life and travel to industrial production, trade, and 
warfare rapidly increased (Rosa 2005, Virilio 1980). Kern brilliantly showed in his 
magisterial study of time and space (1982) how newly introduced technologies have led 
to enormous changes in the temporal and spatial organization and perception of culture 
and personal identity. 
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Victorian thinkers explored the impacts of modern transport systems in terms of 
geopolitics and imperial governance (Bell 2005). For instance, Halford Mackinder’s 
“Heartland” concept, published in 1904,33 advanced the idea that the Eurasian landmass 
determines the future of global power politics. Mackinder famously claimed that a 
geographically induced power shift was taking place, which came at the expense of sea 
powers such as Great Britain. He insisted—in line with geologist Alfred Wegener (see 
Virilio 1980, p. 180)—that international politics should always be analyzed in the context 
of a single integrated unit, the “World Island”. His holistic understanding constitutes a 
response to the massive shifts he was witness to: England’s relative decline, the 
internationalization of the world economy and the spread of radical new technologies. 
Writes Mackinder: “Today armies have at their disposal not only the Trans-continental 
Railway but also the motor-car. They have, too, the aeroplane, which is of a boomerang 
nature, a weapon of land-power as against sea power. Modern artillery, moreover, is very 
formidable against ships. In short, a great military power in possession of the Heartland 
and of Arabia could take easy possession of the crossways of the world at Suez.” 
(Mackinder 1919, p. 80.) Mackinder notices a massive technical “revolution” at work: 
“(The Heartland) has been inaccessible to navigation from the ocean. The opening of it by 
railways-for it was practically roadless beforehand- and by aeroplane routes in the near 
future, constitutes a revolution in the relations of men to the larger geographical realities of 
the world.” (Mackinder 1919, p. 55) 
The technology-induced “time-space compression” was particularly crucial for his 
Heartland thesis. Following the inventions of deep-sea cables, telegraphy, radio 
transmission, the diesel engine, railways and motorcars, scattered places separated by 
vast spaces and long distance became one entity (O’Tuathail 1992, p. 106, Bell 2005). 
However, for his critiques Mackinder’s grasping of the actual pace and the character of 
further technological advances was superficial. They laid bare his geographical 
determinism—keeping the world separated in land and sea power—as conceptually 
meaningless and empirically outdated (cf. Parker 1982). The competition for trans-
oceanic transmission cables and the contested standardization of time and space 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Mackinder’s thoughts remain influential until today. For recent appreciations of Mackinder’s theories see 
Sloan (1999) and Colin Gray (2004). 
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measurement between France and Great Britain brought to the fore that global networks 
of communication and technologies of knowledge gathering were of utmost concern to 
government activities and imperialistic strategy (Nanni 2012, Innis 2007). Despite this, 
Mackinder remains a pioneer of globalization who early on realized the extraordinary 
importance and planetary impacts of new technologies for imperial strategy.34 
Mackinder’s understanding of international politics, that ultimately foregrounds the 
physical conditions, was quickly substituted by the privileged role subscribed to evolving 
technologies. Ralph Turner, for instance, claimed that source of the Soviet Union’s power 
is technological progress, which rendered possible massive resource exploitations in 
Russian hinterlands. Moreover, “the opposition of land power and sea power which 
conditioned Mackinder's thinking is now greatly reduced for each is entering into a new 
complex based on air power.” (Turner 1943, p. 14) The revolutionary effects of airplanes 
mark the superiority of technology over other factors—rendering the industrial base and 
the innovative capabilities paramount. By virtue of this analysis, Mackinder’s Heartland 
thesis was turned into a joke: 
”Mackinder's attempt to make the horse-riding and camel riding areas decisive for world 
politics can hardly be made good in an air age.” (Turner 1943, p. 15) 
But the meaning of “air age”, that seemed clear for Turner, turned itself into a major 
controversy. Already provided in the early history of aviation, many examples of cultural 
“counterappropriations” then reframed what aviation and aviators stood for 
(Pfaffenberger 1992a, p. 302).35 In terms of security, it brought new theories of “strategic 
bombardments” and a defensive urban posture as the civilian population became prime 
target for destruction. Already in the late 1930s, the industrial and technological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  Other thinkers followed in emphasizing the nexus between global politics and technological 
modernization—including, for example, L.S. Wolf, D. Mitrany, or E.H. Carr. Chapter 6 provides a more 
detailed account; see also Ashworth (2006) and Deudney (2000a, 2000b).  
35 While this diversity pointed to the highly contingent nature of military technology, new technologies that 
sometimes became entangled into ”symmetrical discourses” in quite different political systems. By the end 
of the 1930s, automobiles, racing-sports, and car-culture, for example, became inexorably linked to war-
preparedness and fighting ability both in the USA and in Germany, which was under the dictatorial rule of 
National Socialism. On both sides of the Atlantic, the revolution of the transport infrastructure led to mass 
mobilization through sports and the rise of the automobile society (Virilio 1980, p. 38). This interactive 
logic that has been advanced by Virilio is at odds with Turner’s instrumentalist form of determinism that 
turns industrial capacities, science, and weapons into ready-to-use tools. 
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infrastructures moved to the center of strategic war and defense planning (Collier and 
Lakoff 2008). Metropolitan areas presumably turned into objects of airborne attacks and 
aerial bombing, so the urban infrastructure and the urban population had to be protected. 
Long before the Cold War, the safety of civilian populations could only be achieved 
through the invention of another set of technologies such as gas masks, shelters, bunkers, 
and warning sirens (Fridlund 2011), while colonized peoples were the first to actually 
suffer from this new and terrible type of attacks. Airpower played a decisive role for the 
defeat of both Germany and Japan, leaving no doubts about its centrality for future 
warfare. Writing shortly before the end of WWII, Liddell Hart stressed that “superior 
technical appliance” had eliminated other power differentials among nations. The 
evolution of “automatic warfare” would alter the lethal practice of traditional war into a 
large-scale “process of destruction,” hence, “security has undergone a fundamental 
change” (cited in Freedman 2003, p. 20). However, airplanes, missiles, fighter jets and 
strategic bomber fleets have not homogeneously determined strategic behavior. There 
was no uniform response to this revolution in military affairs (Herrera 2003). As with 
almost any weapon system, different defense and security practices occurred 
simultaneously and underwent several reinterpretations and counter-significations.36 The 
national reactions to airborne, and by extension long-range missiles, showed a high 
degree of diversity. Sweden for instance built the world’s most extended underground 
facilities, the US elites sought reassurance from satellite based anti-missile capabilities, 
while Mao Zedong decided to spread the nation’s entire industrial base over the vast 
Chinese hinterland far removed from US-aircraft carriers (see Naughton 1988). 
The final example for the role of indetermination in global techno-politics stirred 
arguably the longest and most existential controversy about weapons (Herz 2003a). 
Thermo-nuclear weapons offer an especially intriguing window into the dynamic mutual 
apprehension between technological innovations and material-political interactions. After 
the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagaski many observers immediately agreed on the 
revolutionary dimension of this event, although it became clear later that its strategic use 
was not the main reason for Japan’s surrender (Freedman 2003, pp. 18-20). Robert Jervis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Similarly, after the first usage of tanks more than 20 years passed by until World War II for this novel 
weapon to become properly integrated into battlefield tactics and war strategy (McNeil 1982, p. 333). 
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(1989) among others has argued that the “nuclear revolution” had fundamentally altered 
statecraft and war. It led to a “radical transformation in the nature and distribution of 
power” (Williams 1986, p. 298). The outcome of this revolution was real and yet clumsy 
at the same time. Ultimately, the Bomb did open the gate to complete annihilation, but 
has not eliminated politics: as Francis Gavin (2012) forcefully argues, nuclear warheads 
did not simply determine defense policies and shape military strategies. So, whether 
atomic weapons have reshaped the international system according to their own image, 
and whether the potential of nuclear proliferation is welcome or worrisome, remain 
widely open practical and theoretical issues (Freedman 2000).  
At the beginning of nuclear politics, social movements and numerous prominent 
individuals including Albert Einstein and Albert Schweitzer kept forcefully contesting 
nuclear weapons. Their priority was not just a taboo, but abandoning this technology on 
moral grounds (Wittner 1993). Einstein, for instance, deeply regretted his involvement in 
the birth of the atomic weapon research program, the secret Manhattan Project, and 
became the first chairman of the “Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, Inc.” that 
was dedicated to close the Pandora’s Box of the nuclear bomb (Rife 2005). The Bomb, 
Einstein believed, was a radically novel situation that demanded immediate adaptation of 
human thinking because humanity “shrunk into one community with a common fate”. 
Ordinary people, according to Einstein “behold the ghostly tragic-comedy which is being 
performed on the international stage before the eyes and ears of the world. But on that 
stage, on which the actors under the floodlights play their ordained parts, our fate of 
tomorrow, life or death of the nations, is being decided” (Rife 2005, p. 6). In November 
1946, Einstein summarized his account of a terrible socio-technical dilemma: 
“…the position in which we are now is a very strange one which in general political life 
never happened. Namely, the thing that I refer to is this: To have security against atomic 
bombs and against the other biological weapons, we have to prevent war, for if we cannot 
prevent war every nation will use every means that is at their disposal; and in spite of all 
promises they make, they will do it. At the same time, so long as war is not prevented, all 
the governments of the nations have to prepare for war, and if you have to prepare for war, 
then you are in a state where you cannot abolish war.” (Letter by A. Einstein, cited in Rife 
2005, p. 7) 
	   75	  
Similar to Einstein, John Herz’s International Politics in the Atomic Age (1959) replaced 
the narrow focus on national security with the existential danger of planetary 
annihilation. He advised universalist policies that should (and must) ultimately overcome 
the security dilemma. But first of all, the life-and-death challenge of the nuclear arsenals 
required, according to Herz, a radical change of mind-sets all around the world, for 
humanity’s survival was at stake (Hacke and Puglierin 2007, pp. 374-377). Morgenthau 
and Herz were convinced of “the obsolescence of the state-system on a global scale and 
the need for a world state” (Deudney, 2000b, p. 21). In short, “nuclear one-worldism” 
was a common strand in early IR thinking. 
The Christian-realist philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr, another astute US 
commentator during the onset of the atomic age, wrote in a less existential language. He 
understood the “Bomb” first of all as an irony of history that illustrated the fallacy of 
modern enlightenment thought, thought that championed technological progress and 
scientific mastery of nature. Once put into the world, the Bomb could not be hidden, 
stopped from spreading or undone. In his realist understanding it was impossible to 
escape from this “nuclear dilemma”. Hence he opposed all kinds of “utopian” solutions 
advanced during the 1940s and 1950s such as schemes of world government, mutual 
disarmament, or the West’s unconditional capitulation. According to Niebuhr, the 
possibility of mutual annihilation led to a “balance of terror” (William 1986, p. 300).  
However, it was not just the forces of particle physics forced statesmen into a 
precarious peace based on mutual deterrence. Neither did scientific advice simply 
determine policy. The story is far more complex and rife with controversies (Gilpin 1962) 
as the “political-military effects of a new technological device” involve a mix of 
uncertainties about the future, common sense, philosophical considerations, and political 
interests (Morgenthau 1964). A paradoxical double movement arose from this delicate 
and first phase of “management” of the Bomb. On the one side, after a period of active 
planning of nuclear war fighting, nuclear bombs increasingly fell under a taboo that 
stigmatized the use of “weapons of mass destruction” (Tannenwald 2007). On the other 
side, the growing nuclear arsenals posed the constant threat of destabilization while 
“deterrence” was only a theoretical idea and heavily contested at that time (Gaddis 1997, 
Gavin 2012). In the midst of a technological arms race in the wake of the Sputnik shock 
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strategists, politicians, and generals were in the mood of “assigning to technology a 
predominantly disruptive role” (Freedman 2003, p. 160).  
Already at the dawn of the atomic age, Niebuhr had repeatedly stressed the need for 
both unwavering attention and cautious restraint because of the real possibility that the 
handling of nuclear weapons could quickly spiral out of control. He criticized Einstein’s 
retrospect “defeatist” stance on grounds that, against “liberal sentiments”, men but have 
to face the unavoidable moral ambiguities of the nuclear age. Given the anarchic 
circumstances, he rejected a world governance as advocated for instance by Einstein 
(Williams 1986, p. 295). Likewise, he condemned Henry Kissinger’s idea, who in 1957 
promoted using tactical bombs in combat because for him a blurring of lines between 
“tactical” and “strategic” weapons seemed technically unavoidable (Williams 1986, p. 
302).  
Others were concerned with the unintended domestic consequences of certain 
technological choices, particularly the alleged authoritarian ramifications of nuclear 
power. Jungk and Winner enlarged the debated terrain in resistance against what they saw 
as a reshaping of liberal societies, civil law, and democratic institutions under the veil of 
techno-political necessities (Jungk 1952, 1977, Winner 1977). In addition, to respond to 
increasing wariness of many allies and the elites in block free states, President 
Eisenhower advanced the “Atoms for Peace initiative” at the United Nations in December 
1953. The sharing of civilian usage of nuclear energy should provide legitimacy for the 
nuclear dominance of the US (Krige 2006b). In short, nuclear politics were anything but 
stable. Only after the mid-1960s, the contradictive policy discourses about the bomb 
slowly converged and became stably organized by the concepts of arms control and 
deterrence. The notion of “interdependence” that opened the possibility of cooperation 
become stabilized by the confluence of ideas within epistemic communities and 
developments in game theory and modeling. Ultimately, this preliminary closure of the 
main controversies was reached at the expense of ideas such as military superiority or 
disarmament (Adler 1992, Gavin 2012, pp. 120-128). 
While the understanding of deterrence became the mainstream, the bomb—in the 
public and within the strategic community—was rendered into a mere tool subject to 
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incremental control and technical management (Bourne 2012, p. 150). As such a form of 
“nuclear mechanics”, Kenneth Waltz’s classical formulation (1981) is suggestive for the 
framing on which grounds the debate of the 1940s and 1950s came to a closure. 
Describing the time-tested reliability of deterrence dynamics and the stability they 
provide in a bipolar system, Waltz denies serious concerns about the manageability of the 
nuclear arsenal. Instead, rooted in his state-centered worldview, he claims spreading the 
Bomb would stabilize international affairs; the Bomb as positive force that presumably 
mitigates wars, aggression, and arms races. 
“Nuclear weapons in the hands of six or seven states have lessened wars and limited 
conflicts. The further spread of nuclear weapons can be expected to widen those effects. 
Should the United States then promote the spread of nuclear weapons for the sake of peace, 
even though we need not for the sake of stability? To do so would replace one extreme 
policy with another. Present policy works hard to prevent additional states from acquiring 
nuclear weapons. My examination of the effects of nuclear weapons leads to the conclusion 
that our policy is wrong without supporting the proposition that true proliferation—the 
rapid spread of nuclear weaponry—is desirable. Rapid change may be destabilizing. The 
slow spread of nuclear weapons gives states time to learn to live with them, to appreciate 
their virtues, and to understand the limits they place on behaviour. (…) Nuclear weaponry 
makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a 
small number of warheads can do.” (Waltz 1981/2008, p. 418) 
The undisturbed language of rationality, which is marked in this passage, reflected the 
factual self-restraint of the nuclear powers after the late 1960s. But the tentative 
stabilization of the nuclear terror has more origins, and is more delicate, than this 
seemingly crystal-clear logic of deterrence would permit. First of all, what deterrence 
exactly meant was subject to intense debates (Freedman 2004, Gavin 2012). Furthermore, 
concerning nuclear weapons, “deterrence” was not the only game in town that led to 
“cold peace”. First of all, the messy industrial-tactical-technical-political reality of Cold 
War “strategies” produced their own tensions and rapprochements. Numerous studies 
showed the complex interplay of thermonuclear stockpiles, missiles systems, bureaucratic 
capabilities, civilian expertise and surveillance systems, nuclear energy usage, and 
military doctrine (MacKenzie 1984b, Ritchie 2010, Krige 2006b, Hecht 2010). 
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“In understanding why the nuclear world has been configured in this way, it is tempting to 
reach for a simple, single, comprehensive cause—the aggressive tendencies of imperialism, 
say, or the ‘inertial thrust’ of exterminism. There are strengths in such explanations. But 
analytically they fail to grasp the sense in which our nuclear world is a layered, a contested 
and often an inconsistent outcome. Nuclear militarism is not a rational, functional 
prerequisite of a socio-economic system; nor is it an irrational, technologically-determined 
Behemoth. It occupies an uneasy, difficult-to-specify, theoretical middle-ground of partial, 
local nationalities, and of organisational and political conflict. It is shaped more by the 
exigencies of politics than by those of technology; but that does not imply it is a coherent, 
rational creation, even of an evil ruling elite.” (MacKenzie 1984b, p. 45) 
Paul Virilio, writing in the late 1970s, similarly doubted the convenient simplicity of the 
logic of mutual deterrence or mutually assured destruction. The powerful elegance of 
Waltz’s argument concealed a thorny issue. To make no mistake, Waltz would not have 
denied the complexity of nuclear weapons but he, like generations of experts, 
foregrounded the notion of cost-benefit calculations in his final analysis (see Sagan, 
Waltz, and Betts 2007). Virilio, in contrast, stressing how evolving technological 
conditions render the security situation increasingly instable, saw the preconditions of 
deterrence in constant need of reproduction. Both sides, he explained, were locked in a 
race to improve their weapon systems. But the trajectory of technologies, the increasing 
speed of missile attacks, inevitably turns the pursuit of national security into a “war over 
time” (Virilio 1980, p. 184). As a consequence, successive arms-control negotiations 
faced the increasing difficulties of keeping the practice of deterrence possible in the first 
place.37 Washington and Moscow had no choices but to limit the sophistication and 
abilities of their arsenals collectively through a mutual consent in order to maintain the 
actual times-span for alerts and decision-making over counter-attacks reasonable, This 
was for a reason that, reducing reaction time to minutes or seconds would have meant to 
concede any serious choice to a computer system, which was also something the US and 
Soviet leadership wanted to avoid under all circumstances (Virilio 1980). Today, the 
intricacies of nuclear arsenal still shape bilateral interactions between the US and Russia, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 For more on this point see Chapter 3, section 3.5. 
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although the end of the West-East confrontation rendered the threat that legitimized the 
practice of mutual deterrence obsolete (Pouliot 2010, p. 301).  
 The controversy about the potential abolition of nuclear weapons has also 
reappeared. A group of elder statesmen around former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
started a new wave of public debate in January 2007.38 They called to abandon nuclear 
weapons entirely, proclaiming a “vision of a world free of nuclear weapons” in the Wall 
Street Journal. With positive response in the global media and support from other 
politicians, the four men—dubbed the “four horsemen”—rendered the nature and 
consequences of the Bomb and its possible proliferation or abolition once again a matter 
of contestation (see Schelling 2009). Ironically, to demand a complete abolishment of the 
“Bomb” was something the very same individuals had earlier perceived as an absurdity—
Kissinger even calling for use of tactical warheads during the 1950s. By now the “four 
horsemen” do consider this utopian vision, which was rejected by Niebuhr some fifty 
years ago, as “consistent with America's moral heritage” (Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and 
Nunn 2008). 
“The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has 
brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest 
weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands. The steps we are taking now to 
address these threats are not adequate to the danger. With nuclear weapons more widely 
available, deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.” (Shultz, Perry, 
Kissinger, and Nunn 2008) 
What worries the “horsemen” is not only the potential breakdown of deterrence. If the 
bomb gets into the hands of a rogue regime or terrorist groups, these are not expected to 
behave rationally. What is really at stake is the practical handling of the material 
complexities of the nuclear arsenal per se. Human control over this technology in general 
appears highly precarious and unreliable. This indicates again that an awful lot of more 
things are going on than in Waltz’s clean world of atomic rationalization. In short, the 
handling of nuclear weapons is so messy and slippery that its dangers are intolerable even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 It also was in the midst of a heated anti-Iran media campaign in the US that complicated already difficult 
negotiations between the IAEO and Teheran about an alleged nuclear weapons program (Al Baradai 2011). 
In this regard, Kenneth Waltz has not changed his opinion one inch when undeviatingly praising the option 
of a nuclear-equipped Iran (cf. Sagan, Waltz, Betts 2007). 
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under the guard of US Air Force specialists. “‘Mistakes are made in every other human 
endeavor. Why could nuclear weapons be exempt?’ To underline the governor's point, on 
Aug. 29-30, 2007, six cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were loaded on a U.S. 
Air Force plane, flown across the country and unloaded. For 36 hours, no one knew 
where the warheads were, or even that they were missing.” (Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and 
Nunn 2008) 
 In sum, a similar pattern may characterize examples of new weapon technologies 
spanning from the nineteenth to the twentieth century: practitioners and theoreticians had 
great difficulties to comprehend the nature, causes, and consequences of technological 
innovations upon modes of strategy and security practices. Some such as nuclear 
weapons remain essentially contested. Even controversies, which had long been settled, 
can open up again to renew a technological drama. The introduction of new technologies, 
if anything, makes it increasingly difficult for military commands to distinguish between 
war and peace. So while determinist accounts fell short of providing a convincing picture, 
social reductionist explanations likewise are flawed. The innovations in weaponry, for 
example, have not caused and often not even conditioned certain forms of warfare. They 
were not unmoved movers, yet have shaped security practices and strategic responses in a 
process of coproduction. What we find are shifting and unstable entanglements into 
various social practices and discourses. As a consequence, we should treat controversies 
about weapon systems as an integral part of the effects of technological innovations on 
power and security, instead of searching for unidirectional determination or abstract 
causation. 
2.5 Summary 
Framing technological innovation as drama may provide a good starting point for the 
conceptualization of global techno-politics. Our exploration of the evolution of multiple 
technologies speaks to John Law’s assertions cited at the beginning of this chapter. 
Determinist and social reductionist approaches are conceptual problematic because they 
share a dualist ontology incapable of accommodating to the transformative power, 
ambivalence, and unpredictability of innovations. To recognize that the social and 
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technical realms are constantly blurring is not sufficient. These two domains seem to 
have never really been separated in the first place (Law 1991, Mitchell 2002). 
 What general lessons can we condense from these puzzles as detailed in section 2.2, 
2.3 and 2.4? Firstly, technological innovations are significant for global politics in 
particular ways that both technological determinism and social constructivism cannot 
comprehend. The puzzle of the “great divergence” for instance illustrates the process-
character and long-term consequences of innovations. Their effects are characterized by 
complex interrelations, feedback loops, and diffusion dynamics that are at the same time 
technical, political, commercial and cultural. Secondly, the difficulties of states have been 
showed in managing, guiding or fostering new innovations. Apparently, statesmen, 
bureaucrats, and scholars have dealt with paradoxical challenges ever since the onset of 
modern statehood, while states possess only limited control over innovation activities. 
Finally, the ability of governments to predict how certain technological innovations 
change warfare and security, especially with respect to the most destructive weapon 
systems, is almost inexistent—not to mention the incapability to control weapons systems 
effectively from evaporating. 
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3. Classical theorists beyond the instrumentalist-determinist divide (interlude I) 
Moving beyond the idea of “technological dramas” introduced in Chapter 2, this chapter 
takes a detour to inquire into research designs and theoretical vocabulary of classical 
theorists that have tried to avoid static and dualist biases. In particular, while the works of 
Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpeter and Harold Innis are zoomed into, I would come back to 
the conceptual roadblocks of instrumentalism and determinism to seek for a more 
appropriate approach. Chapter 2 discussed three puzzles related to technological 
innovations, showing that they evolve at the intersection of social, political, technical 
dynamics. Subsequently, this interlude offers another perspective and interrogates three 
interrelated methodological issues—the unit of analysis, the characteristics of process, 
and the distribution of agency—that are worth considering if we want to develop a better 
theoretical grasp of the problem at hand. 
3.1 Determinism and the unit of analysis 
Scholars have construed different spatial demarcations and principle actors in their 
studies of technological innovations. The emphasis here, instead of asking how empirical 
observations or data can be utilized to theorize, is to revisit the nexus between these 
conceptual abstractions and determinist frameworks; especially, concerning the “unit of 
analysis”. My thesis is that the unit we select as the focus of our inquiry and subsequent 
explanations often implies certain types and directions of determinism to which we have 
to tackle subsequently. This point is exemplified by Max Weber’s critical commentary on 
Marx’s determinism: 
“in Marx (…) that oft-quoted passage (…) is contradictory: the hand-mill causes feudalism, 
the steam-mill causes capitalism. (…) This is not an economic, but rather a technological 
construction of history; and that it is simply wrong is indisputable from the claim itself. 
This is because the era of the hand-mill, which reaches to the threshold of the modern age, 
has seen every conceivable kind of cultural ‘superstructure’ in all fields. (…) The same 
technology does not always denote the same economy, nor is the reverse always the case. 
(…) In Antiquity there was above all a capitalist development which can be measured 
against any other capitalist development in the world. But the capitalist development of 
Antiquity started the ascent – and I’d like to emphasize this here while exaggerating a bit – 
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to its highest peak at that moment when, according to our knowledge today, the technical 
development of Antiquity was at an end. (…) Capitalist development today apparently goes 
hand in hand with technological development, so much so that technicians have seriously 
come to believe that technology and its evolution may be the exclusive leading element in 
our cultural development.” (Weber 2005, pp. 26-28) 
One can, of course, agree with Weber’s refutation of “hard” determinism albeit his 
treatment does not do justice to the nuanced modes of “productive determinism” that 
Marx developed throughout his works. Weber (2005, p. 28) is equally correct when he, 
continuing his argument, rejects the opposite extreme of a purely human/social 
determination of machines. However, the critical aspect I want to point out is that the 
viewpoints of both Weber and his opponents are animated by a similar historical macro-
narrative. They advanced large units of analysis such as “civilization”, “capitalism” or 
“society” combined with abstract levels of generalization. There is no coincidence that 
macro-sociological framing would lend itself more readily to technical determinist views 
than micro-level analysis (Misa 1994, p. 141). The reason that they tend to over-simplify 
technologies is because these perspectives boil down highly complex matters into the 
juxtaposition of a technical world of machines on the one side and human collective 
activities on the other.  
 Furthermore, the grammar of the related macro-level language may easily lead to 
dystopian or pessimist (for others triumphant, cf. Berman 2010, p. 25ff) opinions about 
future developments. The critiques of modernity are often driven by a fear of the 
unstoppable force of machines overwhelming the fragile social fabric. In macro schemes 
there is no place for a differentiated determinism that highlights varying institutional 
responses to the effects of machines and infrastructures (e.g. Heilbronner 1994, Winner 
1986). The “big picture” view prevails. Generations of philosophers and theorists 
trumpeted the fanfare against the techno-titans that, as many believed, undermined 
democratic/liberal institutions and ultimately were bound to enslave humankind 
(Feenberg 1991).39 Against the machine culture of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and 
Adorno (1997, p. 25), for instance, lament that “thinking becomes an automatic, self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Authors writing in this tradition include Ellul (1964), Mumford (1966), Heidegger (1977), Postman 
(1992), Watson (1997), and Luke (1994). 
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activating process; an impersonation of the machine that it produces itself so that 
ultimately the machine can replace it.” Three Canada-based technology theorists have 
then developed a similarly critical understanding of modern technologies. In the view of 
Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan, and George Grant,  
“one finds practice-based understandings of technology, which emphasize the danger that 
technology poses to our civilization. Over the course of their careers each of these three 
thinkers also argued that our ordinary involvement in technological practice can create a 
dependence on a technological approach and that meeting the ethical challenges of 
technology must involve an appropriate awareness of this kind of dependence.” (Gerrie 
2007) 
While these concerns have not ceased to exist, recent research advanced much more fine-
grained approaches to technology. Historians are at pains to avoid the opposition of 
abstract binary notions. In addition, their description of change in a technologically 
mediated world does not imply a process of “hybridization” of separated domains such as 
suggested by terms like “socio-technical” or “society-nature”. Instead they uncover that, 
though in diverging manners, there had never been a separation in the first place 
(MacKenzie 2006, Carroll 2006, Thrift 1996). This task is difficult since it tends, as we 
have seen, to defy conventional language and conventional wisdom.  
 Peter Galison, for example, introduced the notion of “critical opalescence” in order 
to describe the historical “emergence” of the idea of relativity (Galison 2006). By using 
this conceptual metaphor, he highlighted the “triple intersection of practical, abstract, and 
philosophical issues” (Yerxa 2003, p. 6). Critical opalescence neatly corresponded with 
the idea of a “seamless web” that Thomas Hughes regarded it so characteristic for 
technological systems (Hughes 1986). This approach is the radical opposite of macro-
sociology for Galison urged to dissolve the dichotomies, which are often mapped upon 
modernization. Remaining somewhere in an explanatory no man’s land, he did not allow 
for a single primary reason that explained the emergence of relativist thinking in physics 
(and beyond). It is neither technically, nor socially, nor philosophically determined. 
“There isn’t one scale at which this story is grounded or founded. There isn’t an originary 
or fundamental scale. It is all at once about philosophy, technology, and physics. And the 
fluctuations of scale between the abstract ideas of conventionalism and a new kind of 
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knowledge and the practical exigencies of wiring up continents so that they’ll tell the same 
time are very rapid and an essential aspect of this story. Is this a story of social history? 
Yes. Look at the coordination of cities, trains, markets, and maps. Is this a story about the 
intellectual history of physics? Yes. Relativity is one of the epochal changes in the 
discipline. Is this a question about the history of philosophy? Again, yes. Conventionalism 
reshaped modern philosophy.” (Galison cited in Yerxa 2003) 
The first move that Galison emphatically stressed is not to discriminate between social, 
scientific, and technical contexts. His stance indicated a strong form of anti-
foundationalism that challenges both logocentrism and determinism. Whereas Galison 
(2006) noted that the conditions of critical opalescent are exceptional rather than the 
norm, the puzzles presented in Chapter 2 indicated that his notion is carried upon the 
politics of technological innovations in general (cf. de Laet, and Annemarie Mol 2000, 
Law 2002). It is in this sense that we have to look for conceptual frames that mirror fluid, 
hybrid, interconnected worlds, concepts that nevertheless offer a well-tailored unit of 
analysis. From Galison’s analytical perspective, classical IR units like the state, the 
international system and so on have limited use, because applying “methodological 
nationalism” to the exploration of technological innovations would inevitably lead to 
paradox puzzles. Yet Galison’s solution to simply abstain from a clearly shaped unit of 
analysis is not so satisfying, the notorious oppositions of empty signifiers such as “state” 
vs. “technology” are similarly the misleading. Neither does the idea of “hybridization” 
suffice if it means adding up previously separate domains in order to regain the 
conditions of possibility for “parsimonious” theoretical puzzles.  
 So, while macro and micro framings do not offer a way forward, there are middle-
sized approaches to theorize technological innovations that seem most apt. For instance, 
Braudel’s (1992c) “world-economies” and Jasanoff’s (2004a) “coproduction of order” 
provide an alternative vision how we might shape the unit of analysis. At closer 
inspection, however, the scope of these notions is still too encompassing and they 
(deliberately) remain underspecified in analytical and conceptual terms. 40  They 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Braudel’s structural historiography explores the interplay of technological shifts and the social, economic 
and political (Arrighi 2001). Yet, his somewhat organic unit “world economy” is by and large physically 
and not technologically determined (see Kinser 1981, pp. 77ff, 91ff, and p. 103). “Coproduction” does in a 
different sense not suit our purpose. Jasanoff’s idea of coproduction is not intrinsically linked to a particular 
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nonetheless have great value as metaphysical umbrella concepts, which could supplement 
mid-range approaches (see Jasanoff 2004b, pp. 19ff). 
TABLE	  3.1	  CONCEPTUAL	  APPROACHES	  TO	  TECHNOLOGICAL	  INNOVATION	  ©AUTHOR	  
The most promising “scope” for the unit of analysis seems to be the middle-sized notions 
that have been advanced by STS scholars. To name just a few: “technological system” 
(Hughes 1994), “sociotechnical systems” (Fox 1995), “heterogeneous networks”, “actor-
networks”, “collectives”, or “assemblages” (Latour, Callon, Law), “technological zones” 
(Barry 2006), and “sociotechnical ensembles” (Bijker 1993).41 Without going into much 
detail at this point their advantages are obvious. They are heterogeneous in the sense that 
they assume (in different variations) the confluence of social and technical aspects into a 
single reality. Furthermore, these conceptual approaches confine the unit of analysis to a 
tangible, hybrid entity delimited in time and spatial extension. In turn, these authors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
unit or level of analytical perspective. It has indeed been used among other things to analyze “global-local” 
puzzles. Its flexibility can be seen as strength.  
41 See for early collections of these approaches MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985), Bijker, Pinch, and 
Hughes (1987), Bijker and Law (1992) and Law (1991a). 
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assume their units to be surrounded by a distinguishable environment while both have 
mutual effects on each other. The conceptual move of heterogeneous approaches has a 
dual strength. For one, it is widely tested by diverse empirical case studies that avoid 
social reductionism. For another, it promises to replace determinism of all sorts with a 
fine-tuned research framework based on notions of interaction, co-constitution, or 
coproduction (see table 3.1). 
3.2 Levels and concepts of process 
Having outlined the advantages of heterogeneous middle-range approaches, the next step 
is to apprehend the dynamic characteristics of technological innovations without resorting 
to linear, mechanistic program or narrative. As we have learned, innovations do not 
follow a predetermined script. Blueprints do not exist. Their evolution rather contains 
unpredictable interactions between social, ideational, and technical elements that are 
often shifting from one level to another. Acknowledging these twists we cannot but reject 
the assumption that technological innovations emerge out of the blue, implicitly built in 
the premises of various models and theories.42  
 In principle, innovations all have to enter a co-productive phase including 
controversies and reconstruction, in order to get accepted and smoothly functioning in all 
their technical, political, economical, and social dimensions and relationships. 
Considerable time has to be taken until technological artifacts turn into what Bruno 
Latour called “black boxes” (2005)—achieving the stable, irreversible, “hard-core” 
character of a matter of fact. Here raised the question: as technologies have a drama-like 
history of “stabilization,” what would conceptual frameworks suit capturing the 
relevantly revolutionary changes? For an answer it is worth comparing the strengths and 
shortcomings of the models of technological dynamics that three famous social theorists 
have advanced. How have Marx, Schumpeter, and Innis theorized the process that we 
label here as “coproduction”? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 For a comprehensive overview about different explicit models of technological change see Parayil 
(1999). 
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 Karl Marx understood the societal change as structurally determined by way of 
contradictions between the superstructure, the relations of production, and the material 
forces of production (Tilley 1982, p. 35). The introduction, for example, of new machines 
which via industrial automation that helped reshaping the modes of production, is 
indicative of “the instrumental use of technology by the bourgeoisie for their own ends 
(…) in the capitalist phase of history. Technology neither causes nor necessitates the 
class struggle that follows.” (Bimber 1994, p. 96) If machines primarily serve interests, 
the specific history of innovations has no conceptual weight. Innovations and innovators, 
thus, have historic significance only in the sense as they reinforce processes of economic 
accumulation and psychological struggles of alienation (Bimber 1994, p. 97). In Marx’s 
view, technical achievements such as newspapers and railways undermine social order 
elsewhere in the world: 
“when you have once introduced machinery into the locomotion of a country, which 
possesses iron and coal, you are unable to withhold it from its fabrication. You cannot 
maintain a net of railways over an immense country without introducing all those industrial 
processes necessary to meet the immediate and current wants of railway locomotion and 
out of which there must grow the application machinery to those branches of industry not 
immediately connected with railways. The railway system will therefore become, in India, 
truly the forerunner of modern industry.” (Marx 1853, p. 37 cited in Adas 1990, p. 240) 
The automatic flavor of this structural understanding of the processes of production and 
commerce is not confined to Marx alone. Contemporary observers likewise understood 
the technological progress as the step towards the opening up and regeneration of Asian 
societies. This viewpoint placed technological innovation at the center of a broader 
process of market expansion and transformation that would bring to the fore new modes 
of societal organization and class cleavages (Adas 1990, p. 239, 241). And yet, as Nick 
Dyer-Witheford emphasized, Marx’s commentaries and descriptions concerning 
nineteenth-century technologies have sprinkled over his encyclopedic oeuvre and, taken 
together, been allowing for a nuanced and contextualized reading of technological 
revolutions.43 On the one hand, he saw the explosive growth of technologies such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Marx’s historical materialism changed over time. Particularly seen in his early and late works, which 
offer different readings. Marx is anything but a “technological determinist” as his understanding of the 
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railways, telegraphy, and steamships “as tendrils for the extension of a system of 
domination (…) and the ‘automization of the world market’” (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 
p.41). On the other hand, Marx valued their “liberatory possibilities” because these 
technologies tended to undermine “parochialism, localism, and narrow national interests” 
while functioning as “potential catalysts for proletarian internationalism.” (Dyer-
Witheford 1999, p. 42)  
 In sum, Marx’s understanding of machinery and travel and telecommunications 
technologies “oscillated” between to rival possibilities. At one pole, technology is an 
instrument of capitalist domination, a means for the intensification of exploitation and the 
enchaining of the world in commodity exchange. At the other, it is the basis for the 
freedom from want and the social intercourse that are the prerequisites for a communist 
society. How much emphasis is given to each pole, and by what logic or narrative they 
are connected, is, however, a matter of huge contention.” (Dyer-Witheford 1999, p. 42, 
Matthewman 2011, pp. 29-49) This structural bipolar view has another consequence: it 
would downplay the role of actors such as entrepreneurs, merchants, workers or inventors 
during an age of bustling entrepreneurial activity. It stemmed from an influential 
intellectual tradition handed down from Smith and Ricardo, theorists who had 
systematically downplayed entrepreneurial activities. Readers of their works are “bound 
to get an impression”, as Schumpeter noted, “to the effect that this process runs on itself.” 
(Schumpeter 1949/2008, p. 255) 
 Joseph A. Schumpeter, in contrast to Marx’s structural view, stressed the actor-
centric dynamics of economic development, which are associated with the concept of 
“creative response”. For him, “entrepreneur-heroes” would carry out a historical mission 
in the context of “creative destruction” (Witt 1992, p. 219). According to this process 
model, entrepreneurs may realize something that is “outside of the range of existing 
practice” and thereby create fundamental discontinuities in the economy. This could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
connection between technologies and social change is much more differentiated than many critiques admit. 
In Marx’s writings, technologies figure differently depending on different historical periods. As they are 
aligned to labor relations, social resistance against alienation and exploitation, they are first of all enablers 
of the bourgeoisie’s profit interests (see MacKenzie 1984a, Moore 1975, p. 181ff.). Technology, 
accordingly, is not the sole driving agent. Societal configurations have rather changed in concert of 
technical, social, financial, and psychological conditions (Bimber 1994). 
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involve anything from the introduction of new products over the establishment of a new 
market to the exploitation of new resources and lands or the creation of novel categories 
of commodities. As such, the transformative effects of creative entrepreneurial efforts, 
which on average have more often failed than succeeded, are irreducible. They resemble, 
as Schumpeter reassured us, “an essential element in the historical process” (Schumpeter 
1947, p. 222).  
 At the one hand, the purposeful use of technologies is instrumental for this process. 
On the other hand, Schumpeter perceived technological progress at a larger level as 
inevitable, infinite, and (almost) unstoppable evolution. For example, he rejected the 
assumption that the geographical exploration and utilization of the entire globe—an 
insight that has already stipulated Mackinder’s heartland theory—could progressively 
diminish investment opportunities and, ultimately, bring an end to 150 years of capitalist 
growth. Schumpeter not only anticipated the Club of Rom predictions of the 1970s 
concerning limited planetary resources but also refuted its core argument. According to 
him, “technological progress effectively turned the tables on any such tendency.” 
Because of technological innovations, “it is one of the safest predictions that in the 
calculable future we shall live in an embarras de richesse of both foodstuffs and raw 
materials” (Schumpeter 1947, p. 117).  
 Moreover, as Schumpeter was the first economist to rigorously theorize economic 
development as cycles, technological innovations became conceptually related to macro 
shifts and pattern of the global economy (Arrighi 1994).  
“An analogous argument applies to the widely accepted view that the great stride in 
technological advance has been made and that but minor achievements remain. So far as 
this view does not merely render the impressions conceived from the state of things during 
and after the world crisis—when an apparent absence of novel propositions of the first 
magnitude was part of the familiar pattern of any great depression—it exemplifies still 
better than did the “closing of humanity’s frontier” that error in interpretation economists 
are so prone to commit. We are just now in the downgrade of a wave of enterprise that 
created the electrical power plant, the electrical industry, the electrified farm and home and 
the motorcar. We find all that very marvelous, and we cannot for our lives see where 
opportunities of comparable importance are to come from. As a matter of fact however, the 
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promise held out by the chemical industry alone is much greater than what it was possible 
to anticipate in, say, 1880, not to mention the fact that the mere utilization of the 
achievement of the age of electricity and the production of modern homes for the masses 
would suffice to provide investment opportunities for quite a time to come” (Schumpeter 
1947, pp. 177-118).  
In Schumpeter’s systemic view, technology-induced waves of destruction would result in 
the predictable occurrence of up-and-down cycles. This led him to qualify Marx’s 
historical materialism. While a down-cycle does not mean the end of capitalism, the 
innovations do not reinforce a fixed path or teleological processes of accumulation and 
concentration, either. They are rather successive singular events that set in motion an 
evolutionary dynamic of economic development (Schumpeter 1947, 1934). At the heart 
of this process lie the power of novelty that might even transcend “land” and “labor” as 
the traditional resource bases of economic activities. As Schumpeter maintained, “the 
conquest of the air may well be more important than the conquest of India was” 
(Schumpeter 1947, p. 117). Ultimately, no “frontiers” can impede this infinite process. 
Writes Schumpeter: 
Technological possibilities are an uncharted sea. We may survey a geographical region and 
appraise, though only with reference to a given technique of agricultural production, the 
relative fertility of individual plots. Given that technique and disregarding its possible 
future developments, we may then imagine (though this would be wrong historically) that 
the best plots are first taken into cultivation, after them the next best ones and so on. At any 
given time during this process it is only relatively inferior plots that remain to be exploited 
in the future. But we cannot reason in this fashion about the future possibilities of 
technological advance. From the fact that some of them have been exploited before others, 
it cannot be inferred that the former were more productive than the latter. And those that 
are still in the lap of the gods may be more or less productive than any that have thus far 
come within our range of observation.” (Schumpeter 2003, pp. 117-118) 
Schumpeter’s and Marx’s accounts of the politics of technological innovations contain a 
precious heritage. While both contextualize technological innovations within the global 
political economy, suggesting different structural pattern, Schumpeter emphasized the 
micro component of entrepreneurial activity related to innovations. Thus theorizing 
processes, both theorists also pointed to ways in which agency can be conceptualized. 
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3.3 The material and distributions of agency 
While unfolding at the personal level between machines and the laborers, Marx’s version 
of the technological drama has cumulated in mutually reinforcing macro processes of 
automation, alienation, and accumulation. In the Marxist sequential scheme of history, 
these processes and struggles are embedded in the dialectics of historical materialism. 
Here, the individual agency is of secondary importance and different technologies are in 
themselves not significant. Schumpeter’s version of technological dramas, on contrary to 
Marx’s, is bound to the agency of a specific group, the entrepreneurs many of whom 
display an instrumental perspective on technologies. Yet, at the same time, the realization 
of technological novelties has led to an infinite number of revolutionizing events. These 
remade economic structures, creating new products, processes, markets, and entire 
economies. Schumpeter has then coined this historical progress “creative destruction”. It 
included more diverse aspects than Marx’s model of historically structured dialectics of 
class struggle. Most importantly, it replaced a dialectical understanding of history with a 
contingent one. Apparently, comparing these positions would thus take one more or less 
to the opposite ends of the classical structure-agency duality. But such a reading would 
have missed out the subtleness and richness of their descriptions. Clearly, these scholars 
were struggling with the nature of technological dramas. But with all their limitations, 
neither did they articulate a simplistic determinism, nor did they pursue social 
reductionism. 
 On a conceptual level, however, one could still detect an under-emphasizing of the 
agential power of technologies. For Marx and Schumpeter deem the latter either as 
carriers of the structural dialectics or as tools for heroic entrepreneurial agency. On the 
one side, Marx took for granted interest-driven implementation of new techniques and 
machineries somewhat as innovations deus ex machina, shaping social-technical changes. 
On the other side, Schumpeter stressed the immense difficulties that actors have to 
overcome prior to stabilizing innovations. The resulting monopolization practices and 
shifts in economic structures are seen first of all as an issue of investment opportunities 
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and economic wealth creation. Both accounts definitely have not exhausted the potential 
to comprehend the back and forth within varying socio-technical entanglements.44 
 Another point was the concerns on the spatial limitations of the conceptual lenses at 
their disposal. Marx and Schumpeter were not specifically sensitive to the interactive role 
of geography and time in mapping differing transformative features of innovative 
dynamics. The idea that territories and environments could in certain ways interact with 
technological innovations, and thereby possess a form of agential power, was not of their 
concern. It is Harold A. Innis’ work on communication that could provide us with this 
insight. Innis’ “medium theory” proposed to focus on communication environments “as 
part of the structural-material landscapes in which human being interact.” (Deibert 2002, 
p. 117) His main concern is how historically changing media technologies differently 
constrain and facilitate the effective governance of empires. 
“The concepts of time and space reflect the significance of media to civilization. Media 
that emphasize time are those that are durable in character, such as parchment, clay, and 
stone. The heavy materials are suited to the development of architecture and sculpture. 
Media that emphasize space are apt to be less durable and light in character, such as 
papyrus and paper. The latter are suited to wide areas in administration and trade. (…) 
Materials that emphasize time favour decentralization and hierarchical types of institutions, 
while those that emphasize space favour centralization and systems of government less 
hierarchical in character.” (Innis 2007, p. 26-27) 
Far from being overly deterministic, his conceptual understanding is sensible to historical 
contexts of technological change (Deibert 1997). Innis emphasized that a balance 
between space-based and time-based media is necessary for the governance of political 
communities across a far-reaching territory. For instance, his earlier works on the 
integration of Canadian areas into the French and the British empires demonstrated how 
the affordances of different technologies had constrained or counteracted certain 
collective activities and ways of organizing while enabling and supporting others (Innis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 One related aspect that warrants attention is the Eurocentric view that both entertain. Marx and 
Schumpeter took the industrializing path of Europe as a global benchmark (cf. Adas 1990, p. 241). 
Schumpeter, in particular, developed an account of the industrial revolution that implicitly foregrounds 
European superiority and creative agency. He denied economic explanations of Imperialism (Schumpeter 
1919/1951) while neglecting the exploitation and violence necessary in the colonies to feed the machinery 
(see Duffield 2006, p. 21). 
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1938). Innis put emphasis on the diverging political and administrative consequences of 
the material specifics stemming from technologies or emerging industries. Through this 
analytical lens, we can see technologies, that is, their affordances are often at the core of 
power struggles between governments, administrative bureaucracies, companies, 
industries and even religious organizations (Innis 2007). Technologies, in short, have 
agential power as mediators: 
“For Innis, power was not an immediate relation among individuals or even groups. Social 
groups and societies typically seek supremacy over others. That struggle is socially and 
technologically mediated by communications media, but the primary function of 
communication, transportation, production and so on is to transmit information to move 
and make goods. These technologies and their functions are deployed by competing groups 
in their struggle for social supremacy. Technologies thus mediate power, but the causes of 
social action are not reduced to those technologies.” (Di Norcia 1990, p. 347) 
From this follows a difficult question: How to conceptually capture the dynamic and co-
productive properties of technological innovations, which these classical writers have 
stressed in different ways? In other words, where is the place of the “material” in this? 
One interesting possibility touched upon the fascinating issue of agency may wait 
beneath the conceptual level of structure-agency problems. This would involve 
reconsidering the usual logocentric attribution of agency. In particular, close attention 
should be paid towards material agency without resorting to determinism (Dobres 2000, 
Hardie and MacKenzie 2007, p. 77).  
 What does it mean that the “material” really matters and has agential force? Does, 
for instance, the presumption suffice that technology possesses agency in the sense that is 
structuring the conditions or the opportunities for social activities (e.g. Logde 2007, p. 
155)? Turning to the controversies reviewed in Chapter 2, this formulation is obviously 
problematic. For the opportunities that are assumingly offered by technologies to shape 
social behavior are neither intelligible nor transparent. They must be learned, practiced, 
and strategized. Moreover, the variety of options to use or prevent technologies from 
being used is highly contested in the first place. This point, however, does not mean that 
technologies might only become influential by being subject to symbolic representation. 
Such a social constructivist view is equally problematic because it would assume 
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cognitive factors rather than material qualities to be structuring the possible social 
responses or appropriations (see Woolgar 1991, Dobres 2010).  
 Hughes and Cipolla suggested a more genuinely autonomous material trajectory. 
On the on hand, Cipolla (2011, p. 134) while summarizing Europe’s early modern history 
suggested that technologies not only spur economic revolutions, but also exert a 
cumulative effect. Machines, he contended, would create the conditions for and 
eventually demand the invention and employment of additional machines. Hughes, on the 
other hand, concluded that technological systems, depending on their relative size, would 
develop a certain “technological momentum”. The larger they grow—that is, the more 
people, expertise, infrastructures, institutions, political interest and investments they 
assemble—the bigger their impact will grow in shaping their own environments and other 
actors (Hughes 1994, p. 112). 
3.4 Summary 
The above considerations shed a new light on the conceptual roadblocks of dualism 
(instrumentalism vs. social reductionism) on the one side, and technological determinism 
on the other side. It would add to the empirical puzzles provided in Chapter 2 by 
reintroducing key issues in a more abstract way. Conceptually exploring technological 
innovations may require not only sophisticated methodological underpinnings (see 
Chapter 5), but also analytical sensibility to account for empirical complexities. To 
clarify the proper unit of analysis, the characteristics of innovation processes, and the 
potential distribution of agency should set the stage for theorizing the politics of 
innovation. In that sense, this interlude has equipped us with preliminary definitions: 
“technology” may signify the inexorable intermingling between material objects, social 
practices, and discursive utterances that is present in real-world ensembles; “innovation” 
may refer to transformative processes of (re)assembling that can not only reshuffle stable 
socio-technological ensembles, but also affect temporality and spatial dimensions. To 
accommodate to the agential aspects of this phenomenon, Chapter 6 and 7 would sort out 
types of agency that follow to the principle of symmetry. 
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4. Charting the Cartesian complex of IR 
In recent years, the interest of IR scholars in technologies has been growing 
exponentially. 45  This chapter aims to review and discuss diverging theoretical 
approaches. It also proposes to trace the link between the discipline’s dominant schools 
and the relative scarcity of conceptualizations of technological change. My assumption is 
that IR still retains a stunning “lightness” and, only through recent efforts, might be able 
to overcome it. Currently, therefore, artifacts, technological systems, and assemblages 
represent an extremely productive, yet challenging, issue area to develop new 
materialistic approaches and enrich existing IR theories (e.g. Acuto and Curtis 2014). But 
for a long time, technological innovations as such did not attract significant academic 
interest in IR and IPE—certainly not to the extent of their prominence outside academia 
(see introduction). This neglect contrasts with the historical research that we have 
encountered in the second chapter. Despite early attention and research by prominent 
scholars, concerns with the effects of technological changes were marginalized, 
particularly with the rise of systemic theories and, later, constructivism and post-
structuralism. In this light, the first part of this chapter details the surprising degree of 
disregard for technologies within IR scholarship (4.1). This intriguing puzzle calls for an 
explanation. For how could IR have arrived at a point where technological innovations 
were off the picture rather than at the core of international relations? Why is this issue, 
which has become of utmost importance for economists and politicians, almost absent in 
IR and IPE?  
 To offer at least a partial answer to these questions, I assume that a “Cartesian 
complex” affects the development of the discipline.46 By drawing on the philosophers 
Maurizio Ferraris (2013) and Bruno Latour (1999), the reference to Cartesian thought 
allows us to excavate the conceptual commitments underpinning IR’s “lightness”. René 
Descartes, who is often seen as inaugurating modern thinking, generated a highly 
influential intellectual tradition. Based on his skeptical attitude towards human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Indeed, my observation when I started this work almost eight years ago, that there is a scarcity of 
research on that topic, now appears no longer correct. 
46 Several IR scholars (Wendt 2004, Poliout 2010) have proposed to develop post-Cartesian approaches 
without fully clarifying what this exactly means. 
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experience and sensual perceptions, Descartes’ philosophy epitomizes logocentrism. 
Famaouly, Descartes’ enshrined distinction between “res extensa” and “res cogitans”.47 
This philosophical approach narrows down the things that exist in the world to what the 
human mind can (scientifically or logically) know (Ferraris 2013, p. 59). Descartes 
imposed, against the odds of the fluid and unfixed of the premodern worldview, his clear 
intellectual order that is based upon differences (cf. Foucault 2005). Part of this approach 
is the “transcendental fallacy” which strictly separates mind and matter. It also tends to 
privilege intellectual knowledge to such a degree that “reality, including physical objects, 
depends on our conceptual schemes.” (Ferraris 2013, p. 60). Philosophers from Kant to 
Derrida, by following in Descartes’ lead, have reduced the quest for reliable knowledge 
to studying conceptual schemes—resulting in an “anti-realist” focus on reason, 
rationality, and subjectivity, which theses thinkers confuse with epistemology and 
ontology (Ferraris 2013, Braver 2007).  
Cartesian complex of International Relations theories 
Compartmentalization 
of knowledge and 
disciplinary politics 
Logocentric bias of 
ontological 
frameworks of 
dominant theories 
Conceptual dualism 
in the form of 
technological 
determinism and 
externalism 
TABLE	  4.1	  THE	  THREE	  COMPONENTS	  OF	  IR’S	  CARTESIAN	  COMPLEX	  ©AUTHOR	  
Consequently, a form of ontological reductionism also became the hallmark of European 
reflections about legitimate politics and science henceforth (Latour 2005). 
Notwithstanding the numerous thinkers including Marx, Mackinder, Heidegger, 
Benjamin, Bergson, Whitehead, and Carl Schmitt who came to fiercely contest 
Cartesianism (albeit for different reasons), most contemporary IR schools are still used to 
the metatheoretical practice that eschews the “res extensa”. The presence of pervasive 
technological systems, artificial objects, and the experience of technical mediation in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 I use the German translation of Descartes’ original Latin text (Descartes 1637/1986). For an introduction 
to Descartes’ philosophy see Prado (1992). 
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every conceivable human interaction remain unaccounted for. It is in this sense that one 
encounters the specter of Descartes when reading, digesting, and re-reading many 
sublimely crafted IR texts. 
The following section, than, unpacks the practical, ontological and conceptual 
elements of IR’s Cartesian complex: Firstly, research about technological innovations has 
suffered from systematic academic compartmentalization (4.2). Secondly, the ontological 
framework that is shared by leading theoretical approaches to IR has a strong logocentric 
bias (4.3). Thirdly, the approaches that explicitly deal with technological innovations 
belong either to the determinist or the externalist champ. Both rely on a dualism that, 
according to the drama of technological innovations outlined in Chapter 2, leads to 
conceptualizations of technology which are overly simplistic (4.4). In contrast, the third 
group of approaches that is underpinned by the idea of “coproduction” offers viable 
theoretical bridges over, or circumnavigations of, the Cartesian complex. I examine the 
coherence of their theoretical frameworks, that is, how they construe the mutual 
constitution and complex embeddedness of technology and social order. While having 
some limitations at the conceptual and methodical level, coproduction works in IR are 
focused on certain technologies, technical systems, or processes (4.5).  
 Coproduction approaches, thus far, have led to few attempts to create a more 
general theory of technology and international relations. Most of these works are isolated 
studies and did not inform or feedback into mainstream IR debates. Their research 
concerns were, with few exceptions, articulated in the conceptual straitjackets of other 
topics, domains, or debates within IR. Hence, exploring technology under conditions of 
the Cartesian complex necessarily displays shortcomings. The following, then, sketches 
out a philosophical mapping of the lightness of IR, while Chapter 5 (5.1) further unpacks 
the historical context of its emergence. 
4.1 The strange fate of technology as a research concern 
For a long time, technological innovations as such did not attract significant academic 
interest in IR and IPE—certainly not to the extent of their prominence outside academia 
(see introduction). This neglect contrasts with the historical research that we have 
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encountered in the second chapter. As we have seen, various Victorian thinkers in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century were preoccupied with the effects of navigation 
instruments, timepieces, cartography, and undersea cables for the governance and pursuit 
of power over time and space within the empire (Bell 2005). At the turn of the nineteenth 
century and during the interwar period, numerous geopolitical thinkers explored the 
impact of railways, steamships, high explosives, and airplanes on the land-sea balance, 
power, and colonial rule (C. Gray 2004, Ashworth 2013). In Conditions of Peace, E.H. 
Carr argued that modern technological developments have pushed the nation state into 
crisis and even rendered the state-system obsolete (Carr 1942). 
 In 1949, William F. Ogburn, editor of the first extensive IR treatment of our subject 
matter, expected that technological change would turn into a major new field of research 
(Ogburn 1949).48 Prominent scholars including Quincy Wright, William T. R. Fox, John 
Herz, and Bernard Brodie among others began to explore modern technologies and 
infrastructures, drivers and results of industrialization, whose “effect upon world politics 
is impossible to ignore, even though it varies in each case” (Buchan 1972, p. 162).49 
Meanwhile, scholars such as David Mitrany, Ernst B. Haas, and Joseph Nye explored the 
emerging cross-border communications and transnational global linkages through regime 
theory or (neo)functional integration theory.  
  In the 1950s and 1960s, moreover, numerous observers and practitioners 
desperately struggled with the question of how to control technological changes that 
appeared to inevitably spur conflicts and even full-fledged nuclear war (Deudney 2000b, 
pp. 19-22). While “deterrence” was not yet established in theory and practice, the 
essential question moving theorists and practitioners was how to cope with the effects of 
uncontrollable technological progress—particularly strategic weapon technologies—on 
international relations. Hans J. Morgenthau warned that the “modern scientific age” had 
essentially altered domestic politics, “dramatically” decreasing “popular participation in, 
and control over, the affairs of government” (1964, p. 1386), while John Herz theorized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ogburn, a sociologist, was among the pioneering researchers exploring technological transformation and 
material culture. For a comprehensive review see Godin (2010). 
49 See also Mackinder (1919, 1942), Carr (1942), Turner (1943), Herz (1959), Sprout and Sprout (1960), 
Sprout (1963). 
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the deterritorializing effects of nuclear weapons on states (Herz 1957). Strategies to 
handle nuclear weapons became the central research concern of a large epistemic 
community during the 1950s and 1960s (see Ayson 2000). As Chapter 5 details, select 
realists have developed an explicit critique against the prevalent naive and apolitical 
belief in technological progress (Scheuerman 2009). But, since the 1970s, technology has 
faded away from the radar screens of theorists as these works have left few traces among 
current students of IR. 
 While the reorientation of IR after 1989 may have shaken some fundamentals of the 
discipline, technological innovations, and in particular its poster child, the information 
revolution, have not received significantly more attention as a research matter. Ronald J. 
Deibert, writing in 1997, emphasized the “dearth of scholarship in the International 
Relations/communication technologies nexus”. He notes that “to the limited extent 
International Relation theorists have dealt with communications explicitly, the focus has 
primary been on the content to the exclusion of technology” (1997, p. 5, 18). A decade 
later, Johan Eriksson and Gimapero Giacomello 2006 still draw the same conclusion:  
“The end of the cold war resulted in a major crisis not only for neorealism (reputedly, the 
most successful of IR theories), which had failed to predict and explain that turn of events, 
but also for IR in general. But although much has been written about the cold war's end and 
the associated need for redefining IR theory, particularly for increasing its external validity, 
surprisingly little has been written about the information revolution and what challenges 
this implies for IR theory.” (Eriksson and Giacomello 2006, p. 223) 
The dearth of scholarship about other technologies beyond telecommunications was even 
more acute. Despite a growing number of studies on the politics of cyberspace,50 the 
current generation of IR students still becomes socialized in a purified conceptual world 
that omits technology. From reading textbooks and introductions to International 
Relations one cannot but come to the conclusion that technology and technological 
innovations are irrelevant. Consider two recent major edited volumes introducing the 
reader to International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Dunne, Kurki, 
Smith 2010) and The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Cf. Deibert and Rohozinski (2010), Singh (2013), Mueller (2012), Carr (2012). 
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Relations (Baylis, Smith, Owens 2011). The structure of both works is symptomatic: it 
completely leaves out the topic of technological innovations. The subject matter is not 
just missing from the theory chapters, but is strikingly almost completely absent from the 
topical parts.51 The global (technological) transformations originating in the nineteenth 
century are, as Barry Buzan and George Lawson (2013) stress, are virtually omitted in 
textbooks.  
 In addition, the non-existence of both an IR journal and a special subfield broadly 
dedicated to this subject matter indicates the magnitude of neglect—not to mention the 
lack of respective IR chairs or branches within the university systems.52 STAIR, the 
section on science technology arts and international relations of the International Studies 
Association (ISA) has just been established in 2015. As a result, IR and IPE theory is 
rather out-of-sync with its non-academic audience: 
“The pervasive mutual influences of science, technology and international relations, and 
their importance to global governance, make the isolation of science and technology from 
the ‘mainstream’ of international relations a curious anomaly in the 21st century.” (Weiss 
2005, p. 308) 
The claim that technological innovations are a broadly marginalized topic and research 
focus (Herrera 2003, Weiss 2005, Fritsch 2011) is also substantiated by systematic data 
on publications. It is clearly reflected, for instance, in the content of journal articles 
published in major IR journals (see table 4.2). A systematic search in online archives 
reveals that, on average, less than 1.7 percent of the all articles published between 1990 
and 2009 dealt with “science and technology”. Alternatives and Millennium show the 
highest score with roughly four percent relevant publications. 
Journal Period covered 
Number of articles 
concerning "Science 
and/or Technology" 
Percentage 
share of 
ST-articles  
Third World Quarterly 1990-2007 13 1.08 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Notable exceptions are Lawton, Rosenau, and Verdun (2000) and Balaam and Veseth (2008). These 
books, which draw their inspiration from Susan Strange’s work, are to my knowledge the only general 
introductions to IPE/IR that grant knowledge, innovation, and technological change a full-fletched chapter. 
52 A skeptical reader might say: IR confronts the proliferation and control of nuclear weapons that is a high 
technology. Yet, in concepts and empirical account, as will become obvious later, nuclear weapons are 
treated as merely social problem: as a challenge to collective interactions (deterrence).  
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Foreign Policy 1990-2009 13 0.60 
International Organization 1990-2009 6 1.06 
International Studies Quarterly 1990-2007 11 2.17 
International Affairs 1990-2007 23 0.38 
International Security 1990-2007/08 15 2.88 
International Political Science Review 1990-2009 10 2.24 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 1990-2009 5 0.72 
World Politics 1990-2009 2 0.76 
Foreign Affairs 1990-2009 28 0.38 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 1990-2009 18 4.05 
Review of International Studies 1990-2007 10 1.83 
International Studies Review 1990-2007 2 0.93 
Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 1990-2013 31 3.95 
TABLE	  4.2	  NUMBER	  OF	  JOURNAL	  ARTICLES	  CONCERNING	  SCIENCE	  AND	  TECHNOLOGY53	  ©AUTHOR	  
Furthermore, when technological innovations were a subject matter, theoretical interests 
played a minor role. On average, only about six percent of all texts dealing with 
technologies, which were published between 1990 and 2007, focuses on 
conceptualization and theoretical considerations. Millennium and The Journal of 
Conflicts Resolution are exceptions, ranking highest with 22 percent and 20 percent 
theory-focused articles respectively. Overall, merely eleven articles out of 21.866 items, 
which make up our sample, display a substantial interest in theorizing technology or 
technological innovations (see table 4.3).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Data on all journals – except Millenium: Journal of International Studies – was provided by the Jstor 
database. Data on Millenium journal was provided by SAGE journals homepage. All data was collected in 
August/September 2013. Mapping and classification of articles was based on a qualitative approach: In a 
first step, the search for science and technology related articles was based on the keywords “science” and 
“technology”. In a second step, irrelevant articles were filtered out manually. Eventually, the classification 
of relevant articles was carried out keyword-related according to the content of abstract and title. All 
articles were classified within twelve categories with different keywords: “Environment and Energy” (e.g. 
environment, energy, pollution, energy supply), “Climate Change” (e.g. climate change, ozone, sea-level 
rise). “Information and Internet” (e.g. cyberspace, information- and communication technologies), 
“Innovation” (e.g. innovation, invention, innovation systems); “Outer Space” (e.g. satellites, space 
technologies, space law), “Biology” (e.g. stem cell research). “Agriculture and Food” (e.g. genetically 
modified food and organism, seeds), “Technology” (e.g technology, high technologies, products), 
“Medicine” (e.g. HIV and Aids research, epidemics, drugs), “Science and Development” (e.g. research, 
science, development), “IPR” (patents, generic drugs) “Nuclear Warfare” (e.g nuclear weapons, nuclear 
missiles), “Other Warfare” (e.g. military technologies, biological and chemical weapons), “Theory” (e.g. 
ANT). The total number of substantial articles disregards book reviews, forewords and editorials. 
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TABLE	  4.3	  TOPICS	  OF	  JOURNAL	  ARTICLES	  CONCERNING	  SCIENCE	  AND	  TECHNOLOGY	  (SAME	  SOURCE	  
AS	  TABLE	  4.2)	  ©AUTHOR	  
Against this background, it becomes obvious that the works examined below are hardly 
dotted light towers in a dark landscape. Their perspectives and insights resemble—judged 
on the basis of their contributions to broader IR theory building efforts—silos. But why 
should the disappearance of technological innovations concern us? Some scholars might 
reject the relevance of these observations by suggesting that, while deterrence theory 
solved the most pressing issue concerning nuclear technology, the number of existing 
works sufficiently captures the scope and diversity of the matter at hand.54 Indeed, IR 
scholars have produced widely diverging claims about the role of specific technologies 
for the conduct of international affairs and foreign policy—ranging from their irrelevance 
to their preponderance. Eugene Skolnikoff (1994), for example, finds that science and 
information technologies had a limited impact on diplomatic practice and foreign policy. 
In contrast, others see “techno-globalism” challenging or even overriding state authority 
(Ostry and Nelson 1995). Robert Gilpin (1981) stresses the critical importance of 
technological innovations for the occurrence of war. Based on a materialist approach, 
Daniel Deudney (2006) claims that the co-evolution of military technologies and defense 
infrastructures determines national security practices. From a poststructuralist view, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 In addition, one might simply argue that IR’s silence is not remarkable at all by stressing that a certain 
division of labor is unavoidable. Why should one interfere with a field that firmly belongs to economics or, 
at least, to International Political Economy? Yet, as will be discussed in a minute, the very same omission 
is unfortunately also evident in IPE. 
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James Der Derian (2003) sees information technologies enabling a profoundly novel 
coagulation of surveillance, warfare, entertainment, and US power projection. The 
appreciation of these works should not prevent us, however, from realizing that they are 
marginal and insular in the context to the discipline. There is a lack of integrative 
approaches and comparative studies on technological innovations (see 4.5).  
 IR’s indifference towards technological innovations appears even more pronounced 
if we compare it to the contemporary attitude of governments, corporations, international 
organizations, and militaries (Weiss 2005). The great zeal with which practitioners use 
slogans and implement policies concerning “technological leadership”, “human capital”, 
“revolution in military affairs”, or “indigenous innovation” and so on is definitively 
absent in IR. The vanishing of technology as a research concern is also puzzling when we 
consider that other disciplines such as geography, sociology, anthropology, philosophy 
and history have at the same time established subfields, theories, journals and debates 
about technology. It is against this background, that the idea of the Cartesian complex 
seems to offer a plausible explanation for IR’s collective neglect. But before shedding 
light on the ontological and conceptual levels, we first need to clear the ground by 
examining how the disciplinary division of labor turned into another obstacle hampering 
the study of technological innovations. 
4.2 The compartmentalization of knowledge 
Scholars have repeatedly lamented that the discipline of IR is like a container. This 
reality certainly has damaged our understanding of technology. Three conventions govern 
the compartmentalization of professional knowledge of IR scholarship that confuse our 
understanding of technological innovations. The first common problem is the deliberate 
endowment of economists with the supreme authority to analyze and speak for 
technological innovations. The second obstacle lies in the static concepts, which were 
imported from economics. The third issue is the widespread ignorance of insights from 
other disciplines. In the course of this section it eventually will become obvious that such 
“disciplinary politics” prevent a clear elaboration of how the paradoxes of technological 
innovation call into question state-centric and instrumentalist problem-framings. 
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 While the disciplinary division of labor sometimes makes sense, it is unfortunately 
misleading in the case of technological innovations. It tends to put the premium on 
economic and, in particular, econometric research that provides wide-ranging statistical 
data, international rankings, and global assessments. The impressively rich graphical and 
pictorial texture of recent OECD or UNESCO reports purports overwhelming matter-of-
fact statements about innovation and technology. Yet, hidden behind their monumental 
façade are unconvincing methodical moves. They foreground monolithic states and 
national economies in the analysis of innovation processes and innovativeness while it is 
unclear which actors are the most important, how they are related to one another, and 
across which levels innovational processes—local, regional, national, continental, global 
to name a few—take place (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000, Montresor 2001). It is for 
example erroneous to treat the “state” as a unitary actor because various “strategic 
groups” inside state agencies and across institutions may push innovations and 
knowledge growth (Evers, Menkhoff, and Wah 2010).  
Dynamic accounts of innovation reject the notion of “national innovation systems”. 
They emphasize the co-evolution of mutually interacting fields—labeled as “tripple 
helix”—comprising industries, universities and governments (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
2000). Typically, these studies assume the co-evolution of technological innovations, the 
applications and diffusion of technologies on the one hand, and the regulative 
environment on the other (Leydesdorff and van den Besselaar 1994). As companies, 
universities, research institutes, and entrepreneurs are the primary actors “doing” 
innovations, their activities typically evolve within complex transnational and trans-
sectoral networks. These networks are social and commercial at the same time, 
comprising both collaboration and competition (de la Mothe and Dufour 1995, Archibugi 
and Lundvall 2003, Srholec and Verspagen 2008). Innovational processes and scientific 
collaboration often transcend national borders while they are unevenly distributed and 
spatially highly concentrated in metropolitan areas (Evers 2008, Hornidge 2008, de la 
Mothe 2004, Castells and Hall 1994).  
 As a consequence, politicians who attempt to govern or steer innovations in 
developed and developing nations alike experience them as tricky and elusive (Breznitz 
2007). The great difficulties of governments are illustrated by the irresistible blurring of 
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the lines between commercial and military applications. Because almost every high 
technology embodies dual use functions, even powerful states have failed to prevent 
“their” cutting-edge weaponry and expertise from diffusing. The research and 
development of high-tech weapons, surveillance and military equipment, system software 
and so forth become ever more intertwined with a diversity of private firms and civilian 
research institutions (Molas-Gallart 1997, Molas-Gallart and Sinclair 1999, te Kulve and 
Smit 2003). The ability of the “state” to control or to govern the knowledge society from 
its commanding highs is limited. Nevertheless, numerous econometrical studies by 
drawing on aggregated national data sets construe nation states as central units. 
Comparative research, similarly, stresses the state by assuming that national institutions 
and innovation systems matter most for explaining differences in technological 
innovations and economic performance (Lundvall, Joseph, and Chaminade 2009).  
 Adam Segal points out the “mismatch between traditional S&T analysis, based in 
the national innovation school, and an increasingly international process.” (Segal 2008, p. 
423) The resulting empirical and theoretical contradictions are mirrored in the 
impenetrable policy tradeoffs that governments often have to tackle (Godin 2002, 
Robertson 2008). The methodological focus on “states” or “national economies” conceals 
more than it reveals. And the aggregated data sets that we currently have at our disposal 
are not useful if we take the fluid technological world seriously. Moreover, theory-driven 
frameworks are lacking that combine statistical calculations on the one hand and 
qualitative observations in the other. In sum, the dominance of mainstream economics 
over this field reinforces the inadequate picture that innovational activities constitute 
inter-national issues. 
Perhaps most problematic is that the methodologies used by international 
organizations such as the OCED and the UNESCO render technological innovations and 
the resulting shifts a purely economic issue. One surely cannot fault economists for their 
prime concern with economic issues. Yet, positivist-quantitative research and indicator-
based econometrics often purport a thoroughly non-political depiction of innovations. 
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Especially global power dimensions are left out from the picture.55 To explain different 
growth rates and national wealth, innovation economics almost exclusively focus on 
national institutions and policies (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Acemoglu, Aghion, and 
Zilibotti 2006). To the extent to which the world is construed as if no links exist among 
innovational processes, technological change and international power politics, the neglect 
of this political dimension is no mistake. Nor is it simply due to a narrow disciplinary 
mind-set. The OECD places innovations in the context of growth-friendly policies, 
market competition, and collaborative responses to global challenges in order to figure 
them as problem-solutions rather than matters of power-political concerns. Technological 
innovations are consequently seen as 
“essential if countries and firms are to recover from the economic downturn and thrive in 
today’s highly competitive and connected global economy. It is a powerful engine for 
development and for addressing social and global challenges. And it holds the key, both in 
advanced and emerging economies, to employment generation and enhanced productivity 
growth through knowledge creation and its subsequent application and diffusion.” (OECD 
2010, p. 2) 
One can doubt the merits of de-politicizing the diffusion of technologies. However, if the 
OECD outlook holds true and our societies and economies undergo fundamental 
transitions that render high technology progressively pervasive and prominent, it is 
equally reasonable to assume that this transition will—as the historic examples discussed 
in Chapter 2 amply illuminate—inevitably entail power dimensions.  
Of course, this is not to imply that quantitative indicators for technological 
capacities or innovativeness should be abandoned (see Leydesdorff and Zhou 2005). 
However, the quantitative explorations of innovative capacities, economic 
competitiveness, and technological leadership are unsatisfying from an analytical 
perspective: The power aspects of technological transformations fall victim to over-
quantification (in economics) and suffer, at the same time, from constant under-
theorization and under-specification (in economics and IR). At this point, the tendency in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 International aspects are either framed as long-term pattern such as “Contradiev cycles” or as policy 
misfits and coordination problems (e.g. Dosi  et al.1988).  
But see Castellacci and Archibugi (2008), and Archibugi and Coco (2005) for excellent examples that 
render visible the power aspects empirically and conceptually. 
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IR to delegate the subject matter, and the economists’ preference for framing it in 
apolitical terms of problem solving, are mutually reinforcing. 
The second disciplinary obstacle that inhibits conceptualizing technological 
innovations is the custom of IR scholars to selectively borrow only from economics, and 
pay little attention to other neighboring disciplines. As a result, some of the core ideas 
underpinning IR thinking essentially prevent theorizing technological innovations. This 
observation seems, at the first glance, confusing for almost every systematic theory of 
international relations or international political economy has borrowed from major 
economic thinkers. Almost every feature of economic theories has either come—in one 
way or the other—to underlie theoretical approaches to IR, or has been discussed as both 
a policy concern and, from a critical perspective, a site of resistance: these notions 
include trade, production, monetary systems and currencies, global markets, transaction 
costs, and interest groups.56 At the level of theoretical assumptions, a micro-economic 
rational-actor model is the most commonplace imported tenet of economics (Guzzini 
1993, p. 444).  
But there is also an interesting exception. Why has the evolutionary dynamic of 
innovations consistently been ignored both issue-wise and on the level of theorizing?57 
The reason for this is simple. IR and IPE have exclusively borrowed from strands of 
economic theory that tend to downplay innovations systematically.58 Specifically, Joseph 
A. Schumpeter’s concept of “creative destruction” has not been picked up in IR. 
Schumpeter’s ideas are the main source of inspiration for innovation economics and the 
New Economic paradigm (cf. Hospers 2005, Witt 2003), which see innovations as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Other theoretical puzzles include global governance and regulation, the dichotomy between market 
forces and state authority, the integration of economies in a regional or world market, trade barriers, state 
capacity, financial systems and currencies, transnational corporations, and so fourth (Garret 1998, Rodrik 
1997, Moravszik 1993, Gilpin 2001, Underhill 2003, Hobson 1997, Kugler and Domke 1986, Spero and 
Hart 2010). Marxist approaches theorize international relations instead based on the concepts of class 
struggle, exploitation and resistance, core-periphery relations, and forms of hegemony (Cox 1981, 1987, 
Wallerstein 2004, Gill 2003). 
57 Although scholars have advanced “evolutionary theories” in IR they are not related to technological 
innovation at all. 
58 The concepts and puzzles derived from Smith, Ricardo, Marx and neoclassical economists have directed 
the theoretical focus to certain aspects of the capitalistic economy while neglecting others. Indeed, when 
asked to treat innovations in a substantial manner, especially classical equilibrium economics fails to 
deliver (Romer 1994). 
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foremost driving engines for growth and economic progress. Hence, this perspective is by 
and large missing in IR and IPE.59 One needs only to consult Benjamin Cohen’s (2008) 
brilliant intellectual history of International Political Economy in which great thinkers of 
innovation including Joseph Schumpeter are anathema. The entire book does not entail a 
single section that substantially deals with technological innovations either as an 
empirical concern or as a theoretical subject matter. 
While this sort of selection bias is not unusual for intellectual appropriations from 
extra-disciplinary sources, its thoroughness is striking. Not only neorealist, but also 
liberal and Marxist IR approaches have literately turned a blind eye to technology-based 
development and innovation processes.60 There is no good explanation for the fact that 
evolutionary and non-static innovation economics were simply not embraced for 
conceptual inspiration. The ramifications are obvious. The reservoir of economic 
vocabulary that explores the evolutionary dynamics of technological innovations – 
skipping assumptions of equilibrium models or static circulation-economies (Aghion and 
Howitt 1992, Metcalfe 1998, Freeman 1988, Dosi and Nelson 1993) – has not been 
mined. In sum, IR scholars cling to their static assumptions, despite the rise of 
evolutionary economics and the renaissance of Schumpeter’s ideas which ushered in non-
equilibrium models (Romer 1990, 1994, Freeman 2007). IR theories—under the 
intellectual guise of preeminent “classical” economists—have simply overlooked 
technological innovations.  
 It does not follow, though, that IR should shy away from economics. Clearly, 
economic insights inadvertently bear on IR. Particularly, I will later draw myself on 
innovation economics to develop my framework. Against Higgot and Watson (2007, p. 
16), who state that “it becomes progressively less tenable to present economics as ‘the 
approach’ to explaining social reality rather than as one approach amongst many”, it is 
worth noticing that essentially different economic theories exist. Although I agree with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 In this sense, John Stopford and Susan Strange (1991) and John de la Moth and Gilles Paquet (1996) are 
noteworthy as they attempt to capture interactions between emerging technologies and power. Stopford and 
Strange, for instance, stress “investments in competitive innovation have proved decisive in determining 
who gains leadership on the world stage and who loses” (Stopford and Strange 1991, p.66). 
60 To a certain degree, world system approaches have paid more attention (e.g. Arrighi 1994). Yet, most 
scholars in these groups are not pledging allegiance to IR, if they are not in an outright opposition to the 
discipline (Buzan and Little 2001). 
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Higgot and Watson that several other disciplines provide valuable inspirations, IR would 
especially benefit from the New Economics’ paradigm shift towards dynamic, non-linear 
models. 
The third and last aspect of disciplinary politics is the neglect of non-economic 
research. As IR theorists—including scholars who approach technologies—rely on 
misleading thoughts of economists, they have largely refrained from adopting and 
incorporating the rich conceptual frameworks and materials about technological 
innovations advanced by neighboring disciplines. 61  Indeed, sociology, history, 
geography, anthropology, archeology, and science and technology studies (STS) did long 
acknowledge the reality of the technological world. They have accumulated a large body 
of knowledge that highlights the massively transformative and productive character of 
technologies.62 Although some studies directly point to international affairs,63 IR scholars 
have eschewed these insights. They were not used in order to recalibrate and refine IR 
theories.64  
Hence, what Chris Brown has noted concerning the entire discipline is especially 
relevant for the study of technological innovations: “it is embarrassing how often IR 
theorists find themselves grappling with problems that have been current elsewhere in the 
social sciences for decades.” (2007, p. 350) As a result, techno-politics are subject to a 
powerful collective state of denial in IR—otherwise, IR scholars certainly would have 
started to fight over this turf as well. Instead, a learning attitude is needed. IR would 
certainly benefit from importing empirical knowledge and methodological know-how. 
However, given the problematic inappropriateness of existing frameworks, does 
“incorporation” actually make sense? It could be argued that pressing the empirical 
observations and theoretical concepts, which are to be imported, into insufficient 
frameworks would lead to foretold stillbirth.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Tellingly, these disciplines were not occupied with the business of establishing one distinct subject 
matter that embodies the sacred cow of the scientific community. And, perhaps, the former were not as 
much yearning for academic identity as was postwar IR. 
62 See footnote 4. 
63 See Headrick (1979), Adas (1990), Jasanoff (2006), Krige (2006a), Krige and Barth (2006), Winseck and 
Pike (2007).  
64 The important outliers such as Der Derian (1990), Deibert (1997), Litfin (1999), Singh (2002), Deudney 
(2000a) and Herrera (2003, 2006) will be discussed below. 
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Untying the Gordian knot demands a radical cure. We ought to grant IR theories a 
break because integrating insights from other disciplines requires first of all open-
mindedness. To this end, we should assume a genuine empirical/conceptual 
interdisciplinary field that contains the “global politics of science and technology”. As 
one needs to build this field almost entirely from scratch, this enterprise benefits from the 
supply of fresh empirical materials and conceptual tools (cf. Mayer et al. 2014a). To be 
sure, combining notions and concepts in an interdisciplinary way does not imply that we 
must completely sacrifice theoretical parsimony. Yet, parsimony should not be mistaken 
as an excuse for over-simplistic models including logocentric ontologies and static 
assumptions. To establish a new subfield in IR constitutes an enormous long-term project 
– to which this book only can make a small contribution. Nonetheless, removing the 
roadblocks of compartmentalization renders our thinking about technological innovations 
more fruitful. 
4.3 The logocentrism of IR’s ontological framework 
If one agrees that we have to acknowledge the significance of transformative 
technological innovations, how can we explain that mainstream IR theories are so far off 
the mark? Why are the “mainstream” theories such as neo-realism, neo-institutionalism, 
and constructivism silent about these empirical matters of fact? Probing into the 
compartmentalization of knowledge has just scratched at the surface of IR’s Cartesian 
complex. Examining the ontological assumptions that are widely shared by the academic 
community produces a clearly shaped account of the puzzle of lightness. For this 
purpose, I revisit Kenneth Waltz’s influential Man, the State and War. A reconstruction 
of his brilliantly parsimonious line of arguments reveals an ontology that completely 
eschews the material world. As Waltz is often credited for being the most influential IR 
theorist, it turns out that his version logocentrism also underpins other systemic IR 
theories. 
 The first important clue concerning ontology derives from the way in which Waltz 
defines his central problem—the occurrence of war.65 Waltz’s introductory remarks set 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 To be precise, Waltz’ book deals with inter-state war. It does not cover civil wars, mercenary conflicts, 
religious wars, colonial conquests, resource wars, ethnic cleansing, tribal warfare, and so on. His narrow 
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the tone: “War begins in the minds and emotions of men, as all acts do” (Waltz 1959, p. 
9). When Waltz subsequently frames collective action under conditions of anarchy, he 
does so by drawing on contract theorists; and mainly on Rousseau (Waltz 1959, p. 161-
186).66 Referring to Rousseau, Waltz notes that “if harmony is to exist in anarchy, not 
only must I be perfectly rational but I must be able to assume that everyone else it too. 
Otherwise there is no basis for rational calculation.” (Waltz 1959, p. 169) Waltz refers to 
a famous story that embodies the state of nature to layout the concept of anarchy. Writes 
Waltz: 
“Rousseau illustrates the line of reasoning with the simplest example. The example is 
worth reproducing, for it is the point of departure for the establishment of government and 
contains the basis for his explanation of conflict in international relations as well. Assume 
that five men who have acquired a rudimentary ability to speak and to understand each 
other happen to come together at a time when all of them suffer from hunger. The hunger 
of each will be satisfied by the fifth part of the stag, so they ‘agree’ to cooperate in a 
project to trap one. But also the hunger of any one of them will be satisfied by a hare, so, as 
a hare comes within reach, one of them grabs it. The defector obtains the means of 
satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape. His immediate interest 
prevails over consideration for his fellows. The story is simple; the implications are 
tremendous.” (Waltz 1959, pp. 167-8) 
In other words, anarchy is “weightless”: the perennial collective action problem of IR 
plays out primarily in and between human minds. Consequently, Waltz (1959, pp. 235-
237) sees weapon technologies as merely ephemeral. There is, conceptually, no 
difference between a world with spears and a world with nuclear warheads. He argues 
that even nuclear weapons are not able to override the constant threat of war between 
sovereign states as a result of international anarchy. Anarchy, according to Waltz, always 
remains a collective action problem solely posited in terms of mind-mind-interactions. 
The only independent function granted to technology is their influence on rational 
calculations: “nuclear weaponry”, writes Waltz later, ”makes miscalculation difficult 
because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
concept of war thus foregrounds states while the material category of war is not nearly comprehensively 
covered in his discussions. 
66 On contract theories as conceptual resources for IR theories see Jahn (2006) and Beitz (1979). 
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do.” (Waltz 2008, p. 418)67 
 The “weightless” view of Man, the State and War is anything but an outlier. 
Ontological logocentrism is widespread among foundational texts of IR. Consider for 
instance Hedley Bull, another founding fathers. Like Waltz, he reduces the world to 
social interactions, although his arguments fundamentally contradict Waltz’ neorealism. 
Bull sees The Anarchical Society as a functioning, rule based order. “International order”, 
he proposes “is order among states; but states are simply groupings of men” (Bull 1977, 
p. 20). Like Waltz, Bull does not enlist material artifacts in his initial description. 
Technology is thus not constitutive to the world assembled in his classical work. Of 
course, Bull cannot silence technology completely. When he examines the balance of 
power, suddenly, “industry and military organisation” and “military technology” slip in 
to the picture (Bull 1977, p. 102). He determines the defining moment of war as the threat 
to “common values, rules, and institutions” (Bull 1977, p. 187). As Bull discusses nuclear 
deterrence strategies, he mentions that “even without nuclear weapons war for an 
advanced state can involve such physical destruction, and such political, economic, and 
social dislocation as to make war almost unthinkable as an instrument of policy (…)” 
(Bull 1977, p. 194; italics added by author). Astonishingly, Bull spends no more than a 
single paragraph to hint at the planetary technological infrastructures that sustain modern 
life and might be subject to “dislocation”. In the same vein, another proponent of the 
English school notes “change in institutions can have much greater impact on the daily 
lives of ordinary people than most technological innovations.” (Holsti 2004, p. 19) 
Ultimately, the English school relegates technological changes to the conceptual 
sidelines.68 
 Robert Cox, who is known for bringing back a materialist (Marxist) approach into 
IR, surprisingly, advances a similarly logocentric emphasis. Cox (1981, 1987) draws on 
Marx and Gramsci to develop his conceptual framework of global change. He proposes a 
triangle in which the production forces (i.e. the “material conditions”) interact with ideas 
or ideologies on the on hand, and institutional settings that order regulations and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 For a more detailed exploration of Waltz approach to technology see Chapter 5. 
68 But see Buzan and Lawson (2015) who acknowledge massive socio-technical change, yet ultimately do 
not adopt the English School’s central concept of „institutions“. 
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governance on the other hand (Cox 1987, May 2009, p. 40). Yet, the production forces do 
not reflect recurring waves of technologies, but are first of all defined in terms of social 
class. As Cox outlines ontological parameters in a more recent text, he immediately 
narrows down agency to intention-capable actors.  
“The first ontological question is: What is power? And the second is: Where does power lie 
in the present world order? ‘Power’ I take in a very general sense to mean whatever force 
can intentionally bring about change in the behaviour of any of the diversity of agents in 
world political economy. I do not assume a priori what those forces or those agents are. 
States are obviously to be included among the agents. Military strength and the capacity for 
economic coercion are obviously to be included among the relevant forces. But there are 
many other things in each category.” (Cox 2004, p. 308, italics added by author) 
The crucial point here is not to single out theoretical approaches for logical errors or lack 
of parsimony. Rather, these eminent scholars epitomize pars pro toto a theoretical 
commitment of IR that is underreflected. Despite their otherwise huge differences, 
Waltz’s, Bull’s, and Cox’s approaches similarly construe international relations as a 
social matter, that is, human-to-human or mind-to-mind interactions. In as much as 
human interests and social interactions are mediated through norms, institutions, and 
regimes, the latter concepts are defined in purely intentional terms. Such an ontology 
exclusively grants agency to “social” agents, which ultimately means rational calculus, 
ideas and subjectivities.  
 Constructivist (and post-structuralist) scholars even amplify this logocentric bias. 
Although the family of constructivist approaches embodies huge conceptual differences, 
they are equally neglecting artifacts, technical systems and material objects. As such, 
they treat international relations exclusively in terms of “intersubjective relations”, 
“norms”, “discourses”, “speech acts”, “framings”, “signals” or “ideas”. Alexander 
Wendt, for example, famously argued that IR—except for some inescapable constrains of 
“rump matter”—eventually is “ideas all the way down” (Wendt 1999, p. 110). Though 
Wendt’s Social theory rests on a critical realist meta-theoretical foundation, which 
explicitly acknowledges the existence of an “objective reality”, inter-subjectively enacted 
identity remains the central focus of activity, and therefore, domain to capture, order, and 
explain international relations (Zehfuss 2001). As Wendt states, “by virtue of its dualist 
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ontology in particular Social Theory is fundamentally Cartesian in its worldview” (Wendt 
2004, p.189). The same applies to power concepts that refer to knowledge or discourse 
(see Barnett and Duvall 2005). The very term “soft power” (Nye 1990, 2008) is 
suggestive of a sublimation of the material world.  
 Furthermore, it could be argued that studies of epistemic communities involve a 
subtle materialist move. For assuming scientific knowledge can influence international 
negotiations and helps to set the political agenda implies, if indirectly, to bring “nature” 
back in. Yet, all these approaches enmesh the potential agency of the material in a 
profoundly logocentric perspective. The emergence of objects (and subjects) is always 
conditioned by scientific discourse and in form of “purely ideational representations” 
(Allan 2017, p. 157). The same ideational tendency is inherent to the Copenhagen’s 
school of securitization theory that, consistent with radical constructivism (Buzan, 
Wæver, and de Wilde 1998), deliberately eclipses all technological or material elements 
of reality in its model (McDonald 2008).  
 Poststructuralist scholars in general see their subject matter primarily through and 
as textual discourse (Wight 2002) but their analytical tools can involve a subtler reading 
of materiality than most other IR theories would allow for (Fierke 2003, see also the 
discussion in Jasanoff 2004b). Campbell (2007) insists that material artifacts, like ideas, 
are elements of performative processes—substantiated for example by his analysis of 
images and videos about humanitarian emergencies. As an important source for “critical” 
security studies, poststructuralists have expanded the subject matter of security 
enormously (Walker 1991). Yet, no conceptual language was advanced to capture 
technologies and there effects although for Walker “the acceleration of modern life has 
caused the distinction between time inside the state and outside the state to collapse” and 
due to “speed and acceleration (…) space is compressed and borders are becoming less 
significant, and so too is state sovereignty” (Mckay 2016, p. 5). Materials, which can 
shape subjective experiences such time, do not become discursive agents in their own 
right (see Campbell 2007, Walker 1993). For example, critical security studies see the 
predicament of failed states such as Congo in the formation of developmental discourse 
by the international community rather than in the material conditions experienced at the 
ground (Schouten 2013). Poststructuralist approaches in fact have great difficulties to 
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develop analytical lenses and conceptual vocabularies that capture and explore “material” 
beyond text and representation.69  
 To map “postmodern” moves of sublimation that are typical for IR theories should 
not, however, distract us from scholars who have enlarged the ontological parameters 
beyond the perspective of logocentrism. Most notably are James Rosenau, Robert Cox, 
Saskia Sassen, Barry Buzan, and Susan Strange who have dedicated their research to 
understand international politics more comprehensively from economic, historical, and 
social angles (Strange 1988, Rosenau 1990, 2003, Cox 1987, Sassen 2006). And yet, their 
efforts have produced mixed results with respect to technological innovations. Strange’s 
examination of “secondary structures” of global energy supply and transport as 
“important in their own right” (Strange 1988, p. 139) has not been followed up in IR.  
Another group of scholars who write in a feminist tradition displays similar 
expansionist energies. Cynthia Enloe (2000), Christine Sylvester (1994), Ann Tickner 
(1998), and Alison Howell (2011) among others are pushing the ontological envelope of 
IR by proposing to include bodies, persons (other than states men), and emotions as 
crucial elements of international politics (Youngs 2008, Blanchard 2003). It is obvious 
that these and other scholars have opened up many interesting avenues for “materialist” 
research.70 Tapping into their conceptual vocabularies and empirical observations helps 
to theorize new technologies and the techno-scientific world writ large (Howell 2014, see 
4.1). 
 Despite these attempts to broaden the ontological scope of IR, logocentrism still is 
in a dominant position – the great differences among mainstream schools and paradigms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 To the extent to which the practices of exclusion/inclusion within a spatially structured totality of 
sovereign states are dealt with, they remain an expression of the evolving and inherent philosophical 
contradictions of modern subjectivity – a never-ending political contradiction that is embodied, it seems 
inescapably, within the generic triptych of the individual, the state and the international system. “Kant’s 
ambivalent articulation” as to whether the intractably connected pair of modern statehood and the system of 
states is able to resolve the tensions between particularities and universalities, notes Walker, “remains a 
crucial guide to the modern political imagination” (Walker 2010, p. 80). In other words, while international 
relations/IR are the quintessential arena of the sublime aporias intertwined with the unfolding modern 
organization of the body politic, there are no handy concepts to study how this logic unfolds through the 
reality of a technological-material world. 
70 One beauty of many feminist approaches, opposite to research concerned with state systems, is that they 
prioritize empirical field research and “lay-perspectives”. Chapter 4 argues that this constitutes a 
methodologically promising route. 
	   117	  
notwithstanding. Even incommensurable theoretical positions find common ground by 
conceptually externalizing or just neglecting the technological world. On close 
inspection, Waltz and Walker, in spite of their different appropriations and references to 
enlightenment thinking, have more in common than what sets them apart. Most 
important, the ongoing history of technological permeation of the real world is not 
playing any crucial role within their accounts. As proponents of science studies have 
pointed out (Winner 1995, Latour 1992b), to silence technology is a customary practice 
within all social sciences that are heavily indebted to logocentrism and excessively 
foreground the “social”. Andrew Writes Feenberg (1999, p.2): 
“modern political theory subsumed technical activity under the economy and did not raise 
the same kinds of issues about rights and responsibilities in relation to it that are considered 
relevant to the state. Common sense instrumentalism treated technology as a neutral means, 
requiring no particular philosophical explanation or justification. So once again it was 
pushed aside; as an aspect of private life, it was considered irrelevant to the basic 
normative questions that concerned the thinkers of the great tradition in political theory 
such as Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke (Winner, 1995).” 
The Cartesian complex entails a logocentric structure at the ontological level that has led 
to the exclusion and, in fact, suppression of materiality. Technological artifacts, systems 
and infrastructures are barely visible within the basic description of the world that is 
familiar to IR. It is fair to note that the biased ontology of most IR schools’ is not unique. 
One has to go no further than to “global transformation studies” to stumble over the same 
problem.71 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 David Held et al. (1999) mention in the last pages of their monumental volume Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economics and Culture that “the immense increase in global and regional interactions of all kinds 
has been supported by a series of transformations in the infrastructures of global interaction.” However, 
they take back even this cautious notice, by stating “the invention of these technologies is not sufficient by 
itself to account for their deployment, use and growth; but their contribution to both the increased volume 
and transformed character of contemporary globalization is undeniable.” (1999, p. 428) Besides a few 
comments on military infrastructures, Global Transformations does not dedicate a single page to the 
technological world. Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations is another example. While Huntington 
critically notes that the expansion of the western civilization was owed to military superiority (1996, p. 51), 
he prefers to exclusively focus his line of arguments on culture, religion, and identity rather than relating it 
to technological connections. 
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4.4 The two faces of dualism: determinism and externalism 
Aside from its logocentric ontology, the Cartesian complex entails another powerful 
element: conceptual dualism. The impact of Descartes’ ideas comes in the form of an 
entrenched and self-evident distinction that sets apart politics/society and the material 
world (cf. Patomäki and Wight 2000). In the following, I discuss in detail literature that 
belongs to the two most widespread threads of dualism within IR; first, technological 
determinism and second, externalism of technology.  
4.4.1 Technological determinism 
Varieties of hard and soft technological determinism were a mainstream mode of 
theorizing international politics especially during the 1950s and the 1960s. These 
determinist or “substantialist” accounts do not resemble the crude materialism which is 
often wrongly assigned to Marx.72 Determinists within IR rather assume that machines, 
weapons, and infrastructures, to a varying degree, can determine or shape actors, 
practices, and ideas in international affairs (Fritsch 2011). Especially, two groups stand 
out that have distinct theoretical views on technological innovations: Marxists and 
Realists. Marxist approaches generally understand the uneven distribution and ownership 
of production technologies as the central force behind world politics. For world system 
theories and the Dependencia school, the peripheral status of societies is predetermined 
by technological differences, and particularly by the asymmetric dependence on 
technologically leading economies (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Hence, it is the control 
over and the access to cutting edge technologies that is a core determinant structuring the 
world system (Wallerstein 2004, pp. 28ff, Prew 2010, pp. 166ff.). While Marxists stress 
how the diffusion patterns of technological innovations privilege hegemonic centers at 
the core over the semi-peripheral and peripheral regions (Arrighi 1994), realist literature 
usually focuses on the effects of innovations in weaponry.  
 The constant danger of war dominates both the realist research agenda and its 
theoretical interests. Rapid advances in weapons systems are thought to have crucial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See Bimber (1990) and Lawson (2007, pp. 33ff.). A more detailed discussion of determinism in in 
Chapter 2. 
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repercussions. Robert Gilpin elaborates how changes in technological environments alter 
state behavior, making it more or less expansionist. Apart from societal factors, Gilpin 
sees material advantages as underlying drivers of power politics. “Most frequently this 
advantage, especially in modern era, has been conferred by technological innovations” 
(Gilpin 1981, p. 54). Advances in transport and communication technologies have 
historically resulted in a “loss-of-strength gradient”, thereby massively changing the costs 
of exercising political dominance over large territories (Gilpin 1981, p. 56). He notes that 
innovations in military technologies also offer incentives for states to challenge the 
existing world order. For they imply a shift of the size of the area over which it is 
profitable to expand military protection in exchange for revenues (Gilpin 1981, p. 60). 
So, while novel weapon systems have played a decisive role in the advent of hegemonic 
wars within Europe, the global dominance of European empires owes its existence to 
technological progress. “The military superiority of Western civilization”, notes Gilpin, 
“has rested both on the complexity of modern technology and on the character of Western 
science-oriented culture” (1981, p. 61). 
 Elsewhere in the literature, realists assume that persistent weapon innovations 
constitute a general principle. The modern surge of technological inventions compels 
states to be permanently concerned with adapting and anticipating further progress 
(Buzan and Herring 1998). The “technological imperative” thus drives international 
affairs and especially national defense policies (Buzan 1987, p. 74). Exemplifying this 
point are the competitive logic by weapon types such as battleships in the 1920s 
(McBride 1997), the advent of strategic cruise missiles in the 1960s (Betts 1981), and the 
race for offensive cyber forces in the 2000s (Demchak 2003, Arquilla 2012). According 
to this view, waves of “military revolutions” have, over centuries, ushered in vastly 
different forms of warfare, defense policies and, ultimately, social and political order 
(Knox and Murray 2001, Hoyt 2003).73 Anthony G. McGrew points out that the same 
mechanism combined with rapid industrialization in peripheral states led to a “the 
globalization of military innovation and to the emergence of a highly interdependent 
world military order” (1992, p. 84). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 This ties into the literature that sees a key role for warfare, military innovation, and defense organization 
in the context of modern state formation (see Porter 1994, Tilly 1985, Roberts 1995, Mann 1988). 
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“The technological dynamic of the superpower arms race thus imposes itself on all states in 
the global system. It is in this sense that technology acts as a globalizing force – a force 
which not only structures the political relations between states but penetrates national 
societies across the globe.” (McGrew 1992, pp. 84-5) 
The nuclear revolution is perceived as the most pertinent showcase of how a new 
technology led to massive changes globally. Clearly, nuclear physics has essentially 
changed statecraft forever (Jervis 1989). For a period, different determinist arguments 
have been advanced. Numerous scholars and experts feared that uncontrollable 
advancements in weapon technologies were leading to shifts in the defense-offense 
balance. Observers anticipated that the political and military responses to nuclear 
standoffs would unfold in a destabilizing and uncontrollable manner (Freedman 2003). 
Thomas C. Schelling (2006, p. 50) reminds us that it was not exaggerated to believe that 
“unless the nuclear powers drastically disarmed, thermonuclear war within the decade 
was a mathematical certainty.” Herman Kahn assumed that “a continuation of the present 
international order is incompatible with probable technological developments” (Kahn 
1962, p. 209). Another group of scholars advanced to idea of “nuclear one worldism” 
(Deudney 1995). John Herz, for instance, theorized the political effects that the atomic 
age had on sovereignty and international system, anticipating technologically induced 
global interdependence. Herz assumed in a rather deterministic way the demise of the 
territorial state and the global “universalism”, a view that he came later to correct and 
replace by a more complex understanding of the interactions of nuclear weapons and 
territorial statehood (Herz 1968, p. 13). 
 Drawing on these ideas, Daniel Deudney’s “historical security materialism” 
conceptualizes the sequence of military revolutions on the systemic level. He introduces a 
reading of international politics as historically shaped by phases of technological progress 
(Deudney 2007). It links with reference to the critical engagement with modernity by 
early realists74 the massive progress in the forces of destruction to different globally 
prevalent “modes of protection.” Depending on certain historical states of military 
technologies, distinctive security practices are produced in the early modern, the global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 For the ethical and moral critique of technology by Morgenthau and other realists see Scheuerman 
(2009). 
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the industrial, and the planetary nuclear phase respectively (Deudney 2000b, Deudney 
2000a). Deudney stresses the danger of misfits between the material context and actual 
security practices. He especially emphasizes that the security institutions of an anarchical 
international system seem insufficient for the nuclear age: 
“When violence capability is superabundant and rapid, the main real-state external security 
practice—balancing—requires special effort, and thus need no longer define security 
institutions. When violence is superabundant, security-viable politics no longer have to 
strain to mobilize enough power, but rather must de-mobilize power. Where superabundant 
violence capacity is available for extremely rapid employment, security requires enhanced 
checks on violence and on violence employment authorities that real-state practices and 
structures are unable to provide.” (Deudney 2000a, p. 96) 
A somewhat similar approach is advanced in Duvall and Havercroft’s study on future 
space based weapons that might translate into an unknown form of domination. Their 
approach fits more the label of soft determinism than Deudney’s work. They study the 
“the constitutive logics“ of different yet-unrealized space-based weapon systems, and 
how their “modes of political killing are productive of political subjects.“ (Duvall and 
Havercroft 2008, 758ff.) They, too, come to far-reaching conclusions concerning the 
nature of the international system:  
“In the empire of the future the locus of authority is centralised but this authority governs a 
deterritorialised political entity. While this new constellation of political power will present 
new possibilities for resistance, we should not underestimate how this empire’s new modes 
of killing will constitute structures of domination potentially more terrifying than anything 
humanity has yet encountered.“ (Duvall and Havercroft 2008, pp. 774ff.) 
To the extent to which determinist approaches make sense of technologies, their 
shortcomings have become apparent. Determinist studies on atomic weapons have led to 
paradox insights. The nuclear arsenals are said to have put more power into the hand of 
national armies than ever before while apparently ending the era of wars fought between 
major states (van Crefeld 1993, cf. Mueller 1989). In a much-quoted passage, Bernard 
Brodie (1946, p. 76) foresaw the radical impact of the “Absolute Weapon” in reversing 
the purpose of the military establishment from winning wars to averting them. But it took 
almost 20 years until nuclear weapons became recognized as making mutual nuclear 
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deterrence the only game in town. The reason is that the material structures did not 
simply make superpowers realize that their overarching common interest lies in their 
nuclear dominance, non-proliferation, and stable deterrence (Walker 2000, Gavin 2012). 
In other words, the conceptual juxtaposition of the “material context” on the one hand 
and defense practices on the other is not fine-grained enough. It is unable to capture the 
sublime, fluid, and hybrid circumstances of technological systems and how they impinge 
on technically mediated human activities.  
The limitations of determinist assumptions are most obvious from the fact that the 
political “results” of technological innovations become often highly contested. New 
means of transport compress time and space and facilitate economic interdependence 
(Gilpin 1981). But they can also turn into a force of peace, transcending the rivalry 
among states. Barry Buzan, for instance, claims that the idea of a “global society” and 
shared norms at the individual level presuppose high interaction capacities embodied in a 
“densely networked and interactive planet” (Buzan 1993, p. 339). Ferguson and 
Mansbach (2007, p. 534) argue that modern network technologies have caused a 
reduction of distances, which led to a post-international situation as “the product of 
simultaneous processes of fusion and fission of authority”. The essentially contested 
political consequences of the Internet similarly undermine deterministic notions. In the 
debate whether cyber space is the utopian home of digital “liberation technologies” or 
rather the dystopian ocean of all surveillance techniques, it seems two techno-determinist 
accounts fight each other (Diamond 2010, Morozov 2011, see Drezner 2010).  
Another debate among realists raises the question whether a fully modernized 
industrial society can still conquer another one. Against the “liberal” view that 
modernization has rendered military conquest obsolete, realist authors stress the crucial 
role of modern technologies for realizing effective coercion and repression. 
“... the rapid communication and mobility permitted by modernization allows conquerors 
to use their coercive resources efficiently. Communication links and technologies make 
surveillance easier. And since urbanization, roads, and mechanized forms of transport 
permit rapid and sequential responses to outbreaks of resistance, despots no longer have to 
distribute forces throughout their dominions.” (Liberman 1993, p. 143) 
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The clash of mutually exclusive views demonstrates the principle shortcoming of 
determinism. The reason that determinist approaches fail is because they overly simplify 
the interaction between the “social” and the “technical” by merely assuming that social 
response just follows external material conditions. Determinist deductions, methodically 
speaking, preclude a careful empirical analysis of the historical coevolution of the 
practices, norms, and rationales in which artifacts and technological infrastructures are 
embedded in the first place. The development of military technology is subject to 
political choices and thus social nudging (Reppy 1990) as much as the Internet is. 
Madeline Carr (2011) shows that the perceptions of power, authority, and other 
normative priorities of US politicians have heavily influenced the legal and technical 
development of the Internet. In this sense, it “is essential to understand more about 
political interactions with Internet technology if we are to reach any useful conclusions 
about state power in the information age” (Carr 2011, p. 14). 
To theorize technologies based upon rigorous theoretical deduction also produces 
sterile and abstract entities on both sides of the equation (i.e. the state, security policies, 
or the international system vs. “Technology” with big letters). In lieu of detailed 
empirical observations and historical sensitivity, the central weakness or determinist 
perspectives lies in their lack of differentiation ability. For example, the varieties of 
collective responses to different communication techniques from the printing press and 
telegraph to Internet-based social media remain unaccounted for (Mitcham 1994, Poe 
2011). A differentiated theoretical treatment of how civilian and military technologies – 
not to mention their interaction and fusion – have stimulated diverging constructions of 
social order and political institutions therefore remains impossible. Analytically, 
determinists are not able to cope also with the competition among various military 
technologies: neither the technological imperative, nor security materialism can elucidate 
in general terms what actually constitutes the most relevant “material environment”. 
While an increasing number of sophisticated cyber-weapons and robots adds to the 
existing conventional forces and nuclear arsenals, security materialism does not offer a 
conceptual operation to sort out the hierarchy between nuclear bombs, computer viruses 
and drones. In brief, IR’s determinist approaches in their current form lead to a dead-end. 
Because they do not enable us to carefully theorize technological innovations nor to 
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develop a sophisticated comprehension of “how machines make history” (Heilbronner 
1994, p. 70). 
4.4.2 Externalism 
The majority of dualist approaches, however, takes a stance which is opposite to 
technological determinism. Their treatment amounts to externalizing technological 
innovations to a theoretically irrelevant domain, for artifacts and infrastructures are not 
seen as immediate elements of collective action and social agency. John Gerard Ruggie, 
introducing a 1975 special issue of International Organization on “international 
responses to technology“, exemplifies this conceptual move: 
“By introducing political purposes into the equation linking technological change to 
international organization we considerably complicate our descriptive and prescriptive 
tasks. International organization is itself then no longer a simple response to technology, 
but, rather, a more complex product of the intersection of two axes. Along the first is 
plotted the tensions between science, heavily informed by consensual knowledge of 
cause/effect relations, and politics, heavily informed by normative purposes, negotiated 
priorities and available capabilities. The outcome of this tension may be said to define the 
situation which science and its products will have occasioned. Along the second axis is 
plotted the tension between the need of states to respond collectively to problems and 
opportunities such situations contain, and their desire to maintain national autonomy and 
flexibility in so doing. The outcome of this tension may be said to define the response 
which a new situation will have occasioned.” (Ruggie 1975, p. 558) 
Although the sociology of technology has long shown that actual “technological 
changes” do hardly resemble Ruggie’s picture, conceptualizing technologies as a deus ex 
machina still is representative for today’s mainstream research. It is assumed that the 
occurrence of technological innovation creates a new situation that, only then, becomes a 
tangible concern and requires social and political adaptation. Yet, the very existence of 
technologies implies numerous human choices were made earlier. And, as an inevitable 
part of the innovation processes, political and cultural forces come to influence and 
negotiate the shape technologies as mentioned above. Externalism, in other words, 
reinforces the conceptual separation of spheres: objective material facts and “collective 
decision making” must be strictly kept apart (Skolnikof 2002). Bruno Latour has called 
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this conceptual trap the “great divide”. It purifies the messy emergence of technologies 
that entails divers entanglements between, and mutual transformations of, artifacts and 
social activities, ideas and norms from the first moment of innovational dynamics to their 
last step (Latour 1993). 
 Externalist approaches furthermore avoid studying the historical social-material 
complexity of technological evolutions. A range of authors divers as Gilpin, Strange, or 
Keohane seem to accept that innovation just happens. The emergence of technologies and 
related scientific discoveries seem self-evident and is taken for granted.75 The nearly 
universal acceptance of this proposition is also a common tenet of classical economic 
theories (Aghion and Howitt 1992, Witt 2003)—and here compartmentalization and 
externalism are mutually reinforcing. This explains why most theoretical frameworks in 
IR and IPE conceptually silence innovation processes. So, while the “externalists” at least 
indirectly touch upon technological innovations, their research focus is directed towards 
“political” struggles over interests and values attached to technological innovations.  
Contrary to determinism, externalist conceptualizations tend to instrumentalize 
technologies. Most scholars consider technologies as resources to be applied in power 
struggles or diplomacy. According to this widespread view, technical expertise and 
technologies can be deliberately manufactured to serve as a resource yielding to the 
purposes of politicians or generals. Neorealist and neoliberal schools as well as 
constructivism share this instrumentalist view (Singh 2002, pp. 6-12). Constructivist 
analysis in particular insists on the centrality of ideational puzzles for explaining 
international affairs (Wendt 1992, Onuf 1989). Consider Adler’s (1997, p. 336) statement 
that remains largely uncontested among IR scholars: “social reality is a matter of 
imposing meanings and functions on physical objects that do not already have those 
meanings and functions”. In this instrumentalist vein, numerous studies of weapon 
technologies study the meaning attached to objects such as nuclear bombs or chemical 
weapons, and technological progress more generally, to show how actors endow 
materials with social meaning (e.g. Adler 1987, Price 1995, Solingen 1996, Suttmeier, 
Tan, and Yao 2006). As “material” and “ideational” factors are seen as irreconcilable, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 For a more detailed comparison how the big IR schools treat technology according to their logic see 
Fritsch (2011). 
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materials have no meaning, as it is merely an instrument of social actors. To cite Wendt 
at length:  
“Material power is only “power” insofar as it is meaningful, as shown by the relative threat 
to the U.S. posed by 5 North Korean nuclear weapons versus 500 British ones. And interest 
is only “interest” insofar as it is given content by ideas, as shown by the U.S. failure to 
conquer the Bahamas. In each case, realism’s ostensibly material factors turn out to be 
constituted largely by ideas; at best we are talking here about how one set of ideas 
(“realist” ones, perhaps) relates to another (“idealist”). (…) the only fair way to compare 
the relative importance of ideas and material conditions would be to first strip power and 
interest of their constituting ideas, isolating their brute or rump materiality (technology, 
geography, and human nature), and then seeing to what extent the latter constrains or 
causes the former. Were we to do this in IR, however, with its non-material corporate 
actors interacting in a space of shared meaning, it seems clear that ideas would be more 
important.” (Wendt 2004, p. 54) 
Although coming from a different theoretical perspective, scholars who explore epistemic 
communities similarly downplay the “material” side.76 It is suggested that expertise 
embodied by epistemic communities shapes international environmental treaties, regional 
integration, nuclear disarmament, and global governance in general (Haas 1992, 2004, 
Hajer and Versteeg 2005). Yet, the actual subject matter which gets represented by 
scientists – such as “environmental change”, “sustainability” or “technical systems” (e.g. 
Sandholtz 1993, Detraz and Betsill 2009, Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009) – remains 
conceptually neglected because materials are usually seen as mute (Mayer 2012a). 
Ruggie’s proposition of 1975 again is symptomatic for the role assigned to technology: 
“Physical and technological parameters are important determinists of international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Peter M. Haas was most influential in bringing science to the minds of a broader academic audience. He 
advanced the concept of “epistemic communities”, what he defines as a network of professionals that 
articulates ”new knowledge (...) a state may elect to pursue entirely new objectives“ (Haas 1992, p. 4). This 
approach assumes that knowledge is powerful because it influences the framing of problems, international 
decision-making processes, the definition of state interests, and fosters international policy coordination 
based on consensual scientific knowledge. Exploring the emergence of international cooperation and 
regimes, Haas directs his spatial focus at the nation state, whereas his primary actors are epistemic 
communities and individual states. For Haas knowledge can reduce uncertainty among rational actors in the 
context of a moral hazard problem. It further brings about convergence of national interests through a 
common definition of recognized problems and possible solutions as for instance to environmental 
pollution (Haas 1992). 
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responses to technology when those responses concern research, scanning and monitoring, 
and problem recognition in general—when, in a word, the issue is to discover or 
understand some process or situation. When, however, the issue is to manage some process 
or situation, the weight of political purposes becomes preponderant.” (Ruggie 1975, p. 558) 
From externalizing materiality, however, arises serious conceptual inconsistency, 
especially for constructivist theories as Herrera, who notes: 
“the objective conditions in this conception of the international system function just as the 
material environment does for neorealism – as a background condition that constrains but 
does not force states to adapt. So if shifts in the underlying technologies of communication, 
for example, should increase the objective amount of interdependence in the system, then 
technology would be a deus ex machina again driving systemic change and not one that can 
be accounted for by the theory. This is a curiously anti-constructivist conclusion to arrive at 
for a supposedly constructivist theory of international politics.” (Herrera 2003, p. 569) 
Yet, accusing Wendt for not being constructivist enough misses the mark because he 
merely reproduces the preexisting logocentric conventions. Regardless whether from 
realist, liberal, or constructivist schools, numerous authors see technology only as 
external driver or factor (Buzan and Little 1993, Skolnikoff 1994, Keohane and Nye 
1998, Rodrik 2008). It is not regarded as essential part of the social fabric. Wendt 
plunders rationalist concepts such as “interdependence” (Keohane and Nye) or 
“interaction capabilities” from advanced system theories (Ruggie and Buzan) to make 
sense of technological change within his own theory (Wendt 1999, pp. 243-249).77 
Through treating (technological) interdependence as an under-specified “master 
variable”, Social Theory consequently renders technologies external to a purely social 
system.  
 Even IR scholars who acknowledge that the relevance of technology is not well 
captured by notions such as “rump materiality” fall short of assigning substantial 
theoretical relevance to it. Regime theory is a case in point. At first sight, it responds to 
the growing technological interconnections and increased trans-boundary flows between 
nations (Keohane and Nye 1971, 1977) but than moves quickly to the social interactions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 For a systematic overview about Wendt’s borrowings from Neorealism and Neoinstitutionalism see 
Guzzini and Leander (2004) and Kratochwil (2000). 
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We should pause at this point to appreciate the parsimonious beauty with which Robert 
Keohane’s After Hegemony treated the highly complex and globe-spanning operations of 
production, trade and usage of crude oil—the material underpinnings of what should 
come to exemplify “regimes” (Keohane 1984). To the extent to which his work succeeds 
in boiling down everything to a coherent set of assumptions (collective actions problems 
given certain transaction costs), it represents a tremendous achievement in the art of 
abstraction. Overtaking Waltz’s puzzle—state action under anarchic conditions—
Keohane later maintains that “institutions for global governance will need to limit the 
negative externalities of decentralized action.” For he thinks interdependence “provides 
opportunities for actors to externalize costs of their actions onto others.” (Keohane 2001, 
p. 2)  
 The intriguing complexity and connectivity of the technological world is, to put it 
differently, turned into an issue of “beggar thy neighbor“ while the design of 
institutions—formal and informal sets of rules and norms—remains a political issue 
without any material substance. Even the theoretical transmission belt between the 
strategic choice within or through institutions and a messy interdependent world – 
“transaction costs” – is mainly understood in social or cultural terms (see Aspinal and 
Schneider 2000). Related theoretical approaches such as neofunctional and institutional 
integration theories, issue linkage, interdependence theory, or regime complex theory 
similarly see technologies as external to institutions and collective bargaining.78 In brief, 
rationalist frameworks essentially frame technology as a neutral tool that merely creates 
or solves problems. It is thus either a concern for the assertion and deliberation of 
collective social (state) interests or can easily get paired with a material understanding of 
power: “Knowledge”, write Nye and Owens (1996, p. 20) “more than ever before, is 
power”. 
 The English school offers the final example of externalization. While Watson 
acknowledges the central role of military innovations and industrialization for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See e.g. Haas (1968), Rosenau (1969), Keohane and Nye (1971) Haas (1975, 1980), Aspinal and 
Schneider (2000), Pollack (2001) and Raustiala and Victor (2004). Another example is Karl W. Deutsch’s 
work on the effects of emerging transnational communications in the 1950s—a precursor to the research on 
international interdependence. One finds here similar externalizations of communication media, while the 
“content” represents the core theoretical and empirical research interest (see Deibert 1997). 
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expansion of the European International Society (1992, p. 268), it was Barry Buzan who 
has seriously tried to grant technologies a substantial theoretical role in the context of 
neorealist-structural approaches. Through changes in the “interaction capacity”, he 
argues, does technological progress affect the properties of a specific international 
system. This explains than the historical variety of systems—an empirical fact which is 
omitted by Waltz and others who foreground “like-units” to the effect of denying the 
existence of several types of differentiation (Buzan 1993, Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993, 
cap. 4). But Buzan’s still merely sees battle ships, telegraph cables, or transport 
infrastructures as “driving forces” that from the outside push the differentiation of 
international systems or societies (Buzan and Albert 2010, p. 333). The sheer increase in 
“interactions capacity” and the notion of time-space compression, which are used in IR to 
abstractly describe the effect of modern technologies (Walker 1993, Ferguson and 
Mansbach 2001, Buzan and Lawson 2015), cannot explain in detail why and where the 
great divide had occurred (see Chapter 2). As Buzan’s interest remains primarily focused 
on state/society-interactions and modes of power, technological innovations are taking on 
a residual explanatory function. They are construed outside and prior to a social system 
consisting of primary and secondary institutions. 
 In sum, the dualistic component of the Cartesian complex provides an additional 
explanation of IR’s neglect of technologies. On the one hand, technological determinism 
offers over-simplifying frameworks unable to capture the complexity and dynamics of 
innovation processes. On the other hand, externalism renders technology a deus ex 
machina, placing it both outside of history and outside to the theoretically relevant realm. 
Interestingly, constructivist and rationalist approaches employ a similar externalizing 
strategy. To phrase it differently: the analysis of the Cartesian complex reveals a common 
blind spot of seemingly conflicting theoretical approaches. For this reason, the complex 
life of cars, mobile phones, chemical factories, power plants or archives occupies a no-
mans land in between the “material”—objective facts, capabilities or irresistible force—
and the “ideational”—subjective purpose, social meaning, or rational interest. Externalist 
approaches do not just legitimize instrumentalism and reinforce the ontological bias 
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towards rational choice and inter-subjectivity.79 The consequences of dualism also have 
largely detached IR’s comprehension of technologies based on empirical field research. 
Determinists do not offer a better recipe in this regard. 
4.5 Coproductionist approaches 
The two faces of dualism reinforce the fallacy of logocentrism by preventing a 
conceptually differentiated and empirically sensitive exploration of the global politics of 
technological innovations. As the observations in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have shown, 
dualist approaches are unsuited to study technological innovations. It is therefore 
unsurprising that many IR studies which touch upon technological innovations run into 
paradoxes – researchers lack sensitive conceptual tools to develop puzzles and questions 
that display a recognizable resemblance of the technological world.  
 This problem, of course, has not gone unnoticed and theorists have begun to look 
for solutions. One such approach is to find a better “balance” between ideational and 
material factors (e.g. Wight 2006, Deudney 2000a, Poliout 2010). Given the discussion 
above, it must be noted however, that attempts to “balance are not convincing because 
they ultimately reproduce dichotomist theorizing. Another idea is to articulate a “middle 
ground”. Yet, as Herrera states, “placing oneself there should be done with care.” The 
problem of “middle ground” approaches is that they “too easily become vague and 
insubstantial” (Herrera 2003, p. 576). Herrera’s own work on technological innovations 
and world order (2003, 2006), pinpoints the crucial issue. There simply is no “middle 
ground” that resembles a convergence or complementarities of the two ideal-types of 
“determinism and social constructionism”, as he argues (2003, p. 576). Just blending to 
seemingly separate worlds—reconciling the domains of reality that have been separated 
so carefully by Cartesians—is tantamount to self-contradiction. The limits of IR 
theorizing arise where scholars attempt to blend the seemingly separate social/material 
worlds. If middle ground means to take an analytical position between a purely social and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 We understand by now why, if particular technologies are nevertheless addressed, this typically happens 
in an odd “ad hoc” manner (Herrera 2003, p. 565) – of which Kenneth Waltz’s famous assertion, that “the 
longest peace yet known rested on two pillars: bipolarity and nuclear weapons” (1993, p. 44), is an 
excellent illustration. 
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a purely technical world we would perpetuate the illusion of the “great divide”. Merely 
adding up social/material dichotomies or meshing together two inadequate notions does 
not produce an improved conceptual framework.  
 Instead, a viable conceptual language is capable of fusion or hybridization between 
the “material” and the “political”, the “technical” and the “social” as technological 
innovations often leave nothing unaltered. “The realities of human experience emerge as 
the joint achievements of scientific, technical and social enterprise” writes Sheila 
Jasanoff (2004a, p. 17), thereby questioning the conceptual appropriateness of prefixed 
agents, structures, or practices. Approaches that analyze “coproduction” focus on the 
nexus of society, nature, technology and science. Jasanoff distinguishes between two 
main varieties of coproduction: interactional and constitutive. The first group explores the 
interactions, boundary conflicts and entanglements among prior fixed entities, groups or 
processes such as social practices and technological artifacts. The second sheds light on 
the emergence, stabilization, and evolution of previously not existing things, groups, or 
practices such as scientific fields, objects, or technological systems. So, while 
interactional accounts carefully analyze the human activities, social practices or 
institutions interaction with scientific expertise or artificial objects without relying on 
social reductionism or determinism, constitutive accounts focus on intermingling of all 
“domains” at the point of emergence and stabilization of the building blocks of human 
societies (Jasanoff 2004a, pp. 19-22). In short, coproductionist scholars conceptualize 
innovations either in a manner that challenges the idea-matter dichotomy or erase these 
categories altogether (see figure 3.1). 
 By applying a coproductionist lens one can divide the IR approaches to 
technological innovations, which go beyond externalism and determinism, into two 
groups. One group deals with the question how established practices or principles such as 
sovereignty, state authority or foreign policy are challenged by technological changes or 
scientific knowledge (Litfin 1997, Skolnikoff 1994).80 This literature comprises the 
examination of the consequences of the digital revolution and information technologies 
for the regulatory capacity, governance ability, and legitimacy of nation states (Mowlana 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 The impact of technological shifts on statecraft already was concern in earlier (see Deutsch 1957, 
Morgenthau 1964). 
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1997, Rosenau and Singh 2002, Drezner and Farrell 2004, Drezner 2004, Eriksson and 
Giacomello 2009). Other research asks how “national security” is affected by the 
emergence of data networks, cyber weapons, and cyber space in general (Eriksson and 
Giacomello 2006, Grobler and van Vuuren 2012) and how the conduct of warfare has 
changed through digital technologies (Cullather 2003, Halpin, Trevorrow, Webb and 
Wright 2006, Deibert, Rohozinski and Crete-Nishihata 2012, Manjikian 2010). In 
addition, scholars aim at reframing the realist concept of “power” to accommodate to the 
information age (Keohane and Nye 1998, Nye 2004, Mayer 2012b). The Internet, at the 
same time, has become the crystallization point for both hopes about the influence 
“technologies of liberty” and fears of tools of suppression, control, and censorship 
(Deibert 2000, Warkentin and Mingst 2000, Boas 2004, Mueller and Chango 2008, 
Deibert and Rohozinski 2010, Diamond 2010, Drezner 2010, Mueller 2010). Perhaps the 
most systematic approach is Dan Deudney`s (2006) theorizing of security materialism 
which links the macro-level of security practices to the evolution of weapon systems. 
 Although all analyze the interplay between the “technical” and “social”, different 
authors put different emphasis on the respective sides of this equation. However, where 
“inter-state” are relations selected as units of analysis, as it is here mostly the case, this 
leads to odd, yet, widely accepted vantage points to image research puzzles in which 
material objects such as satellites, strategic missiles, monitoring systems, super-
computers, or simulation models, then, still appear as deus ex machina. Accordingly, 
sterile “technology” gets juxtaposed to equally sterile concepts of “sovereignty”, 
“national security”, or “international relations”. This literature, by and large, is restricted 
to a few aspects of what would be potentially relevant when we approach the 
transformative effects of technological innovations. The authors advance puzzles that 
construe an interaction or influence between pre-given concepts such as “the state”, 
“power capacities”, “society” or “national security” on the one hand, and certain 
technologies or rather often technology in general on the other. To the extent to which 
this sort of interplay leads to satisfying questions and puzzles the inherent perspectives 
are narrow in scope. While these approaches make the massless conceptual framework of 
IR a little “rasping”, they mostly remain tied to the conceptual straitjacket of the 
Westphalian System. But, as we have already seen above, it is exactly this sort of 
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conceptual framework, which is poisoned to produce paradoxes and dead ends when 
confronted with technological dynamics. It follows that the analytical stress on the 
interplay of fixed entities is somewhat misplaced. By appreciating the empirical evidence 
presented in Chapter 2, and knowledge of science and technology studies in particular, 
the problem of “interplay” that is typical to the above mentioned approaches is obvious. 
This brings us to the second type of coproduction, which is the most promising. 
While it accounts for the emergence of new structures, actors, practices, identities, it 
zooms in at the politics and sites of contestation, resistance and negotiation (Luke 1994, 
Barry 2001, Flyverbom 2011, Whatmore 2009, Home 2010). As such, Sheila Jasanoff’s 
exploration of the “biotechnological empire” and Karen T. Litfin’s analysis of space 
technologies are extraordinary. Litfin shows how satellites, being a technology of 
surveillance, have socialized a global gaze that made possible arms control 
psychologically and technically. At the same time, this military dominated technology 
has given rise to a plethora of non-state actors, which use images or real time footage to 
reinforce environmental protection or monitor human rights (Litfin 1999, 2002). 
Ultimately, Litfin retains a state focus, whereas Jasanoff unearths with notable theoretical 
rigor a vast structure that reaches across national boundaries tying together human 
bodies, metropolitan lifestyles, peripheral agricultural practices, national security 
policies, high-tech science, and profit strategies of large multinationals (Jasanoff 2005, 
2006). Similarly, Andrew Barry and others (2001, Barry and Walters 2003, Bellanova 
and Duez 2012) demonstrate that the technological fundament – including infrastructures, 
networks, zones – although getting almost no attention from analysts of the European 
Union, is particularly critical for the success and trajectory of European integration.  
A few studies have seriously tried to tackle the contingent relationship and the 
heterogeneous intertwining between the proliferation of material artifacts, extensive use 
of technological infrastructures, and group formations in a manner that goes beyond 
conceptual reenactments of the “great divide” between the political and the technological 
(see e.g. Buzan and Lawson 2015). For example, Rosenau’s brilliant Distant Proximities 
shows that new actors, social constellations, and political connections emerge through 
global technological processes (Rosenau 2003). But, his work does not suggest a more 
systematic view on the unit of analysis problem. In addition, he conceptually maintains a 
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marked distinction between the social and technical domains, clearly granting the former 
preponderance. Strange’s work (1988, 1996) addresses the delicate state of epistemology 
of technological innovation: The blurring of the taken-for-granted lines between 
“security” and “economy”, which Strange stressed as the signature gesture of the field of 
IPE. Today, contradictions of the analytical clarity of IR’s conceptual language is perhaps 
nowhere more obvious than with respect to telecommunication and cyber-technologies 
(Deibert 2013, DeNardis 2014). For instance, the immense digital infrastructure of the 
US constitutes a thriving private-public partnership based on Evgeny Morozov (2013) 
calls “a social contract between Silicon Valley and Washington”. Yet much of the 
research on the Internet overlooks the crucial physical infrastructure and, more 
importantly, the evolving intersection of the virtual and the physical (see Stevens 2012). 
In short, even some coproduction approaches fall back into dichotomist thinking. 
 Another major example for the ambivalent effects of new technologies is the 
connection between nuclear weapons and weather monitoring. Because the cold war was 
conceptualized as “global struggle, reading all conflicts everywhere in the world as part 
of the contest for military and ideological advantage (…)”, notes Paul N. Edwards, 
“military technological change also increased the superpowers’ appetites for global 
weather data and forecasts. (…) Tactical nuclear strategy depended on knowing the likely 
path of fallout clouds and the distances they might travel on the wind.” (Edwards 2006, 
pp. 242-243) However, rather than deepening international conflict lines, “geostrategy 
and technological change”, paradoxically, “aligned military interests with the 
informational globalism of scientists” (Edwards 2006, p. 243). The exchange of 
monitoring weather data went on nearly uninterrupted during the Cold War while 
collaborative efforts to simulate weather and climate eventually transformed the 
understanding of the earth.81 Today, the enormous influence of the scientific ensembles—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Moreover, while the US army waged weather warfare over Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia between 1967 
and 1972 (Flemming 2007, p. 55), computer models that showed the planetary consequences of nuclear 
explosions provided increasingly sophisticated simulation of the global climate system. The crucial lesson 
was that all nations depend on intractably interconnected ecological systems—the climate and the 
atmosphere just being one among others. The “consequences of a nuclear war”, warned Carl Sagan (1983) 
in Foreign Affairs “could constitute a global climatic catastrophe”. Nuclear weapons and climate science 
have a history intimately intertwined. In a twist reminiscent of Einstein’s commentary, their confluence led 
the international spread of consciousness about planetary fragility on the one hand, and to legitimizing 
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consisting of data collection technologies, computer models and shared expertise, 
international research bodies—is best exemplified by the IPCC. Its ability to assert global 
political changes is indicative for the contested removal of power from governments to 
international scientific organizations (Edwards 2012).  
The co-productive set of approaches also ties into the growing concern with 
complexity and hybridity of agential forces within IR and historical global studies (see 
Urry 2007; Youngs 1999, Chudworth and Hobden 2013). This has two major 
consequences. On the one hand, the sensitivity for the ambiguity of technology and its 
multipurposeness is growing. In contrast to determinist assumptions, the political results 
of technological innovations remain—despite immense efforts put into simulations and 
scenario building—underdetermined. This is not only due to the mostly unknown socio-
material feedback mechanisms and interlinkages operating at various levels, but results 
from human ingenuity and creative reappropriations and repurposings of technologies 
(Connolly 2013; Cole 2013; Teschke 2014). On the other hand, coproduction calls for 
amore sophisticated articulation of the agency-structure problem and new forms of 
power. STS and geography scholars have illuminated how the locus of agency that was 
usually assumed to lie within individuals, groups, or states moved into hybrid, networked 
and mediated forms of agential power (Bijker et al. 1987, Latour 1987, Whatmore 2002, 
Dittmer 2014). Research from fields such as security, energy, environment and 
elsewhere, drawing from coproductionist accounts, illustrates that agency is increasingly 
enriched by ensembles, actor-networks, and non-human actors.82 These studies do no 
longer grant the unified actor “state” a central analytical place. In this line, JP Singh’s 
idea of “meta-power” articulates a form of influence that emerges through information 
technologies but outside the classical confines of states (Singh 2013, see also Ansorge 
2011).  
 The interweaving of technology and social practices creates a hybrid world in 
which the neat separation in human and non-human is often challenged and undermined. 
This is most discernible in the military. Der Derian (1990) argues that chrono-politics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“technocratic futurology” and earth system management on the other hand (Ross 1991, p. 14, Edwards 
2012, Miller 2004). 
82 See e.g. Aradau (2010), Mayer and Schouten (2011), Squire (2014), and Salter (2013). 
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have unleashed forces which essential transform the spatial and temporal aspects of 
international politics. 
„Space is no longer primarily territorial in the late-or postmodern condition. Geographical 
space has been considerably challenged by the triad chrono-cyber-hypertransparent space. 
The latter provokes geospace by understanding distance in terms of time rather than 
geography, by substituting hyperreal, simulated space for real space, and by radically 
disclosing a wellshaded space. The forces of production—speed, simulation and 
surveillance—of the challenge create new forms of estrangement while simultaneously 
mediating these estrangements.“ (Huysmans, 1997, p. 376) 
At the same time, technological innovations in warfare have produced semi-autonomous 
machines, semi-cyborgs, and human-machine combinations that are connected on the 
battlefields and with the command centers back in the military headquarters. This has 
brought about profound and unforeseen change in surveillance, warfare, and power 
projection (Dillon 2003, Der Derian 2009). As a result, the boundaries between war and 
peace, the domestic and the foreign, humans and non-humans are becoming increasingly 
blurred and indistinguishable (Singer 2009, Stroeken 2013). Antoine Bousquet, 
employing a Foucauldian approach, shows how the employment of new technical devices 
and systems recurrently transformed warfare. Among the examples are clocks, airplanes, 
missiles, barbed wire, diesel engines, drones, hacking software, and so forth. At the same 
time, a substantial share of scientific inquiry and commercial research and development 
came to serve the needs and desires of national armed forces, creating distinct types and 
discourses of warfare (Bousquet 2009). The idea of “becoming” is also animating Der 
Derian’s work military revolutions:  
“As the infosphere engulfs the biosphere, as the global struggle for ‘full spectrum 
dominance’ supplants discrete battlefields, as transnational business, criminal, and terrorist 
networks challenge the supremacy and sovereignty of the territorial state, information 
warfare has ascended as a significant site for the struggle of power and knowledge. Infowar 
wages an epistemic battle for reality in which opinions, beliefs, and decisions are created 
and destroyed by a contest of networked information and communication systems. (Der 
Derian 2003, p. 452) 
While this kind of empirical field research on was for a long time relatively rare in IR, it 
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is based on an under-conceptualization of technological innovations. Der Derian, who 
depicted the confusing networks of global high-tech warfare, deliberately chooses “to 
avoid the vices of academic abstraction” alongside, as he apparently notes with irony, 
with Pentagon propaganda and journalism (2009, p. xxxvii). It is not really surprising, 
thus, that mainstream theories were unable to adopt these perspectives. 
4.6 Summary: dead-ends and bridges 
This review illustrated that technological innovation constitutes a marginal research topic 
in IR. While central in the 1950s and 1960s, it has faded from the mainstay of the 
discipline both, as an empirical and theoretical concern, only to return quite recently. To 
summarize, the differences among the great schools and paradigms notwithstanding, even 
incommensurable theoretical positions find common ground by conceptually 
externalizing or neglecting the technological world. The history of technological 
permeation, composition, and remaking of the world largely is missing within these a-
historical accounts. Ad hoc accounts remain under-theorized. Obviously, the politics of 
technological innovation does not merely resemble competition among national 
economies; it can not be boiled down to the “great game” for global power and influence; 
it does not constitute a power-seeking strategy for late-developing countries; even less so 
does it make sense to place technological innovations under the trusteeships of “soft 
power”83; it is furthermore not plausible to reduce the international technological catch-
up merely to a matter of perceptions or meaning; neither does the conviction merit 
attention that actors attach “meaning” to technological artifacts that, in turn, are powerful 
carriers of identity. 
 This review also has proposed that this omission is due the to operation of the 
Cartesian complex in IR. Logocentric ontologies, the compartmentalization of 
knowledge, and the practice of dualism leading to determinism or externalism have all 
contributed to the marginalization technological innovations. However, this mapping 
exercise has not yet sufficiently resolved the puzzle how technological innovation, an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83  This may appear attractive for studying communication technologies and cultural exports via 
entertainment industries though (see Nye 2008, p. 101). 
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issue that has become of utmost importance for economists and politicians, could become 
silenced IR and IPE (see more in 5.1). Still, we were able to figure out central research 
desiderata. While many determinist studies on certain technologies deliver fascinating 
accounts they are less convincing in terms of their theoretical frameworks. Moreover, this 
review has also identified alternative approaches that have seriously tried tackling the 
contingent relationship between the proliferation of material artifacts, the extensive use of 
technological infrastructures, and political formations in a manner that goes beyond 
reenactments of the “great divide”.  
 The zone of coproduction is the most promising way forward although limitations 
remain. First, theorizing. The manner in which Herrera (2003, 2006) develops his 
approach to “socio-technological” systems is informative in this respect. Although clearly 
embracing a coproductionist stance, his hybrid perspective is representative for many 
other less careful conceptualizations. It derives, ultimately, from the deductive manner in 
which the theoretical place of technology in IR theories is usually contrived of. 
Consequently most conceptual frameworks do not hold against the complex empirical 
record presented in Chapter 2. The notable outliers who avoid treating the subject matter 
deductively appear to make a telling methodological case. Even though Der Derian 
deliberately waters down theoretical ambition—for good reasons—his research reveals 
how meager, in the first place, the substance and legitimacy of these “abstractions” 
actually is. In addition, it shows that simply applying ready-tailored concepts from other 
disciplines leads one into similar analytical contradictions as ad hoc subscriptions to 
technological “aspects” of international relations. In this sense, approaches that cling to 
deductive, theory-driven methodologies are not successfully grasping the dynamical 
nature of progressive waves of innovation; nor do the seamless webs, connections, and 
translations among different actors, which are so emphasized by historians of technology 
(Galison 2006, Hughes 1994), make it into their texts. 
 Second, researchers on technological innovations largely missed to engage in a 
debate amongst themselves. No collective theoretical advancement has occurred. One 
must admit that these explorations are complicated by the fact that no research field 
exists. Their empirical work and conceptual efforts have remained isolated pieces. The 
knowledge, by and large, was not shaped through conversation with each other but often 
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pressed into the conceptual straitjackets that belonged to other topics, domains, or 
debates. The coproduction approaches in particular have failed to systematize their 
insights in order to feed back into mainstream theoretical debates. Given the general lack 
of deep theorizing within the coproduction zone and the absence of a broad range of 
different, respective theoretical views, I argue that we should look more intensively 
beyond disciplinary borders. 
 Third, as technology just experiences its return as a topic in IR, perhaps the biggest 
shortcoming of the works that have explored the role of technologies lies in their 
common neglect of STS and innovation studies. Few authors have drawn their 
inspirations from the decades of studies on technological innovations.84 In short, to make 
sense of technological innovations—how they relate to the transformation of power and 
international affairs more broadly, i.e. to theorize it in a way that speaks to IR and IPE—
we must draw on research about innovations from fields such as history, economics, 
comparative politics, and STS. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 This is the case for a great variety of studies about technological innovations stemming from different 
disciplinary angles such as cultural studies, anthropology, philosophy, economics, geography and ethics. See 
Kaplan (2004). 
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5. A brief archeology of the onto-politics of lightness (interlude II) 
Is there a deeper reason for the lightness of IR? In Chapter 4, the discipline’s lack of 
interest in technology was explained with the operations of the Cartesian complex, which 
prevents researchers from capturing the evolutionary drama of technological innovations. 
But by focusing on the restrictive ontological parameterization and the problems of 
technological determinism and social reductionism, we only began unpacking this puzzle. 
The following interlude assumes a reversed logic: the absence of technological 
innovations is not accidental but intimately linked to both IR’s general meta-theoretical 
commitments and its conceptual matrix. To substantialize this assertion, we need to probe 
into the related “onto-politics” of practical entanglements, that is, to contextualize the 
deeper strata constitutive of the Cartesian complex of IR.  
 William Connolly used the term onto-politics to indicate that every interpretation of 
the world rests on certain ontological assumptions. All knowledge “contains fundamental 
presumptions that establish the possibilities within which its assessment of actuality is 
presented” (Connolly 1992 cited in Campbell 1998, p. 504). For our purpose, onto-
politics bear a slightly different meaning. As explorative realism replaces the subject-
object schema with a continuum between stable and unstable knowledge (see chapter 6), 
the nexus at which epistemology and ontology converge are scientific practices.85 A 
praxiological understanding of IR (Ashley 1988, Bueger and Gadinger 2014), than, has 
two critical implications: firstly, it requires not only a history of ideas but also a 
sociological perspective to explain the birth of IR's lightness. To examine the latter’s 
onto-politics involves not only conceptual layers and epistemological considerations but 
also other contextual factors and relations, rendering the non-ideational connections and 
interventions visible that partake in research and are shaping its results. Secondly, it calls 
into question how we currently understand the limitations of knowledge production in IR. 
I argue that the comprehension of both what and how we can know, given the shape of 
methodological apparatuses (see Aradau and Huysmans 2014), remains in the grip of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Connolly’s definition is based on an understanding of epistemology and ontology, which need to be 
modified for explorative realism. He foregrounds the shaping of knowledge through interpretative lenses 
(epistemology) over the existence of entanglements, that is a reality without “positivist” observers 
(ontology). 
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Cartesian confinement despite the conceptual nuances and theoretical diversity existing 
within IR. 
5.1 From unproductive dichotomies towards a sociology of knowledge 
Why is IR’s ontological monoculture so persistent? Why does it seem so plausible to 
perpetuate the discipline’s lightness? My thesis is that there is a blind spot at the center of 
the meta-theoretical self-reflection of IR scholarship. Consider, for instance, Collin 
Wight’s treatment of the methodological state of the discipline. After four, according to 
others accounts five, “great debates”, the fundamental philosophical divide between 
hermeneutics and positivism has only been reinforced. Although the discipline 
increasingly draws on the philosophy of science, and the framework of contemporary IR, 
as Wight notes, “bursts at the seams”. A dichotomy of orthodoxies still structures 
knowledge production: On the one hand, according to Wight, we find the cluster of 
“explanation”, “positivism” and “rationalism” indebted to a Humean tradition. On the 
other hand, we are confronted by the grouping of “understanding”, “post-positivsm”, and 
“reflectivism”. “Constructivism” proclaims, unwarranted as Collin correctly notes, to 
occupy the distance in between those two poles (Wight 2002, p. 36).86  
 This unity in disunity points to another chasm, which is as crucial as the 
epistemological division: the fundamental distinction between dualist and monist 
understandings of ontology (see Wight 2006, Jackson 2011). Wight reminds us that 
because of the “tribal” dynamics related to these positions, it is difficult to move beyond 
the current impasse:  
“Unable to shake the positivist orthodoxy because it never really understood it, the 
discipline simply poured the newly emerging patterns of thought into the old framework. 
But, as any mathematician could testify, a ‘thousand theoretical flowers’ into two will not 
go, and hence the current framework bursts at the seams. Simply adding a new ‘middle 
ground’ category does not help and nor does subsuming a range of differing categories 
under one label. And so the current framework ‘disciplines’ and demands that one declares 
one’s allegiance. Once declared, one’s analytical frame of reference is specified and one’s 
identity firmly fixed. As a rationalist you will privilege material factors, causation and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Hollis and Smith (1990), Keohane (1988), and Adler (1997) advanced similar dichotomies.  
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science; as a post-positivist/reflectivist you will privilege ideational factors, deny causation 
and are (sic) anti-science. Any attempt to challenge this categorization is tamed and forced 
into one or other extreme. This is exactly the reaction from both sides of the divide to 
Wendt’s attempt to occupy the middle ground. The idea that one has to declare which tribe 
one belongs to and that this determines one’s ontological frame of reference, epistemology 
and appropriate methods seems a bizarre way for a discipline to proceed. (…) These 
objections notwithstanding, and given the long history of the discipline’s attachment to this 
framework, its rejection looks unlikely." (Wight 2002, p. 40; italics in original)  
Although Wight’s description is sharp-edged and comprehensive, it is itself articulated in 
a Cartesian framework. Importantly, it does not explain how the framework of IR, on the 
one hand, has evolved by silencing the strong materialist currents of thought in the early 
twentieth century (see Deudney 2007), and on the other hand, has long hindered the 
incorporation of additional subject matters and methodologies such as the corporal or the 
material turn in particular (see Salter and Mutlu 2012, Kirsch 2012). The relationship 
between the usage of the philosophy of science and the exclusion of alternative research 
puzzles and empirical domains, that are concerned with the material world in general and 
the modern technological developments in particular, remains unexplored. Wight’s 
depiction of the meta-theoretical framework of IR cannot offer explanations why IR fails 
to capture materiality. One reason is that Wight views IR through a thoroughgoing lens of 
dualism (Jackson 2013).87 To mitigate these problems, Patrick T. Jackson suggested an 
elegant solution in form of a four-fold typology of philosophical ontologies based on 
Weberian ideal types. This model also introduces a different understanding of meta-
theoretical commitments (Jackson 2011). While, the idea of “ontological wagers” are 
productive in thinking about scientific status of knowledge diversity in IR, Jackson once 
more privileged the epistemological and ontological divisions over methodological issues 
(Aradau and Huysmans 2014). 
 Jackson’s failure to capture the full extent of IR’s lightness is suggestive for the IR 
community at large. The reasons for the methodological debate not to catch fire are 
plenty. For instance, Wight assesses how IR theories employ the philosophy of science 
without considering parallel or diverging developments in other disciplines. Susan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See, for instance, Wight’s misunderstanding of Jackson’s philosophical ontology (Jackson 2013).  
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Strange has energetically opposed this isolated form of introspection as she emphasized 
that the reflection about the notions and assumptions of different academic disciplines is 
absolutely necessary to uncover blind spots and mutually unrecognized default positions. 
The lack of systematic inter-disciplinary communication, in turn, leads to a selective 
ontology and biased research and policy prescriptions (Strange 1970, Strange 1988, pp. 
12-15). Moreover, Wight's narrative only takes recourse to ideas and concepts. He does 
not consider research practices, and, therefore misses central aspects of the story of 
knowledge production by IR. Practices, however, involve a lot of additional things; 
things that the researcher has to assemble in order to establish the scientific authority of 
his/her theoretical claims as well as their empirical validation and epistemic plausibility. 
The practice of research also entails instruments, pictures, figures, archives, disciplinary 
costumes, university institutions, publications requirement, concepts, notions, data 
storage, and simulation devices (Latour 1987); and, equally, the use of narratives, 
metaphors, story telling and myth making (Weber 2005). 
 In order to move beyond Cartesian dichotomies and to explain, in particular, why 
IR has eschewed technological innovations, we have to deepen our understanding of the 
IR framework. A different key, that combines tools from the philosophy and science and 
the sociology of science, is needed to crack the puzzle of the discipline’s lightness. My 
suggestion is to unearth the relationship between certain theoretical notions that became 
common sense in IR on the one side, and the interplay of the disciplinary identity in the 
making and emerging research practices on the other. A comprehensive exploration, 
obviously, would require a rigorous disciplinary “archeology” of how IR has treated 
technological innovations from the 1950s to 1990s. This task is beyond the scope of this 
short intervention.  
5.2 The stag-hunt allegory and the purpose of unmediated relations 
My entrance point is, once again, Kenneth Waltz’s work Man, the State, and War (1959) 
because I assume that it played a central role in shaping and stabilizing the “Cartesian 
complex”. In particular, I shall take issue with the question as to how the marginalization 
of technologies relates to the introduction of a set of ideas including the “three images” 
and the “international system” as a unitary actor model, which undoubtedly became 
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obligatory passage points within mainstream IR. Interestingly, Waltz’s seminal picture of 
the world was not always as stable and widely accepted as it appears today. On the very 
last pages of his classical treatment, he struggled to defend the plausibility of the three 
images against the agency of technological changes.88 In his text, it seems, Waltz (1959, 
pp. 234ff.) was barely able to keep under control the defiant non-social agencies, which 
threaten to destabilize his chain of reasoning. 
 Although Man, the State, and War certainly does not stand for the immense 
diversity of approaches to IR, it constitutes a privileged object for inquiry as it animates 
both undergraduate introductory curricula and forms the starting point for theoretical 
discussions. Through a history of ideas about the reasons for war it develops a three-level 
model of the world—the individual, the state/society, and the system of states. This 
model became widely accepted and goes unquestioned as central building block of all 
mainstream theories (Suganami 2009, p. 381ff., Onuf 1995).89 Besides Neorealism, the 
list comprises Neoclassical Realism, Constructivism, Regime-theory, the English School, 
Neoliberalism, and various poststructuralist authors, who are focused on the 
inside/outside division (e.g. Walker 1993, Sjoberg 2008). All these approaches explicitly 
or implicitly presume two things that are set out in Waltz’ classic: the primacy of social 
interaction and the analytical significance of the three levels. Despite repeated efforts to 
deconstruct Man, the State, and War,90 the structure of its argument remains exemplary 
and persistent; the study is still plausible to admirers and critics alike, especially for the 
acclaimed parsimony of its argumentation. 
 Chapter 4 has examined how Waltz’s logocentric ontology derived from 
Rousseau’s stag-hunt allegory. The purpose of this allegory needs to be unpacked further. 
Though Waltz admits that this story constitutes a “hypothetical reconstruction” (Waltz 
1959, p. 167, see also footnote 18 on the same page) of a historical event, he relies on the 
stag-hunt allegory to make sense of international relations throughout his book. Later, he 
refers to this allegory to lend credibility to the unitary actor model, that is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 This distinguishes Waltz from Bull and others, who externalize technologies to an extent that the latter do 
not even appear to threaten theoretical considerations in the first place. 
89 Singer (1961) in another seminal text put forward similar ideas about the relevance of levels.  
90 See e.g. Ashley 1988 and the special edition of International Relations (2009: Vol. 23, no. 3). 
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insignificance of the inherent quality of a state in particular and cultural diversity in 
general for the cooperation under anarchical conditions (Waltz 1959, p. 183). Anarchy as 
logic crucial to explanations of inter-state war, thus, relies on a simplistic speculation 
about the state of nature. It is through this rhetorical means, as Beate Jahn points out, that 
Realists “get from cultural diversity to uniform power politics” (2000, p. 17).91 Most 
importantly, the stag hunt allegory, in Waltz reading, reduces relevant phenomena to the 
rational and unmediated interaction between individuals or states respectively (Waltz 
1959, p. 169). Tools, weapons, instruments, technologies, and other kinds of artificial 
mediators are not present or without relevance, putting Waltz not just in contradiction 
with ethnographical knowledge.92 In brief, the stag hunt allegory is constitutive of an 
implausible definition of anarchy because its “massless” assumptions lead to the illusion 
of purely “social” relations.  
 One should not too quickly dismiss Waltz’s enormous accomplishment of 
purification and abstraction (see Sylvester 2001). A cautious note is warranted. After all, 
he constructed a ‘non-material’ theory completely at odds with two crucial aspects of the 
intellectual landscape of his contemporaries: technological determinism and the diversity 
of autonomous political actors in global politics. Let’s start with the second. To begin 
with, today’s state-centric orthodoxy was not in place at the time of Waltz’s writing. 
Waltz effectively replaces a complex and interdisciplinary landscape that flourished 
among early “IR” thinkers before and after World War II (Ashworth 2013; Williams 
2009, p. 330ff.).93 Despite the Wilsonian vision of a league of equal nations, among the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 This is highly insensible to the colonial undercurrents and, thus, the ideological and imperialist purpose 
of the concept “state of nature” (Jahn 1999, 2000). 
92 Waltz move to use a kind of “genesis” (see Foucault 2005, p. 78ff) is highly problematic. If Waltz had 
relied on historical and ethnological accounts of possible “states of nature” his depiction certainly would 
have rejected Rousseau’s thought model (Sahlins 2004). Even in Rousseau’s own time the knowledge 
about people in the state of nature was incompatible with such simplistic accounts as for instance Michel de 
Montainge’s essay on “cannibals” illustrates. But the main responsibility here is not on Rousseau’s side. 
Waltz does not offer a justification to why he grants philosophical speculation such a central place in the 
argument that establishes IR. 
93 The different strands of post-war realist thinking addressed various philosophical, economic, historical, 
and ethic concerns at the nexus of modern personality, technological progress, and liberal democratic world 
order. It was by no means restricted to “international politics”. I have here for the purpose of this thesis 
only picked out debates related to technological innovations, especially advancements in weapon 
technology. For a broader overview that corrects the flawed hagiography of early IR see Williams (2005), 
Schmidt (2002), and Lebow (2003). 
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eminent actors in world politics were colonial empires, dynastic sovereigns, and great 
powers next to many suzerain or dependent polities (Kratochwil 1986, Spruyt 2000, 
Teschke 2002). Moreover, influential theorists of the first half of the twentieth century 
such as Oswald Spengler, Arnold J. Toynbee, Carl Schmitt, Ellsworth Huntington, 
Samuel N. Eisenstadt and Harold Innis employed larger units of analysis such as empires, 
civilizations, regions, or cultures (see Huntington 1997, p. 325). Meanwhile, the fathers 
of Realism such as Carr and Morgenthau did not necessarily talk about “nation states” per 
se, but about a group of great powers—a focus that is still familiar to current realist 
approaches (cf. Gilpin 1981, Mastanduno 2002). In short, Waltz’s book can be read as 
unlikely success against a dense historical context: back then, “states” were neither the 
predominant unit of analysis, nor was their treatment as like-units univocally accepted. 
Critics attacking Waltz because of his model’s parsimony and simplicity tend to under-
appreciate his actual achievement.  
 Technological determinism was the other intellectual environment to destabilize; a 
powerful thought tradition and, as it were, experience which Waltz had to disproof. The 
majority of his peers considered nuclear weapons in particular—that is, material forces—
to impact international relations greatly (Holsti 1985b, pp. 685ff., Deudney 2000b). 
Thomas Schelling, among many others, emphasized the destabilizing force of 
technological breakthroughs for deterrence and world peace (Ayson 2004, p. 68ff). 
Already several decades earlier, pragmatist or functionalist writers such as John Dewey 
and David Mitrany focused on global interdependence and the consequences of new 
media and communication technologies (Mitrany 1933, see Cochran 2009).94 These 
intellectual traditions that focused on technological change and its discontents are less 
known due to the biased standard historiography of IR that wrongly foregrounds the 
realist/idealist divide (Schmidt 2002). But they have figured dominantly as crosscutting 
themes after the turn of the century:  
“the most extensive body of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century international 
theory was the highly materialistic geopolitics of such figures as Friedrich Ratzel, John 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Similarly, Edward H. Carr argues in Conditions of Peace against the principle of self-determination 
because of the difficulties to reconcile formally equal units of nation states with military discrepancies and 
economic dependencies that eventually require larger organizational units (Carr 1942, pp. 50-66). 
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Seeley, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder, H.G. Wells, Karl Haushofer, and many 
others.” (Deudney 2000b, p. 17) 
Waltz was writing against this “materialist-determinist” mainstream while looking for 
other explanations of the outbreak of violence. If technological innovations in weaponry 
were indeed such a relevant factor, a purely social theory of collective action collapses, as 
it does not account for continuous technological advancements. Therefore, against a 
widespread conviction at his time, Waltz had to prove that technological advances 
actually do not change the basic conditions of IR. He pushed his conceptual efforts to the 
extreme, denying that there is a meaningful difference between the spear and the 
hydrogen weapons (Waltz 1959, p. 235). Accordingly, differences between ancient and 
modern weapons, as it were, have to be assumed irrelevant for explanations of warfare. 
“Advancing technology makes war more horrible and presumably increases the desire for 
peace; the very rapidity of the advance makes for uncertainty in everyone’s military 
planning and destroys the possibility of an accurate estimate of the likely opposing forces. 
(…) Each major advance in the technology of war has found its prophet ready to proclaim 
that war is no longer possible. (…) There may well have been a prophet to proclaim the 
end of tribal warfare when the spear was invented and another the make a similar 
prediction when poison was first added to its tip. Unfortunately, these prophets have all 
been false. The development of atomic and hydrogen weapons may nurture the peace wish 
of some, the war sentiment of others. (…) The fear of modern weapons, of the danger of 
destroying the civilizations on the world, is not sufficient to establish the conditions of 
peace identified in our discussion of the three images of international relations.” (Waltz 
1959, pp. 235-6) 
Waltz recognized that the autonomous force of technological innovations threatens the 
core of his theoretical framework—otherwise why mention them at the end of his book at 
all. Nevertheless, he strictly adhered to an instrumental view on technologies. 
5.3 Non-temporality, the three-levels, and the return of technology 
Waltz had to purify all “things” that could derail his social model. Following the entire 
chain of argument to which social contract theory has given rise—namely a human world 
structured around the individual, the societal, and the inter-societal levels respectively—
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his argumentation is from an empirical perspective completely untenable; this is true for 
the eighteenth century as much as it is in our century. As a consequence, Suganami 
argues convincingly, technology among other factors cannot be located within the three-
level schema predominant in today’s IR. 
“Think of history, geography, economy and technology, which clearly affect the behaviour 
of states. Where, within the tripartite scheme, do they belong? To say, for example, that 
history – historical memories and knowledge claims – belong to ‘man’, that geographic and 
economic conditions pertain to ‘states’, and that the level of technology is a ‘systemic’ 
feature, while not entirely implausible, is not going to help us evaluate the relative 
significance of the three locations of causes, for now so many incongruous items have been 
placed together under each rubric. The tripartite scheme is no more than one, though 
standard, way of characterising our political experiences. It is neither necessary nor 
sensible to squeeze every causal factor of war into the three places.” (Suganami 2009, p. 
283) 
The Waltzian framework, however, has not just difficulties to grant technologies an 
appropriate place. It has to claim technological innovations (Waltz only refers to arms) to 
be ultimately irrelevant in the first place. The key to understand this move can be found 
by comparing Man, the State, and War with Martin Wight’s famous piece “Why Is There 
No International Theory?” Wight stresses that the character of international relations is 
“recurrence and repetition” (1960, p.43). The similarity to Waltz’ arguments is 
remarkable and the attempt to define the “international” is likewise apparent:  
“One wonders whether the prevalent belief that nuclear weapons have transformed 
international politics, giving the Great Powers something to fear more than they fear one 
another, and so making war impossible, may not have a similar root. It is clear, at least, that 
it is the latest in a series of optimistic constructions going back more than a hundred years. 
In the nineteenth century, public opinion was given the first place as transformer of 
international politics; in the twentieth century it has usually been the fear of war. The 
argument that the hydrogen bomb has made war impossible usually contains two 
propositions: first, that war waged with the new weapons will destroy civilisation; 
secondly, that it is therefore too horrible to happen. This argument is the core popular 
pacifism, and was used before each of the world wars. Joad used it in Why War? (1939) in 
respect of the bombing aeroplane. Ivan Bloch used it in Modern Weapons and Modern War 
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(1900), in respect to mass armies, quick-firing artillery, small-bore rifles, and smokeless 
powder." (Wight 1960, p. 45) 
Cynthia Weber has persuasively argued that Martin Wight’s argument (that parallels 
Waltz’)95 establishes the international as specific site through imposing a tempo-spatial 
order. At the inside of states or societies there is progress and teleological history; at the 
outside there is a cyclical history of the repetitive struggle for survival or hegemony 
under conditions of anarchy. Political theory, hence, speaks to a “history of progress” 
within the domestic arena while the “cycle” of recurrent pattern belongs to the realm of 
international relations (Weber 1998, see also Hutchings 2008, Buzan and Little 2009).  
 We can broaden Weber’s examination by focusing on the aspects that threaten this 
kind of spatial-temporal order. Wight and Waltz, while downplaying the significance of 
technological advances, both agreed on the timeless quality of international relations, that 
is, the “recurrent theorem” (Linklater 2009). This view on “History” contradicts other 
realists who proposed a quite different reading. In the eyes of many of their 
contemporaries, technological innovations were at odds with the cyclical temporality of 
the international domain. Most notably in this respect is John Herz who argued that 
technological innovations were central to understand IR (1951, 1959). Against Waltz and 
Wight, his International Politics in the Atomic Age—which was published in the same 
year as State, Man and War—put forward to forceful argument that the security dilemma 
had reached “utmost poignancy‟ (Herz 1959, p. 241). The danger of nuclear annihilation 
both necessitates and enforces the advent of a universal form of global politics that 
inevitably transcends the territoriality inherent to three levels that are, following Waltz, 
the perennial structure of global politics. Because “security concerns were immeasurably 
increased by the invention of a means of potential annihilation” (Herz 2003b, p. 413), 
Herz believed that nuclear weapons had put a definitive end to the cycle of rising and 
declining hegemonies and, consequently, also buried the respective reasoning on balance 
of power politics (Herz 1959). In other words, according to many proponents of “nuclear 
realism” technological innovations were capable of creating real historical change to the 
extent that they displaced a previously repetitive form of time (see Van Munster and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The same argument is forcefully renewed in Holsti (1985b, 2004). 
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Sylvest 2016).  
 Against this backdrop, only the exclusion of technological innovation as a matter of 
concern secured Waltz’s main narrative that purports nothing has basically changed since 
Thucydides. Only domestically, countries and societies could achieve progress (see 
Weber 1998, pp. 464ff). The “recurrent theorem” contradicts, as point out by Hom and 
Steele (2010), the complex thinking about temporality and human action advanced by 
other realist thinkers. It also leads to paradox results if we infer some propositions from 
it. Accordingly, one would have to claim that technological changes have not 
significantly altered, for example, warfare, sovereignty, security policies, anarchy, and 
the balance-of-power politics—all of which clearly contradicts modern experience and 
discourses on technological changes documented in Chapter 2. Waltz’s view, to put it 
differently, is only possible if one neglects the empirical evidence from the formation of 
modern states onwards that was intractably related to technological innovations as for 
instance Morgenthau fully recognized (Lebow 1994, pp. 252ff). Morgenthau explicitly 
emphasizes the existential difference that modern bureaucratized science and technology 
innovations make not only for the calculation of power, but also for foreign policy 
making and democratic control of politics in general (1964).96  
 In sum, Waltz succeeds in stabilizing “three images” and the problem of anarchy as 
the perennial and specific problem of IR only through disentangling his account of 
international politics form the grip of technological (and all material) agencies, which 
were seen as irresistible and pervasive by many of his realist contemporaries.97 While he 
followed a crystal-clear mind-matter distinction his logocentric reduction eschewed 
material factors. Rational minds and the interplay of collective calculations explain the 
course of politics and the occurrence of war as its most important manifestation; matter 
was passive, inactive, and instrumental to human purposes. 
  So, even by risking oversimplification, it can be concluded that Waltz’s 1959 book 
epitomizes a discipline that has eliminated the uncontrollable reality of technological 
innovations from the core of its epistemological and ontological premises. If the Waltzian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 For a detailed examination of different early realist understandings of „time“ see Hom and Steele (2010). 
97 The IR community in general has relegated technological "wild-cards" in the subfield of deterrence 
studies (see Powell 1985). 
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framework is representative for IR, then, the exclusion of technological progress must lie 
at the heart of the IR framework itself. IR theories are built upon assuming lightness by 
their very design. Adding technological factors to existing frameworks therefore faces 
considerable difficulties, as we have found in the second chapter. In general, this leads to 
an odd situation: when most IR scholars speak about technologies, it is against the 
background of an utterly logocentric approach to world politics. This is explains why 
technology appears as a deus ex machina. Waltz’s Theory of International Politics is an 
example. It introduces a micro-economic method to measure the capacities of units 
(including technological capacities) as self-contained variables that feed into the rational 
calculations among states envisioned by defensive realism. While State, Man and War 
totally silenced technological innovations, Waltz’ theory of international politics 
reintroduces them as purely statistical and instrumental features of the international 
structure.  
 Empirically, this position is untenable. The best illustration being the fact that 
Waltz has inverted his own position over the years:  
“The long peace would endure because the superpowers possessed nuclear weapons. Waltz 
was arguing that nuclear weapons, by his definition a unit-level capability can explain war-
proneness, the most important system-level property. Such a reductionist argument vitiates 
the need for a theory of international relations whose principal purpose is to explain war-
proneness. This may be why Waltz has subsequently backed away from his 
characterization of the international system as moving from bipolar to multipolar.” (Lebow 
1994, p. 254) 
Whereas in Man, the State, and War nuclear weapons were insignificant for the 
occurrence of war, its author later acknowledges that “the longest peace yet known has 
rested on two pillars: bipolarity and nuclear weapons” (cited from Lebow 1994, p. 254).98 
The technological progress that was excluded from Man, the State, and War came to 
haunt Waltz’s theory of international politics. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The development of weapons technology even led to the formation of a competitor of the “democratic 
peace thesis”, namely, the “nuclear peace thesis” (see Rauchhaus 2009). 
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5.4 Plausibility and bricolage 
Finally, it needs to be emphasized that Man, the State, and War enrolled other powerful 
devices into its “bricolage”. Particularly, computer modeling and game theory are 
employed by Waltz to shed light on the issue of balance of power. He refers first and 
foremost to John von Neumann as the compelling source of his age. The argument goes 
as follows: the important “clue” about the logic of balance of power, “a logic that is 
intimately connected with the third image of international relations” stems from computer 
models. In addition, Waltz also cites another influential source related to computer 
modeling.99 Morton A. Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics (Waltz 
1959, pp. 200-1) was the first major account to model international relations as system. 
Indeed, Hedley Bull stresses that Kaplan popularized the term “international system” 
through his works (Bull 1977, p. 12).  
 System analysis requires strict definitions of the involved units. Their character and 
behavior need to be clearly delimitated through typologies and are interdependent upon 
each other (Kaplan 1957, pp. 54ff., Kaplan 1966, pp. 469-471). This ties harmoniously 
into Waltz’s own arguments. It made the collection of mainly historic ideas more 
plausible through endowing it with the scientific prestige of computer simulations that, 
meanwhile became crucial for the closure of the deterrence debate (see Adler 1992). 
Waltz’s art of assembling shows no hesitation to connect Rousseau’s contract philosophy 
with descriptions of Bismarck’s policies and von Neumann’s game theory. 
“If this seems complicated to the point of frustration to some, to others it is what makes 
international politics a fascinating ‘game’. That it is a game, with no frivolity intended, will 
be clear if the comments just made are compared with those based on the equally 
frustrating and fascinating mathematical speculations of von Neumann and Morgenstern. 
The third image in general and balance-of-power analysis in particular are relevant in the 
present as they have been in the past histories of multi-state systems” (Waltz 1959, p. 223). 
Perhaps the three levels became so convincing and effective because they resemble 
boundary objects. They have enabled Waltz to connect social contract theories of the 
eighteenth century with a genesis story that narrates the beginning of human societies, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Other scholars such as Karl Deutsch draw much more systematically on system sciences and cybernetics 
to understand and theorize government (Deutsch 1969, see Pfaltzgraff 1972). 
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computer modeling and game theory with the diplomatic history from Thucydides to 
Churchill, the state of nature concept conflated with “anarchy” with morality and system 
theory. It is this blending of things, concepts, methods, persons, and stories, which deem 
Man, the State, and War both a powerful argumentation and a stable theoretical 
conceptualization. For Waltz and many of his readers this bricolage is persuasive both as 
description and prescription. Waltz even appears to regard simulations as more real than 
history: after discussing the bearing of game theory on international relations across five 
pages he concludes by stating, “the preceding analysis indicates that the balance of power 
among states has a firm basis in reality, that it is much more than a ‘delusion’” (Waltz 
1959, p. 207; italics by author).  
 Of course, Man, the State, and War certainly cannot be seen as sole mainspring of 
the Cartesian complex within IR. But the book fully encapsulates its basic tenets and 
onto-political commitments. Man, the State, and War became instrumental in the making 
of the three images, the privileged position of unit-like states, and the state-system 
through assembling a lot of heterogeneous things. Waltz’s three images are not only 
admirable for ending the non-discrimination between suzerain states, great powers, 
empires, dominions, and other possible contenders of agency in “international 
relations”. 100  Against the epistemological and ontological mingle of his times, he 
amalgamated an answer, unmatched in its clarity, to one of the most fatal questions: inter-
state war.  
 Yet, this was achieved at considerable costs. Structural realism advocated a tempo-
spatial model of the world that purports a double temporality (inside teleological progress 
toward the pursuit of happiness and outside the perennial cycle of war) at the expense of 
technological innovations. Waltz succeeded by setting out a way of externalizing the 
material actors that have haunted politicians and experts throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
This conceptual move has been very effective until lately, as legions of students of IR are 
still socialized with a black-boxed version of Waltz’s approach. Especially, the three-
level schema has become an obligatory passage point. Most post-structural approaches 
only have reified this “lightness” by clustering their critiques around a basically logo-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 It goes without saying that exactly this move to exclude other actors on the world stage was always a 
central critique against Waltz’s theory. However, here the unitary treatment of “states” is most important. 
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centric scheme (see Mitchel 2002, p. 2ff). In turn, it is intriguing to follow the practices 
and materials contained in Waltz’s text. Arguably, the entanglement of computer models 
and contract theories seems to render his notions compelling and enduring.  
5.5 Summary 
Digging into the deep strata of a classical work of IR is informative. It helps to 
understand the challenges of resetting the current onto-politics of IR. So, let us briefly 
summarize the main reasons that buttress the need for a post-Cartesian framework. 
Firstly, the inquiry in the historical politics of technological innovations carried out in 
Chapter 3 clearly indicates the limitations of the meta-theoretical framework of IR. 
Especially, IR theories fell short of advancing models of dynamic technological changes 
that come close to the sophistication that Marx, Innis or Schumpeter had already 
achieved.101 Secondly, because the meager IR literature on technological innovations 
constantly bumps against conceptual boundaries, the framework of IR needs to be 
radically reconsidered. Thirdly, this can be realized by novel approaches to ontology and 
methodology. IR scholars, often at the disciplinary margins, have shown that an 
ontological opening produces stunning insights. Many scholars who have done research 
about technologies and international relations point to the need for interdisciplinary 
cross-fertilization. Meanwhile, various neighboring disciplines have indeed ventured 
fairly well in developing a conceptual language that is applicable to technological 
changes. If it is true that IR is lagging behind we should not ritually silence this 
knowledge and instead mine these resources for concepts and theoretical inspiration.  
 Ultimately, to pursue ontological expansion—by proliferating new foundational 
collectors—implies that we reconstruct basic parameters of the discipline. Since the blind 
spot concerning technological innovations is intimately connected to notions constitutive 
to IR, an alternative framework should serve the task of shedding light on both the 
question of how we can make sense of technological innovations and on the actual 
restrictions of the ontological parameters underpinning IR theories. In this sense, the 
subsequent chapters draw on different extra-disciplinary sources to lay out an explorative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 For a critical overview on models of change in IR see Holsti (1998b). 
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realist approach. The approach of explorative realism (developed in Chapter 6 and 7) 
involves ontological expansion to address the role of material agency (Schouten and 
Mayer 2017). 
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6. Explorative realism: theory and knowledge 
The preceding chapters give the impression that the objects of our theoretical inquiry are 
considerably difficult to grasp. The politics of technological innovations imply a “drama” 
that causes a serious insecurity on the part of the observer who aims at capturing their 
ontological properties and evolution. Seeing especially how theorists such as Karl Marx, 
Joseph Schumpeter, and Harold Innis have struggled to make sense of the transformative 
properties of technological innovations, we conclude that both a determinist and a social 
reductionist analysis turn the concern with technology into a conceptual minefield. 
Pointing to the critical issues of agency, process, and the proper units of analysis, I have 
reasoned that the conceptual shortcomings of existing approaches in IR stem from their 
problematic presuppositions at the ontological level. Specifically, the premise of a 
material-social divide diminishes the ability to compose adequate descriptions of 
technological innovations (Chapter 2 and 3). As the usual socio-technical divide 
collapses, an appropriate conceptual language is lacking to account for the dynamics of 
co-productive processes.  
 It is worthwhile to reflect on historical experiences in order to gain a better 
understanding of this predicament. The theoretical fuzziness resembles the fundamental 
problem that Denis Diderot encountered when he began to work on the Encyclopedia 
which would become a 28-volume work. In 1747, Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert 
were among the first European philosophers to see emerging new technologies and 
related knowledge as a serious societal issue. To narrate the mix of tacit knowledge, 
machine tools, scientific assumptions and technically organized production required a 
rather different approach to collect data and depict objects (Proust 1984, p. 4, Sennet 
2008, pp. 94ff). They were convinced that combining thousands of images and texts was 
the best way to convey the power and authority of science to eighteenth century European 
publics (see Feenberg 1999, Ezrahi 1990, p. 82). But they soon observed a mismatch 
between language and reality that was very difficult to overcome. The words, concepts, 
and metaphors that Diderot used for annotating the numerous illustrations of the 
Encyclopedia could not clearly express what was visible. Neither “the worker nor the 
analyst of labor can really explain what’s happening.” (Sennet 2008, p. 106) Diderot let 
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pass the impulse to reinstall order by imposing another, potentially more suitable, 
systematic conceptual grid. When it comes to clarify the operations of technological 
innovations, the extraordinary acknowledged of the limitations of vocabulary offers clues 
for thinking about the roadblocks met by IR theorizing.  
 To make sense of the incomprehensibility of technological innovations requires a 
novel approach. Chapter 4 and 5 sketch out the core elements of such a meta-theoretical 
framework and the corresponding research design: explorative realism. In order to do so, 
we first need to clarify some foundations. One important source of relevant insights for 
this task is the philosophy of science. Though the philosophy of science is a vessel that 
contains many different views, it is agreed upon presuming that scientific practice 
inadvertently involves ontological and epistemological commitments. Conversely, the 
social sciences, including IR, are practically always intertwined with philosophy if often 
unrecognized (Kuhn 1970, Bunge 1996, Bashkar 1989). Most IR scholars agree that 
meta-theoretical considerations and commitments need to be clarified from the outset. 
But the discipline is divided along several fissures regarding the three main components 
of meta-theory: ontological presuppositions, theoretical assumptions and methods, and 
the epistemological underpinnings of scientific truth (see Wight 2002). Consider the so-
called “third debate” that animated the discipline. It has challenged the predominant 
positivist and rationalist scholarship on the conceptual level. But it has also placed the 
foundational commitments within the discipline under sustained scrutiny (Cox 1981, 
Lapid 1989).102 Ever since, the conversation about the philosophical underpinnings of IR 
has been ongoing (Hollis and Smith 1990, Wendt 1992, George 1994).  
 The most recent debate about philosophical foundations reveals that the 
characteristics, the viability, and the legitimacy of diverging foundational commitments 
are highly contested among IR scholars.103 Competing meta-theoretical frameworks have 
been proposed based on preferences grounded, for instance, in critical realism, 
pragmatism, or social constructivism. Throughout this chapter, it becomes obvious that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See Almond and Genco (1977) for an earlier call to revisit foundations. 
103 Several forums and symposia have discussed these issues at great length. See Millennium (2007: Vol. 
35, no. 2), Review of International Studies (2012: Vol. 38, no. 1), and International Theory (2009: Vol. 1, 
no. 3). 
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we must take issue with these competing hegemonic ambitions. Firstly, because there are 
good reasons to believe that the claims to meta-theoretical monocultures are misplaced. 
Instead, the existence of multiple perspectives is a healthy state of our discipline—not 
despite, but because of the often-incommensurable nature of meta-theories. Secondly, 
while these debates center on epistemological questions—the problem of reliable 
evidence and sound scientific knowledge about international relations—my 
considerations lead to a different direction. Aiming at a post-Cartesian theory of 
knowledge, we need to clarify the “onto-political” entailed in the philosophical 
foundations of our research design. 
 This chapter particularly elaborates the kind of meta-theoretical commitments that 
render feasible assessments of actuality (Campbell 1998, p. 504). In other words, it must 
become clear in what ways specific philosophical a priori are constraining the 
comprehension of technological innovations on the ontological level. In this sense, 
explorative realism can be understood as one foundational position among others—
though it is not another contender for epistemological hegemony. The distinctive feature 
of explorative realism, though it is perhaps closest to pragmatism, is not its opposition to 
epistemological police officers. Rather, at its core lies the strong impulse for expanding 
ontological parameters. It echoes Colin Wight’s (2006) argument that becoming realist 
about the world means coming to terms with perplexing diversity and complexity. 
Explorative realism requires that we direct our concern towards new objects, processes, 
agencies, and modes of existence relevant for IR while postponing epistemological 
quarrels. 
 Preparing the discussion of the ontological level which unfolds in Chapter 5, the 
epistemological and methodological elements of explorative realism are sketched out in 
the following. First, I reconsider the role of theory in the context of a “non-normal” IR. 
Against the background of the current situation, I argue that theoretical concepts should 
enable ontological expansion (6.1). This leads one to investigate the functions of theories 
especially focusing on dissident approaches to international relations. My approach to 
meta-theory particularly emphasizes the explorative or investigative function. Theory, in 
conclusion, is defined here as a preliminary map in support of an explorative research 
practice (6.2). Qualifying pragmatic thinking, knowledge production is conceptualized as 
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the stabilization of truth claims. In line with social constructivism, I point to the 
“constitutive” character of scientific knowledge. But against social constructivism, I 
refute social reductionism and the limitation of agency to intentional actors. Remaking 
realist understandings, the fact-value dichotomy is substituted by a gradient which 
reaches from matters of concern to matters of fact. This approach, thus, rejects Humean 
positivism and correspondence models of truth (6.3). Finally, I elaborate how the practice 
of ontological expansion is related to questions of criticality, ethics, and methodical 
issues. From explorative realism follow two methodological propositions for approaching 
the politics of technological innovations: For one, researchers stay in a prolonged state of 
“limbo” that is however productive. For another, theoretical vocabulary and analytical 
tools, first of all, should enable us to capture and describe heterogeneous and fluid 
multiplicities To fit together the bits and parcels of the politics of technological 
innovation we need “foundational collectors”, rather than “foundational positions” (6.4). 
6.1 Non-normal science and the limits of IR 
To introduce the notion of “explorative realism” as a foundational approach, we first need 
to tackle more generally the current state of IR in relation to the purpose of theories. 
Theoretical diversity characterizes the discipline more than ever. The majority of 
scholars, by now, appears appreciating, or at least adapting to, the growing methodical 
and theoretical diversification (Sil and Katzenstein 2010).104 However, their appreciation 
of this condition has conflicting motives. Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009), for example, 
argue that the goal of “useful” knowledge warrants methodical plurality for its own sake. 
Patomäki and Wight (2000, Wight 2006) value different theoretical perspectives and 
methodological pluralism as essential means to capture complex realities. Buzan and 
Little (2001) argue that multiple perspectives would help with overcoming the failure of 
IR to display relevance beyond its own narrow disciplinary borders. For Monteiro and 
Ruby (2009a) post-foundationalism is a recipe to cure the discipline from cleavages 
arising from unproductive disputes about foundational positions, whereas Moravcsik’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 The foundations and limits of the discipline of international relations are essentially contested. 
Theoretical pluralism is a fact, yet it is far from a universally shared normative position among the 
participants to paraphrase Dunne, Kurki, and Smith’s (2010, p. vi) introduction to a recent IR theories 
reader. 
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(2003) ultimate aim is to abandon theoretical pluralism through synthesizing theories. 
Accordingly, theories should be empirically tested. IR should be rendered problem-driven 
in order to develop sound multi-causal explanations. In opposition to this instrumentalist 
reading, Cox values pluralism since theoretical monocultures of “problem solving” are 
prone to ahistorical reasoning. He also reminds us at the onset of the “third debate” that 
perspective uniformity conceals the politics of purpose inherent to all theories (Cox 
1981). This move, however, implies keeping up the status quo as unified views bury the 
potential for revolutionary agency (Booth 2007a). 
 But the case for “multi-perspectivism” remains unconvincing. While I sympathize 
with theoretical and methodical pluralism, not all of its advantages are fully understood 
yet. A central reason that legitimizes the endorsement of diversity concerns the functions 
of theories in IR. Whereas foundational debates were focus on epistemology, the 
orthodox functions of theory vis-à-vis empirical materials went unchallenged. 
Interestingly, within conflicting foundational positions such as critical realism, social 
constructivism, and pragmatism, theories may have different content but standard 
definitions of theory still usually assume “patterns to international events and that IR 
theory is about revealing those patterns,” and subsequently explaining them (Sterling-
Folker 2006, p. 4). Theories have the purpose of ordering data and explaining 
regularities. The odd consensus about what theory should be able to do is illustrated by 
Samuel P. Huntington’s attempt to advocating an alternative view on global politics after 
the end of the Cold War. He advances that “simplified paradigms or maps are 
indispensable for human thought and action” (Huntington 1997, p. 30). Huntington 
proceeds to explain the specific advantages of having maps:  
“Every model or map is an abstraction and will be more useful for some purposes than for 
others. A road map shows us how to drive from A to B, but will not be very useful if we 
are piloting a plane, in which case we will want a map highlighting airfields, radio beacons, 
flight paths, and topography. With no map, however, we will be lost. The more detailed a 
map is the more fully it will reflect reality. An extremely detailed map, however, will not 
be useful for many purposes. If we wish to get from one big city to another on a major 
expressway, we do not need and may find confusing a map, which includes much 
information unrelated to automotive transportation and in which the major highways are 
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lost in a complex mass of secondary roads. A map, on the other hand, which had only one 
expressway on it would eliminate much reality and limit our ability to find alternative 
routes if the expressway were blocked by a major accident. In short, we need a map that 
both portrays reality and simplifies reality in a way that best serves our purposes.” 
(Huntington 1997, p. 30-31)  
This vivid account is, arguably, a commonplace for most IR scholars. Indeed, the 
participants of the most recent foundational debate, however divided they remain on 
other matters, would agree with Huntington’s broad understanding (albeit not with his 
undifferentiated terminology). The purpose of theories, models or maps, to paraphrase 
Huntington, includes ordering, abstracting and generalizing reality, understanding causal 
relationships between phenomena, anticipate and predict future developments, 
distinguishing primary from secondary issues, and evaluating policy choices.105 And this 
leads to an intriguing observation. Monteiro’s and Ruby’s argument about the “false 
promise of philosophical foundations” (Monteiro and Ruby 2009a, 2009b), which 
stipulated a lively debate, omits a consideration of specifically how theories were 
affected by their vision of post-foundationalism. Why does the essential contestation of 
IR’s philosophical foundation (foremost its epistemology) not also have significant 
impact upon the status of theories? The function of theories appears surprisingly self-
evident and stable even if anything else crumbles.  
 In other word, how to render Huntington’s reasoning about maps less convincing? 
To comprehend what is puzzling about the non-controversial status of theory,106 I believe 
we need an alternative reading of the contemporary foundational debate, a reading that 
sheds light on the forgotten “explorative function” of theories, a function which combines 
mixes „Ontological“ and „empirical theorizing“ as suggested by Stefano Guzzini (2013). 
This function is a central premise of explorative realism and critical for the progress of a 
post-foundational IR for reasons that will become clear within a moment. Adopting a 
broader historical-comparative view upon the development of IR helps to contextualize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 For maps as research tool see Schouten, Loughlan, Olsson, and Anderson (2013). 
106 Note that this point is not identical with questions such as the general function of theories for research 
practice, scientific explanations or critique. 
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IR’s current multi-perspectivity and reveals why “theory” ought to be different treated. 107  
 Philosophers of science supply two possible readings of the contemporary 
predicament of theories: Following Kuhn, IR could be understood as a discipline in its 
infancy or in crisis. “The early developmental stages of most sciences have been 
characterized by continual competition between a number of distinct views of nature, 
each partially derived from, and all roughly compatible with, the dictates of scientific 
observation and method. What differentiated these various schools was not one or 
another failure of method—they were all ‘scientific’—but what we shall come to call 
their incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it.” (Kuhn 
1970, p. 4) Accordingly, it will require some time for IR to outgrow a non-mature stage 
and reach an equilibrium level, squeezing perspectivism by introducing a real 
paradigm.108  
 Alternatively, we could follow Funtowicz’s and Ravetz’s (1993) considerations. 
According to their reframing of Kuhn’s concept, IR could have arrived in a phase of 
“post-normal science” by now. Thus, “the reductionist, analytical worldview which 
divides systems into ever smaller elements, studied by ever more esoteric specialism, is 
being replaced by a systematic, synthetic and humanistic approach. The old dichotomies 
of facts and values are being transcended. Natural systems are recognized as dynamic and 
complex; those involving interactions with humanity are ‘emergent’, including properties 
of reflection and contradiction. The science appropriate to this new condition will be 
based on the assumptions of unpredictability, incomplete control and a plurality of 
legitimate perspectives.” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, p. 739) 
 Both narratives, in spite of their conflicting recipes, carry a common theme. 
Theoretical perspectivism emerges as response to shifts and twists at the ontological 
level. In short, reality is uncontrollable and ontology is not fixed. Under this condition, 
puzzle-solving practice is impossible. For it depends on “the ability (…) to group objects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 To trace the institutional and personal roots of its intellectual currents and methodical fancies from the 
sociology of science’s angle (Hoffmann 1977, Weaver 1996, 1998, Smith 2000, Bueger 2012) is not 
sufficient for our purpose. It does not provide answers to the question as to what the current function of 
theories could be because it remains fixed on internal issues and trends. 
108 Wight (2002, p. 31) wonders how Kuhn’s concept of paradigms could get so much (mis)used in IR, 
while Kuhn doubted that social sciences would ever become “mature”. 
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and situations into similarity sets which are primitive in the sense that the grouping is 
done without an answer to the question, ‘Similar with respect to what?’” In other words, 
an unfolding scientific crisis melts down all sorts of ontological and epistemological 
orthodoxies (Kuhn 1970, p. 200). So, when scholars appeal to a seemingly ambiguous 
“reality” they increase the difficulties of communicating incommensurable scientific 
views. For Kuhn, this confusing experience indicates the practice of non-normal science. 
This is suggestive for IR’s current constitution—whether we deem it to live through a 
crisis or the stage of early childhood (cf. Frieden and Lake 2005). Scrutinizing 
foundations, as it currently occurs, seems primarily a response to the ontological level 
although it is pursued in the epistemological arena.  
 It must be understood at this point that theories do not offer conflicting 
explanations for similar puzzles. They are instead ontological doors to radically different 
worlds. If this description applies to IR, we should generally welcome foundational 
exchanges and advances because they prelude major theoretical innovations, as Kuhn 
points out (1970, p. 85). The crucial insight from the philosophical perspective on non-
normal science is, then, that theories are mainly instruments for exploring the “unknown 
unknowns” of the cosmos. Meanwhile, we recognize by now that the explorative function 
of theories is completely absent from Huntington’s narrative. The landscape, the roads 
and expressways that he wants to navigate appear unproblematic because they are 
generally known in advance. His concerns with the use of the map are centered on the 
correct zoom and the selection from a large pool of established matters of facts. Nothing 
new to discover here; the sole purpose is proper navigation. Similarly, theories do not 
feature as tools for discovering new worlds in the post-foundational debate.  
 This lack of concern for novelty is evident from Robert Cox’s influential typology. 
Cox based his two types of theory on the argument that theories are “always for someone 
and for some purpose” (Cox 1981, p. 128), putting himself the premium on critical 
inquiry. Originally, his critical-Marxist approach primarily was focused on actively 
bringing about changes in world order for good (Cox 1981, pp. 149-151). But as he 
points out more recently, his actual contribution to IR was “to broaden the idea of ‘the 
international’ beyond the realm of political/military interactions of states”. In this line, 
Cox sees his approach as front-runner in “a departure from what might be called a 
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Cartesian view of politics.” (Cox 2007, p. 514) Regardless the viability of this 
assessment, in retrospect, Cox’s true innovation was less the “critical” function of theory. 
His genuine contribution to IR came in the form of a massive expansion of the 
discipline’s ontological limits. And yet, this claim reveals a blind spot within Cox’s own 
typology. It does not conceptualize the property of theories, among other things, to 
possess an irreducible explorative power. The recourse to other scientific disciplines only 
reinforces our curiosity here. For example, the physicists’ playful appreciation of models 
for exploring novel matters in the universe, quantum matter, or planetary movements and 
so on (Randall 2006, pp. 87-97), indicates the almost pathological state of IR: the 
disciplined meta-theoretical imaginary is merely about “policy advice”, “regular 
patterns”, “causal explanations” or “emancipatory critique”.109  
 This leads us to a difficult question: why is the critical property of theories to 
enable explorations not fully acknowledged or rather neglected during meta-theoretical 
debates? The lack of historiographical depth that marks the current debate about 
foundations surely is one reason. Despite multiple earlier integrations of Kuhn’s ideas 
(see Wight 2002, pp. 31ff), the scholarly community is not taking into consideration the 
discipline’s scientific trajectory and maturity through Kuhnian lenses. The critical 
function of theories, hence, remains uncontested. But this is only half of the explanation. 
Cynthia Weber offers a complementary reading of the seemingly a-historical nature of 
intra-disciplinary deliberations. Weber’s analysis treats theories as cultural myths that are 
perpetuated through storytelling. At a higher level, storytelling is effectively veiling the 
mythic character of the basic framework of IR itself. That is the framework that functions 
as master narrative for all other stories and silently reproduced by them. Writes Weber:  
“As a site of cultural practices, IR theory provides not just the stories about international 
politics but the framework which makes these stories meaningful, serious, and important. 
And it is this grid, this support, this basis for storytelling that goes without saying in IR 
theory itself – that it is reasonable, rational, and objective to narrate stories about IR theory 
which focus almost exclusively on sovereign nation-states in anarchy and the “high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Contrarily, as the multifaceted application and function of “models” in physics affirms it could be tied 
into a joyful practice of trying out, making sense of data and developing theories and so on. It should be 
noted that the meaning and function of a model, as well as its relation to reality, data, and theories is 
contested in physics. See Hartmann (1994) and Etkina, Warren, and Gentile (2006). 
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political” practices their interactions give rise to. (…) IR theory itself underwent (and is 
always really undergoing) a mythologizing function so that its framework for analysis 
appears to be natural, neutral and common sense rather than cultural, ideological, and in 
need of critical analysis. While exposing the myth function in IR theory would not put an 
end to it (for we never escape culture and ideology), it may temporarily disrupt it. And if 
IR theory’s myth function is disrupted, then this might open up new possibilities for 
uncharted stories about international politics to be told. This would be a terrible threat to 
traditional IR theory.” (Weber 2005, p. 184) 
Weber’s story reminds one of the naiveté of putting forth the question whether there 
might exist anything radically novel to discover. The question is whether there is 
anything unexpected beyond the discipline’s horizon, which is real and relevant for our 
profession and therefore could undermine the fixed delimitations of our ontological 
framework.110 These irritated questions, irritated by the complacent self-confidence one 
finds in papers, research projects, and books as well as during conferences and 
discussions with colleagues, strongly resonate with Buzan’s and Little’s critique that the 
“intellectual project” of IR has failed. They regard IR’s standard ontological parameters 
as “hopelessly narrow and oversimplified” (Buzan and Little 2001, p. 30). The levels of 
analysis, the units and logics of interactions, the potential puzzles and problem-fields: not 
much has been diversified in decades  
 Buzan and Little further lament that the narrow domain of IR theories is treated as a 
settled issue, for “the IR community has been seduced into wearing the Westphalian 
straitjacket.” (Buzan and Little 2001, p. 26) Their contention is strikingly similar to an 
earlier indictment by Susan Strange. She states that “even at their most extensive, the 
‘directional’ or ‘azimuthal’ agendas that exist are still far too restrictive and so do not 
really qualify as the study of political economy.” (Strange 1988, p. 13) In the same vein, 
Chris Brown maintains that none of the concepts making sense of post-Cold War world 
have had their origins within IR theories. Notwithstanding the need for theoretical rigor, 
he states that “there is a world of difference between disciplined thought about 
international relations and the notion of a discipline of International Relations. One can 
have the first without the second—and having the second does not guarantee the first.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Besides, of course, the fictitious threat of zombies (Drezner 2011). 
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(Brown 2007, p. 249) I propose to address this predicament through developing further 
the explorative function of theories. 
6.2 The explorative function of theory 
In general, the claim that mainstream IR is hardly, if at all, interested in “new possibilities 
for uncharted stories about international politics” (Weber 2005, p. 184) is correct. 
Though, a few cautious notes are warranted. Particularly, scholars at the margins of the 
discipline defy this description. These scholars, many of whom advance contested 
epistemological and ontological parameters, were both explorative and incompatible with 
the positivist mainstream research programs (cf. Zalewski 1993, Smith, Booth, and 
Zalewski 1996, Youngs 2004). Undoubtedly, mainstream IR has not paid enough 
attention to personalities whose research practice comes close to the working style of 
Charles Darwin or Alexander von Humboldt. Robert Keohane’s attempts to discipline 
feminist approaches to IR under the authoritative umbrella of a pre-fixed research 
program is exemplary for this tendency (Weber 1994, Tickner 1998). The incomplete 
comprehension of the function of theories is, in this sense, merely the reflection of a 
scientific practice that reifies variables and abstract concepts at the expense of describing 
the actual practices of international relations.  
 Re-reading the writings of genuine “explorers” borne into our discipline, in turn, 
offers both a telling story about the dismal status of IR and clues about the explorative 
function of theories. The research conducted by Cynthia Enloe and Susan Strange can be 
singled out for this purpose. How does their work help us reshaping our understanding of 
theories? Both have, albeit in different ways, written impressively dense descriptions of 
the reality of international politics. These accounts are stunning to the reader first and 
foremost because they relentlessly transcend the traditional ontological scope accepted 
within the IR community (Enloe 2000, Strange 1988). For example, in the vast uncharted 
landscape that Strange sets out to explore the international system appears but as one, 
almost marginalized, complex. A complex of interactions that is, according to Strange, 
surrounded and crisscrossed by myriads of non-state actors, economic agencies and social 
struggles, and, in addition, complex historical legacies, value conflicts, and technical 
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innovations merging at the “market-authority nexus” (Strange 1988, p. 22).  
 In a similar sense, yet from an early feminist perspective, Enloe argues that “we 
risk being globally naive” (Enloe 2000, p. xiv) if we do not investigate the entirety of the 
international system. It would be silly leaving “untouched our presumptions about just 
what ‘international politics’ is.” (ibid. 2000, p. 196) Writes Enloe: 
“Governments need more than secrecy and intelligence agencies; they need wives who are 
willing to provide their diplomatic husbands with unpaid services so those men can 
develop trusting relationships with other diplomatic husbands. They need not only military 
hardware, but a steady supply of women’s sexual services to convince their soldiers that 
they are manly. To operate in the international arena governments seek other governments’ 
recognition of their sovereignty; but they also depend on ideas about masculinized dignity 
and feminized sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood. (…) An 
exploration of agribusiness, prostitution, foreign-service sexism and attempts to tame 
outspoken nationalist women with homophobic taunts all reveal that in reality it takes 
much more power to construct and perpetuate international political relations than we have 
been led to believe.” (Enloe 2000, pp. 196-197)  
Strange’s and Enloe’s outstanding investigations provide crucial lessons that are often 
overlooked during the debate about philosophical foundations. First, while they aspired to 
grasp and describe international relations in their entire scope and dimensionality, they 
have largely stayed aloof epistemological skirmishes. Furthermore, Enloe and Strange 
have employed an almost invisible theoretical toolbox and a sort of infra-language to 
facilitate curiosity and discovery (Enloe 2004). In this sense, methods, theoretical 
concepts and frameworks are not seen as an end in itself that warrant rigorous 
epistemological safeguards as a precondition for research. Rather, theoretical apparatuses 
make sense only if they foster curiosity about the things one does not know yet, and 
enable a non-reductionist, realistic investigation into the multiplicity of the world (Enloe 
2007, Aradau and Huysmans 2013).  
 Such an investigation reveals, according to Enloe, that sustaining international 
politics is “far more complicated than most experts would have us believe.” Thus, she is 
not appealing to specific theories or methods, but rather to the nitty-gritty of fieldwork. 
The foundational claim, which Enloe consequently advances without much ado, is the 
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proposition that “the international is personal” (Enloe 2000, p. 196-197). Her 
foundational position is not cloaked in epistemological silk. Like other feminist 
explorers, Enloe prioritizes hidden contexts, personal experiences and biographies, and 
real local or corporal situations to carve out the role of women in sustaining the 
“international”. Christine Sylvester, in a similar sense, juxtaposes the abstractness of 
isolated male-made hypothesis testing and stylized facts with Sandra Harding’s “feminist 
empiricism” that foregrounds the “context of discovery”, putting the researcher onto the 
same plane with its subject matter (Sylvester 1994, p.33). The main concern of these 
dissident voices amounts to “first-order questions about the world”, as Griffiths and 
Callaghan note, rather than to a-priori limiting the scope of international relations 
(Griffiths and Callaghan 2000, p. 199).  
 Enloe’s feminist IR and Strange’s global political economy illustrate that minimal 
theoretical tools put into practice can be highly innovative with respect to shifting IR’s 
prior ontological demarcations. This captures precisely the where explorative realism 
identifies the main function of theories; its underlying problematique is peculiar: it cannot 
be confused with the epistemological problems of the Kantian object-subject duality 
(Patomäki and Wight 2000). Nor is it similar to the critical realist concerns for 
“correspondence” between theory and reality (Wight 2007). The key difference is that 
theories here unearth ontological novelties. Quoting again from Jennifer Sterling-Folker’s 
introduction to IR theory helps to clarify what is at stake here: 
“Another useful analogy is to think of IR theory as a set of perspectives equivalent to the 
alternative lenses one might use on a 35mm camera. The subject may be an elephant in 
grasslands, but an alternative lens will reveal different aspects and details of the elephant 
and its surroundings so that, as Barry Buzan says, “looking through it makes some features 
stand out more strongly while pushing others into the background” (…) The basic lens 
provides a shot of the elephant and its setting immediately to its front, back, and sides. A 
panoramic lens suddenly makes the elephant seem smaller in relation to its surroundings, 
which are now more expansive and more important to the image. A series of close-up 
lenses draw attention ever nearer to the elephant, enlarging it until its surroundings no 
longer seem relevant and details that had escaped attention before are noticeable. Tinted 
lenses of yellow, red, or blue highlight different shadows and features that had not seemed 
pertinent or particularly noteworthy with other lenses.” (Sterling-Folker 2006, p. 5) 
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In line with Huntington, Sterling-Folker’s metaphorical story perfectly captures one 
important function of theory—the usage of different lenses for zooming in and out in 
order to get a complete picture of the subject matter. Conceptualizing theory in terms of 
its potential for exploration, however, would turn this narrative on its head by asking how 
theories enable one to discover, in the first place, an elephant in the grasslands, or even 
the entire species of elephants. In a similar sense, what counts is not the resolution of a 
map or the set of features that has been selected. Against Huntington, theories, maps, or 
models have to feature the “white areas” and must lead to places without a stable “order”. 
It should offer clues and hints about where we might feel insecure to the extent that we 
walk on instable ground. It should point to locations where the dimensions and 
parameters on which we usually rely might not hold. It is the edges of a map, where the 
clarity of representation is muddled, that attract our attention.  
 Putting such a demand to maps seems odd only if we expect maps to deliver exact 
representations and forget the contingency of map making. If the landscape is unstable, a 
map that employs the logic of stability—focused on the known—will guide us into 
perplexing and paradoxical situations. Instead, what our map should do is to support 
navigating the insecure categories, unclear processes, and unknown agencies. Our travel 
itinerary could take us to broken expressways between two metropolises, or across nano-
particles in the human body or to mountain tribes that lack categories of statehood. 
Differently, we could plan visiting assembly lines or air force drone facilities where 
humans converge with machines and are stretched over virtual spaces; or, perhaps, 
satellite equipped nomads, online-shamans, and stateless migrants. As such, the content 
of a specific map (and some auxiliary travel guides) were to offer us different axes and 
dimensions of controversial subject matters.  
 Explorative realism, in other words, understands theories as working tools that help 
to uncover real-world multiplicities and complexity under conditions of analytical 
uncertainty. That one should never mistake the map for the landscape, here, takes on a 
new meaning. Theory does not refer to a pre-given “order” and, therefore, does not 
foreclose what we might encounter. In turn, reading theories in accordance with 
explorative realism explains the marvelous and surprising experience if one turns to 
Strange’s and Enloe’s texts. 
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 We are now familiar with the explorative function of theories. What needs to be 
done is to systematize this function. Table 3.1 shows two related subdivisions: The first is 
named “foundational collectors”. Their role is expanding (or restricting) the uncertainties 
that we are able to “perceive” at the ontological level. Foundational collectors, thus, 
enable us on the one hand to disclose uncharted empirical landscapes and on the other 
hand to multiply objects, sets of objects, and sets of sets of objects. In practice, they can 
be freely applied to texts, archives, or used in the field. The second column displays 
“conceptual models”, which enable researchers to connect different objects, to 
circumscribe processes, and to think about puzzles using various concepts. This 
conceptual language does not aim, ultimately, to contribute to or being assessed by an 
isolated “Theory”. Rather, as suggested, the two types of theoretical tools—employed 
separately or in combined fashion—are at the disposal of an explorative IR. Accordingly, 
theories do not resemble “as if” operations typical for instrumentalist frameworks such as 
Waltz’ Theory of International Politics (Monteiro and Ruby 2009a, p. 27). Neither are 
they sets of assumptions about causality or causal explanations of empirical variations 
(cf. Kurki 2006). Theories understood in this sense neither buttress truth claims, nor 
critically inquire historical contingencies. Their only purpose is enabling scientific 
exploration in practice. In short, theory, instead of delivering answers to epistemology, 
poses questions to empirics. 
 foundational collectors conceptual models 
function opens up new landscapes 
multiplying objects and processes 
sorts out relevant processes and 
interconnections 
parameterization 
nature 
statement 
definition 
slogan 
motto 
data-driven middle-range proposition 
metaphor  
map 
network 
web 
flashlight 
lens 
chart 
paradigm  
framework 
concept 
hypothesis 
model 
toy-model 
working-model 
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example 
'international system' 
'world system' 
'the international is personal' 
'global-local' 
'coproduction of order' 
'state' 
'sovereignty' 
'markets' 
'power'  
'associations'  
'stabilization' 
practical 
purpose a tool for discovering and description 
a tool for selecting of sets of cases and 
formatting and comparing puzzles 
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Given that the politics of technological innovations still represent an under-researched 
subject matter in IR, foundational collectors will play a crucial role for my purpose.111 
Moreover, foundational collectors play an instrumental role concerning the multi-
perspectivity of IR. Their innovational capacity could become a decisive factor for the 
progress of the entire discipline. To realize their potential, foundational collectors must 
be understood as, to quote Jackson, “working assumptions, or wagers, and evaluated for 
their analytical productivity rather than in terms of their ultimate philosophical validity” 
(Jackson 2009, p. 463). But as a mental precondition, we have to revitalize the creative 
dimension of IR. “At the core of the theorizing process is a creative imagination”, 
reminds James Rosenau students of international politics, and maintains: “to think 
theoretically one must allow one's mind to run freely, to be playful, to toy around with 
what might seem absurd, to posit seemingly unrealistic circumstance and speculate what 
would follow if they were ever to come pass.” (Rosenau 1980, p. 35)  
 Rosenau’s plea applies to the ontological level in equal terms. The explorative 
mind-set is imperative for non-normal conditions. While “the commitments that govern 
normal science” restrict the entities contained in the world according to Kuhn (1970, p. 
7), we are by now released from these chains. Why not open our descriptions for 
additional objects, processes, beasts, relations, modes, and existences--all of which were 
dwelling beyond the great wall of restrictive onto-politics. The proliferation of 
foundational collectors could lead to an age of ontological revolutions. It would therefore 
be mistaken to perceive the contemporary foundational debates as boring burden or as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 As the second chapter has shown, technological innovations warrant a special attention at the 
ontological level, as their fluid character is evading the typical conceptual boundaries that social science 
draws between the “social” and the “technical” domain (De Laet and Mol 2000, Mol and Law 1994). 
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dry exercises. Instead, multiplying perspectives, diversifying assumptions, and 
differentiating methodologies gives reason for remaining faithful to a “divided 
discipline”. The momentum of theoretical plurality should be embraced as an innovative 
move of discovering and exploring new dimensions, scopes, and complexities of 
existence as relevant for IR. The fruits of these discoveries, of course, demand the hard 
work of processing. It is not without efforts to incorporate them into the body of accepted 
puzzles and theories. World-views have to be corrected; theoretical frameworks need be 
adopted and so on. Stretching the traditional boundaries of IR also requires enormous 
efforts of intellectual persuasion, bridging conversations, and inter-paradigm 
“translations” (Busser and Wegner 2012, cf. Kuhn 1970, p. 202ff.).  
 To some extent this is already occurring. The ramifications of opening up 
Pandora’s box are exemplary, as illustrated by the field of security studies. Steven Walt’s 
(1991) attempt to keep the flood gate closed notwithstanding, the spread of security 
concepts, concerns, and actors, has almost violently forced “security studies” to 
accommodate to broadening, deepening, and multiplying of the “stuff” of security 
(Lipschutz 1995, Smith 1999, Fierke 2007, Booth 2007b, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 
2008, Buzan and Hansen 2009, Aradau 2010). Due to this sustained momentum, it is not 
by coincidence that especially the field of “critical security studies” is most furiously 
pushing the envelope of IR theories.  
 Explorative realism extends and supports this kind of ontological widening in 
specific ways. It agrees with pragmatic thinking that “gladiator style” research has 
entirely lost its appeal (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009, Sil and Katzenstein 2010). The 
increasing plurality of theoretical perspectives, which has already been a feature of IR 
during the interwar period, has lessened the epistemological dominance of positivist 
approaches embodied in Neorealism and Neoinstitutionalism to a certain degree. As 
Cochran notes, a historical chance, related to methodological pluralism, exists for the 
“broadening of our understanding of what international relations is, opening the range of 
possible ontological claims” (Cochran 2009, p. 147). The “blossoming of a hundred 
flowers” is not just the analytically most productive way forward as pragmatism suggests. 
Learning, among others, from Vandana Shiva and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, we have 
to value the diversification of philosophical foundations also for ethical reasons. 
	   173	  
Ontological homogeneity in IR produces narrow-minded research agendas, policy advice, 
and sometimes policies. The conditions of possibility for monocultures, ultimately, 
depend upon willful blindness against alternative ontologies (Shiva 1994, de Santos 
Sousa 2004, 2005). As such, monoculture puts the community of researchers into a fairly 
troubled position (Smith 2004).  
 From the view of philosophy of science, however, critical research does not 
necessarily require embarking on the postcolonial, the anti-western, the subaltern realist, 
or the anti-neoliberal camp. It would suffice shifting the epistemology-focused debates to 
ontological concerns by means, for instance, of a playful and agnostic employment of 
foundational collectors. Capturing the gist of post-foundational times from a Kuhnian 
perspective, then, means taking theory seriously as a device for discovering and exploring 
new empirical landscapes. As such, the anti-positivist tenet at the core of many feminist, 
postcolonial, and post-structural studies has from the very beginning contained an 
emphasis on redirecting our attention away from epistemological battles. Quite a few 
scholars, arguably at the margins of IR, entertain the ambition to push ontological 
frontiers outwards. In Chapter 5 I lay out my own approach to ontological expansions 
suited for studying technological innovations—inspired by Cox’s, Strange’s and Enloe’s 
monumental inroads und drawing on other extra-disciplinary sources. Prior to that, the 
next section will briefly discuss the epistemological position that accommodates 
explorative realism. 
6.3 The practice of knowing: from matters of concern to matters of fact 
Turning the simultaneity of mutually exclusive philosophical foundations into a virtue, I 
have stressed the “explorative function” of theories. Supposed that we have accomplished 
the task of assembling the multiplicity of a particular case of technological innovation, 
what does explorative realism imply for the solidity of our acquired knowledge? Would 
not legitimizing theoretical diversity in the sense proposed here ultimately amount to 
relativism? Influential IR schools certainly suggest so. For example, King, Keohane and 
Verba (1994) have argued in their account of scientific inquiry that positivist standards 
would ensure the validity and comparability of research projects. Only the use of 
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quantifiable variable-based models and assuming causal relationships between 
“observable patters of observables” would ensure added value and substantiate claims 
about the truth (Kurki 2006, p. 196). When this is not the case, such as with post-
structuralism, the value of scientific knowledge is nullified. Indeed, post-structuralist or 
feminist writings are often not referred to as scientific knowledge because the lack of 
“internal validity” threatens the root of scientific “dignity”. For, as Mercado (2009, p. 
482) states, scientists should be able to “lay claim to any more respectability than the 
political insights of a Churchill, a Kissinger, a Kennan.”  
 The central point, though, lies in overcoming the misleading claims that one can 
either have reliable knowledge, through epistemological mono-cultures or multi-
perspectivism coupled with “relative”, that is, unscientific knowledge. On the one hand, 
various philosophers of science reject calls for scientific monocultures for good reasons. 
A single foundation or paradigm neither delivers an unproblematic guarantee nor a 
sufficient condition for the possibility of reliable truth-claims that differentiate between 
practitioners’ insights and scholarly knowledge (Feyerabend 1975, Lakatos and 
Musgrave 1970). On the other hand, pragmatic scholars emphasize that the validity and 
the reliability of knowledge is instead achieved through diverse scholarly procedures of 
judging, selecting, evaluating, and affirming research methods and results (Friedrichs and 
Kratochwil 2009, pp. 214-217).  
 Pragmatism notwithstanding, we cannot refute so easily the accusation that a 
pragmatic epistemology, lastly, still amounts to relativism. In times of a foundational 
crisis, or so it seems, one cannot but become a relativist (Kuhn 1970, pp. 240ff.). This 
ultimately is also the essence of post-foundational reasoning (Monteiro and Ruby 2009a, 
2009b). However, it seems to me, the plea for post-foundational attitudes would be 
premature if it involved the claim that solid knowledge is impossible to achieve. The 
notion of a post-foundational attitude of the kind, which Monteiro and Ruby advocate is 
self-contradictory. For if we consider all philosophical foundations in IR—just as their 
relatives from the philosophy of science—as shaky and disputable because they demand 
committing acts of belief, is this not a foundational claim in itself? Particularly, this 
would establish that we could never escape knowledge uncertainties in social science. 
After all, such would be the implication of Monteiro and Ruby’s (2009a, p. 18) notion of 
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“foundational prudence”. Accordingly, they suggest adopting an “attitude” rather than a 
“position” for which one potentially might wage academic wars over foundations. 
Foundational prudence implies that we cannot and should not validate, or for that, rule 
out, paradigmatic perspectives, analytical designs, and research results solely on the basis 
of their philosophical underpinnings (Monteiro and Ruby 2009a, p. 39). To sum up, the 
contemporary debate has us believing that we have to choose between Scylla and 
Charybdis: Either we say farewell to scientific facts or we surrender to a commonwealth 
of foundational monoculture. 
 This dichotomy represents a false choice as will become perfectly clear in the 
course of this section. At the core of it lies what I will call a Cartesian move. The basic 
tenets of Cartesianism, that is, the mind-matter divide and the inevitable gap between 
intellectual speculation and the material world, are still ingrained in the research practice 
of social sciences, our conceptual language, and our meta-theoretical commitments in so 
many different ways that it seems nearly inescapable (Foucault 2005, Latour 1993, 
1999b). Establishing a post-Cartesian approach to IR, whatever this means (e.g. Pouliot 
2010, Wendt 2004), is simpler said than done. One might even wonder whether IR can be 
saved if we give up Cartesianism. Explorative realism thus is not the solution but merely 
attempts to contribute to a post-Cartesian solution for epistemology.  
 The first point that needs to be acknowledged is that scientific knowledge is 
manufactured. This does not preclude us from speaking about “matters of fact”. One 
should not mistake the understanding of construction for a deconstructionist project. 
Understanding how sound knowledge is attainable instead requires us to substitute a 
number of commonplace dichotomies such as mind vs. matter or reflective reason vs. 
material causality that have rendered epistemology a confusing enterprise. On that 
ground, I reject contenders of foundational hegemony in IR—critical realism, social 
constructivism, and pragmatism that claim to offer consistent elements of a philosophical 
fundament. The decisive epistemological point to notice, which I draw from science and 
technology studies, is that only the proper fabrication of knowledge—that entails multiple 
relations/associations among colleagues, data, institutions, theoretical concepts, 
instruments, et cetera—explains the occurrence of the hard icons of scientific progress 
(Pickering 1995, Latour 1999a).  
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There are Cartesian misconceptions abound. “Brute facts” are not mysterious 
entities that must be extracted somehow from “external reality” as critical realism would 
have us believing (Searle 1995). Nor do scientific facts refer to observable regularities as 
Humean brands of positivism claim. No more do I agree that (social) facts, ultimately, are 
“ideas all the way down” because of their entirely subjective or discursive construction as 
Wendt’s (1999) social constructivism proposes. The reason is that the epistemology-
driven views which dominate IR overlook an important issue: we can inquire, observe, 
and describe the various relations that characterize scientific construction practices 
(Shakley and Wynne 1996). This is, for example, evident from the politics of climate 
change (Demeritt 2001, Miller 2004, Mayer 2012a) and from the emergence of “failed 
states” (Bueger and Bethke 2013). Here, it is crucial to understand that “relational” or 
“relativist” are not just buzzwords, but rather help to explain why matters of fact exist at 
all (Latour 1999a). In short, a realistic view on the relational nature of research and 
knowledge production is against commonsense within IR.  
To begin with, peer review constitutes today’s predominant validation practice. 
However, the discussion among IR scholars, except pragmatist views, widely ignores that 
peer review provides a respected validation procedure involved in the creation of matters 
of fact. It is practiced across a large array of disciplines and apparently not inhibited from 
the parallelism of different foundational positions. But to sustain it as a process-based 
solution to thorny epistemological problems poses huge challenges to epistemology. 
While peer review amounts to an additive process that entails multiple actors with several 
foundational occupations, it nevertheless often gets under attack for exclusionary 
tendencies that threaten to silence alternative, yet supposedly valid bodies of knowledge 
(Edwards and Schneider 2001). In short, hidden or exposed foundations bear on the 
“internal” politics of research funding, publication policies, and career paths (Kurki 
2009). Moreover, as soon as scientific knowledge enters the field of policy advice the 
validation process additionally embodies “external” political interests. This brings me to 
my second point: In the context of scientific practices such as in the case of climate 
change research the foundational claims of scientists and their contradictions became 
political weapons in the hands of skeptical politicians, political lobbies and an often 
confused public (Demeritt 2006, Jasanoff 2003). Conversely, certain theoretical 
	   177	  
discourses are distinct from their alternatives in as much as they are intermingled with 
certain realities. IR theories are practices because, as Ashley notes, “the predicament it 
portrays and takes to be foundational is actively produced in history and through 
practice.” (Ashley 1988, p. 228)  
 This brings science into a trouble position. On the one hand, if scientists resemble 
“honest brokers”, as Roger Pielke proposes, they have to present different choices to the 
public including the inherent insecurity of models, data limitations, conceptual biases, 
and thus more generally their foundational beliefs (Pielke 2008). On the other hand, the 
practice of scientific knowledge validation usually operates not only within a scientific 
community, but also within a larger political and economic environment. This inevitably 
bears on the status of matters of fact as climate change research amply illustrates (Hulme 
2009, Jasanoff 2004b). For pragmatists, thus, the example of other disciplines 
significantly complicates the picture, because it diminishes the promise of “useful” 
knowledge against the backdrop of rampant epistemological politics. At the same time, 
pragmatists have not proposed tools that help closing a scientific debate in which 
“politics” and “science” can never be sorted out (see Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009). 
This leads to a seemingly thorny question: do we eventually have no other choice as to 
“deconstruct” scientific knowledge—for it is, in addition to its relative character, often 
politically biased?  
 The answer is a cautious “no” because we are stuck in a Cartesian fog of war here. 
Fortunately, IR theory does not need to invent the wheel anew. Opting against 
unrestricted deconstruction, explorative realism—following approaches in science and 
technology studies (STS)—is based on the believe that we should not reduce the problem 
of sound knowledge to Descartes’ puzzling about the human mind-matter divide that has 
so much influenced modern European thought. Rather, it aims at observing what actually 
happens at the sites of knowledge construction, where concerns are turned into facts in 
the first place (Latour 2005, p. 91). Similarly, Feyerabend’s slogan “anything goes” is not 
a postmodernist’s epistemological cry out of the blue. Rather, “anything goes” reflects 
Feyerabend’s careful observation of the empirical reality of scientific progress 
(Feyerabend 1975, chap. 1). The key lesson of philosophy of science holds that only after 
ascertaining through which processes scientific knowledge is being established, we 
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should construct a theory of knowledge. Accordingly, my notion prefers ontological 
insecurity to an epistemologically imposed order. It privileges cautious description over 
undisturbed prescription—a stance, however, running against most recent attempts to find 
a philosophical grounding for IR. In short, I treat epistemological questions first and 
foremost as an issue of scientific practice.  
 Explorative realism suggests symmetrically interrogating the performances 
entailing collective action, material objects, theories and ideas, while avoiding an 
overemphasis on ideal, textual, and linguistic dimensions. What this means is best 
explained by how the understanding of epistemology did evolve within science and 
technology studies. It contrasts with IR perspectives about how “reality” is accessed and 
which theory of knowledge is appropriate. In order to clarify my own epistemology, it is 
useful to follow the principle of “symmetry” that is central in STS debates about 
epistemology while mentioning various other lines of arguments when necessary. The 
Edinburgh School introduced the postulate of “symmetry” in the 1970s against the 
widespread assumption in the science studies community that “true scientific beliefs” 
correctly refer to objective reality while false beliefs follow from biased political or 
social influences (Bloor 1976). The main protagonist, David Bloor, stated “both true and 
false, and rational and irrational ideas, in as far as they are collectively held, should all 
equally be the object of sociological curiosity, and should all be explained by reference to 
the same kinds of cause.” (Bloor 1999, p. 84) This implied a radical rejection of crude 
forms of naturalism that were prevailing at that time. However, a subsequent generation 
of scholars placed this line of argument under scrutiny for the reason that it reiterated the 
classical subject-object distinction. In addition, they criticized that Bloor sustained the 
correspondence model of scientific knowledge as an integral component (Bloor 1999, 
Latour 1999b). This notion presupposes, to use Bruno Latour’s ironic metaphor, an 
unbridgeable gap between the “things-in-themselves” and the “mind-in-a-vat” (Latour 
1999a, p. 4). 
 The idea that juxtaposes an isolated mind and reality “out there” constitutes a 
constructivist narrative that underlies European philosophy and meta-theory—beginning 
at least with René Descartes but carried with different accentuations from Hume to Kant 
and even further to post-structuralists such as Derrida (Latour 1999a). The 
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correspondence model is employed and accepted in many sciences—in IR especially by 
positivist or rational approaches while opposed by pragmatist approaches. Among the 
tenets of this knowledge theory is the idea that indisputable knowledge only resides in the 
individual mind and in its thinking activities that are isolated from the outside world of 
material things. So, to the extent to which it was Descartes’ philosophical heritage, this 
“great divide” also resounded in the approach of the Edinburgh School, which put its 
focus on “social” explanations. Ultimately, much like in IR today, the notion that material 
objects could influence scientific explanations and philosophical reflections through their 
own agential power was totally excluded.  
 STS scholars searched for an alternative principle of symmetry. They were step by 
step exploring a new methodology and conceptual vocabulary. In as much as they were 
moving away from transcendental idealism, it was a result of their research work about 
laboratories and technological systems. Crucially, they assumed the potential of agency 
in both material objects (nature) and scientists (society). Different varieties of this sort of 
symmetrical methodology were applied to numerous cases of laboratory and historical 
studies of technological systems (Latour 1987, Lynch and Woolgar 1990, Bijker and Law 
1992, Law 1987). The exploration of scientific practices revealed that numerous theories 
of knowledge were simply entertaining incorrect and idealized assumptions. This added 
new empirical evidence to Paul Feyerabend’s earlier assessment that Popper’s and 
Lakatos accounts of scientific progress were too simplistic (Feyerabend 1975, chap. 16 
and 17). For example, STS showed that the subject-object schema is misleading and 
implausible. Furthermore, what is usually conceived as ahistorical facts actually has a 
history itself. Facts do not possess a hard shell but rather are products of a process of 
hardening, which involves various actors inside and outside of a laboratory. In other 
words, scientific facts move along an axis from instability to stability (Latour 1988, 
1999a, 1999b).112 Science and technology studies show that it is misleading to assume a 
sharp distinction between “facts” about which Science—with a capital s—speaks, 
representing the objective matter, and “values” that are ever contingent, purely 
constructed outcomes of political processes. In scientific practice “language”, “symbols,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Ludwik Fleck (1947) was an early predecessor, who put forward a similar observation when he explored 
the “Denk-Kollektive” that was part of finding a new drug substance. 
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and “nature” are inexorably intertwined.113 
 In sum, investigating the scientific praxis progressively renders several ideal-type 
models of science untenable that underpin theories of knowledge. Matters of fact exist, 
but they are not timelessly given and discovered in the “outside world”. Rather, they are a 
product of numerous relations and negotiations involving human agency, material 
entities, artificial objects, ideas, concepts, measurement devices, standardization, and so 
on. This offers a fascinating portray of the world in which little is left of the traditional 
delimitations of the “social” and the “natural” (Latour 1988, 1992, Stenger 1997). A post-
Cartesian theory of knowledge thus begins by taking real knowledge for multiple 
relationships instead of Descartes’ puzzle of doubtful minds, which are isolated from the 
world (and their bodies). 
 
What are the consequences of the relational epistemology if neither objectivist 
(“materialist”) nor critical-deconstructivist (“vanguardist”) rationales underpin truth 
claims? Is our knowledge consequently entirely arbitrary—that is, are IR theories fully 
contingent, in particular, dependent upon political interests, directed by funding, or 
dictated by shifting scholarly conventions? Are theories, finally, not distinguishable from 
myths as Paul Feyerabend claims even for theoretical perspectives of other “hard 
sciences”? The most plausible answer to these questions is first that scientific facts and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 See Latour and Woolgar (1979), Knorr Cetina and Mulkay (1983), Lynch and Woolgar (1990), 
Pickering (1992, 1995). 
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myths are distinguishable because they are constructed and maintained differently 
(Latour 2012). And, secondly, scientific knowledge is contingent but not random. Matters 
of fact are constructed for good reasons and with much care and effort. In contrast to 
correspondence models of knowledge, this approach first of all observes and specifies all 
efforts and acts of care. As Christian Bueger argues, we relate things, ideas, and people, 
make chains of arguments that have to be stabilized and translated—from the collection 
of various “data”, to the interrogation with fellow colleagues and the writing onto pages 
or typing into laptops, to publishing in journals and books (Bueger and Gadinger 2007, 
Bueger 2012). But IR does not only comprise the social activity of “research as the 
consensus-oriented practice of discursive communities” (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009, 
p. 214). It also involves various artifacts, virtual technologies, recalcitrant “data”, and 
various strings that reach outside our laboratories (which is our texts and offices) 
including university politics, funding mechanisms, policy advocacy, fieldwork 
informants and so on. If we would fail to keep up all these chains of translations and 
would stop integrating, and accommodating to, new actors no single truth claim would 
ever survive.114  
 Inevitably, it follows that research results can never be evaluated according to 
“objective” or “subjective” standards in the sense of Max Weber’s Werturteilsfreiheit 
(Weber 1985) – yet not because of intractable complex realities as Patomäki and Wight 
indicate (2000). The reason that the fact-value distinction makes no sense is that the very 
networking practices by stabilizing knowledge are constantly interweaving value 
arguments and factual claims as a matter of necessity. “Matters of fact” thus emerge from 
collective practices that relate—across the domains we think of as neatly separated—
texts on journal pages, concerns between colleagues, artifacts, empirical data, public 
controversies, metaphorical rhetoric, and policy relevancy. This is to say that scientific 
disciplines shape the world as much as the world shapes their research (MacKenzie 2006, 
Mitchell 2005). In brief, a post-Cartesian theory of knowledge would not be concerned 
with the arcane problem of ascertaining knowledge claims about the “outside” world 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114  This also appears underpinning the notion of integrative or transdisciplinary research, which 
characterizes the burgeoning scientific fields of earth-system research, geography, climate, linguistics, 
engineering, and computer sciences See Nowotny, Scott, and Gibbons (2001), Zimmerer and Basset 
(2003), Russell, Wickson, and Carew (2008). 
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across mind-world chasms. Epistemology rather is about assembling and associating all 
the way down. The key concern of explorative realism, hence, is the question as to 
whether the construction of knowledge is well done (Latour 1999a).115  
 Testing the solidity of knowledge, in this sense, involves a set of evaluation criteria, 
which set explorative realism apart from other philosophical foundations. First, the 
question whether something does actually really exist—for instance as scientific realists 
are concerned with the status of theories, which should be closely corresponding with 
reality (Wight 2007)—is meaningless. Reality is simply not separated from knowing and 
our minds are neither isolated, nor the only locations of knowledge production and 
validation. Observing the multiple entanglements with artifacts, systems, algorithms, and 
so on that render our lives real and scientific knowledge credible, we should simply 
discard the mysterious Cartesian contemplation that doubts existence and frames secure 
knowledge as a matter of dreaming (Latour 2005, p. 103). The real task is instead to 
ethnographically explore whether and how these entanglements unavoidable within a 
technological world are relevant for IR. Inspiration for this kind of research flows from 
STS, sociology, geography and first of all anthropology that methodically tries to avoid 
modern dichotomies (see Shaw 2003). 
 Second, our core analytical interest is not concerned with constitutive or causal 
explanations—in whichever of its versions (Waltz 1979, Wendt 1987, Hollis and Smith 
1990, Kurki 2006)—but how theoretical notions and analytical concepts help us 
assembling the multiplicity of the world. This comes down to the mentioned explorative 
function of theories. Especially with respect to technologies, the discussion in Chapter 2 
has shown that we lack conceptual approaches that capture the agency for artifacts 
without relying on determinism. How to understand and conceptualize things as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 This is the opposite of “social constructivism”. To cite Latour: “‘constructivism’ should not be confused 
with ‘social constructivism’. When we say that a fact is constructed, we simply mean that we account for 
the solid objective reality by mobilizing various entities whose assemblage could fail; ‘social 
constructivism’ means, on the other hand, that we replace what this reality is made of with some other stuff, 
the social in which it is ‘really’ built. An account about the heterogeneous genesis of a building is 
substituted by another one, dealing with the homogeneous social matter in which it is built. To bring 
constructivism back to its feet, it’s enough to see that once social means again association, the whole idea 
of a building made of social stuff vanishes. For any construction to take place non-human entities have to 
play the major role and this is just what we wanted to say from the beginning with this rather innocuous 
word” (Latour 2005, pp. 91-92). 
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“mediators” is thus a key question. Theories must help to multiply actors and agency 
without employing short cuts such as social structures or else (Latour 2005, p. 240). This 
is the meaning of “explaining” according to explorative realism.  
 Third, we need to modify the notion of mathesis. Descartes had suggested defining 
reliable knowledge exclusively in terms of discrimination, that is, a method that “imposes 
upon comparison the primary and fundamental investigation of difference” (Foucault 
2005, p. 63). Yet, qualifying the most fundamental element of Cartesian thought remains 
complicated. Specifically, the (conceptual) order of difference that, in accordance with 
Cartesian understandings must be imposed on the world, should be turned into an open 
question—an empirical questioning sensible to the fundamental difficulties of discerning 
‘identity’ and, hence, ‘difference’ in the first place. We cannot go beyond Descartes’ 
notion of difference entirely. But we should pose ‘identity’ as a question for empirical 
inquiry. Consequently, the dynamic relationships between agents, the replacement of 
qualities, agencies, and shapes, and the shifting agency of and within collectives move to 
center stage. If concepts such as “power”, “sovereignty”, or “states” are not framed in a 
way as to enable us to capture the reshuffling of identities and differences in the world we 
ought better drop them.  
 One of the core issues at stake is precisely captured by the notion of 
“methodological nationalism” and John Agnew’s “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994, 
Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, Ferguson and Mansbach 2007). What the sociologists 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim write about their discipline applies perfectly to IR as well:  
“methodological nationalism involves much more than just a problem of empirical data, 
which are largely collected and analysed on a nation state basis and compared 
internationally. Much more profoundly it is about how the core sociological concept of 
generation (like the concepts of social inequality, the state, the family, the household, 
justice, neighbourhood, etc.) can be liberated from the mental horizon of methodological 
nationalism and opened up to the fundamental transformations of globalized Second 
Modernity. Where this does not happen, the lived reality of the rising generations will 
remain terra incognita—no matter how much data the social researchers gather.“ (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim 2009, pp. 34-35) 
In this sense, critical realists in IR—referring mainly to John Searle’s or to Roy 
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Bhaskar’s thoughts116—point in the right direction by claiming that the status of our 
knowledge must be open-ended, not absolute, because it reflects an ever-changing reality 
(Patomäki and Wight 2000, Jackson 2008, Wight 2006, 2007). Yet, even if critical 
realists want to abandon the “level of analysis” assumption and the simple opposition of 
agents and structures, their realism is not radical enough. They continue maintaining 
metaphysical orders of difference without observational evidence. These arbitrary 
“orders” of stratification include the divide between social and material worlds 
mentioned above (Patomäki and Wight 2000, Wendt 1999) that cannot be justified 
empirically—particularly due to the technoscientific reality that we experience. Even 
approaches more sensitive to material agency ultimately maintain a dualistic 
understanding (e.g. Wight 2006, pp. 295ff.) and, hence, by reinforcing the fundamental 
chasm (Weber 2012) reintroduce a prefixed ontology.  
 Fourth, knowledge production cannot be evaluated and legitimized by means of its 
alleged contribution to the cumulative growth of disciplined bodies of knowledge. 
Explorative realism here contests Popperian or Lakatian understandings. The idea that 
accumulated academic knowledge can authoritatively speak about regularities and 
discover laws seems unrealistic due to the diversity of solid knowledge. Its realization is 
even not thinkable, as critical realism and social constructivism argue against positivism, 
through an infinite process of accumulation (Kurki 2006, p. 193, Searle 1995). One 
reason is that such an argument must, as the condition of possibility, take recourse to an 
“outside” world that gets described cumulatively. This means, however, to hold up the 
Cartesian division between minds and facts. Another reason to reject the idea of 
accumulation is the fact that we live in multiple ontologies as archeologists and 
sociologists affirm (Mol 2002, Dobres 2010).  
 Fifth, we can nevertheless attempt to order empirical observations by establishing 
taxonomies or putting collections of data and puzzles into their proper place. For that to 
happen, we must not only assure that our “categorical order” derives from careful 
observation and thick description of reality rather than from positivist “as if” 
assumptions, logo-centric prescriptions, or Kantian a priori. It is possible if we do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 See Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson, and Norrie (1998) and Searle (1995). 
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mistake the map as a representation of the landscape. The fundamental issue at stake here 
is to keep taxonomies open-ended, instable, and in the form of an infra-language. It also 
requires making transparent and explicit the Cartesian-inspired purification practices that 
cut through the relationships of a subject matter and its environment (Foucault 2005, p. 
142, Latour 1993).117 To the extent to which we overcome Cartesian mathesis we really 
begin to grasp how “purifying” does not only allow for theoretical parsimony, but does 
also lead to fundamental flaws of our conceptual language. In turn, it is a methodological 
and a meta-theoretical obstacle, which limits our comprehension of real multiplicities. Its 
high cost can never be highlighted enough. Most IR theories, as Enloe for instance points 
out, have systematically “under-estimated the amount and varieties of power at work.” 
(Enloe 2000, p. 197) Overcoming the traps of purification, therefore, demands an “infra-
language” (Latour) for both analytical practice and theoretical conceptualizations. For 
instance, post-Cartesian accounts employ a symmetrical reading of what has previously 
been treated separately as material “forces” and human “agency”. In addition, Descartes’ 
heritage, while enshrining the difference between mind and matter, first and foremost 
does foreground reasoning and speculation over perception and entanglements. The 
quantum-ontology by which means Alexander Wendt aims at rebuilding the ontological 
fundaments of his Social Theory (Wendt 2004, p. 189) is thus in some respects even more 
Cartesian than his initial approach.118 
 Sixth, explorative realism requires a differentiated understanding of the role that 
language plays for the construction and application of IR theories. It is important to 
recapitulate the role that Descartes’ model of knowledge has granted to language. Forged 
hundreds of years ago in the age of representation, the assumed gap between words and 
things has made it possible in the first place that “things touch against the banks of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 At this point, my wording will perhaps irritate the reader. It is treacherous. For it seemingly goes 
without noticing: social scientists almost automatically accept that a thing/subject matter/unit of analysis 
has a context or an environment. Exactly this order of difference, Descartes’ powerful bequest, that we are 
used to apply to our subject matter, is what we need to abandon if we want to seriously inquire into the 
politics of technological innovations. 
118 As such, Alexander Wendt’s proposed “quantum social science”, which allegedly differs from Cartesian 
social science by virtue of its “dual quality of quantum ontology” (Wendt 2004, pp. 200ff), is misleading. 
From explorative realism, it is unconvincing to radically remake only the physical basis of the human 
consciousness, whereas the rest of the “order”, namely Wendt’s three levels of individual, society and 
international system, just remains intact and, hence, as we have seen without any substantial matter. 
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discourse because they appear in the hollow space of representation.” Michel Foucault 
argues that in the age of similitude, words used to be “interwoven in the very being of the 
beast”. At the time of Descartes, however, “they have been unraveled and removed: and 
the living being, in its anatomy, its form, its habits, its birth and death, appears as though 
stripped naked” as Foucault puts it (Foucault 2005, p. 141). This primordial heritage still 
to some degree underpins correspondence-theories of knowledge and other foundational 
commitments. While words and signs prior to Descartes were usually seen as interrelated 
and interwoven with meaning, practices, the creation, and artificial objects, the Cartesian 
mathesis purported a neat split reality: “on the one side, we shall find the signs that have 
become tools of analysis, marks of identity and difference, principles whereby things can 
be reduced to order, keys for a taxonomy; and, on the other, the empirical and murmuring 
resemblance of things, that unreacting similitude that lies beneath thought and furnishes 
the infinite raw material for divisions and distributions.” (Foucault 2005, p. 64)  
 As in the case of Diderot’s Encyclopedia, where the missing ability of language to 
express experience led to considerable problems, the issue of language has serious 
implications for IR. Fierke argues that meta-theory in IR is strongly influenced by two 
different late-modern language theories. Language has been relegated to the margins of 
the discipline due to positivist epistemological presuppositions that base their knowledge 
claims on a practice that excludes language both as concern of research and with regard 
to meta-theory (Fierke 2003). On the one hand, positivist and rationalist approaches 
aligned with the early Wittgenstein, who left open the possibility that words still could 
somewhat resemble the real things. Post-structuralists, on the other hand, took on the late 
Wittgenstein who emphasized language as a game that is unrelated to reality (Fierke 
2003, pp. 74-79). An explorative realist perspective, however, calls into question the 
meta-theoretical commitments, which made possible in the first place that language 
became singled out from reality and was deemed merely instrumental for representing the 
“outside world”. Instead, language is constantly travelling and “border-crossing”. This 
may contradict textbook accounts of social science. But it is prevalent to the extent that 
the boundaries of different domains become blurred. The connecting performance of 
words, concepts, signs, and narratives attract our core empirical interest in itself (Bueger 
and Villumsen 2007). As a consequence, any consistent theory of knowledge must 
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comprehend the mutual participatory logic of entanglements between “scientific 
knowledge”, “theories” and “lay knowledge”. This can lead to the adoption of “emic 
concepts” (Brislin 1976), a term that refers to the vocabulary used by actors themselves 
to make sense of what, why and how they are interacting; it certainly implies the 
deliberate collapse of the theory-practice distinction (Villumsen Berling 2011, Caliskan 
and Callon 2010). As noted in the introduction we find a closely related emergence of 
new concepts and actual economic realities the field technology and research policy 
(Godin 2002, 2006). 
 Overall, explorative realism implies an understanding of knowledge that aims at 
fully apprehending the practice of knowing without unraveling into a de-constructivist 
attitude that strives to debunk power, interests, or ideology as forces allegedly luring 
behind scientific knowledge. Instead, the practice of knowledge making amounts to 
“collecting them into one collective.” (Latour 2005, p. 256) Explorative realism 
acknowledges that network practices collect from the diversity of things and stabilize 
matters of fact. It lays out a set of criteria in order to judge whether the construction of 
our knowledge is good or bad. Thus, it does not respond to the perennial Cartesian 
concern whether knowledge is true of false. As outlined above, six criteria are paramount 
for the attempt to transcend Cartesian thinking—an ethnographical attitude, explorative 
theorizing, difference as empirical question, conceptual infra-language and avoiding 
purification, the collapse of language and “context”. Together, this translates into 
concrete methodological measures summarized in the following. 
6.4 Methodological ‘limbos’ and the post-Cartesian toolbox 
If we assume that the traditional ontological boundaries are too restricted, how could we 
account for additional levels and dimensions of reality? Explorative realism, first of all, 
involves a move that merges theoretical insecurity with research methods. The reason 
technological innovations pose challenges to research is because common conceptual 
dichotomies fall short in capturing their real intricacies. Against this backdrop, methods 
such as thick description (Geertz 1973), ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 2002, Maynard 
and Clayman 1991), and Actor-network Theory (ANT) (Mol 2012, Barry 2001, Latour 
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2005) provide us with tools of inquiry that do not take any categories for granted and lead 
away from prescriptive social science. In this vein, Bruno Latour argues, 
“anthropologists, who had to deal with premoderns and were not requested as much to 
imitate natural sciences, were more fortunate and allowed their actors to deploy a much 
richer world. In many ways, ANT is simply an attempt to allow the members of 
contemporary society to have as much leeway in defining themselves as that offered by 
ethnographers. If, as I claim, ‘we have never been modern’, sociology could finally 
become as good as Anthropology” (Latour 2005, p. 41).  
 James Der Derian, who investigates the interplay between technological 
innovations and war perhaps more closely than any other IR scholar, emphatically 
reaffirms this view. Recalling his seminal research into the hybridization of war, ethics, 
virtual technology, and media-entertainment, a complex that he labels “virtuous war”, he 
notes about maps:  
“As I went deeper into the MIME-NET, the more often I felt the need to leave the map 
behind, not because it was flawed but because it was taking me to the wrong place, in 
which the illusion of command and control squeezed out the rich contingencies of life. In 
short, I'd rather get lost, at some subliminal level, than end up where the map was taking 
me. (...) Looking back on my efforts to map the military-industrial-media-entertainment 
network, I realize that getting lost produced some of the most important insights. (...) 
Getting lost forced me to reconsider the interdependent relationship between map-making 
and map-reading; it illuminated the shadow space between the landscape and the map, 
revealing why and how the modern map-reader would prefer the inaccurate map to a 
recalcitrant landscape. In my travels I often found the most interesting perspective—and 
interesting people—at the edge of the map, where the monster lurk, where the distinction 
between the representation and the real thing begins to break down but is not yet 
overwhelming.” (Der Derian 2009, pp. 279-280) 
This vivid description comes close to Galison’s “critical opalescence” that we have 
encountered in the second chapter. Like Galison (2006), Der Derian stresses the 
inexorable mingle of reality that seems bottomless. Analytically, he makes no attempt to 
foreground “social” actors over technologies or vice versa. He tries to circumvent the 
very dualism of these notions. In Der Derian’s sensitive reading, the lines between 
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military strategy, public relations, pictures, computer-simulation, soldiers, virtually 
augmented battlefields, and the muddling-through of global high-tech warfare are blurred 
or have collapsed entirely (Der Derian 2009). Through his methodological attitude Der 
Derian stresses a fundamental insecurity about a world filled with real-virtual, human-
cyborgs, war-entertainment, and virtuous violence reality where we are getting lost and 
our categories easily become fuzzy.  
 Interestingly, these observations reverse the ontology-epistemology nexus as it is 
often discussed within IR (see Kratochwil 2000, Wendt 1999). The predominant 
epistemological concern is no longer the legitimacy of scientific truth-claims, but whether 
a theory of knowledge enables the comprehension of a complex reality. The function of 
foundational collectors is thus to open up windows into complexity instead of foreclosing 
them for the sake of parsimonious puzzles or usable expertise (Der Derian 1990). Its 
prominence among many anthropologists and critical geographers notwithstanding, this 
sort of sensitivity, arguably, is of limited appeal to IR scholarship.  
 The sense of deep insecurity that persists because the researcher deliberately avoids 
presupposing any specific order of difference constitutes what I want to call “limbo”.119 
In relation to epistemology, the idea of limbo conveys two meanings here. First, it 
denotes the mind-set at the starting point of research that is not tempted towards 
reductionism but aims at unearthing unexpected differences. Turned into a methodical 
guide, limbo suggests probing into unstable/stabilizing differences and heterogeneous 
identities through empirical tests. This implies three complementary paths of exploration: 
1) Exploring controversies about agency, group-belonging, and fact/value distinctions 
(Venturini 2010, Barry 2012, Jasanoff 2011). 2) Following the circulation of things, their 
movements, fluidity, agency, and employment within and across collectives. 3) 
Following human actors in their engagements within collectives and their shifting agency 
during processes of assembling and reassembling (Latour 1987, Law 2004). Obviously, 
these paths require not only a considerable conceptual repertoire, but also the full range 
of empirical research methods including ethological fieldwork, observational research, 
extensive interviews, and archival studies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Thanks to discussion with Peer Schouten for attending me to this term. 
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 The other meaning of limbo refers to the status of knowledge itself, which is in a 
phase of stabilization and thus prone to disruption, translations, and shifts. This comes 
close to the understanding of theory that Annemarie Mol suggests: “a ‘theory’ does not 
necessarily offer a coherent framework, but may as well be an adaptable, open repository. 
A list of terms. A set of sensitivities.” (Mol 2012, p. 265) If we assume a gradient 
between limbo (the concerns at the beginning of our research activities) and the matters 
of fact that should be its end point, then theory is flexible and adaptive in order to enable 
the navigation through a complex landscape. Rejecting the object-subject schema frees us 
from the obstacles and intricacies of correspondence models of knowledge. As a 
consequence, scholars do not impose hierarchical research methods onto their “objects”. 
However, this does not imply that consistency in our conceptualizations and precise 
empirical work is no longer warranted—the opposite is true.  
 The important point here is that practices of empirical research and “theory” are not 
separated in the first place. Instead, the methodology of explorative realism assumes that 
we can easily relate and associate with actors and follow their relations. There is simply 
no prima facie reason to anticipate limits of access, as Kantian constructivism would 
content. In contrast to critics of using ethnographical methods in IR, it is plausible 
assuming that we can listen and talk to people, can observe and participate in processes 
and practices. Simply, we can become entangled in networks of humans and non-humans 
in multiple ways. Sound knowledge actually is always based on mingling with and 
possibly changing thereby the world that we want to explore—we contribute to the 
constitution of our subject matter in as much as the practitioners we engage with. 
Different forms of entanglement are unavoidable for conducting research and producing 
stable knowledge (Vrasti 2008, Rancatore 2010, Neumann 1996, 2011). Political 
engagement is normal and activism happens often—just consider the life experiences of 
Hume, the Humboldt brothers, Einstein, Heisenberg, Marx or Foucault. None of them has 
shied away from entanglement for a mistaken fear of distortion of “science”.  
 In brief, entanglement is both a product and a condition of sound research. As 
historians of science have shown indeed, scholarship and reality have never been divided 
into two domains (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, Galison 2006). In practice, concepts and 
buzzwords are moving among diverse academic disciplines, the public, and political 
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discourse back and forth. Ideas, metaphors, and theories do not only help to explain 
phenomena, they also, over time, strongly influence them and vice versa (Latour 2005, 
Polanyi 1943). In international politics, as in other fields, this relationship rather 
constitutes a two-way expressway and often a seamless web (Litfin 1994, Mitchell 2005). 
Similarly, classical traditions in IR are “constitutive rather than merely reflective forces 
in international politics (…) they are part of a constant making and unmaking of history 
through interrogation, interpretation, and narration.” (Der Derian 2009, p. 301, Ashley 
1988) By implication, the construction of scientific knowledge needs to be evaluated by 
its actual entanglement precisely because it does not only flourish in an isolated scientific 
domain. But it helps in fact with assembling the common reality. 
 Does this mean that explorative realism leads one to merely describing what is to be 
found in the field or what is perhaps the latest political fashion? The answer clearly is no. 
In contrast, explorative realism advances quite distinctive methodological motives. But 
let me shortly restate what it does not claim: it neither aims at finding regularities and 
correlations/causality as positivism suggests; nor does it have to introduce “counter-
phenomenality” or “trans-phenomenality” as Wight (2004, p. 270) suggests with 
reference to Marx. The latter view presumes that critical social scientists resemble a kind 
of vanguard, who possesses deeper knowledge and thus can tell appearance from reality 
(Wight 2004). The imperative of such a claim to superior knowledge boils down to an 
anti-superstition priesthood that has never really tasted the limbo experience. Against 
vanguardism, I propose two alternatives: on the one hand, to learn from the visible and 
accessible controversies that occur when practices or collectives change or become 
unstable. This approach is post-Cartesian in the sense that it aims at a pre-disciplinary 
view questioning the validity of disciplinary boundaries. It is the opposite of the rigorous 
compartmentalization that belongs to the mainstream understandings of theory in IR. 
Regardless of whether the understanding of theory is a positivist, critical realist or 
constructivist one, the subject matter is always neatly divided and ordered to begin with 
(Smith 1996, Waltz 1997, Wight 2006, Wendt 1999). Instead, the state of limbo is 
suggested here as default position where methods and methodology collapse (Aradau and 
Huysmans 2013). It resembles a pre-disciplinary ontology in which Beate Jahn sees the 
great advantage of classical writers:  
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“I think it is more promising to use a pre-disciplinary approach. I use a lot of classical 
authors and to me, the most valuable thing about classical theory is that a lot of it is pre-
disciplinary. What does that mean? It means that these people did not actually start out 
from the assumption that economics was separate from politics and that politics was 
separate from, say, religion. And so, what you can get from classical theory is actually a 
theorization of the relations between all of these different dimensions of political life. That 
gives us a starting point in which these dimensions are connected. And we can then trace 
the fragmentation that arises subsequently, identify its roots but also the continuing 
connections that we miss when we begin with an already separated or fragmented point of 
view. (…) So, in classical texts, what strikes you most, is that politics, economics, religion, 
domestic and international are not separated from each other, and it gives you a good 
understanding of where society and international society is coming from in an integrated 
way. We can use classical theory to look at what actually inspired people to properly 
distinguish and separate out domestic from international politics: what actually led to the 
separation between politics and economics? And this is what we can’t really do so easily 
when we start from today, because we’re going to read the present fragmentation back into 
history.” (Schouten 2012a) 
On the other hand, I agree that there might be “hidden” things—yet quite different from a 
Marxist or critical realist understanding. The bottom line is that the big elephant in the 
room often resembles a black box that is taken for granted by actors and scholars alike. 
That is, it is stabilized to the extent that it functions as a mere intermediary. Contra 
Kantian idealism and methods of theoretical deduction, we therefore need to explore by 
empirical testing in situ which (human and non-human) actors really make a difference. 
Latour (2005) argues that finding out which actor figures as mediator and which one is an 
intermediary replaces theorizing invisible structures of the “social” and systemic forces 
of “structures”. 
 The limitations of “theorizing” based on such an epistemology and methodology 
presented above are obvious. It does not lend support to notions of causal or constitutive 
explanations. It does not reveal hidden meanings. Nor does it examine intangible social 
forces or invisible structural power. In contrast, the task of foundational collectors can be 
summarized as follows. They should enable us to produce a thick and detailed description 
of the real multiplicity of the world without shortcuts. The promise of foundational 
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collectors lies in their ability to assemble actors, agencies, and connections whose 
identity and differences are unclear or contested. Writes Latour:  
“All those questions are raised not only by scholars, but also by those they study. It is not 
that we, social scientists, know the answer that would reside behind the actors, nor is it the 
case that they, the famous ‘actors themselves’, know the answer. The fact is that no one has 
the answers—this is why they have to be collectively staged, stabilized, and revised. This is 
why the social sciences are so indispensable to the reassembling of the social. Without 
them we don’t know what we have in common, we don’t know through which connections 
we are associated together, and we would have no way to detect how we can live in the 
same common world.” (Latour 2005, p. 138) 
Ultimately, research should represent the collective to all its participants. The post-
Cartesian twist that is involved here renders these textual accounts to transcend a purely 
“social” comprehension of the world. Against purified accounts by social scientists, the 
world is made to presents itself as various entanglements and networks of humans, 
animals, material things, ideas, images, language, and artifacts—a crazy mixture that 
cannot be separated without performing ontological violence. In this sense, thick 
descriptions pose a considerable task. They involve theoretical infra-language and require 
a methodological tool-kit that aims at generating research puzzles, typologies, and 
generalizing from phenomena in a mingled world.  
 This chapter has developed a post-Cartesian approach of how we access our subject 
matters. Any conceptualization of the politics of technological innovation can 
accordingly be assessed in two different ways: first, concerning its ability to capture 
insecure differences (of groupings, boundaries, agencies, facts, and so on) and, secondly, 
with respect to the extent to which it embodies the principle of symmetry. The idea of 
foundational collectors consequently breaks with the ontological logocentrism of IR 
theories. In short, explorative realism demands that we test empirically how all sorts of 
actors—and not just humans—relate to each other; it foregrounds process and hybrid 
elements in our collectives. How this can be undertaken in a conceptually systematic way 
with regard to technological innovations is developed in Chapter 7. A two-dimensional 
frame renders different options for ontological expansion intelligible. 
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7. Ontological expansion in the double-mixed zone 
At the heart of explorative realism lies the task of expanding IR’s ontological parameters. 
While my discussion ties into the ongoing conversation about the role granted to 
materials in IR’s ontology (Connolly 2011, Coole 2013), I will employ a variety of 
different disciplinary literatures about technological innovations to develop a theoretical 
outlook that embraces heterogeneous forms of agency on the one hand and processes of 
emergence on the other. By ontology I refer broadly to both the assumed central features 
and ‘actual’ qualities of research subjects and the corresponding ontological building 
blocks that make up research and theory (see Furlong and Marsh 2010, Rescher 1996). In 
line with the methodological considerations detailed in Chapter 6, three interlinked 
subsections advance the argument for systematic ontological expansion. I draw on 
process philosophy, Schumpeter’s evolutionary economics, and science and technology 
studies to sketch out accounts of material agency and processes of group formation (7.1-
7.2).  
 These considerations are subsequently summarized in form of a two-dimensional 
matrix that helps to locate a post-Cartesian meta-theory. It aims at rendering intelligible 
the discipline’s current ontological parameters and helps to chart the possibilities of 
ontological expansion. Approaches situated in the “double-mixed zone”, in which 
processes of group formation and heterogeneous agencies form the primary notions 
underlying research concerns, are specifically suited to overcome the limitations of the IR 
approaches to technology (7.3). Conceptual vocabulary and empirical examples from 
other disciplines about technological innovations are utilized to animate the ontological 
component of explorative realism. Replacing the lightness of IR enables us to articulate 
an orientation for future research programs, covering multiple new issues, puzzles, and 
questions related to technological innovations and materially mediated processes of 
emergence writ large. 
7.1 Heterogeneity and material agency 
The first key to a post-Cartesian ontology lies in a differentiated understanding of agency 
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that replaces the dualist notion of IR theories that either reduces agency to techno-
determinism or to social reductionism. The latter rest on René Descartes’ strict division 
between matter and mind. Perpetuated and reframed by various modern thinkers, it was 
handed down by Hume, Kant, and others (Latour 1993, 1999) and still has a considerable 
effect on current IR theories (see Patomäki and Wight 2000, pp. 219ff). As the deep 
analysis of Man, State, and War in Chapter 5 demonstrated, the construction of the 
current IR framework has escaped technological determinism only through imposing a 
rigid social world in which material artifacts make no significant difference. IR's 
privileging of social agents or human intentionality that sharply restricts ontology speaks 
to a long-standing logo-centric and “anti-realist” tradition within social sciences more 
generally (Braver 2007). As theorists concentrated on a purely “social” turf, all “natural”, 
“physical”, and/or “material” traits of reality were sorted out (see Latour 2005, p. 83, 
Barry 1999, Deudney 1999). Most conceptual frameworks reaffirm the social domain of 
symbols, meaning, rationality, or subjectivity, and while the prevalent conceptual 
language clearly shaped the boundaries of the proper domain as non-material (Mitchell 
2002, Paterson 1995, Hovden 1999), only a few theorizations suggest otherwise.  
 Carroll provides an interesting option to replace the mind-matter divide in his 
analysis of the expansion of the modern British statehood on the Irish island. In 
describing the modern state formation, he avoids dualist conceptualizations such as 
“socio-nature” or “socio-technical”. Instead, Carroll suggests granting the material, the 
semiotic, and the practical dimensions equal agential potential. Mapping these three 
dimensions onto the state produces a tripartite model comprising the state-idea, the state-
country, and the state system. Writes Carroll: 
“All three dimensions of cultural formation—discourse, practice, materiality—can be 
granted their peculiar agential power, though in a manner, and this is a crucial point, that 
does not theoretically subordinate one dimension to the other. The relative agency of 
discourse (symbolic meaning, representation, and cognitive structure), practice (social 
activity variously organized), and materiality (constructed environments, spaces, and 
technologies) in processes of cultural formation can be treated as an empirical issue to be 
settled in each case by research.” (Carroll 2006, pp. 14-15) 
Analytically, Carroll suggests that state formation proceeds in three mutually embedded 
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gravitational zones of social practices, symbolic discourse, and materials – this maintains 
a “reference to embeddedness and internal relatedness.” (Carroll 2006) As he splits the 
world into three fields, he does not assume substantive differences between allegedly 
different worlds (materials vs. meanings) with other approaches from anthropology. 
Carroll’s idea to study technical engineering, public debates and social policies as sites of 
similarly important sites of state activity, represents a significant improvement upon 
earlier binary juxtapositions of political institutions, or social frames on the one hand and 
technological infrastructures on the other (Chandler 1977, Winner 1977, White 1962). It 
also affirms that reductionism, regardless if it is the idealistic or materialistic version, is 
mistaken from the beginning. Clearly, neither side is reducible to its opposite. Instead, on 
the empirical level, we must learn to see the world as it is. But is the world simply 
“hybrid”, a mixture of the social and the material? This notion and related language are 
mistaken if they indicate the collapse of two originally separated domains. The 
anthropologist Descola substitutes the social-nature divide at once with the notion of 
collectives of humans and non-humans: 
“Once the ancient nature-culture orthogonal grid has been disposed of, a new multi-
dimensional anthropological landscape may emerge, in which stone adzes and quarks, 
cultivated plants and the genome map, hunting rituals and oil production may become 
intelligible as so many variations within a single set of relations encompassing humans as 
well as non-humans.” (Descola 1996, p. 99) 
Similarly, Donna Haraway (1991), Sheila Jasanoff (2004a) and Bruno Latour (1993) 
argue each in their own way that social theory should overcome the axiom of the “great 
divide”. For Latour this represents an analytically misleading dichotomy between nature 
and society that is, however, constitutive for the ordering of both modern sciences and 
politics (Latour 1993). A key modern thinker such as Hobbes bases his Leviathan on a 
dualist order of knowledge: on the one side the objective “Nature” that is without history, 
and on the other side the societal sphere that is rife with power struggles over constructed 
values without any substance (Shaw 2004).  
 Importantly, the proposals to move beyond the great divide are not merely exercises 
in speculative philosophy. They are rather supported by three large bodies of empirical 
work. First, feminist writers have stressed the connected character of the female body 
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where materiality, technology, politics, and identity are inseparably intermingled 
(Haraway 1991, Butler 1993, Sylvester 1994). Second, researchers who started exploring 
the practice of natural sciences in laboratories from the 1970s onwards stress the 
“fabrication” of scientific facts. Their careful observations render substantial 
differentiation between a pre-existing objective nature at the one hand and agency-given 
subjects discovering laws of nature at the other hand a fiction (Latour and Woolgar 1979, 
Knorr Cetina 1981, Knorr Cetina and Mulkay 1983, Pickering 1992, Latour 1987, 
Pickering 1995, Mol and Law 1994, Aronowitz 1988, Mol 2002).120⁠ Thirdly, studies 
about evolving technological systems and infrastructures have shown the profound 
“socio-technical” nature of technologies. Clearly, their results indicate that reality is not 
reducible to social interaction. But, against historical materialism, materiality, built 
environments or technological infrastructures are not determining but highly interactive, 
constitutive and interwoven with human practices and meaning (Bijker, Hughes and 
Pinch 1987, Law 1991a, Bjiker and Law 1992, Galison and Hevly 1992, Hughes 1994, 
Star 1999, Misa, Brey and Feenberg 2003, Jasanoff 2004a, Galison 2006, Dolata and 
Werle 2007, Ribes and Lee 2010).121  
 Bruno Latour, arguably the most decisive proponent for a new method of exploring 
“society”, advances a symmetrical methodology. This leads him to an understanding that 
agency is no longer compartmentalized:  
“we have to accept that the continuity of any course of action will rarely consist of human-
to-human connections (for which the basic social skills would be enough anyway) or of 
object-object connections, but will probably zigzag from one to the other. To get the right 
feel for ANT, it’s important to notice that this has nothing to do with a ‘reconciliation’ of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 This understanding diverges from classical treatment of scientific knowledge and expertise in IR. For 
example, Peter Haas’ influential approach relates scientific knowledge in a linear manner to politics, while 
science functions unambiguously and apolitically in order to realize international cooperation. He only is 
concerned with the “effective use of consensual knowledge” (Haas 2008, p. 4). Even though Haas refers to 
Fleck’s and Kuhn’s writings, he adheres to the idea of unproblematic objective scientific truth as, in 
principle, strictly separated from politics (Litfin 1994). Cumulative, universal knowledge, thus, is by 
definition not mixed with powerful political interests. Its great leverage stems from as many (relevant) 
people as possible sharing their knowledge with other, equally relevant people.  
121 This is not to say that this vast literature does agree on the different emphasis put on the social shaping 
of technology (e.g. Bijker 1993) or the “material” side (Woolgar 1991, Law 2002). This is itself a matter of 
controversy. Nevertheless, this body of literature seriously tries to tackle the heterogeneous nature of 
technologies. 
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the famous object/subject dichotomy. To distinguish a priori ‘material’ and ‘social’ ties 
before linking them together again makes about as much sense as to account for the 
dynamic of a battle by imagining a group of soldiers and officers stark naked with a huge 
heap of paraphernalia—tanks, rifles, paperwork, uniforms—and then claim that ‘of course 
there exist some (dialectical) relation between the two’. One should retort adamantly ‘No!’ 
There exists no relation whatsoever between ‘the material’ and ‘the social world’, because 
it is this very division which is a complete artifact. To reject such a divide is not to ‘relate’ 
the heap of naked soldiers ‘with’ the heap of material stuff: it is to redistribute the whole 
assemblage from top to bottom and beginning to end. There is no empirical case where the 
existence of two coherent and homogeneous aggregates, for instance technology ‘and’ 
society, could make any sense. ANT is not, I repeat is not, the establishment of some 
absurd ‘symmetry between humans and non-humans’. To be symmetric, for us, simply 
means not to impose a priori some spurious asymmetry among human intentional action 
and a material world of causal relations.” (Latour 2005, pp. 75-76) 
Concepts of performativity in social sciences come close to Latour’s understanding. 
Various post-structuralist writers have employed this notion to capture the theoretical 
practice of IR as well as de facto international relations (Ashley 1988, Weber 1998, pp. 
464ff.). However, these approaches, which mainly draw on Butler or Searle (Butler 1990; 
Searle 1995), frame agency mainly in terms of linguistic constructions or the enactment 
of “social fictions”. This violates the symmetry principle towards both humans and non-
humans. Particularly, the concentration on “agency” conveyed through language, 
cognition or self-consciousness does not justice to the hybrid character of the 
contemporary forms of agency.  
 Against the prevalence of the “IR theory of the social”, we can assume ontological 
categories that comprise of different degrees of agency structured in layers and describe a 
state of becoming instead of a state of being (Connolly 2011, pp. 21-32, Coole 2013). 
Often, matter itself performs as is suggested in Jane Bennet's Vibrant Matter. Things, in 
this sense, are vital; they possess a “thing-power” (Bennet 2010). Empirically, it can be 
shown that artifacts, stuff, and materials can align, bond, entangle and connect with other 
actors and ensembles (Sultana 2012, Coward 2012). The issue of vitality or the “agentic 
capacities” of human bodies is also at stake in the recent debate about the ways in which 
bodies are conceptually incorporated in IR studies (Wilcox 2014).  
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 In a similar line, DeLanda suggests choosing emergent phenomena as a main 
research focus. His macro-approach stresses that, though mechanism of emergence can 
be distinguished, emergence itself remains unexplainable (DeLanda 2011). So, even with 
respect to what IR scholars have dubbed as “rump materialism” (Wendt 1999, p. 136) – 
that is, biophysical entities and atomic and subatomic particles – we must assume 
differentiated agency and specific vitality (Bakker and Bridge 2006, DeLanda 2011, 
Barad 2007). 
 “The very dynamism of matter (unto ‘itself’, as it were, without the need for some 
supplement like culture or history to motor it), its agential and affirmative capacity for 
change with every doing, is its regenerative un/doing. Matter is always already open, 
heterogeneous, noncontemporaneous with itself. Matter is always shifting, reconfiguring, 
re-differentiating itself. Deconstruction is not what Man does (it is not a method), it is what 
the text does, what matter does, how mattering performs itself. Matter is never settled but is 
agentive and continually opens itself up to a variety of possible and impossible 
reconfigurings. Matter is ongoing hauntological transformation. Nature is not mute, and 
culture the articulate one. Nature writes, scribbles, experiments, calculates, thinks, 
breathes, and laughs” (Barad 2010, p. 265/FN11). 
It is obvious that this ontological understanding runs opposite to critical realist views and 
also Wendt’s quantum account of emergent material agency (see Wendt 2015, pp. 243ff). 
The former advance a metaphysical approach that tries to improve upon ontological 
reductionism a la social constructivism. Critical realists in IR advance an integral 
perspective, stressing “that the material and ideational have to be viewed as a whole” 
(Patomäki and Wight 2000, p. 235). Their stance treats “nature” as complex activities 
governed by, at least in principle, clearly discernible natural laws. Consequently, this 
approach has critical limitations. For one thing, it ultimately comes down to keeping up a 
dualist ontology (see Lawson 2007). For another, by virtue of foregrounding “natural 
laws”, critical realism privileges a determinist reality, which relegates the material to the 
natural sciences, and therefore ultimately deemphasizes any agentic capacities of matter 
(see also Wendt 2015, pp. 280ff.).  
 Alexander Wendt, on the other hand, proposes a “vitalist sociology” in his brilliant 
Quantum mind and social science. Wendt rejects the critical realist worldview mentioned 
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above, and develops an ontology that tries to capture the human bodies as material and 
the mind as quantum phenomena. 122  While this book certainly presents the most 
systematic attempt to reframe IR’s ontology and include material agency, it retains a 
classical way of conceptualizing IR actors. The quantum approach privileges humans and 
their interactions but still leads to the “three levels” model. Wendt theorizes the state as 
an organism based on emergent quantum states of individuals (that is, the mind of 
individual persons) (Wendt 2015, p. 273), but he leaves out the massive technological 
matter that makes societies and civilizations work beyond and above quantum realities.  
 This leads us to the question what or who qualifies then as an actor under these 
fluid conditions. Especially, when technological innovations unfold in a creative way so 
that controversies erupt and strategies collapse, and stable collectivities are becoming 
unruly and, at times, matter and ideas conceptually collapse, how can we define agency? 
Describing the mingled reality of technological innovations in world politics, in other 
words, means to discard the specific practice of purification that neatly distinguishes the 
social domain from the material domain. We need a novel set of terms to denote 
agencies, which do not presuppose a separation between lively subjects and mute objects. 
This need is acknowledged in law studies, where the proliferation of information 
technologies that enables the acting at a distance by and through technical agents 
increasingly leads to the need to legally attribute rights and personhood to artifacts 
(Koops, Hildebrandt, and Jaquet-Chiffelle 2010). In Chapter 6, it has been that argued 
that an ethnographical attitude is a crucial methodological component of explorative 
realism. Capturing the agency of things means first of all describing our own “modern” 
world, just like “pre-modern” cultures (Latour 2005, Orford 2012). Technological 
innovations require a research design which ensures that the relations between, and 
agential power of, all sorts of actors are considered without prior assumptions about their 
alleged ontological or agential differences.  
 For technological innovations to occur both human and non-human actors play a 
crucial role. Accordingly, we should not attempt to prescribe what counts as an actor—
referring to notions of intentionality only. Explorative realism rather comes down to an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 It is not enough space here to develop a more detailed critique of Wendt’s analysis and especially how 
he discusses scientific knowledge and „matters of fact“ as part of his own methodological approach. 
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agnostic view with regard to actorhood. It avoids presupposing a fixed set of actors. It 
does not a priori exclude ‘things’. The term agency, then, denotes a relational effect of 
both human and non-human actors upon other actors (Callon and Law 1997, Whatmore 
2009). Relational effects need to be empirically tested. For that purpose, Latour 
emphasizes the distinction between the intermediary and the mediator: “Is the element B, 
whose emergence is triggered by a factor, treated as a mediator, or is it construed as an 
intermediary for some force simply transported intact through the agency of the ‘factor’? 
We have to be very practical again and as myopic as possible: we are not talking here 
about grandiose epistemological questions but about vehicles, movements, 
displacements, and transportation systems” (Latour 2005, p. 105). Exploring agency, in 
brief, constitutes an empirical research question rather than a conceptual problem.123 
“We don’t know yet how all those actors are connected, but we can state as the new default 
position before the study starts that all the actors we are going to deploy might be 
associated in such a way that they make others do things. This is done not by transporting a 
force that would remain the same throughout as some sort of faithful intermediary, but by 
generating transformations manifested by the many unexpected events triggered in the 
other mediators that follow them along the line. This is what I dubbed the ‘principle of 
irreduction’ and such is the philosophical meaning of ANT: a concatenation of mediators 
does not trace the same connections and does not require the same type of explanations as a 
retinue of intermediaries transporting a cause (...) [mediators] have to draw connections 
between entities that are completely different from what before was considered to be a 
string of social explanations. Those writers state that a factor is an actor in a concatenation 
of actors instead of a cause followed by a string of intermediaries.” (Latour 2005, p. 107) 
The acknowledgement of hybrid, heterogeneous, and shifting forms of agency – which 
are in the following section linked with concepts of process – leads to a perspective on 
political systems radically different from what is put forward by contract theories and the 
Cartesian IR framework. Against the presupposition of a society purely made of human-
to-human relations, the key assumption consists of a flat ontology which neither 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 As a result, to expand the ontological parameters of IR so that it includes more than just states, but also 
non-state actors such as multinational enterprises, NGOs or "polities" (Risse-Kappen 1995, Ferguson and 
Mansbach 1991), is fine but still amounts to just adding another purely "social" actor to the Cartesian set of 
established social actors. 
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privileges humans nor material objects (Latour 2005, Graham 2016c).124 The reason we 
should follow those who propose to trace the progress of human societies via the 
incorporation of an ever-larger number of material objects and artifacts is because this 
method generates basic insights in how societies remain stable and durable. The stability 
of relations, and therefore political systems, companies, or states, is possible only through 
myriads of material mediators (Sturm and Latour 1987). 
“Latour’s Leviathan—or political society—is in the first place the result of introducing 
non-human entities that give durability and ‘body’ to social arrangements. Latour’s social 
contract is thus not a contract between different human individuals, but rather concerns 
alliances between humans and non-humans. Such entanglements allow us to ‘black-box’ 
(or stabilize) some of the hesitations and anxieties that are inevitable in unmediated 
encounters. By introducing non-humans, the vast, flat expanse of his state of nature can 
now become populated with elevations constituted by novel entanglements—‘macro-
actors’—arising out of the entanglement of individuals with things, and the mediation of 
interaction by symbolic and material entities” (Schouten 2012b, p. 6). 
How to study the variegated agency within such stabilized entanglements or “macro-
actors”? Following Deleuze and Guatarri (1998), Michel Callon suggests the term 
“agencements” to conceptually capture the foldings of human-non-human alliances. 
Agencements indicate the “combination of heterogeneous elements that have been 
carefully adjusted to one another.” These arrangements are “endowed with the capacity 
of acting in different ways depending on their configuration. This means that there is 
nothing left outside agencements: there is no need for further explanation, because the 
construction of its meaning is part of an agencement.” (Callon 2007, pp. 319-320). This 
ontological understanding implies the necessity to render the various relations among all 
sorts of actors and their constant reconfigurations visible (Barry 2001).  
 Criticism has been voiced, in this line, against IR research that treats nuclear 
weapons as inert, passive and isolated from other inter-human relations. Stressing the 
agential power of nuclear warheads, Vincent Pouliot inverts the constructivist treatment 
of technologies: “it is not only people who attach meanings to things; things also attach 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Philosophers who strive for an object oriented ontology (OOO) and develop object-oriented methods for 
social theory, go even further to focus on relations among things that are outside of human reasoning and 
inaccessible for sensory techniques, that is, almost alien to human thinking (Graham 2016a, c). 
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meanings to people” (Pouliot 2010, p. 294). Furthermore, Pouliot “seeks to depart from 
Cartesian dualism and the age-old philosophical distinction between ideas and matter.” 
“The materials of practice, which are at once enabling (that out of which practice X 
emerges) and constraining (that without which practice X cannot emerge), do not 
obey conventional ontological distinctions between nature and culture. For one 
thing, meanings can be as ‘material’ or non-plastic as matter itself. For another, 
physical objects are no mere passive repositories for meaning-attachment – often 
they also attach significations to social relations. Put differently, ideas can be 
material too; and matter can take on a symbolic life of its own.” (Pouliot 2010, p. 
295) 
Ultimately, Pouliot’s view reaffirms a dualism between people and things. For it does not 
handle the full range of hybrid webs of agency by which nuclear weapons are constituted 
and maintained. The analytical focus on either the strategic implications of atomic 
weapons or the “symbolic life” of the bomb within bilateral negotiations, silences various 
other elements that make nuclear arsenals possible and stable in the first place—the 
stockpiles, personal, and training, the uranium mines, the radioactive waste facilities, the 
research institutes, the trade in raw materials, and so on. In order to make this network of 
local, national and global interconnections traceable, our comprehension of agency needs 
to include complex agencies across different levels, epistemic fields, and material 
systems (see Gusterson 2001, Hecht 2010, Ritchie 2010). 
 In sum, the existing literature suggests a critical role for non-human actors and 
agential forces within ‘social relations’ on the one hand, and proposes genuinely 
relational accounts of agency on the other. Human agency and social activities are hardly 
ever unmediated. Individual agency and group interactions happen only through and 
within large ensembles of things, words, symbols, material objects and networks 
(Whatmore 2002, Aradau 2010, Coole and Forst 2010, Mayer and Acuto 2015).125 As a 
consequence, the framing of isolated social actors such as individuals or states, which is 
implicit to dualist accounts, and conceiving them as self-contained units or systems, is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Further literature in security studies and IR that foregrounds technologies and develops a nuanced 
understanding of material agency includes Collier and Lakoff (2008), Cooper (2008), Coward (2009), 
Schouten (2011), Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams (2011), Duffield (2011), and Appel (2012). 
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untenable for theorizing the transformative effect of technological innovations. The 
entities called “society”, “state”, “markets” or the “international system” constitute an 
array of hybrid and lively webs of humans and non-human agents (Appadurai 1986). 
Geographic research on resources illustrates how certain biophysical endowments are 
entangled with specific political institutions and practices of extraction (Bakker and 
Bridge 2006, Bridge 2008), while research about the emerging information infrastructure 
reveals the inexorable linkage between new ways of knowing with “large” physical 
systems and “small” local practices (Bowker, Baker, Millerand, and Ribes 2010). The 
intricate techno-politics of political and commercial empires through assemblages, webs 
and imaginaries, which always include and evolved through crucial technical and 
scientific elements – while modern techno-science itself is partly product of empires 
(Jasanoff 2006, Potter 2007, Lightman 2008).  
 In light of these examples, it is important to reiterate that the principle of symmetry 
does not led to a simple juxtaposition of humans and non-humans; nor the privileging of 
materials. Numerous studies in geography and STS illustrate that the presumptive notion 
of sharp socio-technical or static socio-natural divisions is illusionary (Cronon 1996, 
Castree 2001, Woolgar 1991, Jasanoff 2005). Instead, these authors employ terms such as 
webs, assemblages, collectives, zones, imaginaries, networks, and associations in order to 
conceptualize the hybrid combinations and the complex folding of agency and actors that 
produce social order, political and epistemic entities (Swyngedouw 1999, Barry 2001, 
Latour 2004b). 126  In term of the recent debates about methodology in IR, the 
philosophical ontology of these “neo-materialist” approaches falls into Jackson’s 
category of “monism” (see Jackson 2008, 2011). Yet, as Diana Coole points out: 
“ (…) if new materialism describes a monist ontology, this does not express a single 
substance. New materialist becoming is ineluctably multiple and complex; 
variegated, folded, labyrinthine; and multi-dimensional and multi-scalar. Different 
levels and entities move with variable speeds and manifest themselves with variable 
intensity. The point here is that entities, structures, objects all emerge as unstable, 
indeterminate assemblages that are composed of and folded into manifold smaller 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 For the fruitful neo-Marxist engagements with heterogeneity and assemblages see Castree (2002), 
Kirsch (2004), Rudy and Gareau (2005). 
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and larger assemblages. At every level, these open systems are reconfigured by their 
encounters with other provisional constellations, from the tiniest to the most cosmic. 
The challenge for the social scientist is to trace these densely productive and 
reversible relationships, without assuming they yield only a chaotic or random flux.” 
(Coole 2013, p.455)  
Such is the first move towards the “double-mixed zone”. It significantly extends the array 
of possible actors and agencies that are relevant in international relations by 
deemphasizing discourse, intentional dimensions and human actors. These heterogeneous 
assumptions about material agency are illustrated by micro-studies on the material 
operations of security governance in post-colonial Congo (Schouten 2013) or multi-level 
probes into the metallurgic fragility of international pipeline politics in Georgia (Barry 
2013b) and the novel robotic war experience arising from the unmanned weapon systems 
(Holmqvist 2013). Similarly, Making Things International brilliantly shows how 
globalized assemblages of video filming, garbage, bodies or passports are constitutive 
for shifting international practices and generating material politics inaccessible to other 
IR theories (Salter 2015). 
7.2 Emergence and processes of group formation 
A shift from substance ontology to process ontology constitutes the second ontological 
move in order to develop a post-Cartesian framework. It implies to direct conceptual and 
empirical attention away from assuming what things are, what their quality and properties 
entail, towards the exploration of becoming, that is, what ‘things’ and ‘groupings’ do and 
how they come into being. With the development of the field of “international political 
sociology”, emergence or becoming have become critical lenses to study world politics 
(Guzzini 2017). The attention to emerging practices, problems, objects, and actors has, 
partially, replaced existing process models that were focused on interaction between 
fixed actors and schematic interplay of forces. While the latter understandings of process, 
such as great powers competition and polarity models (see Buzan 1987), or Marxist 
dialectics and core-periphery models (Cox 1987) have their merits, the theorizing of 
technological innovations requires elaborating on the issue of „becoming“. This section 
first discusses the crucial aspects of process ontology and, then, connects this discussion 
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with IR. 
 Multiple process philosophies have been advanced in Western and Eastern thought 
traditions; they share some basic commonalities (Rescher 1996, Berthrong 2008). First of 
all, it is assumed that “one must prioritize processes over things and activities over 
substances”. The ontological categories foreground change and development, while 
“fixity and persistence” is less important (Rescher 1996, p. 35). Process philosophers 
such as Alfred N. Whitehead or Gilles Deleuze would agree with the aforementioned 
post-Cartesian varieties of agency. They share “the desire to develop a new ontological 
approach, one that goes beyond simplistic divisions or categorizations of the world into 
subject/object, natural/social, dead/alive, and so on.” (Halewood 2005, p. 58, Robinson 
2009) In turn, all versions of substance ontology are seen as problematical because they 
presuppose fixed things. Static assumptions led to logical deficiencies: the properties of 
things, for example, cannot become intelligible without recourse to the processes of 
emergence or actual interactions between those things (Rescher 1996). Overcoming 
substance ontology therefore has several conceptual advantages: 
“Instead of a two-tier reality that combines things together with their inevitable 
coordinated processes, [process ontology] settles for a one-tier ontology of process 
alone—at any rate, at the level of basics. For it sees things not just as the products of 
processes (as one cannot avoid doing) but also as the manifestations of processes—as 
complex bundles of coordinated processes. It replaces the troublesome ontological 
dualism of thing and activity with a monism of activities of different and differently 
organized sorts.” (Rescher 1996, p. 49; italics in the original) 
In the context of IR, the customary usage of a substance ontology structures research and 
theorizing in various ways, for the main subject matters are entities such as the “state”, 
which are typically defined in terms of their properties, essences, or attributes and not in 
terms of the processes that give rise to them (Stripple 2007, Jackson 2009). Substantialist 
thinking, in other words, has build-in difficulties that prevent the comprehension of 
change. IR theorists usually construe change by foregrounding the “capacities” of like-
units such as in system theories (Kaplan 1960, Waltz 1979, Wendt 1999) or through the 
idea of unfolding power transitions and resulting hegemonic cycles of war and 
dominance (Puchala 1994, Kugler and Lemke 1996, Lemke 1997).  
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 Realists see the relevance of technological changes only in thus far as they may 
lead to shifts in the offense-defense balance. However, this does not imply a shift in the 
general patterns of activities nor in the ensemble of the pivotal actors, namely the great 
powers (Jervis 1978, Gilpin 1981, Buzan and Lawson 2015, pp. 240ff.).127 Change 
means, in brief, that behavioral patterns of interaction among a fixed set of units change. 
For instance, an unipolar configuration turns into a multipolar configuration (Waltz 
1979). The prior existence of these units usually is presupposed instead of a description 
of their emergence and evolution – not to mention the tracing of new things, practices, or 
processes.128 
 The literature on economic interdependence and globalization, conversely, 
interrogates how the movement of knowledge, people, and goods leads to a redefinition 
of state interests or how it erodes the political authority and regulative power of states 
versus markets (Hobson 1995, Schirm 2004, Berger 2001, Rudolph 2005). System-
theories in IR, despite claims to the contrary, also lack consistent conceptual treatments 
of agency (Hudson 2007, pp. 10ff.). Conceptually, the issue of change, regardless 
whether it concerns the consequences of globalization, the Internet or communication 
technologies, is framed by asking how a fixed set of actors is affected by evolving 
technologies, economic disturbances, or sorts of secondary actors (see Youngs 1999). So, 
essential changes as the potential result of technological innovations are less compatible 
with upholding the premise of the state-system as privileged actor.129  
 When it comes to specifying how technologies lead to changes, the double problem 
of externalism and techno-determinism (discussed in Chapter 4) comes to the fore again. 
“The Industrial Revolution”, Holsti notes in Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change 
in International Politics, “surely a change as momentous as globalization is today, did 
not reorder major international institutions, except perhaps in the domain of war. In our 
awe of recent technological and commercial changes, we may forget that this is not the 
first ‘revolution’ in world history.” Against determinist views, he simply argues that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 For a critical discussion of the technological core of the offence-defense balance see Lieber (2000). 
128 But see Ruggie (1993), Newman (1999), Steinberg (2009). 
129 But see Andrew Linklater’s point (2010, 2011) that, following process philosophy, societies of states 
have crucial functions in taming the destructive power modern weapons have over a distance as well as the 
potential harm caused by reality of global interconnectedness.  
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technological innovations, after all, do not really change the ontological parameters of 
international politics (Holsti 2004, pp. 18-19). Obviously, the empirical puzzles discussed 
in Chapter 2 contradict such claims. Whether technologies are construed as determining 
forces (Deudney 2000b) or just ignored and downplayed as ‘lower level’ changes 
ultimately makes no difference. 
 It is therefore inevitable that focusing on processes leads one to move beyond the 
substantialist assumptions that underpin the majority of IR theories. For one thing, this 
meta-theoretical shift subjects the ‘state’ and ‘international institutions’ to a thoroughly 
empirical historicization. For another, the set of actors and in interactions relevant to IR 
becomes open-ended. James Rosenau is exemplary in offering a radical challenge to the 
standard approach. In Rosenau’s terminology, the world is separated in two realms, one 
of which is “post-national” while the other is still “international”. Especially, in the latter 
Rosenau renders changes, transformation, and discontinuity intelligible (Rosenau 1990, 
2003, see Holsti 1998b, p. 9ff). His approach starkly contrasts with substantialist 
accounts of inter-action that carry the “illusion of agency”, whereas the agents, who 
actually operate, are but variables or attributes of entities (Jackson and Nexon 1999, p. 
294). Process-based understandings help to investigate historical novelties in terms of 
actor-configurations and group building instead of suppressing them out of the theoretical 
need to save a parsimonious theoretical construct. Thereby, process philosophy assumes a 
variety of genuine and specific agency.  
 The systematic attempts to apply process thinking to international affairs constitute 
helpful theoretical exercises (Jackson and Nexon 1999, Albert, Jacobson, and Lapid 
2001). In the context of this argument, however, they appear restricted in scope and 
implications, particularly, because they advance empirical puzzles foregrounding social 
or intersubjective activities (see Jackson 2009). Linklater has reconstructed Norbert 
Elias’s idea of a “civilizing process” – that combines “’psychogenetic’ accompaniment to 
‘sociogenetic’ or social-structural transformations” (2010, p. 58), to link IR back to the 
enlightenment project which was fully aware of the transformative and, at times, harmful 
power of global connections. Buzan and Lawson suggest that the key features of today’s 
international system resulted form a process of transformation in the 19th century. As 
such, technological innovations are empirically connected to changes of primary and 
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secondary institutions, great power relations, and core-periphery bias of the international 
system (Buzan and Lawson 2015). Elsewhere, Mayer (2012) and Allan (2017) suggest 
theorizing the emergence of major political concerns and governing objects such as 
“climate change” in the international community. Aside from these exceptions, the 
predominant substance ontology that underpins the IR framework in general, and the 
leading theoretical schools in particular, still posits an impediment to the capture of 
technological innovations.  
 As technological innovations involve transformational, open-ended processes, the 
shift to process metaphysics also makes the fixed juxtaposition of agents and structures 
unsustainable. For the ontological models that are usually employed in IR—positivist, 
critical realist alike—analogue to the individuals in the “state of nature”, completely miss 
material mediators. They construe agents such as individuals or states capable of 
unmediated, merely social inter-actions (e.g. Wendt 1987, Hollis and Smith 1994, Bieler 
and Morton 2003). In this respect, even more differentiated accounts such as Colin 
Wight's (2006) suggestion to allow for multiple overlapping layers of structures are not 
convincing. Wight replaces the simplistic divide between the state and the state-system, 
although he presupposes a dualist account of interaction focused on social actors. This 
more complex account of the structure-agency problématique is still indebted to the 
Cartesian-Kantian line of thought. Post-Cartesian approaches to agency avoid the mind-
matter dualism, while rejecting the agent-structures scheme as a matter of principle.  
 In this sense, an emerging body of work proposes to focus on “international 
practices” rather than interactions between preconceived entities (Haas 1992, Keck and 
Sikkink 1999, Pouliot 2008, Bueger and Villumsen 2007). This analytical move opens up 
the black box ‘state’ considerably more than neoliberal frameworks.130 If applied to 
global affairs, the notions of practice fields, actor coalitions, or epistemic communities 
help to grasp agency beyond the interaction between state-entities (Pouliot and Adler 
2011a). The family of practice theories renders the myriads of relationships visible, 
whereby, in principle, it does not exclude material agency and non-human actors, thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Neoliberal analysis, in its most consistent version either suggest a threefold model of the world (groups, 
the state, and the international system) such as Moravcsik (1993) or presuppose a binary model juxtaposing 
states on the on hand, and market actors on the other hand (Underhill and Stubbs 2006). 
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providing an option to explore the multiplicity of shifting agencies among and between 
human and non-human actors over time.  
 Adler, for example, shows how the “associations” among actors such as political 
scientists, advisors, politicians, modelers enabled across national borders, political parties 
and institutional delimitations have established a new policy to control nuclear weapons 
and to finally reduce their numbers (Adler 1992). However, the conceptual vocabulary 
and the research agenda involved tends to take recourse to cognitive abilities, 
professional expertise, and human intentions, while under-representing the material 
agencies of technologies.131 The efforts to account for the heterogeneity of agency, in 
particular concerning different research methods, still have a long way to go in order to 
realize the goal of symmetry (Allan 2017).  
 The advances of practice theory are one thing. But tackling the global politics of 
technological innovations is another. For instance, exploring how emerging technologies 
such as drones and other robotic weapons become entangled with and translate warfare 
and power politics (Singer 2009) requires moving beyond existing IR approaches by 
more radically drawing on process philosophy (Holmqvist 2013). Three aspects arise 
from the relation between technological innovations and process ontology.  
 Firstly, processes of technological innovation constitute complex forms of 
evolutions in which states per se do not play a dominant or leading role (de la Mothe and 
Paquet 1996).132 For Schumpeter “states” are not part of the actual process of creative 
destruction at all. Yet, the “protective strata” such as institutions, interest groups, 
ideologies, and beliefs play a critical role in his view as they enable entrepreneurs to 
carry on with their creative destruction (Schumpeter 1943/2003, pp. 131ff.).  
 Secondly, these processes are powered by creativity. The idea of novelty is crucial. 
Technological innovation means, both literally and metaphorically, the emergence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 See for instance the collection in Pouliot and Adler (2011b) that is heavily tilts towards a focus in social 
and human interaction. 
132 This is also where evolutionary economics and the research about “National Innovation System” take 
different routes (Balzat 2006, p. 32): the latter is mainly focused on national containers, while the former 
explores rather the dynamic evolution of a diverse set of units such as firms, technologies, products, 
economic cycles, infrastructures, sectors, national economies, entrepreneurs and so on (Witt 2003, Metcalfe 
1998, Mokyr 1990, pp. 273-299, Fagerberg and Verspagen 2009). 
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something new. They are transformative, partly teleological, but basically without 
predetermination (Witt 2003, pp. 3-34). At the same time, novelty is not a feature that can 
be attributed to the advent of an isolated phenomenon, idea, thing, machine, or whatever. 
Herein lies the crucial difference between the ‘invention’ and the innovative process. The 
former may be in the waiting, for instance, in the form of a patent, but might never be 
picked up (Schumpeter 1947/2008, p. 224).  
 Thirdly, the full-scale materialization of innovations involves the participation and 
coordination of all kinds of actors and across what is normally seen as separated “fields” 
such as the economy, politics, science, and law (Latour 1987, 1988). As such, Joseph 
Schumpeter and other innovation theorists describe crucial properties of technological 
innovations (see Fagerberg 2002, Witt 2003, Freeman 2007) that offer, in turn, a rough 
guidance of what foundational collectors should be able to render intelligible. As such, 
Schumpeter and Latour challenge both IR’s preference for staticism and state-centric 
interactions. Equally, an external or instrumental treatment of technologies inevitably 
falls short of capturing what is empirically observable. 
 For Schumpeter the core “problem” of economic development is “’revolutionary’ 
change”, a phenomenon that is not captured and often denied by static equilibrium 
approaches to economics (Schumpeter 1934, p. 63). Technological innovations occur 
through the “creative response” mainly by entrepreneurs. Schumpeter argues that the 
transformative character of innovational activities is impossible to foresee or model based 
on preexisting data: 
“Creative response has at least three essential characteristics. First, from the standpoint of 
the observer who is in full possession of all relevant facts, it can always be understood ex 
post; but it can practically never be understood ex ant; that is to say, it cannot be predicted 
by applying ordinary rules of inference from the pre-existing facts. This is why the ‘how’ 
in what has been called above the ‘mechanisms’ must be investigated in each case. 
Secondly, creative response shapes the whole course of subsequent events and their ‘long-
run’ outcome. It is not true that both types of responses (adaptive and creative, the author) 
dominate only what the economist loves to call ‘transitions’, leaving the ultimate outcome 
to be determined by the initial data. Creative response changes social and economic 
situations for good, or, to put it differently, it creates situations from which there is no 
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bridge to those situations that might have emerged in its absence. This is why creative 
response is an essential element of the historical process; no deterministic credo avails 
against this.” (Schumpeter 1947, p. 222)  
Novelty is not a trivial fact but results from an immanence that may alter the modes of 
reality in an irreversible way. Antonelli argues that technological innovation arise from 
“ergodic” processes in which the “initial conditions have no influence on its development 
and eventual outcomes” (Antonelli 2007, p. 52). This extreme position needs to be 
calibrated with general insights from process philosophy that distinguishes between 
processes with stable patterns on the one hand. Certain processes merely reproduce the 
stability of things, groups, and entities.133 On the other hand, processes can lead to the 
emergence of new patterns, things, and processes that are qualitatively different form the 
prior existing conditions on the other hand (Rescher 1996, pp. 74ff). Technological 
innovations rather resemble the latter understanding.  
 If technological innovation means that different agents (not only entrepreneurs) 
collectively create new conditions, the degree of affected change differs. Schumpeter’s 
generic definition of “recombination” does not suggest a substantial differentiation 
between different novelties (and their ramifications) as he argues that even a tiny 
innovative change may have immense and unexpected effects. The modern literature on 
innovations, however, has typically distinguished between two types: process and product 
innovations as well as between incremental and radical innovations. While different 
authors have used this binary vocabulary with different meanings (Garcia and Carlatone 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 This is because of the reality of constant change. Heraklitos was among the first Greek philosophers 
who emphasized “panta rei” as a fact about life. But innovations are not the same as saying that you never 
set your foot twice in the same river (Rescher 1996). In our time, ever since we became aware of the 
planetary environmental changes that point to the fragility and instability of our “life support systems”, the 
issue of panta rei is ever-present. Immediately, the immense and often unacknowledged achievement of 
holding our living worlds stable and structured comes to light. For climate change might lead, as many 
predict, to the occurrence of adaptation limits and even collapse of social structures from villages to 
civilizations. Global warming, of course, is not the only game in the town. Ongoing socio-technological 
changes are arguably even more pervasive and far-reaching in its repercussions, in particular since the 
advent of the first industrial revolution. Despite their different causes and dynamics, these changes stress a 
crucial issue that is systematically overlooked in many social sciences. The temporary stable patterns and 
structures of interactions such as tribes, societies, states, cities, families, firms, international organizations, 
universities, and so on are itself—even without large-scale changes—products of constant up-keeping 
(Latour 2005). In order to understand their response the internal or external innovations, thus, we need to 
explore how actors stabilize by for instance routine practices their living environments. 
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2002),134 it is safe to say that the former set (process / incremental) is less ambitious and 
refers to small and continuous improvement steps of an existing system or process. In 
contrast, product and radical innovations are also often called “disruptive”. Radical 
innovations require a long-term vision, much more experimentation efforts, research 
investments, and risk-tolerance, as they largely are steps into the (technological, social, 
commercial and so on) unknown (Ettlie et al 1984, Dewar and Dutton 1986, Norman and 
Verganti 2014). 
 This leads directly to the other important aspect of novelty: technological 
innovations involve “group formations”. Depending on the magnitude of the innovations 
this can involve a few or a multitude of other actors and things. The formation of novel 
groupings or associations is neither limited to a fixed set of actors, nor even to a single 
ontology and therefore can entail various heterogeneous agencies. For instance, the 
introduction of infrastructures such as the electricity grid involves processes of group 
formation that reshuffles pre-existing ensembles of actors, institutions, interests, 
knowledges and techniques. The entire complex of interlocked processes is what 
Schumpeter terms “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 2003, Diamond 2006). 
 We have to notice the crucial difference, here, in terms of importing non-
equilibrium notions from economics into IR. The main reason given why entrepreneurs 
and firms are constantly striving for innovations implies the impossibility to prescribe a 
set of actors. According to Schumpeter’s understanding, economic actors, however small 
or large in size, and however different in function, are constantly facing a form of 
competition that functions not primarily on the basis of marginal profits—as traditional 
conceptions of competition hold—but in terms of extinction. 
“Capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture [resembles] (…) competition 
for the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of 
organization (the largest-scale unit of control for instance)—competition which commands 
a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and 
the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives” (Schumpeter 
2003, p. 84). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 See for instance Hall and Soskice (2001) and (Freeman 1995). 
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This nervous condition resembles an “ever-present threat”—a state of mind that 
disciplines the entrepreneur even if he might be the only player in his field or operating 
under a perfect monopoly (Schumpeter 2003, p. 85). It is telling to compare this with 
Waltz’s (1979, p. 91) quasi-analogy between firms and states. Although both rely on self-
help, the latter search for security based on the prime motive of survival, whereas the 
former strive for innovations to sustain profits. The crucial difference, Waltz suggests,135 
lies in the fact that governments restrict and regulate the competition between companies. 
Hence, “market economies are hedged about in ways that channel energies 
constructively” (Waltz 1979, p. 91). This line of argument is mutually exclusive with 
Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction as he suggests that the struggle between firms 
is not mainly about more or less profits. It is about survival. As a result, Waltz has no 
difficulties in claiming a fixed set of unitary actors—arguing that the state death rate is 
low, while Schumpeter’s historic account shows the rise and demise of new economic 
actors, markets, and products as the result of creative destruction. 
 Another important aspect of the creative destruction lies in the basic blending of 
institutional domains and practice fields. During their controversial period innovational 
processes display a seamless web of material objects, social practices, and discursive 
utterances (Hughes 1983). In other words, when struggles over boundaries prevail no 
standard set of actors or set of groups does easily apply to innovations. 
“While, after one hundred and fifty years, sociologists are still unclear on what the ‘right’ 
social aggregates should be, it is a rather simpler matter to agree that in any controversy 
about group formation—including of course academic disputes—some items will always 
be present: groups are made to talk; anti-groups are mapped; new resources are fetched so 
as to make their boundaries more durable; and professionals with their highly specialized 
paraphernalia are mobilized.” (Latour 2005, p. 31)  
Hence, the predominant conceptual notions in IR that presuppose like-units and prescribe 
certain actors are inappropriate. A static conceptual vocabulary would fail to capture the 
fact that innovations have revolutionary effects, as innovations tend to destroy prior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 There is another illogical argument in Waltz’s static account, when he holds that firms were not locked 
in a permanent struggle for surviving, while at the same time, empirically speaking, he points to the death 
of firms as compared to states. But, if firms have much higher death rates, why can it be logically derived 
that their behavior is profit led and risk-taking, as opposed to “defensive” behavior? 
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existing equilibriums, groupings and relationships. Moreover, the emergence of new 
things and collectives is a destructive process. It comprises the dissolution of existing 
structures and actors such as the decline of markets, branches as well as the replacement 
of epistemic boundaries and categories of life and ethics – a process which Sheila 
Jasanoff calls with respect to advances in biotechnology “ontological surgery” (2011). 
 The indetermination resulting from this kind of process inevitably leads to 
“taxonomic complexification” (Rescher 1996, pp. 78-82). As a result, the Cartesian 
mind-matter divide is destabilized and the idea of “interaction” among a fixed set of 
actors becomes similarly untenable. In this line, Claudia Aradau highlights Barad’s post-
Cartesian conceptualization of intra-active materialization: “not only are boundaries and 
objects not pre-given, but matter is an open-ended practice, the historical effect of 
iterative materializations” (Aradau 2010, p. 6).136  
“Matter is generative and agentive not just in the sense of bringing new things into the 
world, but also in the sense of bringing forth new models (Barad 2007, p. 170). Subject and 
object, matter and meaning do not exist separately and do not come to inter-act, but are 
both formed and transformed through inter-action. Intra-action is one of the key terms in 
Barad’s reconceptualization of performativity. It signifies the ‘mutual constitution of 
entangled agencies’ (Barad 2007, p. 33) and is opposed to interaction, which assumes pre-
existing agencies. Intra-action is an open-ended practice involving dynamic entanglements 
of humans and non-humans, through which these acquire their specific boundaries and 
properties.” (Aradau 2010, p. 6) 
In addition, process philosophy helps us to accommodate to the idea that the same actor 
may operate or act within different ontologies and thus display different properties and 
agencies at the same time. This enables us to account for the reality and effects of 
multiple enrollment and participation of actors in various groupings (cf. Mol 2002, p. 84, 
Mayer and Schouten 2011). This implies, than, that conflicts, ambiguity, and 
indetermination are a characteristic feature of technological innovations. As Bijker shows 
in the case of light bulbs and the bicycle, or McNichol in the case of electrical 
transmission, it often takes decades for an innovation to mature and to take the 
temporarily stable shape both materially and discursively (Bijker 1997, McNichol 2006). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 For a critique from object-oriented philosophy approach see Graham (2016d). 
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Therein lays another the reason why binary and dichotomizing frameworks are not suited 
for studying the collective phase of technological innovations. For the former downplay 
contingency and fall short of capturing the controversial emergence of technological 
artifacts and scientific facts through a long phase of fragility that always corresponds 
with the “coproduction” of the social and epistemological order (Jasanoff 2004a). 
 The last aspect of technological innovations, which needs to be mentioned here, 
concerns the instability of tempo-spatial dimensions. This is at the core of evolutionary 
economics that stresses an “inevitably holistic” perspective because it inquires into “the 
processes of structural change, rather than the generation of changes in the behaviour of 
competing entities” (Metcalfe 1998, p. 24). As Schumpeter argues, innovations—and 
even simple forms of recombination—involve novelties that can break with the 
preprogrammed and predetermined routines and practices. It could be argued with 
Schumpeter that the real-world characteristics of innovations are incommensurable with 
the presumption of linear progress. History, in other words, evolves not gradually, but in 
jumps, despite economic models that assume static circulation and convergence to the 
equilibrium (Schumpeter 1934/2008, pp. 57ff). Drawing on non-economic studies of 
innovation, it becomes clear that the process of innovation entails the emergence of new 
material-social configurations and, as such, ruptures in basic categories of reality such as 
temporality, spatiality, subjectivity and objectivity (Kern 2003, Harvey 1989, Galison 
2006, Abbott 1990, Harvey 1990).  
 Taking a relativistic understanding seriously renders time and pace unstable. 
Against the habit of accepting them as constants, we can see these categories as subject 
matters open to careful empirical research (Fabian 1983, Friedland and Boden 1994, May 
and Thrift 2001). A growing body of literature explores in this line the planetary 
“chronopolitics” that is the accelerations of and increasing space-time compression that 
co-evolve with weapon systems and capitalist globalization (Der Derian 1990; Walker 
1993, p. 155, Harvey 1990, Klinke 2013). Others focus on the differing temporalities 
involved in working discipline and societal organization that had an impact on power 
projection and European perceptions of Chinese and Indians (Adas 1990, pp. 246ff.). Not 
to mention the perceived gap between “primitive” peoples whose sense of time is bound 
to natural cycles: In the nineteenth century, timekeeping was seen as commonplace 
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distinctiveness of the “Western civilization”.  
“Though clocks and watches were often described as object of wonder and amusement 
for the Africans, European writers considered timekeeping devices as such completely 
meaningless to their guides and bearers. They were contrivances of a world of ‘railways, 
steamers, and telegraphs’ which was impossible for the primitive African even to 
imagine. For explorers (…), the Africans’ inability to comprehend the workings and uses 
of clocks was yet another manifestation of the chasm in social development that separated 
Europe from the peoples of the ‘dark continent’” (Adas 1990, p. 245) 
Against this background, an explorative realist ontology does shape our research design 
to the effect that we should employ a toolbox that allows to explore these fundamental 
discontinuities and (de)stabilizations. To fully capture group formations (and breakups), 
we have to cope with hybrid agencies, unpredictable creativity and unrestrained 
ambiguity, which is inherent to technological innovations, and also take notice of 
possible alterations of basic ontological dimensions and categories of life. Such is the 
second step to expand the ontological parameters of IR. 
7.3 The double-mixed zone: framework for a post-Cartesian onto-politics 
The “lightness” of IR that prohibits the exploration of the global politics of technological 
innovations is no lapse. The deliberate separating out of technologies constituted a major 
achievement of IR scholars after World War II. As the efforts undertaken by Waltz and 
Wight exemplify, this was not easily realized (see Chapter 5). This move rejected techno-
determinism and shifted the focus to a purely social framing of all subject matters, thus 
resulting in a framework of IR that was radically Cartesian. Since IR’s neglect of 
technological innovations is, in turn, intimately connected to the basic notions 
constitutive of IR, only an alternative framework can shed light on the question of how 
we can make sense of technological innovations. First and foremost, this task requires 
ontological expansion.  
This chapter has charted how IR might be able to capture technological 
innovations. Summarizing the discussion, table 4 shows a two-dimensional space 
representing ontological positions. Plotted along two axes it displays four ontological 
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fields, which can possibly be covered by analytical concepts. 
 
Process 
Fixed units/ levels 
and unit-
interactions 
Emerging relations 
and ontologies / 
group formations 
Agency 
Technological 
determinism/social 
reductionism 
1 2 
Symmetrical notions of 
agency 3 
 
4 “Double-mixed 
Zone” 
 
TABLE	  7.1	  A	  NEW	  MATRIX	  OF	  ONTOLOGICAL	  POSITIONS.	  ©AUTHOR	  
The vertical axis designates foundational collectors that capture agency in technological 
innovations either from a symmetrical or from a techno-determinist/social reductionist 
point of view (fields 1 and 3). The foundational collectors grouped at the horizontal axis 
cover the distance between unit/interaction assumptions and a genuine process-ontology 
(fields 2 and 4). This conceptual taxonomy, than, corresponds with four different families 
of foundational collectors.  
 From the examination above, we can draw tentative conclusions: from a post-
Cartesian perspective, the ‘diversity’ of the majority of IR theories, and even attempts to 
expand ontology, are limited to the upper left area (mostly field 1) of table 7.1. This field 
represents a stylized version of the Cartesian complex as it produces the meta-theoretical 
conditions for the core building blocs of IR: the “three levels”, the “like-units”, and 
“anarchy” as it is purely defined in terms of an rational actor or an inter-subjective 
problématique. In other words, when we map IR theories onto this ontological 
parameterization, the general limitations of IR theories become intelligible. The 
ontological scope of the entire discipline—or at least of the leading schools of thought—
	   219	  
is more restricted than Colin Wight’s assessment (2006) would have one believe.137 Even 
the most radical (ontological) advancements in the field hardly move out of the upper half 
of the matrix. 
 But this matrix also indicates that the room for ontological expansions is enormous. 
In comparison to field 1, the fields 2, 3, and 4 implicate a more radical adjustment of 
ontological parameters and lead to by and large undiscovered or uncharted territories. In 
particular, field 4, which combines a symmetrical approach to agency with process 
ontology, is most interesting because it extends the ontological scope to the utmost. Yet, 
this “double-mixed” zone is the most uncommon or, arguably, alien ontological field 
from the perspective of IR scholarship. It does not just contain a staggering and 
unfamiliar multiplicity of ontological possibilities that demand novel research designs 
and methodologies. It is also the best place to begin with articulating a post-Cartesian 
framework.  
 The onto-politics of field 4 has two characteristics: first, it entails redefining agency 
in a symmetrical manner in order to include humans and non-humans alike; second, 
based on process philosophy, it involves a focus of becoming, that is, emergent relations 
and processes of group formation. Neither the types of actors nor the set of groupings are 
prefigured by a priori frames. Both present instead open empirical questions for research 
and discovery.  
“Although our most common encounter with society is to be overloaded by new elements 
that are not themselves part of the social repertoire, why do we keep insisting that we 
should stick to the short list of its accepted members? Such a limitation made sense during 
the time of modernization. To mark a clean break with the past, it was logical to limit in 
advance society to a small number of personae gratae. But this doesn’t mean that sociology 
should accept forever to be an object-less discipline, that is, a science without object. 
Respecting the formatting power of the sociology of the social is one thing, but it’s another 
to restrict oneself to metrology and abandon the discovery of new phenomena. How could 
we call empirical a discipline that excises out of the data only those that can be packaged 
into ‘social explanations’?” (Latour 2005, p. 234). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 For instance, the “great divide” into reflective and rational approaches/ Verstehen and Erklären that—
according to the usual reading—fundamentally structures the scope of diversity within IR (Wight 2002, 
Hollis and Smith 1990) merges into one aspect within the two upper fields. 
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Only moving towards the double-mixed zone enables us to meaningfully inquire into 
technological innovations. Epistemologically motivated attempts to reach a closure on the 
crucial question as to which actors and agencies are deemed relevant to IR are misplaced. 
So, what is needed to stipulate research and conceptual debates? It is neither genesis-type 
of stories, nor philosophical speculations such as contract theories. Instead, a precise and 
detailed ethnography of the “international”, that is, solid empirical fieldwork, is required 
(Coole 2013). This resembles an “explorative ontology or open metaphysics” (Latour 
2005, p. 51), meaning that the categories of existence, which we employ in our research, 
are not fixed, limited and pre-given, but remain accumulating and evolving in an open-
ended manner. The actors themselves have a say in these onto-politics while enabling the 
documentation of agencies and processes that give rise to novel objects, entities, 
constellations, and collectives is the purpose of this ontology.  
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8. A world of assemblages 
So wie wir auf dem Wasser schwimmen, schwimmen wir auch in einem Meer von Feuer, 
einem Sturm von Elektrizität, einem Himmel von Magnetismus, einem Sumpf von Wärme 
und so weiter. Alles aber unfühlbar. Zum Schluß bleiben überhaupt nur Formeln übrig. (...) 
“Ja, ja“ unterbrach Walter diesen Bericht. “Erst werden aus den vier Elementen einige 
Dutzend, und zum Schluß schwimmen wir bloß noch auf Beziehungen, auf Vorgängen, auf 
einem Spülicht von Vorgängen und Formeln, auf irgendetwas, wovon man weder weiß, ob 
es ein Ding, ein Vorgang, ein Gedankengespenst oder ein Ebengottweißwas ist!” (Musil 
1980, pp. 80-85) 
Based on the matrix for ontological expansion laid out in Chapter 7, the following two 
chapters elaborate on a conceptual framework around assemblages and creative 
destruction in order to make sense of technological innovations in relation to global 
affairs. The idea of assemblages renders an immense empirical landscape and various 
disciplined bodies of knowledge accessible to IR—including urban and security studies, 
environmental politics and national law, trade and financial markets, world order and 
business strategies to name only a few.138 It is helpful that the term “assemblages” was 
accepted and applied across many disciplines,139 signaling its analytical fertility as 
foundational collector. In addition, as argued in Chapter 3, the concept of assemblages 
offers a proper mid-range unit of analysis. However, the integration of multiple 
disciplinary languages, theoretical frames, and methodologies is not a minor task and 
poses conceptual challenges. The term “assemblage” helps to capture the multifaceted 
relations between human and non-human agents.  
 If assemblage captures a snapshot of relations, the concept of “creative 
destruction”, which is further developed in Chapter 9, introduces change over time. It 
theorizes technological innovation as a process entailing the stabilizing and destabilizing 
of assemblages. For this purpose, I draw on the works at the intersection of political 
theory, critical security studies, science and technology studies, history, critical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See Friedmann and Wolff (1982), Acuto and Curtis, 2014b. 
139 See Sassen (2006) and Ong and Collier (2008). For two recent examples in IR see Salter (2015) and 
Acuto and Curtis (2014).  
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geography and anthropology.140  This conceptualization of technological innovations 
follows the principle of symmetry and aims at proposing a distinct “post-international”141 
perspective. 
 The chapter starts outlining the central importance of technologies for 
understanding assemblages. I assume assemblages could neither exist, nor have a stable 
shape, without all kinds of artifacts—alongside with words, images, and concepts. 
Assemblages are furthermore understood as a performative process of group formation or 
evolving webs of relations (Callon and Latour 1981). This understanding directs the 
research concern away from static notions such as structures, units, levels, institutions, or 
systems (8.1). Instead, the notion of assemblages suggests focusing on heterogeneous 
agency, the power of acting in concert, and the role of non-coercive authority (8.2). 
Classifications that systematize the world of assemblages discussed but have to remain 
open-ended (8.3). Chapter 9 extends, then, this framework proposing three models of 
creative destruction: assembling, reassembling, and disassembling. 
8.1 Emergence and stabilization 
Assemblage is the analytical concept that appropriately denotes a world comprising 
multiple and clustered relations between humans and non-humans.142 The meaning of 
assemblages needs further clarification. How does the concept of assemblages replace 
dualist assumptions and logocentric vocabulary contained in the notion of “socio-
technical” systems and similar notions? The term assemblage is a foundational collector 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Including among others Murdoch (1989), Swyngedouw (1999), Barry (2001), Aradau (2010), Schouten 
(2013), Elden (2007), de Laet and Mol (2000), Law and Callon (1989), Castree (2002), Latour (1987), Law 
(1991a), Legg (2011), DeLanda (2006), Mayer (2012a), Farías and Bender (2010), Bueger and Villumsen 
(2007), Bellanova and Duez (2012). 
141 The perspective developed here differs from neo-medievalist portrays of world politics (Friedrichs 
2001); from frameworks that replace the “international” with numerous “polities” (Ferguson and Mansbach 
1996); and also from approaches to global governance (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006). While other 
scholars previously have employed the term “assemblages”, my use diverges from Saskia Sassen’s (2000, 
2006) temporal-spatial focus as well as from the “global security assemblages”, which Rita Abrahamsen 
and Michael C. Williams advance (2009); since the latter works fall short of fully developing a symmetrical 
analysis. 
142  In the following I use associations, ensembles, assemblages, actor-networks, and collectives as 
synonyms because all these terms contain a common analytic meaning and are employed in different bodies 
of research I drawn on.  
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that is post-Cartesian in a dual sense. First, it does not refer to pre-given categories such 
as sovereign states, society or the international system. As discussed in Chapter 7, and as 
Thomas Hughes famously has put it, the building blocks of reality are “seamless webs”. 
Therefore, theoretical distinctions between fields, structures, domains, or levels make 
little sense (Hughes 1986, 1991), and the convenience with which one imposes a priori 
differences without due recourse to empirical observations and factual plausibility 
capsizes. Assemblages can refer to objects reaching from planetary size to tiniest things 
without the need to deductively distinguish between different levels such as “local” and 
“global” or “micro” and “macro”. In terms of size and diversity, assemblages might entail 
everything from an electron to a car to a transnational supply chain; from a local criminal 
network to a full-fledged techno-civilization that spans beyond Mars.  
 Second, this foundational collector signifies collectives of human and non-human 
agents; they are able to embody the material and heterogeneous aspects of technological 
innovations, which theories of the social usually purify. Several strands of theory help to 
further develop the thingness of human worlds that is seen through the lens of 
associations. Political philosopher Hannah Arendt, for instance, has emphasized the 
central importance of things and technologies to human existence (Arendt 1989). Against 
the backdrop of the ever fluid and circular processes in the natural world that affects 
humanity as a species, the conditions of possibility for human societies to exists, and 
similarly for ownership and markets, is bound to durable artifacts. Artifacts including 
technological infrastructures increasingly enable the flows in the global economy and in 
daily life as the sine qua non for sociality and freedom. Arendt has also critically 
scrutinized the way in which machines turned work into labor and were significant for the 
rise of the “consumer society” (Arendt 1989, pp. 124-139). In this sense, technologies 
make the social durable, a theme we will return to later. 
 Assemblages, in addition, are concerned with the relational character of human life. 
Biologist Gregory Bateson has explored humans as “extra-regulators”. What unites 
humans with few other species is the ability to regulate and design the climate, the 
geography, the fauna and flora in their surroundings (Bateson 1973). This renders human 
group formations by definition closely intertwined with artificial environments in a way 
that blurs the line between allegedly social- and non-social relations. It constitutes a 
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biological actuality.143 It is the primordial condition of being human as Peter Sloterdijk 
points out. Building on Heidegger’s arguments, he emphasizes the beginning of human 
life as an “ecstatic entwinement of the subject in the shared interior” (of the female 
womb). The existential intermingling of human life, as Sloterdijk’s “spherology” stresses, 
spurs a psycho-metaphysical drive that renders human history—on the individual and the 
species level—one of a global expansion of technological self-domestication (Sloterdijk 
1999, 2001). Jongen summarizes: 
“Held out into the monstrous, humans can only survive and thrive if they create for 
themselves a ‘technologically enclosed external uterus’, (…) or in other words if they 
move into a ‘human greenhouse’ fabricated through material and symbolic 
‘anthropotechnologies’, in which they nurture, protect and immunise themselves against 
the unlivable outside. The clearing that emerges as the world comes into being is created 
by technology. This is the crucial point: it is the result of a human ‘technology of self-
domestication’” (2001, p. 197).” (Jongen 2011, p. 206) 
From another angle, Bruno Latour suggests a corresponding reading human macro-
history: human-nonhuman actor-networks expanding across the planet in phases (Latour 
1999a, pp. 176-215, see also Mumford 1966). This is a mythical narration of course. But 
unlike Sloterdijk’s psycho-drama of co-existence, where the human tragedy of never 
regaining original unity—wholeness, or “hominess”, to use Sloterdijk’s phrase—takes 
center stage, Latour describes human progress as the stepwise “socialization” of 
additional things into human collectives (Latour 1999a, p. 198). From including more and 
more non-human actors spring layers that are neither hierarchically structured nor 
ordered according to a teleological sequence. In the same line, Manual DeLanda (2000) 
suggests that the world is composed of myriads of assemblages, which he describes as 
“irreducible and decomposable” wholes. Every assemblage, despite its possible 
resemblances with others, has always a specific individual history (DeLanda 2011, p. 
185). In short, assemblages can interact and become interlocked into layered webs of 
complex activities. But how do they emerge? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 When IR scholars came to acknowledge economic interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977) and 
human-environmental interconnectedness (Strange 1999, Linklater 2009) did not fully capturing the long 
history of structural interdependence in this sense. 
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 DeLanda compares the homology of emerging thunderstorms, intelligence, 
language, and complex social organizations. Here, “emergence” is understood as 
“a contingent accumulation of layers or strata that may differ in complexity but that coexist 
and interact with each other in no particular order: a biological entity may interact with a 
sub-atomic one, as when neurons manipulate concentrations of metallic ions, or a 
psychological entity interact with a chemical one, as when subjective experience is 
modified by a drug.” (DeLanda 2011, p. 6) 
DeLanda points out the crucial differences that distinguish assemblages from organic 
totalities, as conceived by Hegel and others:  
“While those favouring the interiority of relations tend to use organisms as their prime 
example, Deleuze gravitates towards other kinds of biological illustrations, such as the 
symbiosis of plants and pollinating insects. In this case we have relations of exteriority 
between self-subsistent components such as the wasp and the orchid; relations which may 
become obligatory in the mores of coevolution. This illustrates another difference between 
assemblages and totalities. A seamless whole is inconceivable except as a synthesis of 
these very parts, that is, the linkages between its components form logically necessary 
relations which make the whole what it is. But in an assemblage these relations may be 
only contingently obligatory. While logically necessary relations may be investigated by 
thought alone, contingently obligatory ones involve a consideration of empirical questions, 
such as the coevolutionary history of two species.” (DeLanda 2006, p. 11) 
In short, insights from philosophy, ecology, and STS tell us that technologies are 
indispensable for the stability, historical progress and character of “human” collectives. 
We must expect, in the light of the symmetry principle, that technological innovations 
never occur external to “society” and that they will automatically entail and embody 
human intentions, norms, institutions and so forth. As a consequence, all collectives—be 
it in the form of states, firms, churches, or criminal networks—are “hybrids” of different 
forms and sizes. 
 Given their generic heterogeneity, another difficult question arises: what holds 
assemblages together? Assemblages are constitutive for the world and our experience, yet 
are chronically unstable and decaying. The law of atrophy appears to apply. Because 
stability needs to be explained, we cannot simply assume some form of hidden power 
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forces or structures that cause the stable state of an assemblage. According to the 
methodology of explorative realism, stability is an empirical question and the actor-
network approach points out various mechanisms for inquiry. For now, it suffices to refer 
to the role of performativity. Assemblages can be decomposed into a temporarily stable 
set of interrelated practices and agentic programs. Acts or practices mean locally 
routinized activities involving intentions and emotions, material elements, discursive 
representations, and tacit knowledge (Reckwitz 2005, Adler and Pouliot 2011a, p. 18). In 
brief, the stability of assemblages depends on performance. 
 When practices and circulation stop, connections break down and an assemblage 
may immediately disassemble. “Because there exists no society to begin with, no 
reservoir of ties, no big reassuring pot of glue to keep all those groups together (…) the 
object of a performative definition vanishes when it is no longer performed” (Latour 
2005, p. 37). For instance, a house that was assembled from stone, wood, glass, steel and 
so on. Without maintaining, heating, securing, repairing, and simply living, every house 
falls apart soon to be no longer recognized. As performance is the glue without which 
human realities would fall apart, we can speak about assemblages primarily in a 
performative sense. Yet, against the concentration on “social agency” anchored in self-
consciousness, and against the resulting inadequate “sociology of the social” that is 
prevalent in IR, I would assume—in line with process philosophy—that matter also 
performs. In the light of the above, my approach departs from merely considering 
“social” performances (Whitehead 1979, Rescher 1996; see Chapter 7). Concerning 
assemblages, technological agencies are part of performativity. 
 A complementary explanation for stable relations among heterogeneous actors 
refers to the circulation of “immutable mobiles”. Actors within a network are connected, 
among other things, through the constant movement of immutable mobiles such as 
devices, vehicles, standards, and “collecting statements” (Latour 2005, p. 196). It needs 
to be noted that immutable mobiles do not deterministically prescribe practices. They 
rather make actors “do something”, largely, helping an assemblage to march in unified 
fashion because they function as “metrological” instruments (Latour 1987, p. 251). They 
support the standardization and the normalization of practices and subjects across 
different localities and spaces (Oakeshott 1975). The circulation of immutable mobiles 
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cuts across all “levels of analysis” and “domains” as they keep practices and routines 
stable. Just imagine how we would know the time without coordinated global time zones 
and billions of clocks? How would one know distances, spatial location, and weights 
without standard measurement units, cable signals, laser devices, and satellite position 
systems? Or, how could economic activities, state policies and personal lives be enacted 
without standardized sets of statistical measurements and respective data? How would we 
imagine political communities without statistical means or common memes of reference? 
8.2 Agency 
What kind of agency is relevant for understanding assemblages? How does technology 
feature as actor accordingly? Drawing on ANT in particular, my approach to agency 
comes down to a notion of relational effects (Powell 2007, p. 318).144 Consequently, an 
actor is defined in terms of whether he/she/it is able to divert other actors from their 
intentions, identity, or activities. As should be obvious from the discussions above, such 
an approach to agency does not refer to Langdon Winner’s famous Brooklyn Battery 
Bridge (Winner 1986)145 – architectural designs that presumably were a congealment of a 
racial ideology; nor does agency necessarily involve human intentionality.  
 A thought experiment will clarify why concepts that privilege self-conscious 
actors fail to capture agencies within performance of assemblages. Imagine a large iron 
bridge that is part of a high-speed train connection between two metropolises. After a 
severe flooding, the iron structure of the bridge displays tiny fissures, which make the 
railway company stop traffic. All of a sudden, a material component that was reliable for 
decades requires attention. Engineers have to be sent out to open up the “black box” that 
the bridge has been since its construction was completed. While engineers figure out the 
concrete damage and assess the instability of the iron frame, the railway management 
redirects bullet trains, rendering the normal schedule obsolete. Passengers have to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 In contrast to what its critics postulate, ANT is not a constructivist approach to “science” and “nature”. 
Instead, it constitutes a pragmatic research attitude and offers a methodological toolbox to inquire into how 
humans and things are entangled by presupposing as few assumptions about actorness as possible (Law and 
Hassard 1999). See also Chapter 7. 
145 Winner’s influential example for determinism, besides being factually incorrect (Joerges 1999), does not 
capture what is here understood as material agency. 
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informed, bus transports have to be organized, and so on. It may take weeks or months 
until the bridge is repaired, that is, repacked into an unproblematic functioning black box. 
Only when this is accomplished will the entire assemblage of rail traffic enter a stable 
state. This example illustrates aspects of non-human agency. Technologies are not only 
essential parts of assemblages; they also possess the potential to become actors in their 
own right. Following the STS literature, we can distinguish among three forms of 
“technological agency”. 
 a) Technological agency consists of complex cascades of actors. Computer 
systems that are undertaking complex economic activities constitute the quintessential 
example for the complex forms of agency that signify our contemporary world. The 
consequences of massively incorporating artifacts are illustrated by the widely anticipated 
“millennium bug”—an alleged incapability of software to switch dates to the next 
century. An estimated $200bn to $858bn was spent worldwide to prevent the expected 
disruption of global financial systems, electricity supplies, nuclear weapon facilities, and 
air traffic control. Yet to many observers it was not clear whether these huge expenses 
were justified at all: “The bug panic [is] a symptom of our immaturity about technology 
generally. Businesses and the public are increasingly dependent on computers, but still 
understand little.” (Beckett 2000) As the real costs of the bug can never be clearly 
ascertained, it remains unknown whether there were serious threats at all.146 The crucial 
point is that the “millennium bug” implies a profoundly complex agency that may disrupt 
markets and societal systems.  
 Activities that social science usually conceptualizes purely as human agency are, 
in fact, irreversibly mediated by a mix of technical devices, algorithms and fiber cables; 
alongside with images, symbols, and utterances (Pinch and Swedberg 2008). For Latour, 
it is the myriad of material objects “through which inertia, durability, asymmetry, 
extension, domination is produced” (Latour 2005, p. 86). Agency is empirically located 
in “a thoroughly artificial reality generated by humans and their cultural technologies. 
This artificial reality”, as Marc Jongen argues, “has no ground onto which one might 
leap” (Jongen 2011, p. 214). It is because of this degree of complexity, that Michel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Others stress that the Y2K problem really existed and has been averted (Schofield 2000). 
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Callon and Donald MacKenzie highlight the practical difficulties of attributing agency. 
Understanding economic actors in financial markets as “sociotechnical combinations”, 
they note that actors are lacking fixed attributes or characteristics and should be viewed 
as the effect of “agencements”. Agency cannot simply get attributed to unitary human 
actors but belongs to complex hybrid ensembles that act in concert. This notion, then, 
directs our analytical focus away form “agential peaks (…) not just towards things but 
towards less high-status human beings.” (MacKenzie 2009, pp. 21-22, Callon 2007) 
 b) In a process of translations technological agency can shift goals, identities, 
and activities of other actors. The replacement of actors’ attributes and properties has 
various manifestations. Chapter 2 has mentioned how the nuclear bomb led to a variety of 
translations. Ultimately, these controversies led to a replacement previous aims of 
national security and defense strategy. The decision makers at both sides were struggling 
to prevent high-speed weapon systems from annihilating the room for reasonable 
decision making at all. The large-scale technological associations that were assembled for 
the “management” of the bomb ultimately transcended the bifurcated Cold-War 
imaginations. Experts, policy makers and the public on both sides acknowledged that the 
super powers share one earth with fragile ecological systems (Gavin 2012). Translation, 
obviously, constitutes a highly non-deterministic process. The ambiguity of technological 
assemblages always offers multiple options of replacing properties, goals, and interests 
by differently relating actors within and across actor-networks (see Tenner 2004).  
 Another variety of translation involves changes in the composition of large 
technological assemblages that lead to malfunctions of certain elements. Here, the 
creativity of innovators (human actors) plays a central role. For instance, as shipbuilders 
increasingly constructed large ships by steal and with steam engines replacing sails, the 
traditional magnetic compass, which had provided reliable orientation to navigating for 
centuries, ceased to function due to electromagnetic fields. The solution came in form of 
the gyrocompass that was invented just before World War One. Yet, as Thomas Hughes 
points out, existing actors and institutions were not simply applying inventions such as 
the gyrocompass. Inventor-entrepreneurs have seldom found “an established 
manufacturing firm willing to abandon a line of products in which it had heavily invested 
skill, knowledge, and capital in order to develop a new innovation unrelated to its 
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investment.” Typically, inventor-entrepreneurs do only succeed by translating 
institutions, laws, norms, or mind-sets. They invent “not only a device but an institution 
for manufacturing and marketing as well.” (Hughes 1991, p. 14, Todd 2001) While 
Schumpeter (1947) refers to successful entrepreneurs who master this situation with their 
“creative response”, Goddard (2009) shows that political entrepreneurs display similar 
abilities. 
 A final case involves material agency that initially was external to an assemblage 
but may interrupt the flow of circulation and, hence, has to be considered and 
“socialized” in some way. A recent exemplification for this source of instability is the 
2010 eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland. The civil aviation authorities 
closed north European airports, stopping most transatlantic and inter-European flights 
because the navigation systems and aircraft engines were thought to be unreliable. When 
the volcanic ash relentlessly kept diffusing into the northern hemisphere, air traffic was 
shut down for weeks. In response, different actors tried to integrate the ash particles as 
new actors in order to facilitate the restart of aircraft circulation. This was done by 
modeling and measuring the new actor, making it visible and intelligible by means of 
computer and navigation systems, and by testing the engines’ ability to withstand the new 
member of the collective. The institutional ensemble of international and national 
authorities in charge of air traffic control meanwhile issued new standards and 
benchmarks in order to coordinate traffic over Europe. All this involved intense 
negotiations in a seamless web of bureaucracies, turbine engines, passengers, computer 
simulations, economic concerns, and last but not least myriads of ash particles (see Adey, 
Anderson, and Guerrero 2011). So, several collectives underwent a translation process, as 
described above, in order to accommodate an “irritating” new member. 
 c) Artifacts and systems are ambiguous actors, which can provoke controversies 
and instability. Technology does not per se possess agency. Contrarily, technologies 
often are “black-boxed”—that is, they are taken for granted, functioning as mere 
intermediaries. When bridges or computer programs, for example, work smoothly they 
are black boxes co-constitutive of passengers, railway companies, and banking systems. 
These “intermediaries” do not divert actors from their normal course of action. Vice 
versa, actors that make a difference during translations behave unexpectedly as they turn 
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from an intermediary into a mediator (Latour 2005). When black boxes are reopened, 
technologies stir public controversies. Even a tiny actant that does not smoothly circulate 
or perform can disrupt the practices of all other actors in a network; the taken-for-granted 
mode of life breaks down. Compare, for instance, the accident of the Space Shuttle 
Challenger (Vaughan 1996) with a scenario in which regional electricity supply systems 
break down. Depending on the size of an assemblage this can lead to disasters of different 
magnitudes. Destabilizing technologies are able to disturb all other elements and relations 
within an assemblage and, therefore, divert human actors from their usual practices.  
 Even the largest assemblages remain fragile and require constant efforts of 
upkeeping and stabilizing. The reason these efforts are difficult is also because the same 
actors are often enrolled in different associations at the same time. Thus, overlapping, 
inter-locked, or possibly competing assemblages push and pull upon the same actors. 
Assemblages can never really escape ambiguity. In an assemblage, due to its flat 
ontology, the agency of its elements is never irreversibly suppressed. The consensus and 
alliances that enable a certain network “can be contested at any moment” (Callon 1986, p. 
15). As a result, disruptions in the chain of connections may appear instantly, stopping 
the circulation of artifacts and the practices by which actors perform in concert. This 
constitutes a typical characteristic of technological innovations.  
 It should have become clear by now that assemblages are conceptually rather 
distinct from totalizing notions such as “structures” and “systems”—auto-poetic or 
otherwise. They do not resemble static container-like concepts of social groupings. Their 
spatial boundaries are penetrable and their elements and agential programs are not strictly 
separated from the environment. The three aspects of material agency—heterogeneous 
complexes of agency, translations and ambiguity—become meaningfully operational to 
the extent to which two central notions related to assemblages are considered: power and 
authority. 
8.3 Power and authority 
In the context of assemblages, the concept of power does not refer to a domination of the 
thinking or the behavior of other actors as proposed by thinkers such as Machiavelli, 
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Hobbes, Rousseau, Weber or Dahl. For one, geometrical assumptions of unmediated 
power relations do not stand empirical scrutiny. It is progressively unreasonable to derive 
definitions of power from a laboratory situation that allows only for the interaction of two 
rationally calculating minds while everything else is kept constant.147 This sort of highly 
artificial condition, though widespread in IR and IPE theories, has no resemblance to the 
nitty-gritty of a world full of technological heterogeneity.148 For another, it is important 
to avoid the conflation of power, influence, and violence. While the frequent occurrence 
of forms of violence is a matter of fact, conceptually speaking, this often implies the 
absence of power. Writes Arendt: 
“where commands are no longer obeyed, the means of violence are of no use; and the 
question of this obedience is not decided by the command-obedience relation but by 
opinion, and, of course, by the number of those who share it. Everything depends on the 
power behind violence. The sudden dramatic breakdown of power that ushers in 
revolutions reveals in a flash how civil obedience—to laws, to rulers, to institutions—is but 
the outward manifestation of support and consent.” (Arendt 1969, p. 49) 
Taking seriously a world of assemblages, one cannot conceptually foreground command, 
coercion, and control. Instead, the understanding of power most adequate for studying the 
politics of technological innovations amounts to a “collective momentum”. Hannah 
Arendt and Michel Foucault propose respective conceptual approaches (Allen 2002). 
According to Arendt’s differentiation between the notions of power, violence, strength, 
and authority, power means a “unified marching”. It constitutes a collective activity 
(Arendt 1969, pp. 44-45, 50ff). For Arendt, power does not belong to a single actor but 
“springs up whenever people act together and act in concert” (Arendt 1969, pp. 52). As 
for the conditions for “collective action” there is a parallel in the thought of Arendt and 
Foucault. Arendt (1989) affirms power as a positive expression linked to the availability 
of a public sphere while Foucault (1983) understands the discursive embeddedness of 
actors as constitutive of their subjectivity and agency. Against coercion-obedience 
models of power, Foucault’s concept of governmentality finds power located in quotidian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Actors and agency are always enmeshed and constituted by assemblages. Unidirectional leverage or 
purely bilateral power constellations by and large are absent in real world environments. 
148 Even more integrative frameworks of power (see Barnett and Duvall 2005) must be rejected on 
empirical grounds for they fail to account for the meditative role of technologies. 
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practices—including the resistance to them (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991, Allen 
2002). So, while for Arendt and Foucault “power” refers to coordinated practices within 
stable collectives, I assume following STS that any conceivable “concert” naturally 
includes non-human actors such as technological artifacts. This results in the abstract 
definition of power which resides with ensembles of human and non-human actors who 
act in concert.149  
 “Acting in concert” has a substantial meaning. The concerted practices that 
constitute assemblages are fabricating dimensions of reality including space and time. 
The latter, in other words, can be understood as the effects of power operating within 
stabilized assemblages. In other words, power is “productive” (see Barnett and Duvall 
2005).	  The global standardization of time illustrates the productive dimensions of power. 
Against the assumption that time and space are stable, geographers and historians trace 
how both have been constructed and need to be maintained—though they are not purely 
social constructions (Harvey 1990, Kern 2003, Thrift 2002) Over centuries, only differing 
local times existed which were not comparable. Traveling was difficult for no single time 
standard existed. Especially, navigators on ships had greatest difficulties in determining 
their location as they needed precision time facing the so-called impenetrable “longitude 
problem”. As clocks were not working exactly enough, ships used to carry several clocks. 
Only when clockmaker John Harrison’s famous timepieces won him the Longitude Prize 
of the British Royal Society—not after personally appealing to King George III—reliable 
clocks stabilized and simplified naval navigation enormously (Taylor and Wolfendale 
2007, Wilford 1995).150 It was in the late nineteenth century that a single standard time 
was—driven by expanding railway systems and engineering entrepreneurs—agreed upon 
both within nations and worldwide (Stengers 1997, Bartky 2007).  
 The crucial point here is that we simply can’t treat time and space as constants. 
Space and time are neither fixed external realities of life nor globally given constants 
(Latour 1987, Sack 1986). Instead, the existence and standardization of time and space 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Subsequently, coercive types of power have only limited relevance in an actual world of assemblages. 
150 Although contemporary clocks work several magnitudes more precisely than their precursors—relying 
on highly expensive and complex combinations of atomic clocks—the satellite navigation systems still face 
the same challenge of stabilizing the time regime on which our technological assemblages rely (Debrunner 
2011, Galison 2006). 
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relies on complicated networks that require immense maintenance costs; another 
reminder how indispensable artificial objects are for the durability of modern civilization 
(Law 2004, Latour 2005, Crang and Thrift 2000). Here comes a crucial difference with 
the notion of “time-space compression” (Buzan Lawson 2015, pp. 67ff). Whereas the 
latter claim indicates the mere collapse of space and a simple reduction of distance, the 
idea of agencements or assemblages implies that we study more closely the intricate ways 
in distance is “compressed” – the operations of “power” that overcome distances and act 
upon remote parts of an assemblage. Here, the role of “immutable mobiles”, maps, 
chronometers, forms, or mathematical calculations, as they circulate and connect 
localities across networks is crucial. Because the “results of building, extending and 
keeping up these networks is to act at a distance, they do things in the centres that 
sometimes make it possible to dominate spatially as well as chronically the periphery.” 
(Latour 1987, p. 232, Porter 2013) In sum, power here means acting in concert to the 
effect that, among other things, space and time are synchronized and stabilized. From that 
springs a hypothesis, which stretches the meaning of “productive power” beyond 
subjectivity (see Barnett and Duvall 2005): different assemblages (or combinations of 
assemblages) may produce relative different life worlds that envelope partly 
incommensurable modi of existence. 
 “Authority” is the other notion critical for understanding the emergence of 
assemblages. Different from power, the term authority signifies the ability of actors—
human and non-human alike—to assemble and interconnect (with) other actors. The 
endowment with authority does not stem from threatening others with coercive means or 
using violence, although authority is unevenly distributed during processes translations 
and actors come to occupy central positions. For instance, it is unconceivable that a cell 
phone treats you violently. Nonetheless, myriads of smart phones and other digital 
communication gadgets make billions of users worldwide fundamentally reorganize their 
working environments, shaping their communication manners and transforming their love 
lives (Castells 1996, 1997). In addition, the application of information technologies 
increasingly transforms war theaters, defense parameters and the mechanisms of power 
(Castells 2008, Farwell and Rohozinski 2011, Singh 2013). Or take the car as another 
archetypical non-violent authority. For decades, the automobile assembles more and more 
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actors, inter-relating among many things fuel prices, oil extraction, street size, traffic 
systems, industrial pride, urban planning, labor policies, billions of tons of concrete, 
imaginations of male-hood, and racing sports (Paterson 2007, Volti 2008). 
 Extending or reconfiguring an assemblage requires authority. This, first of all, 
involves negotiating, indeed a lot of negotiations, in order to achieve shared conventions 
and a consensus. Authority is the ability of actors such as for example inventors, 
technical artifacts, criminals, entrepreneurs, genes, scientists, states-man, and so on, to 
convince other actors without violence to assemble in the first place. The use of violence, 
in contrast, rather equals disassembling a collective into its pieces—literally or 
figuratively—or at least undermining efforts to stabilize a collective.151  
 While applying violent force often supported acts of disassembling, the case of 
US military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan sadly drives home the crucial point that 
violence or coercion must not be confused with power. Advanced weaponry and high-
tech soldiers have conquered both countries, tearing apart preexisting assemblages, but 
US forces still strive to stabilize the kind of assemblages they wished to have in place in 
these countries. CIA and DoD drones enjoy almost unrestricted access hunting down 
“terrorist targets” in order to help reduce US death tolls and the number of extra-legal 
detainees. But they have also caused thousands of civilian casualties (Junod 2012). At the 
same time, Afghanistan had been turned into the most fortified country in the world with 
thousands of “foreign” and “domestic” military installations. Yet, “even with 4,200 bases 
set up to secure the country, along with close to 80,000 troops from the most 
technologically sophisticated and well-funded military on the planet (with assistance 
from 40,000 personnel from other powerful armies) and an allied indigenous force of 
around 350,000 soldiers and police,” notes Nick Turse, the war remains unfinished. One 
important reason for infinite war is that the enormous build up of military infrastructures 
does not provide sufficient authority to stabilize the assemblage of the Afghan nation.152 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 In this line, Arendt (1969, p. 56) remarks suit well: “to speak of violent power is actually redundant. 
Violence can destroy power: it is utterly incapable of creating it.” 
152 Not to mention the prewar plans of US companies and politicians that foresaw Afghan oil-pipelines. Not 
only has military might “been unable to decisively defeat a rag-tag, minority insurgency of limited 
popularity” (Turse 2012); dotting the landscape with military installations has not brought peace in any 
tangible sense. 
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The groundwork of stabilizing instead requires collective negotiations—based on the 
authority to assemble large numbers of human actors and material objects inside and 
outside of Afghanistan—as the Carnegie Foundation reminds hawkish pundits: 
“instead of a simple ‘surge,’ there needs to be a much clearer focus on bringing security to 
Afghans’ daily lives. Only once this is achieved will Afghanistan’s government have real 
reservoirs of legitimacy. (…) the United States should support systemic reforms, first 
through the development of an effective executive office to support the Afghan president. 
Counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan must take account of domestic socioeconomic 
complexities, and be based on long-term development projects that increase the returns 
from cultivating different crops. Serious thought needs to be given to encouraging more 
Muslim states to contribute personnel to support the promotion of human security and 
development in Afghanistan” (Maley 2008, pp. 1ff). 
At this point, deepening our understanding of authority benefits form studies on 
international regimes and global governance.153 Accordingly, authority resembles “a 
patchwork that does not lend itself to simple generalizations. It is negotiated between 
authorities and communities, multiple in forms, and continuously contested. Most 
authority in the world today likely still originates at the national level, but this is possibly 
changing as globalization progresses.” (Lake 2010, p. 600, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 
2006) For example, the governance of the Internet and the politics of communication 
technologies are shaped by various actors and agencies without a clear hierarchy (Mueller 
2010, Mayer-Schönberger and Lazer 2007). Though censorship and access control 
abound (Deibert et al. 2010), state agencies cannot dominate the highly heterogeneous set 
of governance activities. So, in principle, we cannot presuppose any privileged authority 
such as for instance sovereign national states. As David Lake states: “all authority is 
negotiated” (Lake 2010, p. 598). 
“(…) the emergence and workings of such hybrid forms of organization and steering 
remain under-studied. In particular, we have only just started to make sense of the myriad 
of transnational networks comprising governments, business and civil society groups 
currently shaping the emergent socio-political problems and opportunities.” (Flyverbom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 See for Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006), Held and McGrew (2002), Hall and Biersteker (2002), Grande 
and Pauly (2005). However, only a few authors chose technological innovations as a central research 
concern (see Sandholtz 1993). 
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2011, p. ix) 
In general, I agree that the heterogeneity of authority dethrones states as the primary 
crystallization site of the “political” (see Stripple 2006, Avant et al. 2010). However, 
there is a crucial conceptual difference. Though approaches to global governance evolve 
to a certain extent in parallel to the concept of assembling, these frameworks suffer from 
IR’s lightness. Authority, for my purpose, does not denote, as Lake argues, a “social 
contract in which a governor provides a political order of value to a community in 
exchange for compliance by the governed with the rules necessary to produce that order.” 
(Lake 2010, p. 587; italics by author)154 Authority, instead, signifies the performative 
ability of actors to bring about assemblages by means connecting and enrolling human 
and non-human actors.155 Authority is linked to human and non-human actors possessing 
a non-coercive power-generating agency. It belongs, for example, to Schumpeter’s 
innovating entrepreneur-heroes, to Adler’s (1992) “epistemic communities” and to 
Chandler’s organizational managers as much as it resides in Galison’s, Latour’s, and 
Hughes’s engineers and scientists, who are weaving seamless webs (cf. also Goddard 
2009). Varying degrees of authority are similarly invested in networks which become 
political actors on a global scenery (Sassen 2004, Grewal 2008, Kahler 2009). And no 
less may, as pointed out by ANT, artifacts and things command the capability of 
collecting actors to construct (or reshape) an assemblage through establishing solid 
connections between human and non-human actors (Latour 2005).156  
 In conclusion, assemblages require a fresh conceptual vocabulary of power and 
authority. Power here is defined as coordinated collective performance having productive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 The same purely „social“ approach is inherent to the related “network power” definition offered by 
Castells (2011). 
155 Although I build on Arendt’s useful conceptual clarification of the terminological field of “power”, this 
understanding differs from Arendt’ view (1969, p. 44-45). For Arendt, authority rests upon personal respect 
as opposed to coercion or persuasion.  
156 It must be noted that this definition of authority is at odds with several traditions in social sciences. It 
does neither stem from ideal-types of legitimate rule (Weber), nor from the persuasive force of “respect” 
(Arendt), and it is still less resulting from the leadership properties of hegemonic positions (as suggested in 
early regime theory). In addition, the question of legitimacy might be seen as related to the issue of 
authority in IR (see Mulligan 2006). As suggested here, however, legitimacy is conceptually different from 
authority. The concept of legitimacy is mainly related to a reflective process of deliberation and 
representation that occurs in the grouping of assemblages that could be labeled “modern states”. 
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effects.157 To “act in concert” is difficult to achieve – especially, against the backdrop of a 
hybrid world full of contradicting, shifting, and multi-directional agencies. As 
technological innovations occur within or across assemblages almost everything can turn 
into a matter of negotiation. When the back and forth of translations is ubiquitous, the 
attribution of agency becomes a pressing real-world concern (MacKenzie 2009). The 
concept of authority refers to innovating actors who bring about translations, 
replacements, and ultimately stabilize assemblages. 158  Crucially, neither power nor 
authority is restricted to intentional actors/acts. Under the above-mentioned 
circumstances, logics of coercion (power from or over capacities), which seemingly 
cause others to do what they otherwise would not do, may complement “network power” 
but are no substitute. 
As a foundational collector, the concept of “assemblage” offers a viable path to 
overcome the lightness of IR. To study the modern state through the lens of assemblages 
is only one option (Passoth and Rowland 2010). Other assemblages might stretch around 
the entire globe and might be collected through the authority of religion, ethnicity, 
family, agriculture, or “criminal” activities. The conceptual world of assemblages carries 
a greater resemblance with the realities of global politics than the logocentric premises 
and concepts of many other IR theories. Sloterdijk correctly points out that the main task, 
then, is “describing the togetherness, the communication and the cooperation of the 
multiplicities, who are held together under the stress of coexistence in their own space, 
but who are unfortunately still referred to as societies, on their own terms” (Sloterdijk 
2004, p. 293, cited in Jongen 2011, p. 213). But the empirical diversity of assemblages 
requires some form of differentiation.  
8.4 Towards classifications of assemblages 
The sheer diversity of assemblages raises the question whether we should elaborate 
different types or classes of collectives to enable comparisons of case studies across 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Perhaps the vague usage of term of “great power” in early IR, which scholars and observers used to 
signify expanding empires (cf. Meyers 2006), comes closest to the perspective that is suggested here. 
158 If this still appears absurd just remember the worldwide response to things such as a nuclear 
Armageddon, the millennium crash, or consider the fight against the proliferating agency of the first major 
cyber-robot “stuxnet”. 
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historical periods and divers modes of existence (see Latour 2005, pp. 238ff). The 
question of classification is problematic from the outset. It must remain without a 
definitive answer. Categorizing assemblages is done at pains and only by avoiding a fixed 
set of categories. No hierarchic order should be imposed upon the jungle of assemblages, 
although I do believe that attempts to classify are necessary—in one way or the other—to 
carry out further research because classifications help navigating through these 
unexplored lands. They organize puzzles and render phenomena and cases intelligible. 
Also, we need more than a mere “list of the elements always present in controversies 
about groups” (Latour 2005, p. 31). In particular, it is crucial to distinguish, if only 
rudimentary and preliminary, between assemblages in order to theorize the shifts in 
power and authority involved in technological innovations. In an explorative spirit, the 
aim is to indicate diverging sets of possible classification methods. Three options will be 
considered: firstly, the size of assemblages; secondly, a refined Weberian approach of 
ideal-types. Finally, I consider a classification that grants non-human actors, and 
particularly technologies, the defining role. This cartography of assemblages, then, is 
centered around non-human agencies and highlights different ways of capturing the 
characteristics of assembling.  
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Table 8.1 provides a distilled account of the three options for categorizing assemblages. 
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While preliminary and open-ended, it articulates the possible differentiations. All 
classifications possess advantages and limitations in characterizing assemblages but their 
comparison helps differentiating processes of technological innovation in illuminating 
ways. The size-based comparison; the typology of ideal typing, and the cartography of 
assemblages centered around non-human agencies highlight different ways of capturing 
the characteristics of assembling. 
 The first option to distinguish assemblages is comparing their size. In a rough 
approximation, size could be measured as a function of the number and diversity of 
actors and practices that are associated (Mayer 2012a). We may start with a modest sized, 
yet already rather complicated, assemblage such as a combustion engine. Automobiles 
are already a bit larger involving more agency and actors. Cars, in turn, could be seen as 
crucial components of even larger assemblages of traffic and transport. Transport 
systems, at the same time, are but one element among others in the mega-sized 
“petroleum assemblage” that encompasses diverse human and non-human actors, 
economic, political, military, and criminal practices, and numerous connections across 
the entire planet. Because large assemblages rely on an extraordinary high number of 
black-boxed actors, which could at any time turn into intermediaries that cause 
controversies, we can employ controversies as an additional measure of size. Moreover, 
as this way of categorizing counts the number of actors performing in concert, a 
comparison of the “power” of an assemblage becomes possible.  
 Measuring the size of an assemblage does not resemble computing stylized sets of 
variables (i.e. “power capabilities”). It is not comparable to neorealist frameworks (cf. 
Lebow 1994) which ignored sociological understandings of the significance of 
technological change for the size and power of political entities (see Ogburn 1949). 
Rather, this classification combines a qualitative and a quantitative approach. As a rule of 
thumb, large assemblages have more power than small ones because they connect and 
coordinate more actors, practices, and materials. The resulting “mode of existence”, 
produced by acting in concert, has a larger geographic, epistemic, or temporal extension. 
For example, one could compare in such a manner the power of the “petroleum 
assemblage” with the power of a “state-assemblage” (see Sampson 1975, Mayer and 
Schouten 2012, Hoyos 2012). Qualitatively, the difference in size has significant 
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implications. The bigger the size of an assemblage, the more durable and encompassing 
are the modes of existence that it creates. 
 What does a classification based on size imply for the understanding of 
technological innovation? Inquiring the number of assembled actors renders tangible the 
extent to which the accumulation of earlier technological agencies has enabled power. In 
turn, this classification emphasizes the inertia and difficulties that possible technological 
innovations might face. It puts the magnitude of translations (MOT) into the spotlight: 
that is, the amount of authority that is necessary to invest into processes of negotiation, 
replacement, and enrollment necessary in order to realize a technological innovation. The 
size of an assemblage, in general, correlates positively with the MOT. An assemblage 
becomes more difficult to shock into change as it gets bigger. Consider, as a thought 
experiment, the different magnitudes of translation that are warranted for the realization 
of “decarbonization” – depending on whether bio-fuels are introduced, the automobile is 
supplanted, or the entire petroleum assemblage is replaced,159 the implications of the 
scale of different technological innovations become obvious. The bigger an assemblage 
has become, the more translational “energy” is necessary to unpack and destabilize them. 
In this sense, studying the size resembles a method to de-flatten the power political 
landscape of assemblages as layered and reconfigured through successive technological 
innovations. 
 The second possibility to categorize assemblages draws on Max Weber’s 
methodology of ideal types. Weber postulates a close correspondence of subjective 
meanings and social structures (generated by actions) which sociology can captures by 
the notion of ideal types (Weber 1964b, pp. 4-15, Hekman 1983). At first sight, this 
seems counterintuitive because ideal types presuppose that we can grasp our subject 
matter merely based on meaningful motives and, thus, intentionality, whereas a post-
Cartesian definition of agency claims going beyond human intentions. Indeed, Weber 
explicitly stresses that artifacts remain external to his approach of verstehende Soziologie 
and are only be understood through the rational meaning that humans may bestow upon 
them (Weber 1964b, p. 5, 9) So, even if we assume assemblages with a high density 
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human actors, the Weberian methodology needs to be revised in order to provide 
meaningful criteria for difference. This can be achieved by three changes of the original 
ideal type methodology. 
 One the one hand, Weber’s concept of “motives” (Sinnzusammhang) that constitute 
the reason of individual actions, and from which social scientist can carefully construct 
pure or ideal types (1964a, pp.8-9), is replaced by the notion of “script” (see Akrich 
1992). Scripts operate in heterogeneous assemblages and refer to more or less coherent 
programs of action for putative users of technologies. Against Weber’s one-way 
determinism, technologies and scientific objects can alter the program of action of users 
and so can users alter scripts designed into technology by producers (Latour 1992a). 
Weber’s individualist-rational assumptions, in addition, give way to complex and 
mediated forms of agency. Scripts as understood here imply a form of meaning that is 
more ambiguous, flexible, and instable than Weber’s motives.  
 On the other hand, the construction of ideal types is understood as an 
unconstrained, constant, and infinite practice. Going beyond Weber, the range of actors 
who conduct “ideal typing” does not only entail scholars; it potentially involves all 
subjective actors of an assemblage. Ideal typing, then, does not resemble a procedure that 
assumes a divide between subjects and objects. It rather captures the interactions and 
intermingling of economists, IR scholars, legal scholars, philosophers, priests, biologists, 
engineers and many others, though separated by disciplinary boundaries, who (en)frame 
the world—directly influencing the very assemblages under construction, examination, or 
conceptualization (Shaw 2003, Ashley 1988, Latour 1993).  
 It needs to be pointed out that language is not a mute vessel. In contrast to Weber’s 
original methodology, ideal typing assumes travelling vocabularies. There are no barriers 
between academic and vernacular discourses. Words, concepts, and metaphors inevitably 
move back and forth between laboratories, universities, and research institutes on the one 
hand and the “outside world” on the other. Actors enrolled through this process are 
constantly up-keeping and, at the same time, reframing assemblages. Collectives are 
distinguishable through the practices of “ideal typing” because specific scripts and 
inscriptions co-constitute and stabilize specific subjectivities, agency, and collective 
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practices (see Walter 2002). 
 Caliskan and Callon (2009, 2010) describe the practice of economization—that is, 
an ideal typing of “the economy”. They suggest a pair of concepts including 
“subjectification” and “objectification”. These concepts denote the mix of legal, political, 
business, and scientific practices whereby actors get enrolled and transformed to become 
consistent elements. In due course, preexisting practices and subjectivities are completely 
translated according to the script of the “market assemblage”. Consider the ways in 
which divers materials and technical and scientific efforts have been turned into 
“fictitious commodities”—to employ Karl Polanyi’s phrase. As bioprospecting and the 
clean development mechanism indicate, commodification is an ongoing process that 
replaces properties of actors and breaks apart existing assemblages and establishes 
materials as legible to governed by new institutions and rules (Jasanoff 2006). To trace 
ideal typing processes of commodification is a powerful way to study the role of 
technologies and materials in making the world (see Coole 2013, p. 466).  
 Scientific knowledge production resembles another form of ideal typing. To 
translate a questionable claim, which has been ignored at the political level, into a “matter 
of fact”—that is to objectify knowledge, which henceforth becomes relevant for policy—
scientists must actively assemble. In a “procedure for collecting new associations of 
humans and nonhumans” (Latour 2004b, p. 238), they enroll the material actants by 
means of instruments, and ensure the autonomy of scientific knowledge, at the same time 
forging alliances in order to receive research funding and represent their knowledge to 
the general public (Latour 1999a, Bueger and Gadinger 2007). In the case of climate 
change, actors from multiple professional and disciplinary backgrounds collaborate in 
order to produce reliable expertise. The stabilization of such a heterogeneous network 
requires to synchronize research work, facilitate communication among different 
professional groups, and to reinforce scientific authority (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998, 
Shackley and Wynne 1996). Another symmetrical way to think about scripts is presented 
by Jasanoff’s comparative work. For instance, in design on nature she shows the 
diverting ways in which law, science, and new technologies (in this case gene 
technology) emerges in different countries (Jasanoff 2005). The concept of sociotechnical 
imaginaries opens to possibility to compare different assemblages around large technical 
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systems, such as civilian nuclear technologies, across countries (Kim and Jasanoff 2009). 
 Insofar as we could simply distinguish a list of assemblages due to specific scripts 
or programs, this classification reveals serious shortcomings. Given that the likely items 
on our list of scripts contain law, economy, religion, science, music and so on,160 such a 
list would lead us to probe into assemblages such as “states”, “markets”, “church”, 
“nations”, “empires”, “epistemic communities”, “prison camps” alongside with 
“orchestras“. This sort of classification amounts to rebranding preexisting concepts. It is 
misleading because categorizations based on coherent scripts are problematic. 
Assemblages are seldom sharply defined by a single clearly scripted 
meaning/logic/reason. Take the example of a commodification process that translates 
ancestral lands, personal information, or physical properties into monetized and tradable 
goods. This process is believed to be indispensible for the construction of free markets. 
And yet, these transformations typically involve endemic corruption and plunder by a 
few actors that happen to be at decisive positions. To analyze the actual replacements that 
were negotiated in their favor and rendered them obligatory passage points, however, 
cannot be achieved by reference to “market” scripts.  
 The practice of ideal typing can also be misleading since scripts are often not 
implemented in a coherent manner. The script of “sovereignty” has seldom worked as it 
was supposed to do (Krasner 1999, 2001, Howland and White 2008). Only in very few 
instances have actors managed translations that led to presumably unquestioned scripts 
and coherent routines. Social scientists regard “states” and “markets” among them. But 
even granted the existence of coherent scripts, one must acknowledge that their specific 
meaning tends to change over time. The scripts of “state assemblages” may radically alter 
over time as Arendt, Foucault, and Sennet brilliantly show in their research. Employing 
ideal typing thus inevitably leads to historicizing perspectives, which are, however, 
unfortunately underrepresented in IR that rather thrives on universal or ahistorical 
categories (see Vaughan-Williams 2005). Historically, scripts remain fluid and 
inconclusive. The heterogeneity of assemblages ultimately suggests that scripted 
practices such as sovereignty actually are never able to escape incoherence. 
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Inadvertently, classifications built on this sort of comparison rest on shifting sands. 
 Ideal typing, it must be repeated here, always implies a symmetrical reading. Thus, 
if we recycle existing concepts we should not forget that we symmetrically refer to 
radically different subject matters by now. A focus on ideal typing could easily cause one 
to understand assemblages as distinguishable because they constitute vessels filled with 
“political”, “social”, “technical”, “legal”, “scientific” or whatever kind of pure relations 
respectively.161 But it would be a mistake, if accounting for ideal typing would lead us 
down the road of “great divides” and other artificial separations (as reviewed in chapter 3 
and 4). While Cartesian social science all-too-commonly accepts the purified domains 
imposed onto the world that already underpins Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (cf. Shaw 
2004, Williams 1996), ideal typing is to be explored based on a monist understanding of 
ontology (Jackson 2001). 
 Consider once more the example of “state assemblages”. Needless to say, the term 
does not indicate national containers or sovereign units; neither is it confined to the triple-
corset of a limited territory, people, and legal authority. Like all other assemblages, states 
are stabilized through complex practices that may traverse the inside/outside delimitation, 
the global-local nexus, the micro-macro levels as well as the social-material distinctions. 
Unless we employ a symmetrical methodology we neither can explain which attributes 
and properties characterize state assemblages, nor what maintains their existence in the 
first place. The brilliant works of Benedict Anderson (1996), James Scott (1998), Isabelle 
Stengers (1997), Thomas Mitchell (1994, 2002), and Mark Duffield (2006) illustrate how 
the principle of symmetry (albeit used in differing ways) excavates significant, yet 
unexpected connections between humans and non-humans and technological agency that 
“explain” states in the first place. 
 A crucial supplementary possibility for ideal-typing-based differentiation arises as 
assemblages differ in what they “silence”. The notion of silence here refers to 
externalized consequences of practices. For instance, certain stable assemblages may 
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ignore inherent hardships such as destruction, violence, or pollution. Silence indicates 
assembled elements that are taken for granted. These “black boxes” are bereft of agency 
as noted above. But silenced things, that is, matters of fact, can become problematized as 
“matters of concern” in any moment. As such, the specific “politics of ignorance” greatly 
vary among assemblages. The assemblages of “energy security” and “environmental 
security” are a telling pair of examples. The former sees oil platforms and pipeline 
networks as technical black boxes (vital for energy security) and silences carbon 
emissions and environmental degradation as external issues. The latter takes the very 
same material objects as “matters of concern” (threatening environmental security); the 
concern with environmental impacts of oil production and usage is inherent to its script of 
security (Mayer and Schouten 2012). When technological innovations move along a 
gradient between unproblematic fact and political concern they tend to involve 
controversies that disturb coherent meaning. The shifting politics of ignorance is a key 
site to investigate the potential of innovations to destabilize practices of ideal typing. In 
turn, emerging technological innovations also complicate this type of classification. 
 The third option to classify assemblages sets out from an altogether different 
starting point. Taking serious the “topology of agency” it focuses on which kind of non-
human actors prevail within an assemblage.162 What here springs to the eye are altogether 
different species of assemblages in which rational practices of “ideal typing” are largely 
insignificant. This does not mean human actors are completely absent. But at the core of 
this type of assemblage the affordances of different materials (see Ash 2013) as well as 
interoperability and inter-lockage between technological systems and artificial 
components—often entailing a planetary scale. Recognizing the minor importance of 
scripts is also critical for the research methodology: “topological” assemblages require a 
cartographic approach featuring “real types”. 
 Whereas IR theories shed light on several of the ideal typing practices, even though 
by neglecting their material underpinnings, they have overseen topological assemblages. 
Authors exploring material culture (e.g. Appadurai 1986, 1996) and logistics (Belanger 
and Arroyo 2012) challenge the neglect of these seemingly incomprehensible or 
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“meaningless” assemblages that are downplayed by social sciences. Proponents of an 
object-oriented ontology have advanced research in the same direction (Graham (2016c). 
Indeed, it can be argued that they proliferate in numbers, grow in extension, and actually 
make up the lion’s share of all existing assemblages. Examples of this type of “acting in 
concert” include the “car assemblage”, “metropolitan assemblages”, the “plastic 
assemblage”, “production networks”, “waste recycling assemblages”, the “coffee 
assemblage”, “resource extraction assemblages”, the Internet’s “International exchange 
points” and “encryption chain assemblages” and so forth. A good measure for their 
growing size and number is the accelerating consumption of raw materials such as sand, 
water, iron ore, copper, timber, rare earths, and minerals. These assemblages can be seen 
as more powerful because they are less visible – they are simply relayed to the 
background of other assemblages.163 The scripts and program at work, equally, are buried 
in scientific discourses of logistics, finance, and engineering rather than being part of 
public political deliberations. 
 But what glues these assemblages together? The “container assemblage” evolving 
around the intermodal shipping container is a prime example (Mutlu 2015). The cargo 
container, write Alan Sekula and Noël Burch (2011), “has radically changed the space 
and time of port cities and ocean passages”, “a modest American improvement in cargo 
logistics has now taken on world-historic importance.” Over decades, it globally enrolled 
innumerable companies, new markets, seaport infrastructures, just in time procedures, 
production networks, 100,000 ships, choke points, the “flag of convenient” system, 
dockers, cranes, security practices, economies of scales, shipyards that build mega-bulk 
carriers, cargo logistics, trade policies, and so forth (Murphy and Yates 2009, pp. 46-67). 
Of course, human actors within these assemblages could be singled out as somehow 
linked through standard setting, market mechanisms, and rational economic behavior at 
the “micro-level”. Yet, “the containerization of the International” (Mutlu 2015, p. 64) 
becomes intelligible if we put the agency of the cargo container at center stage: “the 
containerization of the International”. The agential topology is distinct. Anonymous 
logistical connectivity dominates this kind of assemblage. The logic of a standardized 
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metal box overrides meaning-based practices: particular scripts and individual human 
subjectivity and intentionality in general. The presence of materially mediated agencies is 
overwhelming vis-à-vis human actors. 
 Why did these assemblages so readily stay below the radar beam of social 
scientists, and especially IR theories? One possible explanation – aside from object-
disinterested European philosophy (see Harman 2016a) – is that the predominance of 
material mediators often results in a lack of “public faces”, visible leaders, or outstanding 
heroic characters, which are so familiar to ideal-typing assemblages and, more generally, 
akin to the dominant social narrative relevant for political theories. One would 
mistakenly conclude from the absence of highly visible spokespersons—or perhaps a 
missing human feeling of ‘hominess’—that these assemblages are marginal as is pointed 
out in Parag Khanna’s Connectography that brilliantly traces how myriad technical 
networks and associations structure foreign policy, firm activates and state interventions 
all over the world (2016).  
 A second, perhaps more significant reason for why we have failed to comprehend 
the significance of these vast assemblages is simply that their scale and evolution are hard 
to grasp from a human perspective in the first place. George Kubler’s (1962) impressive 
study, in this vein, shows that although humans live in the midst of large ensembles of 
artificial things which they have produced over millennia; understanding the duration, 
interrelated sequences and serial evolution of these “things” requires a dramatically 
different conceptual language. As such, movies, novels, and photography offer invaluable 
insights. For example, Paul Auster (1988) depicts the incomprehensibility of the immense 
material environments of megacities that are overwhelming and immersive for human 
experience, rationality, and bodies in The New York Trilogy. Likewise, Haruki Murakami, 
in Hardboiled Wonderland and the End of the World (1985) and in Norwegian Wood 
(1989), describes human experiences and conditions of consciousness that are per se 
enmeshed in Tokyo's chaotic metropolitan techno-spaces.164 Mega cities resemble cases 
of “material assemblages” that are most immediately appealing, but there is more.  
 Edward Burtynsky’s photographic oeuvre and his documentary Manufactured 
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Landscapes broaden the perspective. Burtynsky brings to our attention the environments 
that we would not necessarily accept as part of our “world”: the vast deserted landscapes, 
the abandoned infrastructures of grotesque proportions, and the macro-scale technical and 
natural transformations that are linked to extracting crude oil, coal, precious metals, and 
rare minerals, giving rise to “resource assemblages”. From yet another angle, author 
Annie Leonard has paved an inroad to the alien agencies of materials.165 Her Story of 
Stuff opens a window into the extensive world of artifacts permeating our daily lives—
including its polluting and anti-human consequences (Leonard 2010, Bennet 2010)—that 
usually is silenced by social theories. 
 To sum up, a preliminary cartography distinguishes between four different 
topologies: 
• mapping technical and logistical agencies (machinery, gadgets, buildings, 
military and research installations, cyber/virtual world, clinics, walls, urban, 
industrial, and traffic infrastructures et cetera) 
• mapping material resources (drugs, natural raw materials, crops, oil, coal, 
timber, gold, garbage et cetera)  
• mapping geographical and climatic environments (mountain regions, islands, 
climatic areas, desert and forest areas) 
• mapping physical-biological-chemical webs (laboratory sciences, scientific 
research, energy use, particle emissions, human activities embedded in 
“ecosystems”) 
Needless to say, this cartography is open-ended and not intended to be exhaustive. The 
third and fourth topology are in need of further clarification. Talking about 
geographically centered assemblages, of course, does not entail any structural or 
deterministic readings. James C. Scott (2009), among others, has demonstrated—
although employing a different conceptual terminology—how geographical conditions 
are central actors in assemblages without resorting to determinism. In addition, we also 
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should carefully re-read determinist accounts because non-vulgar writings often pertain 
more lively descriptions of agencies than implied by their theoretical apparatus (e.g. 
Diamond 2005).  
 In this vein, claiming that IR has overseen material assemblages, as I do above, has 
ignored some exceptions. Classical realism addresses the “stopping power” of oceans. 
Since “water is a forbidding barrier” realists assume that navies which project power 
suffer from structural disadvantages. This “objective” fact determines to a certain degree 
great power politics despite technological progress (Mearsheimer 2001). Obviously, 
recent strands of realism have not reexamined the objections to the pioneers of geo-
strategy such as Mackinder, Mahan, and Innis many of whom have clearly recognized the 
interplay of revolutionary transport and communications technologies with material 
environments (see Chapter 2). So, while the older realist generation has conceptualized 
material topologies in a more or less meaningful way, contemporary realist approaches 
have, in terms of theoretical sophistication, retreated a step behind Mahan and 
Mackinder. 
 The last topology focuses on physical-biological-chemical processes that do not 
only fall under the domain of the “natural sciences” but are—as climate change—often at 
the center of human history and political decision-making (McNeill 2001, Cohen 2001, 
Dalby 2009b). In this sense, assemblages can complement approaches such as “social 
metabolism” that analyze the interplay of human activities and ecological systems 
addressing “technical domination” (Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl 2007). Mapping 
assemblages, however, offers a post-Cartesian methodological corrective to the 
mechanistic and dualistic mode of analysis inherent in the social metabolism approach.166 
Following physical-biological-chemical webs quickly leads one to scientists, laboratories, 
simulations models, NGOs, think tanks, and politicians as I have shown elsewhere 
(Mayer 2012a).  
 The last topology highlights a possible totality, that is, a reference point for 
normative deliberations. If many natural scientists view “Gaia” as the ultimate planetary 
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body that encompasses all other collectives (Brauch, Dalby and Oswald Spring 2011, 
Dalby 2009a), the fourth topology instead stresses global interconnectedness. 
Philosophically speaking, this totality sees humans as a truly global force altering the 
ecological parameters on a planetary scale. It radically diverges from most what is 
interrogated within IR at the moment. Instead of lamenting the inescapability of the 
“inter-national”167, it suggests that we engage in cosmopolitarian debates about the 
consequences of the Anthropocene that momentarily evolve without a substantial 
contribution from IR (Linklater 2009, Dalby 2009b). 
8.5 Summary 
The three classifications explicate now the concept of assemblages can be used as a 
foundational collector. It must be noted that assemblages are, in situ, not always clearly 
distinguishable because they may actually overlap, merge or appear to mix up. During 
controversies, actors may voice conflicting claims to hierarchical order. As different 
assemblages are often layered or connected without discernable hierarchy, the same 
actors (having multiple agencies or properties) also can be enrolled in various 
assemblages. These observations lead to the conclusion that different ontologies are 
experienced in parallel or ontological pluralism (Mol 2002, Dobres 2010, p. 110, Latour 
2012). Ontological pluralism and controversies complicate the applicability of a priori 
differentiations. For sure, one should not confuse the map with the territory (see 6.1). 
These classifications offer tools of distinction that need to be adopted while encountering 
empirical materials. Ordering diversity to a certain degree—without a fixed hierarchical 
grid—prepares us for exploring the relationship between assemblages and creative 
destruction. Given their ubiquity and significance from a historical perspective, 
technological innovations have played a crucial role in creating or have significantly 
altered all four classifications, as will be detailed in the next chapter. 
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9. Varieties of creative destruction 
From time to time, and always in time, new forms emerge that catalyze previously existing 
actors, things, temporalities, or spatialities into a new mode of existence, a new 
assemblage, one that makes things work in a different manner and produces and 
instantiates new capacities. (Rabinow 2002, p.180) 
This chapter elaborates how technological innovations relate to assemblages. Drawing on 
Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction, three models are developed that distinguish 
processes of stabilization and destabilization. The first model considers technological 
innovations as “assembling”, which if successful leads to the establishment of a new 
assemblage. The second model explains how technological innovations animate the 
“reassembling” of an existing collective. The third model focuses on the process of 
“disassembling” that results in the complete dissolution of an assemblage. While the 
three models operate based on a clear analytical separation, the actual processes often 
occur in combination or sequence. The chapter employs empirical cases to illustrate how 
and to which effect the varieties of creative destruction involve shifts of “power” and 
“authority” within assemblages, offering an alternative lens to grasp the transformative 
changes of historical and contemporary global techno-politics. 
9.1 Assembling 
Creative destruction has a double meaning. On the one hand, it highlights the 
creativeness of all involved actors that is necessary for assembling. Chapter 8 has shown 
that this involves the replacement of identities, interests, routines, and properties—
otherwise no actors would be assembled into a collective in the first place. Or, to phrase it 
diffently, every new technology has to become part of an assemblage (Bousquet 2014). 
When new authoritative actors start to construct new collectives, they don’t employ force 
but use their ability—during a process of translation—to negotiate, objectify, and 
stabilize; in short, they convince other actors to become part of an emerging assemblage. 
On the other hand, Schumpeter’s terminology emphasizes the resulting “destruction” that 
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inevitably follows from innovation.168 Schumpeter thought that innovations revolutionize 
“economic structures” (Schumpeter 1943). While his theory is focused on the 
“economic” aspects of innovations, the following discussion broadens the perspective by 
assuming that innovations reconfigure collectives of humans and non-humans. 
 The birth of an assemblage constitutes a three-step evolutionary process.169 In a 
nutshell, the story of assembling starts with an invention, a concern, or a vision. It goes 
through a translation phase of innovating activities until a stable technical artifact gets 
constructed. The artifact is stabilized because it is embedded into new practices, 
enmeshed in identities of manifold actors and entrenched with numerous interests and 
routines. Technological innovation, therefore, is never happening outside of “society” but 
involves a mixture of human and non-human actors. 
 Figure 9.1 condenses and extends existing STS literature (Latour, Maguine and Teil 
1992, Latour 1999a) to capture the conceptual links between creative destruction and 
assemblages. This process model assumes that a “thing”170 that initially was ignored or 
unknown (i.e. an invention) can become controversial and initiate the assembling of a 
potentially large assemblage that is unknown in its evolution, actors, and subsequent 
extension. The model plots the evolution of assemblages along two dimensions 
explicating certain aspects of creative destruction. The x-axis refers to the translation 
process and the y-axis the size of an emerging assemblage. The x-axis is (for analytical 
purposes) divided into three layers: practices of group formation, the status of 
material/artificial objects, and different forms of politics. Moreover, the x-axis represents 
in a stylized way three temporary phases of translation that can be distinguished.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Historically, the process of creative destruction as a whole cannot be stopped. But this does not mean 
that creative destruction always unfolds inevitably. Just consider the first historically known anti-
proliferation initiative conducted by the Catholic Church against the spread of bows and crossbows in 
medieval Europe (McNeill 1982). This ban had not succeeded. And the mighty assemblage of knighthood 
had to adapt its armory to the new cheap and deadly weapons. The protective measures grew to a point of 
“gigantic absurdity” at which King James I of England reportedly remarked that “it kept the knight from 
being injured, and second, it kept him from injuring anybody else” (Brodie and McKay 1973, p. 37, Ruff 
2001). The record is much better when it comes to technological innovations such as chemical and 
biological weapons that have been banned from proliferation and usage (Price 1995). So, in a few cases 
creative destruction was prevented. 
169 Although I will here exclusively focus on technological innovations as assembling, assemblages can be 
constructed in several other ways. 
170 Following Latour, a thing (or a person) is seen as an “assembly of a judicial nature gathered around a 
topic, reus, that creates both conflict and assent.” (Latour 2000, p. 117) 
	   254	  
 The term translation was already introduced in the context of agency and 
classifications in Chapter 8. Here, it can be further elaborated based on the phases and 
layers shown by the x-axis of figure 9.1. In the process of translation actors start to 
assemble and establish new connections (red arrow) while matters of concern eventually 
over time turn into matters of fact. In this sense, the y-axis represents another aspect of 
stabilization: the higher the number and diversity of human and non-human actors 
enrolled in an assemblage, the more stable and powerful will an assemblage become. 
Given the heterogeneous and fluid world of assemblages, the trajectory of an assemblage 
is always reversible and its stable condition of temporary endurance. 
 
 
FIGURE	  9.1	  STYLIZED	  MODEL	  OF	  THE	  EVOLUTION	  OF	  ASSEMBLAGES	  SOURCE:	  MAYER	  (2012A)	  ©AUTHOR	  
What is the motivation of actors to assemble? Notwithstanding the narratives in which 
technological innovations were realized by engineers, scientists and entrepreneurs—and, 
less important, state bureaucracies, many different motivations can drive the hard work of 
collecting, including beliefs, visions, profits, truth, glory, aesthetics, enrichment, dreams, 
adventurism, and so forth. As John Darwin points out in Unfinished Empire, the 
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assembling of even the biggest political power structure has worked without a “master 
plan”; without a guiding ideology; without a fixed and centrally coordinated set of 
practices (Darwin 2012). In this sense, the core question is not what motifs make 
collectors to do the assembling, but how they overcome the challenges and the obstacles. 
Actors who assemble successfully must possess the ability to overcome ignorance and to 
connect all different human actors and practices. This ability refers to the term 
“authority” in the context of translations. In addition, assembling also requires the 
enrollment of an array of non-human actors.  
 While innovating actors are important, it needs to be pointed out that novel 
technologies cannot be simply controlled. There is no single actor—presumably at 
commanding highs—who can conduct or manage the creative process in a top-down 
manner. The enormous expansion of coordinated action that a successful innovation 
presents (to which Chapter 8 refers to as the increase of “power”) is only due to the 
authority of the many. It cannot be boiled down to state policies or national innovation 
systems—though an array of actors that are often wrongly subjected to the concepts of 
“state” play important roles. The idea of a coherent “state” does not reflect the empirical 
reality of innovational processes as is shown by McNeill’s (1982) brilliant study of 
innovations in weapons and defense systems. Similarly, the evolution of the “nuclear 
assemblage”, which has been discussed in Chapter 2, illustrates that we cannot foresee 
the creative process of translation, partly, because, the later tend to decompose container-
like entities, facilitating the agency of many different groups (see Adler 1992). Another 
current example for the contingency of assembling is the “virtual assemblage” which 
enrolls users, electronic networks, images, property laws, businesses, regulations and so 
on. All this constitutes a back and forth without a clear plan or a design (Bessette and 
Haufler 2001, Lemley 2012). 
 The operation of collecting intensifies during the second phase. A series of 
controversies arises during which the identities and goals, and the relationships among 
the involved actors are “a series of negotiable hypotheses” (Callon 1986, see also Nelkin 
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1979)171. In an assembling process, according to Michel Callon, the situation remains in 
flux because of the agency of all actors involved. Gabrielle Hecht’s work on “nuclearity” 
of things exemplifies how the ontological nature of materials can become contested and 
subject to international negotiations (Hecht 2010). Her work also indicates that an 
assemblage is stabilized only after various unexpected and unpredictable adjustments and 
transformations. Callon, in his famous study on the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay, describes 
“translation” as follows: 
“Translation is the mechanism by which the social and natural worlds progressively take 
form. The result is a situation in which certain entities control others. Understanding what 
sociologists generally call power relationships means describing the way in which actors 
are defined, associated and simultaneously obliged to remain faithful to their alliances. The 
repertoire of translation is not only designed to give a symmetrical and tolerant description 
of a complex process which constantly mixes together a variety of social and natural 
entities. It also permits an explanation of how a few obtain the right to express and to 
represent the many silent actors of the social and natural worlds they have mobilized.” 
(Callon 1986, p. 19) 
Only after multiple positionings, controversies, and negotiations can a new association 
finally reach a stable state. Although Callon does not speak of technological innovations, 
his insights similarly apply. Several competing versions of an innovation that, later, seem 
to be a self-evident entity with an unquestioned form may have existed in parallel for a 
long period. For example, the form of the bicycle and the light bulb, which is taken for 
granted today, was totally unsettled for decades until a single model supplanted 
competing versions (Bijker 1997). Who would have thought that cars, by the turn of the 
last century, would not become predominately electric automobiles as vehicles with a 
dirty and malfunctioning combustion engine struggled to increase their market share. The 
automobile was not inevitably linked to fossil fuels (Yergin 1991). Similarly, who would 
have thought that basic technical specifications of electricity would be contested for 
decades (Schiffer 2008) while the engineers innovating electricity grids and long-distance 
communication had to struggle for decades to convince users, businesses and politicians 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Four a similar flexible model of negotiations, though it does not include “actants”, see Singh (2008, 
pp.18ff.)  
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to assemble accordingly (Hughes 1983). In addition, the prolonged situation of ambiguity 
is also mirrored by complex and unpredictable political choices 172  as well as the 
difficulties of law to regulate and govern technological changes and their consequences 
(Bennett Moses 2007, Lemley 2012, Jasanoff 2011). 
 The question, then, is how a translation process ends given that the authority to 
assemble does not rely on the use of force or coercion. It does not happen autonomously. 
Indeed, many technological innovations were canceled after years of unsuccessful 
assembling (e.g. Law and Callon 1988). So, which mechanism is at work here? An 
insight from STS is to look for “boundary objects” (Star and Griesemer 1989). In short, 
actors can solve controversies gradually since boundary objects become focal points of 
translation processes. To the extent to which artificial objects (regardless whether small, 
complex or large scale in nature) become boundary objects, they constitute sites where 
the struggle of connecting human and non-human actors unfolds.173  
 Boundary objects are used pragmatically to articulate shared problem definitions 
and joint priorities for action regarding a matter of concern. They are interfaces enabling 
“the weaving together of a multitude of different elements which renders the question of 
whether they are 'scientific' or ‘technical’ or ‘economic’ or ‘political’ or ‘managerial’ 
meaningless.” (Latour 1987, p. 223)174 Boundary objects such as metaphors, devices, 
images, and machines et cetera enable various actors from heterogeneous practice fields 
and professional contexts to connect and negotiate. In science, for instance, boundary 
objects synchronize research work, facilitate communication among different 
professional groups, and reinforce scientific authority (Sundberg 2007). Boundary objects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Consider as an illustration the different, but interrelated, concerns that Winston Churchill confronted 
when he had to decide whether or not to switch the entire British fleet from steam to oil engines in the year 
1911. Among his concerns were the altered range and speed of battle ships, the anti-innovative stance of the 
admiralty, the unknown volume of reserves and the reliability of crude oil, the massive global security 
measures on which the British Empire would get dependent on to secure oil for its naval superiority, 
engineers’ methods of determining crude oil deposits, the consequences for British naval strategy, and so on 
(Yergin 1991). 
173 I have selected here only technological innovations but it could be argued that every innovation (say in 
management, science, culture, philosophy, or policy) is somewhat based on novel material components, 
instruments or devices as well. Take as an example the Copernican revolution that was partly enabled by 
new telescopes (Feyerabend 1975). 
174 MacKenzie’s study of the design of strategic missiles shows that to stabilize the meaning of “precision” 
required the mobilization of actors and agencies across all domains (MacKenzie 1987). 
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play a pivotal role in the process of translation and help to put actor into position, 
standardize possible ranges of agency, and structure identities all human and non-human 
actors. Negotiations organized around “boundary objects”, by definition, involve the 
(partial) replacement material characteristics of novel technologies, collective practices, 
and political priorities.  
 Sometimes, boundary objects cannot facilitate a stable assemblage. An example for 
the difficulties of translation is the global negotiation about climate change. Due to the 
“global circulation models”—a crucial boundary object in this field—few actors deny the 
fundamental ecological interconnectedness of “human activities” and bio-chemical or 
physical processes on a planetary scale. Yet nearly 25 years of research failed to produce 
a common definition of the matter of concern and, thus, stable prescriptions to solve the 
problem (Mayer and Arndt 2009, Hulme 2009). This holds an important lesson for 
technological innovations. Only in retrospect do they seem to have followed a linear 
“technical” development trajectory, whereas their actual translation phase was full of 
twists, uncertainty and contingency: a history that is largely forgotten later on, however.  
 When things reach a point of “a constraining network of relationships” (Callon 
1986, p. 15) a new assemblage finally is stabilized. Figure 9.1 depicts this last phase of 
assembling by the orange-inked areas at the right side of the x-axis. All concerned actors 
are collected, enrolled, and transformed into coherent parts of an association—each in a 
new position, endowed with a fresh role and with altered properties—a sort of concert in 
which all voices are “speaking in unison” had been established (Callon 1986, p. 19). 
Accordingly, the material and epistemic layers of an association have reached a 
structured condition. Practices have been routinized and are carried out uncontested. 
Boundary objects were transformed into obligatory passage points (Latour 1987, p. 150). 
The flat ontology of translations became, in other words, structured.  
 What is the essence of this stability? Let’s begin to answer this question by looking 
more closely at “obligatory passage points”. Obligatory passage points have various 
functions: They resemble knots in a network that are indispensable for the practice of 
acting in concert. They constitute material connections between various practices or 
legitimate intellectual reference points in debates. Why are obligatory passage points so 
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influential, and how are they different from boundary objects? Schumpeter’s 
understanding of monopolies is helpful here as it sheds light on the nature of obligatory 
passage points. To begin with, one has to recall a fundamental aspect of capitalism that 
Marx and Schumpeter emphasized: economic development is a nonlinear and 
unpredictable process. Especially for Schumpeter, the endless stream of innovations is the 
actual engine of capitalism—to quote from him at length: 
“The first thing to be noticed about the capitalist process is its evolutionary character. 
Stationary socialism would still be socialism but stationary capitalism is impossible, is, in 
fact, a contradiction in terms. For the central figure on the capitalist stage, the entrepreneur 
(q.v.), is concerned not with the administration of existing industrial plant and equipment 
but with the incessant creation of new plant and equipment, embodying new technologies 
that revolutionize existing industrial structures. This is the source of his profits (…) All the 
typical phenomena of capitalism, all its achievements, problems and vicissitudes, including 
the trade cycle (q.v.), derive from this process.” (Schumpeter 1946, pp. 198-199) 
This raises a difficult question: if creative destruction never stops revolutionizing “the 
economic structure from within” (Schumpeter 1943, p. 83) how can we conceive of 
structures, that is, stable relations as possible outcome at all? Schumpeter’s answer lies in 
the discussion of “monopolies”. He holds that innovations typically lead to monopolies if 
only in a temporal manner. According to Schumpeter, non-perfect competition has to be 
viewed as desirable outcome.175 So, against overactive anti-trust proponents, Schumpeter 
argued that temporary monopolies are a necessary condition for entrepreneurs to accept 
the huge risks of investing in innovations. By and large, the realization of temporal 
monopolies keeps the capitalist process running (Schumpeter 1947, pp. 87ff). The market 
might be structured in favor of a single company that possesses superior procedures or 
radically novel products.  
 The empirical record shows that monopolies end rather earlier than later. Because 
further innovations tend to denigrate a company’s advantage and legal rights, such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 While the opposite view that innovations are stopped by monopolies and, more recently, by protective 
patenting, has been raised ever since the turn of the last century (Gagnon 2009, Moldaschl and Stehr 2010), 
a holistic view on the historical record proofs Schumpeter’s understanding correct. Partial monopolies have 
not hampered the increased pace of innovations after World War II (Archibugi and Michie 1997, Diamond 
2006). 
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patents, expire anyway. In practice, a company usually exploits its monopoly only for a 
certain period, argues Schumpeter (1943, p. 99), as a new cycle of innovations may 
destroy the existing monopoly or render it meaningless (Spencer and Kirchhoff 2006). In 
addition, Schumpeter points out that the emergence of short-term “monopolies” as a 
result of creative destruction can’t be assessed in a static setting because the innovative 
firms “provide the necessary form for the achievement” in the first place: “they largely 
create what they exploit.” (Schumpeter 1943, p. 101) The obligatory passage point in an 
assemblage roughly resembles the Schumpeterian idea of a temporal monopoly. 
 Insights from innovation economics also help to distinguish between boundary 
objects and obligatory passage points more clearly. Boundary objects possess the 
particular technical capacity to connect—the term authority, here, can refer to this ability. 
So, while actors have different choices during ongoing controversies, over a period of 
time, boundary objects assemble more and more actors and thus turn into proto-
monopolies. At a certain point (marked by a dotted line in figure 9.1), pragmatic activities 
are routinized so that few alternative ways of assembling with respect to the initial 
concern or thing is thinkable and tangible. In a stable assemblage, one or several 
obligatory passage points frame decisions, practices, and artificial objects according to 
their fixed set of standards or a single script.  
 It is in this sense, that “monopolies” do not merely denote an asymmetric moment 
of control or possession of certain goods, ideas, products or technologies. Monopolizing 
actors constitute an intersection of relations within or across assemblage. All new actors 
that are enrolled—say in an ideal typing “market assemblage”—have to pass through this 
point and stay related with it subsequently. Such a prominent, if temporary, structural 
position is a result of technological innovations. Authority, to put it differently, has turned 
into the ability to structure the options of other human and non-human actors to 
assemble.176 The shift from authority to structural influence is akin to the first mover 
advantage that puts certain innovators177 in the best position to exploit the fruits their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Furthermore, monopolizing actors are influencing the associating activities of other actors and may 
enjoy the additional advantage of creating further obligatory passage points—while increasing the size of 
an assemblage. 
177 This does not apply to all innovators. 
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work by harnessing the new forms of acting in concert, which had not existed before a 
specific assemblage was stabilized. 
 However, this economic-inspired reading of the third phase of translations is not 
sufficient to comprehend all effects of stabilization. The phase of translation is also 
finalized by fixing the level of onto-politics. After major controversies are settled and the 
“outpouring” matters of concern had been transformed into black boxes, a new order or 
knowledge has been established. A hegemonic episteme regulates both epistemology and 
ontology. Thus, the experience within a stable assemblage includes fixed delimitations 
about which actors and agencies, ontologically speaking, belong to an assemblage and the 
particular limits of political discourse of what knowledge is real, ultimate, and legitimate 
are clearly shaped and enforced by standardized ways of knowing (cf. Foucault 2005).  
 A last component that is important to keep an assemblage together is the 
“immutable mobiles” (see Chapter 8). For instance, as European monarchies and 
companies established a vast “global network of communications” between the fifteenth 
and the eighteenth centuries, (Braudel 1992a, p. 415, McNeill and McNeill 2003), printed 
texts became critical elements in these fragile networks. The movement of these “fixed 
inscriptions” containing new knowledge and information about the outside world was a 
decisive factor to assemble land, resources and people. The advantage of mobile, accurate 
knowledge available to conquistador Pizzaro is exemplified by the events after he had 
arrived in Peru in 1527. Before this singular encounter of two great powers from different 
continents, the Inca rulers had neither learned about the landing of Spanish ships at 
American shores several decades earlier, nor were they informed about the brutal 
conquest of other powerful native societies by Spanish soldiers. Pizzaro, on the other 
hand, knew the reports from fellow conquistadores and thus was able to make informed 
judgments about his enemies’ whereabouts and behavior.  
The capture (and later execution) of Inca Emperor Atahualpa in the year 1532, a 
furious achievement of a completely outnumbered troop of Spaniards, was published in 
book form back in Spain only nine months after the incident happened (Diamond 1999, 
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pp. 69ff).178 Secret reports, maps, resource inventories, classifications of plants and 
animals, ships’ logs and so forth increasingly circulated back and forth, thus enabling 
people at the “centers of calculation”—that is, where Lisbon, Madrid, Paris and later 
London were located—to know, to archive and to recombine what they had never seen 
with their own eyes. In brief, the combination of centers of calculation mobile 
inscriptions made it possible to rule “at a distance” over a diversity of peoples, lands, and 
natural resources (Latour 1987, p. 219); it had never been realized before, a long time 
before the invention of the telegraph, radio, satellites and the Internet. 
 
FIGURE	  9.2	  ASSEMBLING	  ©AUTHOR	  
By now, the puzzle of stability becomes fully intelligible. As indicated in figure 9.1, the 
stability of assemblages stems from the correlation between two factors. On the one hand, 
the size of an assemblage, referring to the number and diversity of assembled actors (y-
axis); on the other hand, the end of the translation phase, which is plotted as a temporal 
dimension along the x-axis. A stable state is reached when the red curve, which illustrates 
the evolution of an association in figure 9.1, reaches the upper right quadrant. 
 In addition to the abstract evolution model, figure 9.2 shows the full effects of 
stabilization by articulating more in detail the three layers of figure 9.1. This rendering, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 This account is far from comprehensive. Especially, it must be pointed out here that female translators 
played a central role in giving the Spaniards the advantage to know their enemies much better than vice 
versa (Todorov 1982). 
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then, depicts the dimensionality of the assembling process which is generative of a 
regime of time, build environments, specific objects of circulation and particular 
subjectivities all of which have been stabilized at the end of the phase of translation. It is 
important to notice that these dimensions have a post-Cartesian quality. They are neither 
based on dichotomies juxtaposing the “social” and “material”, nor do they signify 
combinations of “socio-technical” entities. Instead, regimes of time, for instance, always 
combine materials, practices, and discourses. Similarly, “orders of knowledge” are not 
only constructed by cognitive categories but also enabled by material and technical forms 
of knowledge storage, research methods, and data processing. As a result, stable 
assemblages have a specific and enduring order of knowledge in which both “facts” and 
the range of possible “truth claims” are fixed. 
 At this point, it is worth digging deeper into the “order of knowledge” (or what was 
earlier called “epistemological hegemony”) that has evolved through translation; 
especially, the question arises how to better understand the (hidden) effects of 
assembling. Each order of knowledge implies a certain politics of ignorance. According 
to a particular onto-political commitment some things are “matters of concern” while 
others are taken as “matters of fact” (see Chapter 8). Cascades of translations allowed for 
the acceptance of certain practices and institutional apparatuses that might seem, from 
outside of an assemblages, odd or ridiculous and would otherwise inspire resistance. 
Consequently, their ramifications are naturalized in accordance with a certain epistemic 
hegemony. Naturalization is ubiquitous. For example, consider that we knowingly accept 
the high death toll from traffic, the environmental pollution resulting from war, or the 
civilian casualties from “precision” drone warfare. 
 This orchestrated silence, which could be referred to as “externalities” or “collateral 
damage”, is strongly related to the stability and instability of assemblages. On the one 
side, the scope of relevant political issues that warrant attention is limited. The politics of 
ignorance is specific for each assemblage. In this sense, the term “black-boxes” signifies 
silent actors. The intermediaries that are readily connecting and smoothly circulating 
without disruptions differ between assemblages. Notwithstanding “real” tradeoffs which 
are deemed unavoidable, the questioning of or resistance against that what had been 
naturalized (yet renders an assemblage stable) is not a legitimate action. On the other 
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side, this silence can be reversed as the discussion of forms of technological agency in 
Chapter 8 has shown. The emergence of new “matters of concern” renders established 
practices controversial, and makes the epistemological hegemony potentially fragile. 
 Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society and subsequent works illuminate the politics of non-
knowledge. Beck studied how “modernity” had to take into account the side-effects of 
technological progress. The “silence” and non-knowledge became a precarious and 
destabilizing factor in a constantly modernizing society. Chemical substances or technical 
devices turned into a matter of grave concern ranging from the (previously unknown) 
toxic nature of construction materials, the dangers of new scientifically produced 
substances, or the detrimental effects of large-scale infrastructures and industrial 
pollution (Beck 1986, Beck, Bonss and Lau 2003). Nevertheless, it can be generally 
assumed that many things are necessarily black-boxed and externalized in a stable 
assemblage—despite the chance of opening black boxes. 
 Having explored the process of assembling, the effect of technological innovations 
became clear. According the idea of creative destruction, technological innovations are 
generative power via the emergence of a collective that acts in concert. In sum, this 
process was mapped in three phases: technological innovations start with unconnected 
collectors (innovating actors), turn to a phase of boundary objects, and, finally, crystallize 
through obligatory passage points. If one follows the expanding size of an assemblage (y-
axis in figure 9.1) over decades or even centuries, its own ontological parameters become 
apparent (See Graham 2016b). In particular, in the case of an extremely large association 
the new reality entails, among other things, new regimes of time and space, new build 
environments and new life styles, imaginaries and so on. 
9.2 Reassembling 
From the claim that assemblages are generative of their own modes of reality does not 
follow that every attempt to assemble will result in a new, full-fledged assemblage. The 
reason is that only few innovating actors achieve this goal (and many do not have such a 
goal). The authoritative ability to assemble differs from innovator to innovator and so 
does the novelty of proposed connections. The understanding that innovative activities 
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are often less ambitious and that not all innovations are equally transformative brings us 
to the second model of creative destruction: reassembling. What are the differences 
between assembling and reassembling? The key point is how different types of 
technological innovations relate to the magnitude of shifts in power and authority as a 
consequence of translation.179 In other words, while reassembling also involves a phase 
of translation, the latter is typically short, less controversial and far less wide-ranging.  
 To compare “radical” and “incremental” technological innovations offers a 
relatively simple and useful distinction. 180  I employ the concepts of radical and 
incremental innovation in the following sense: 181  Radical innovations refer to the 
assembling that has no substantial prior connection to existing assemblages and all 
practices that keep them stable – a “thing” becomes a matter of concern at the start of the 
evolution of an assemblage (see figure 9.1), which is radically alien to known materials 
and practices within existing assemblages. Radical innovations therefore are the product 
of an extremely creative vision and a very strong authority of an innovator. In addition, 
radical innovation such as the automobile, the bicycle or the use of electricity often need 
a longer time to materialize than incremental innovations because their radically new 
properties require a high degree of translations. 
 The best way to illustrate the problem of radical novelty, which is often mentioned 
with reference to Schumpeter’s idea of innovation (see Spencer and Kirchhoff 2006), are 
the many cases in which inventors successfully assembled an invention but came, 
nonetheless, too “early” because no further connections with the surrounding 
assemblages could be forged. As such, the balloon invented by the famous Montgolfier 
brothers that flew with passengers in the year 1784 remained a fairly exotic and “useless” 
phenomenon. Flying became “possible” only 130 years later, when an array of radical 
innovations finally ushered the air age. The fate of being too early is shared by many 
inventions. Another way to illuminate the difficulties of radical innovations is to observe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 The occurrence of reassembling can have different reasons. As noted above, the assembling process can 
lead to reassembling in existing assemblages. When increasingly more actors are enrolled elsewhere other 
assemblages are affected by controversies, must realign themselves, or can even break into pieces (see 
Latour 2005, Whatmore 2009). 
180 In addition, I will also discuss the relative as opposed to the absolute novelty of technological 
innovations and which translational steps they require. 
181 For a discussion see Chapter 7. 
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the mismatches between their potential demands on the one side, and the actually existing 
mental, regulative, and material support infrastructures on the other side. Consider the 
case of the automobile. In the early 20th century, the number of cars often grew much 
faster than the existing system of expressways and urban streets but also traffic laws, 
driver experience, and public awareness could accommodate.  
 The power that results from radical innovations is immense. Drawing on 
Schumpeter, the logic of (temporal) monopolies can be used to distinguish between 
assembling and reassembling. “Generic technologies” such as microelectronics are an 
example of radical innovations. They “apply to almost and industry” and are so pervasive 
that their rise is facilitated by the creation not only new companies, industries, and 
markets but also a novel technological paradigm (Russell 1997, Dosi 1988). Radical 
innovations, therefore, always involve new boundary objects and obligatory passage 
points, thus, resulting in a translation process of assembling to the detriment of other 
“knots” as was discussed above. As assembling radical innovations requires an enormous 
authority to construct seamless webs and to enroll actors into relations, it leads to 
completely unanticipated and unprecedented connections generating vast monopolies 
which is untypical for reassembling. For instance, a firm that comes to dominate entire 
business sectors, or the imperial capitals in Europe that gradually became able to govern 
“empires” or “world markets” across vast distances (cf. Schumpeter 1943, p. 117). 
 The term “radical”, however, implies an exaggeration, as it has to refer to the 
complex settings of innovational processes. Firstly, even radically novel inventions have 
to build on material components, concepts, engineering know-how, or scientific insights 
that do already exist. Rarely are these components created or produced at the same 
time.182 Secondly, radical innovations require other existing assemblages to adopt – and 
thus tend to lead to reassembling. Renewable energy sources such as wind and solar 
power, surely embodying radical technological innovations, exemplify the legal, 
technical, political, financial, and technological challenges to plug into larger existing 
networks of electricity production and consumption. Notwithstanding a radical break is 
impossible, the electricity networks have to be reconfigured in myriad ways to adapt to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Arguably, this was the case with the Manhattan project that had to pioneer entire industrial processes, 
special metals, and other materials to be capable of manufacturing the first atomic bomb at all. 
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solar roof panels, small scale power plants or the unstable power production of large 
wind parks and so on. Thirdly, the term radical innovations also can signify relative 
novelty--novelty as compared to the surrounding assemblages. Although a specific 
innovation might not be “new to the world” viewed from a global perspective, it still 
constitutes a radical novel development, say, in a certain region, area, or environment 
(see Ayres 1985).  
 For example, the technological innovations brought to the Arctic regions or to 
Southern Mongolian mining areas in order to start extracting natural riches such as oil, 
gas, iron ore, copper, and gold count as radical innovations in a relative sense. For the 
ongoing assembling has significant consequences to other prior existing assemblages 
such as indigenous ways of living, working, energy use, or agriculture. The same is true 
for the radical impacts that new road-systems and pipelines, which are build to connect 
South Asia from Iran to India, or for the water power dams constructed in pristine 
mountain valleys in western China183—these technological innovations, thus, share in 
common that they alter regimes of space and time in a fundamental manner at the local 
level. 
In contrast, incremental innovations refer to technical artifacts, technological 
systems and infrastructures, or other elements that are purposefully constructed to fit into 
existing assemblages and practices. This type of innovation, thus, does not face the 
difficulties of “too early” inventions. Usually, it does not lead to the emergence of new 
collectives and obligatory passage points but rather to the reshuffling and enlargement of 
preexisting assemblages. Still, the power effects of reassembling can be immense. The 
reason that incremental innovations have strong power effects is because they enable 
assemblages, following the logic of path-dependency, to recruit more or other actors.184 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 About mining in Mongolia see Gillet (2012). About recent construction work on pipelines and road 
system in Eurasia see Escobar (2012). On dams in china see Phillips (2012).  
184 Numerous processes of reassembling unfold on a global scale, including the spread of “isotopes” 
(Herran and Roque 2009), the establishment of pasteurization (Latour 1988), organic chemistry (Hugill and 
Bachmann 2005), the usage of containers (Poulsen 2007, Mutlu 2015), the proliferation of mobile 
communication tools (Castells 2007) and the usage of “bloggs” (Drezner 2010). 
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FIGURE	  9.3	  REASSEMBLING	  ©AUTHOR	  
Incremental innovations are related to reassembling as figure 9.3 illustrates. In a process 
of reassembling, obligatory passage points are not totally replaced. The process tends to 
cement the monopole positions that are already occupied. In brief, comparing these 
(stylized) accounts of incremental and radical innovations shows that both can lead to 
power shifts. The key difference is that radical innovations require numerous translations 
and are authority-intensive. The authority, in contrast, that is necessary to reassemble due 
to incremental innovations is smaller than in the case of radical innovations. For enrolling 
more intermediaries and black boxes proceeds with fewer controversies as the “order or 
knowledge” remains stable. Radical innovations possess the tendency to create new 
obligatory passage points and generate new realities. The incremental innovations can 
fortify existing monopolies or shift both authority and obligatory passage point, while the 
modes of reality largely remain unaltered. 
 Reassembling also includes cumulative and interactive dynamics. Through creating 
multiple and interconnected layers of temporal monopolies—some will expire soon, 
others are persisting due to constant flow of various technological innovations—creative 
destruction leads to massive shifts in power. The contemporary world cannot be thought 
without the great assemblages of the final decades of the nineteenth century—electricity 
grids, radio signals, railways, and cable based inter-continental telecommunication—that 
have fundamentally altered “acting in concert” on a planetary scale (Smil 2005, see 
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Buzan and Lawson 2015). There is no way around the obligatory passage points of these 
assemblages and the convergence of many of the involved technologies. In this line, one 
could argue that these collectives, by creating radically different regimes of time and 
space, embodied the power that fundamentally set apart the “West” and the rest of the 
world after around 1830.185 This observation corresponds with the nineteenth-century 
experiences of Japanese and Iranians. In their eyes, the key difference of the European or 
Western colonial powers was the “machine civilization” that underpinned their thinking 
and acting (Mirsepassi 2004, p. 104, Wakabayashi 1986). 
 The example of the “petroleum assemblage” shows the cumulative dynamics of 
reassembling. After the assemblage emerged from a few radical innovations, a long 
process of reassembling set in. The first drilling efforts were in the late 1870s and the 
fossil fuel production for transport really started only after the year 1905. Through 
incremental innovations new actors are enrolled such as kerosene lamps, combustion 
engines chemical products, ships, cars, and so on, thereby increasing the size of 
assemblage by magnitudes. Today, even after two “oils shocks”, the popularization of 
“peak oil” and the danger of fossil emissions, petroleum still features as the “life blood” 
of our civilization (Yergin 1991). The powerful reality of this assemblage is operating as 
countries like China, Vietnam and India became fully fossil societies. Reassembling is 
akin to a path-dependency on the technical and intellectual level.186 
 Susan Strange’s and Joseph Nye’s emphasis on the structural persistence of US 
hegemony refers to the same idea. Due to prior investments in large technical systems, 
aspiring powers are typically confronted with the difficulty of reshaping global 
infrastructures of transport, energy, and communication in their own favor (Strange 1989, 
Nye and Owens 1996, Krige et al. 2013). 
“The one country that can best lead the information revolution will be more powerful than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 However, it is not convincing to presume a determining force of technological path-dependency, which 
prolongs the technological superiority of an actor indefinitely. The history of technological innovations 
shows a frequent sharing of knowledge, unexpected combination, or exchange of agency among humans 
and non-humans. 
186 The reality of multifaceted oil-dependency is still purely understood. Political, economic, engineering 
and scientific commitments prohibit an alternative imagination, that is, how we could reasonably overcome 
this predicament—a condition that is not fully comprehended with regard to international politics (Mitchell 
2011, Litfin 2003). 
	   270	  
any other. For the foreseeable future, that country is the United States. (…) This advantage 
stems from Cold War investments and America's open society, thanks to which it 
dominates important communications and information processing technologies – space-
based surveillance, direct broadcasting, high-speed computers – and has an unparalleled 
ability to integrate complex information systems”. (Nye and Owens 1996, pp. 20ff.) 
Existing layers of technologies form a complex landscape that assigns an asymmetric 
position to different actors (Below et al. 2014). Chang (2002) and May (2009) point out 
how these asymmetric “knowledge structures” inhibited the economic ascent of 
developing nations, prefiguring the growth of their national innovative capacities. The 
uneven distribution of infrastructural power constitutes a highly politicized issue in 
international politics (Krasner 1991, Arrighi 1994). A broader view suggests that the 
obligatory passage points within assemblages of global communication systems, transport 
infrastructures, weather monitoring, and research laboratories result from earlier 
standard-setting and administrative and legal decisions. There was an earlier process of 
assembling that promoted international regulations and binding rules as dominant states 
have tried to extend domestic regulations beyond their borders (see Kindleberger 1988, 
Howland 2014). More recently, technological leaders shaped the global regulations of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) under which expertise, products and techniques are 
transferred in their favor (Singleton 2008, p. 200). For instance, the EU and US, argues 
Andre Sapir, are “the regulators of the world” as they account for around eighty percent 
of norms and standards that regulate world markets (2007, p. x). As such, the current 
global intellectual property system reflects the preferences of the industrial countries in 
general and those of multinational corporations in particular (Wissen 2003, Sell 2003, 
Matthews 2002). 
 In contrast to its cumulative effect, the process of reassembling can also lead to a 
demise of authority and the replacement of monopolies. The evolution of the “rubber 
assemblage” illuminates how authority can shift. To begin with, this resource assemblage 
materialized with the advent of bicycles, automobiles, and several other applications in 
industrializing countries, which produced an enormous demand for crude rubber (Knorr 
1945, p. 9). For decades, the main source for supply was wild rubber, which was 
collected in tropical forests. Brazil enjoyed a monopoly over rubber exports making Latin 
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America the home of the world’s richest rubber barons. Their operations placed certain 
Amazonian regions at the center of a rapidly growing global rubber assemblage which 
also included the US companies such as Dunlop and Goodyear as well as millions of 
automobile and bicycle users worldwide. But the association was destabilized by further 
innovations. The relocation of rubber trees and the construction of rubber plantations in 
South East Asia by commercial pioneers began to redraw the connections within the 
rubber network. During the First World War, the plantations in Siam and British Malaysia 
became the obligatory passage point of a reassembled association producing more than 
90 percent of the total global rubber output. As had happened earlier in Latin America, 
the production and export of raw materials led to an expansion of asymmetric wealth 
while local state-assemblages and market assemblages became technologically linked and 
globally interdependent—by shipping and railway systems but also through the 
movement of plants, people, and animal species (Kennedy and Lucks 1999, Knorr 1945). 
 Then another wave of reassembling occurred. German scientists pioneered methods 
to synthetically produce rubber. Subsequently, they became innovators that worked hard 
to reassemble yet again the rubber assemblage, shifting the monopole position. In the late 
1930s, German and US firms powerfully assembled a “synthetic rubber assemblage”. 
They constructed this new network through scientific and engineering innovations, new 
chemical particles and national security concerns. Germany had been cut off from rubber 
supplies in the First and Second World Wars and the US had the same experience during 
the Pacific War (Hugill and Bachmann 2005). After 1945, petrochemical companies 
became obligatory passage points, feeding the growing demand for synthetic rubber as 
well as other chemical products (Chapman 1992).187 Though natural rubber still has a 
considerable market share, by the late 1960s, synthetic production accounted for roughly 
60 percent of industrial rubber (Wellhausen and Mukunda 2009, p. 119). As a result, 
neither Brazilian rubber barons, nor East Indian plantations functioned as obligatory 
passage points.188 In the Tropical areas, the plantations, the laborers, the rubber trees, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Technological innovations, particularly the synthetic production of various raw materials by the rising 
chemical industries had considerable impacts on tropical production networks, wealth distribution, and 
under-development (Hugill 1988, Wellhausen and Mukunda 2009). 
188 The economic consequences of these power and authority shifts can be seen, for example, in the case of 
Argentina. At the turn of the 19th century, it was among the global top five wealthy countries; “civilized” 
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the related national economies, which by now were involved in the production of 
“natural” rubber, experienced a significant decrease of authority, but they remained 
assembled. In the reassembled rubber collective, in addition, the ontology of rubber was 
different and also the scientific knowledge related to rubber production.  
 In sum, reassembling involves the shift of authority and can lead to the enrollment 
of new actors or, in contrast, to decline of an association. The process of reassembling 
often is coupled to a process of assembling elsewhere and, thus, implies a certain level of 
interconnectivity and synchronicity that is studied – using a different vocabulary – in the 
literature about “uneven and combined development” (cf. Rosenberg 2010). The crucial 
difference to assembling, though, is that even when reassembling does result in the 
remodeled and reframed character of an assemblage, it does not lead to a complete 
change of the stabilized dimensions of reality, as it happens to be the case with 
disassembling. 
9.3 Disassembling 
While we have examined technological innovations through the lenses of assembling and 
reassembling, the final model of creative destruction is the most radical. At the core of 
disassembling lies a massive loss of power, that is, the decreasing ability of numerous 
actors to act in concert within an assemblage. The ability of assemblages to “glue” actors 
together declines sharply. As a result, practices become controversial, obligatory passage 
points “degenerate” to mere boundary objects and descend into obscurity. Under 
conditions of disassembling, monopoly positions become insignificant. At the most 
fundamental level, a loss of power signals the decreasing ability of an assemblage to be 
generative of a distinct mode of reality. The destructive process, therefore, can be seen as 
reversing the three phases of translation depicted in figure 9.1.  
 In extreme cases, collectives cease to exist as a consequence of disassembling. The 
experiences related to this shift are powerful and stunning. Creative destruction renders 
disappearing seemingly vast assemblages such as, for example, large companies, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
on par with European nations. However, after the First World War it rapidly lost, related to shifts the 
production and trade in raw materials, its favorable economic conditions (Campante and Glaeser 2009). 
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industrial sectors and resource supply chains, countries, empires—or, at it were, the 
mighty knights and with them the feudal order of medieval Europe (see McNeill 1982, 
pp. 33ff.). Conceptually, this process refers to the vanishing of an entire reality. The order 
of knowledge, the regime of time, built environments, the circulations of artificial 
objects, and personal subjectivities that were enmeshed in practices, discourses, and 
material agencies are dissolved. As figure 9.4 illustrates, disassembling does resemble a 
mirror image of assembling. 
FIGURE	  9.4	  DISASSEMBLING	  ©AUTHOR	  
As such, the idea of “ruination” offers an interesting way to conceptualize the dissolution 
of assemblages. The awareness of structures and monuments, especially from the great 
empires of the past, is well developed in the trope of “ruin gazing” in Europe (Stoler 
2008, Hell and Schönle 2010). The size of ancient assemblages can still be captured if 
one cultivates the ability to read the historical landscape through ruins. For example, the 
ruined castles that everywhere are littered across Europe suggest that vastness of the 
“Feudal assemblage”. Elsewhere, industrial ruins are a prominent example of 
technological transformations that have led to the destruction of entire local and regional 
economies and lifestyles (Mah 2012). 
 Another crucial aspect of the decrease of power in an assemblage is the loss of 
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practical knowledge. While the material substance of the built environment may remain 
in place with more or less endurance, the knowledge how artifacts such as the Egyptian 
pyramids or the Cathedrals of the Middle Age were constructed is lost. Disassembling 
undoes technologies and the knowledge how to construct them as numerous examples 
show. Consider the engineering capabilities of the ancient Greeks, the medicine of Arabic 
doctors, the abilities for road-construction, sewage systems, or weapon technologies in 
Roman Empire, the imperial Chinese activities of drilling, shipbuilding, or watch-making 
that have been forgotten. More contemporaneous examples include traditional 
manufacturing skills to produce silk, clothes, or carpets that have vanished with the 
globalization of monocultures of industrial manufacturing (cf. Mittelman 2004). Some 
observers worry that the IT technologies of the digital age ultimately erase the hard-
earned ability of handwriting in the Western world (Goff 2008). To sum up, the process of 
disassembling dismantles technologies and, thereby, also destroys the know-how to build, 
employ, and maintain them. 
 This disturbing effect of disassembling is a pressing real-world concern related to 
various high technologies that are part of our energy collectives. It regards, for example, 
the considerably intractable question of how the storage places for radioactive waste 
should be designed to endure millennia: a problem that enjoys an alarming low degree of 
attention (Hora and von Winterfeld 1997, Alvarez 2012). Moreover, disassembling could 
be used purposefully in order to “uninvent” nuclear weapons as MacKenzie and Spinardi 
argue. These systems could be disintegrated including all relevant know-how, tacit 
knowledge, and industrial processes (MacKenzie and Spinardi 1995). 
 The major problem to describe the process of disassembling lies in the proverbial 
insight that “history is written by the victors”. The reason that it is so difficult to capture 
disassembling processes is because the politics of ignorance of other assemblages, 
described above, makes disassembling almost invisible. The decreasing ability to “act in 
concert”, it needs to be noted again, is often closely related to the emergence of radical 
innovations elsewhere, which lead to replacements in one assemblage and erosion of 
connections and agencies in another assemblage. Moreover, certain actors may get 
enrolled in a new assemblage while no longer participating in their previous actor-
network. Against this background, the new epistemological hegemony has a double 
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effect: first, it silences practices that are no longer matters of concern. Second, it also 
silences the historical narratives and the experience related to the assemblage that 
disintegrates. So, while assembling might bring about new realities of time, space, and 
subjectivities, at the heard of disassembling lies the erosion and eradication of these very 
realities.  
 After an assemblage dissolved it can become impossible to remember it or even 
unbelievable that such an assemblage had actually existed at all. The novel One Hundred 
Years of Solitude is a superb exemplification of the limits of memory. Not unlike other 
Latin American writers, Colombian author Gabriel García Márquez captures the magic 
and the tragedy of an entire life cycle of collectives—embodied in the mythic village 
Macondo—from assembling to its total dissolution. In his fabulous story, several 
generations of the family Buendía perform the role of innovators. Numerous 
technological innovations (coming from the outside of the village) reassemble their 
village. From its poor origins, the village eventually becomes related to the political 
struggles in Colombia and the global commodity markets (García 1967). The most 
important feature, as far as our discussion is concerned, is García’s concern for the 
problem of keeping the memory of events and the entire world of the village alive. The 
concern for remembering is woven throughout his masterful story. The village Macondo, 
in the end, vanishes without any traces of its material existence.  
 That the history of Macondo, its people and the human experiences that were vital 
to its success disappear is suggestive. 189  García’s story narrates the eradicative 
implications of “disassembling” that remain a formidable theoretical and empirical 
challenge. One element of his account is the lack of frame of references after a mode of 
reality was obliterated. The notion of creative destruction, in this sense, renders 
intelligible what it means if the evolution of assemblages entails incommensurable 
realities. It is difficult to keep the description of incommensurable assemblages next to 
each other at all. For example, Buzan and Lawson (2015, pp. 166ff.) suggest in their 
discussion of the transformation during the nineteenth century that the experience of time 
was radically different for people in the core as compared to people living at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 See Martin (1989, chapt. 7) and Ortega (2010) for a thorough discussion of One Hundred Years of 
Solitude. 
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periphery of the world system. The magnitude and the direction of changes come down to 
different, almost incommensurable, experiences as suggested by the notion of era versus 
the experience of a spatial and temporal break with the past. 
 Finally, the resemblance between disassembling and warfare needs to be clarified. 
Whereas violence cannot sustain assembling, the destructive aspects of technological 
innovations sometime can equal the consequences of military conflict. Obviously, violent 
conquest can destabilize existing networks. The employment of the British, Dutch, 
Portuguese and French naval forces, for instance, led to a reconfiguration of trading 
routes and political alliances in the Indian Ocean region during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries (cf. Frank 1996, p. 62). Warfare can destroy a state assemblage or an 
economic network. This is highlighted by the wars destroying the assemblage of Imperial 
Japan in 1945 as well as the multi-ethnic empire ruled by the House of Habsburg or the 
Ottoman empire by end of World War I. But the cases of disassembling by war are a 
minority.  
FIGURE	  9.5	  VARIETIES	  OF	  CREATIVE	  CONSTRUCTION	  IN	  COMPARISON	  ©AUTHOR	  
For we find few empirical cases where all former practices, relations, connections, and 
obligatory passage points, which were integral components of a large assemblage, were 
pulverized by warfare. Overall, war has a limited ability to disassemble simply for the 
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reason that “state assemblages” and other large assemblages are constituted by 
psychological, material, and technological agencies, among many other aspects, which 
can endure every conceivable defeat. However, another case of disassembling involves 
violent practices. The most radical examples are the operations of settler colonialism. It 
has been pointed out that the form of “dissembling” pursued by settler colonial societies 
deliberately targets lifestyles, time, memory, knowledge, build environments, and so 
forth. The ultimate goal of physical, structural and institutional violence is the destruction 
of an entire collective and its very mode of existence (Wolfe 2006, Veracini 2011). In 
sum, creative destruction mainly involves violent and non-violent processes of 
disassembling. 
Assemblages can completely vanish even without violence as exemplified by the 
resource assemblage that formed around whaling. Worldwide, fishermen and small 
processing companies used to secure the global fuel supply of lamps and lightening, aside 
from producing the raw materials for many additional products based on whaling. Yet as 
kerosene and, later, electrical light bulbs were invented, new collectives, which emerged 
through kerosene production and use, replaced the whaling assemblage in the late 1870s. 
Although that Epstein does not apply the vocabulary of assemblages, her study on the 
discourse of whaling offers a brilliant case of disassembling; a process unfolding on a 
global level in which local traditions and economies, the various products obtained from 
the whale hunt, and the culture of whaling completely disappeared (Epstein 2008, cf. 
Yergin 1991).  
9.4 Summary 
The three process models of creative destruction expand the conceptual toolbox of IR. 
Summarizing the main ideas of this chapter, figure 9.5 offers a schematic depiction 
comparing the three models of creative destruction. In addition, table 9.6 provides the 
analytical vocabulary that helps distinguishing between assembling, reassembling, and 
disassembling. Conceptualizing technological innovations as the emergence, 
reconfiguration, and destruction of assemblages offer various puzzles and sites, scaling 
up and down within and across assemblages, to explore technological innovations in a 
coherent and comparative way even though these processes in situ often overlap, are 
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interlinked, or evolve in parallel. 
TABLE	  9.6	  THE	  VOCABULARIES	  OF	  CREATIVE	  DESTRUCTION	  ©AUTHOR	  
While assembling follows an evolutionary path of stabilization (see figure 9.1) the 
“destructive” side of creative destruction can equally be analyzed in three phases of 
translation—but in a reversed order, starting with a stable assemblage. Disassembling 
comprises, for example, controversies that call into question established practices or the 
ways in which actors are related. The ability to act in concert is diminished. In brief, 
technological innovations, both incremental and radical in nature, can lead to the 
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destruction of an assemblage, resulting in an unrelated multiplicity while a new 
assemblage emerges elsewhere. Disassembling implies the de-framing, de-standardizing, 
de-objectifying, and dissolving of assemblages, which amounts to the destabilization of 
the entire mode of reality.  
 Reassembling involves shifts in authority and obligatory passage points without 
immediately breaking apart an assemblage. Yet it is still destabilizing to the extent to 
which a collective slides (back) into a phase of translation. Routines become challenged 
and black boxes are re-opened. Some actors increase their ability to enroll others and 
become more important nodes. Others, in contrast, face a decreasing authority. The 
monopole positions of certain actors erode, whereas new innovators are able to assemble 
more actors. 
It has become clear that the enormous power effects encapsulated in the third model 
of creative destruction concerns the disruption of the fundamental dimensions human life 
such as space, time, knowledge, and subjectivity. Decreasing or destroying the ability of 
“acting in concert”—within an assemblage—constitutes the most elementary and, 
arguably, most underappreciated effect of technological innovations. The moving of 
ontological and epistemic parameters makes technological innovations and, particularly, 
radical innovations unique and powerful processes. Moreover, technological innovations 
are special because, while many collectives have not primarily been the result of 
technological innovations in the first place, creative destruction potentially can 
destabilize any assemblage. In sum, the notion of creative destruction treats human and 
non-human actors symmetrically and conceptualizes assembling, reassembling and 
disassembling as three distinct processes of coproduction. Such a post-Cartesian 
approach to technological innovations might contribute to overcoming the “lightness” of 
IR. 
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10. Conclusion: a plea for leaving the pond 
In 1949, William Fielding Ogburn introduced the first extensive edited volume about 
“Technology and International Relations”, noting that the subject matter “is one in which 
there has not been much scientific research.” The “field of technology and international 
relations”, Ogburn claimed, were “pioneering ventures.” (Ogburn 1949, p. vi) Ogburn 
would be surprised to discover that the subject matter still remains in a pioneering phase. 
Although a growing number of researchers advance the issue and a new section has been 
established in the International Studies Association, neither a technology related subfield 
nor a specific research agenda or debate is established thus far. Chapter 4 detailed how IR 
scholarship, with few exceptions, neglected the myriad technologies and non-human 
agencies that influence world politics. Two modes of thought, the social-reductionist and 
the externalizing, that prevail within IR scholarship have marginalized technological 
innovations, particularly as an object for theorizing. 
This makes technological innovations an intriguing topic. They resemble, I 
propose, an Archimedean point from which we can assess the broader achievements and 
limitations of the entire discipline. What lessons can be derived from the fate of 
technological innovations within IR? Are they simply too unpredictable for systemic 
theories to deal with? Do the academic blindfolds, which are responsible for the omission 
of technologies, perhaps, constitute a sort of Achilles’ heel of theorizing global politics? 
The neglect of technological innovation does not merely result from a lack of curiosity or 
coincidental moves on the conceptual level. It is rather, as Chapter 4 and 5 elaborate, the 
result of the “Cartesian complex” – the foundational commitment that renders IR an 
almost entirely social science that deliberately excludes non-humans, materials artifacts, 
technologies, and hybrid modes of agency. As the “foundational” debates in IR were 
mostly preoccupied with the intricacies of epistemology, the logocentric bias has 
remained largely unaddressed, legitimizing the discipline’s generic lightness. The rise of 
Foucauldian approaches, new materialism, and other similar figures of though have only 
recently begun to dispute the logocentrism of IR. 
Overcoming the rampant logocentrism with a dose of explorative realism perhaps 
constitutes an iconoclastic attitude of sorts. Taking an explorative realist methodology 
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pushes one into a somewhat radical position. But I believe that our discipline should give 
up its lightness. The practice that parsimoniously depicts and conceptualizes the world, as 
if materials, artifacts, and technological agencies were inexistent is untenable. Because of 
technologically mediated global problems abound such as climate change, urbanization, 
and energy security, but also as nano-technologies, big data and robotics emerge at the 
nexus of warfare, statehood and technological networks, we should give up the dualistic 
parsimony and treacherous simplicity that is prevalent in research practice and theoretical 
concepts. In this vein, the following conclusions reflect upon three critical issues 
intimately related to the main outcomes of my study: the ethos of cosmopolitics, the 
promise of ontological expansion, and the design of post-Cartesian research puzzles.  
10.1 The cosmopolitics of creative destruction 
In order to overcome the lightness of IR theories, this book shed light on world politics 
by introducing the vocabulary of assemblages and creative destruction. While both 
notions enable a symmetrical conceptualization of technological innovations, creative 
destruction also can function as a metaphor that enables us to appreciate the politics of 
technological innovations in specific ways as “cosmopolitics”. To begin with, 
cosmopolitarian approaches refer to a reality that is mingled, fluid, interconnected and 
prone to massive changes; an understanding that appreciates classical “modern” thinkers 
such as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Karl Marx (cf. 
Berman 2010). The term cosmopolitics captures both the evolution of a specific 
assemblage and the combination of all assemblages—connected, overlapping, competing, 
or unrelated. It accepts humans alongside with non-human actors in a single conceptual 
domain, or rather a multiplicity that does neither possess a common regime of time or 
space, nor a separation between the “social” and the “material”. 
Normatively, this view sets one apart, for example, from Aristotelian and Platonic 
imaginations of representational politics. While examining the onto-political 
commitments of IR theories I connected the ideas of such thinkers as Hannah Arendt, 
Joseph Schumpeter, Cythia Enloe, Karl Marx, James Der Derian, Michel Callon, 
Annemarie Mol or Bruno Latour, amongst others. Their insights, indeed, lead us to 
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reexamine recent articulations of liberal cosmopolitanism and post-structural frameworks 
that miss to situate political communities according to their evolving spatial, temporal, 
and technological dimensions (e.g. Jakobeit, Kappel, and Mückenberger 2010, Beck 
2004, Pogge 2008, Archibugi 2008, Chandler 2009). As such, these approaches articulate 
a purely social science: they perpetuate and reify the matter-mind distinction and the 
premises of a dualist ontology. I agree with Linklater that “the central question is whether 
humans can undergo a global ‘civilizing process’ in which the widening of the ‘scope of 
emotional identification’ keeps pace with any further lengthening of the webs of material 
interconnectedness” (Linklater, 2010, p. 156). Alternatives are necessary that are based 
on a heterogeneous ontology. Without the principle of symmetry any understanding of 
“cosmopolitics” is challenged by technological innovations (Latour 2004a, 2011). 
Post-Cartesian ethics, in brief, amount to a relative understanding of the dimensions 
constitutive of reality—a reality under composition, which can be called ‘cosmos’. This 
view bears no resemblance to “postmodern” structuralism (cf. Stenger 1997, Latour 
2004b). Instead, this approach emphasizes ruptures, non-linearity, unintended 
consequences, and feedbacks that affect all dimensions of reality as a major research 
topic. Non-dualistic premises are particularly apt for IR as we face rapid changes in 
world politics tied to emerging technological innovations. While similar conditions were 
to a certain degree present in earlier phases, contemporary dynamics render the 
stabilization of collectives more difficult than ever. Creative destruction as a metaphor 
then conveys a crucial lesson. When grasping the essence of “politics”, one should avoid 
references to static and dualist constellations, a priori fixed sets of actors and interactions. 
In short, the main research concern focuses on the themes of stabilization, becoming and 
emergence.  
A cosmopolitarian research practice also requires a new analytical-methodical 
language. To this end, I suggest an ensemble of analytical terms that are deliberately 
“blank” to enable the discovery of new things and relations. The flat ontology that is 
implied by the concept of actor-networks aims at overcoming the meta-theoretical 
shortcomings of static notions such as the “international system” or “levels of analysis”. 
It replaces bipolar narratives such as “micro-macro” and “structure-agency” with 
empirically founded understandings of processes of assembling and a relational 
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understanding of agency, not limited to human actors. Theorizing technological 
innovations becomes easier if concepts such as “institutions” and “structures” are 
abandoned for the time being. Because of their contemporary usage the latter terms 
inevitably carry a logocentric burden and forestall the development of a post-Cartesian 
approach to world politics.190  
Furthermore, the notions of “power” and “authority” were reframed in order to 
make sense of the effects and processes of assembling, reassembling and disassembling. 
The term “power” has come to signify “acting in concert”, referring to an entire 
assemblage. It is no longer located within individual (social) actors or invisible structures. 
Power, in addition, captures the coproductive consequences of a stabilized assemblage: a 
fixed temporality, subjectivity, and build environments among other things. For instance, 
the petroleum assemblage involves life-styles, commercial interests, forms of war and 
traffic, physical and chemical changes in the atmosphere, and so on. “Authority”, on the 
other hand, means the capability of assembling other actors into one collective. It denotes 
a creative ability—necessary for both incremental and radical innovations—of single 
actors to forge connections and construct seamless networks. Technological innovations 
resemble a process of assembling but they also involve the destabilization or even 
dissolution of previously existing assemblages. Both sides of creative destruction lead to 
significant shifts in power and authority. Their analysis highlights the centrality of 
various non-coercive forms of power in global affairs and the need for a sophisticated 
exploration thereof. 
What are the politics at stake with technological innovations that theoretical 
approaches and research practice has to cope with? Three aspects are central to the 
cosmopolitics of creative destruction. 
Reality confronts us with a multiplicity of agency. This requires open and evolving 
classifications instead of an order-imposing mono-typologies and fixed taxonomies. 
Research equates ontological expansion and its practice isn’t guided by foregrounding 
epistemological concerns. Concealing the materiality of its subject matters, on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 One can still employ generic IR “containers” such as states, transnational companies, organizations or 
regimes. However, this requires a conceptual refashioning in accordance with the notion of assemblages 
and always needs to refer to actor-networks entailing human and non-human agency. 
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contrary, would only remove IR further from real-world problems. Ontological realism 
replaces the reductionist twin-brothers techno-determinism and social instrumentalism. 
Against the current onto-politics of IR, the principle of symmetry offers sensibilities 
towards the beings and agencies of things, processes, entities, humans, and nonhumans 
alike. 
Technological innovations involve the construction of new assemblages while 
reconfiguring existing collectives. These processes imply a certain imbalance between 
silence and concern. In turn, researchers should carefully study controversies and black 
boxes in order to uncover historical and contemporary silences. Through interrogating the 
totality of a given reality, this kind of cosmopolitics counteracts the politics of ignorance 
inherent in the evolution of assemblages. Exploring silenced externalities brings to the 
fore the full “costs” of stabilizing an assemblage. As research depicts the externalized 
effects of innovations, it problematizes “matter of facts” and collapses the difference 
between “facts” and “values”. The state of non-differentiation is necessary because we 
often simply do not know how numerous and diverse the actors and agencies are, 
especially in large assemblages. Epistemology, in a first step, then comes down to the 
concern for having accounted for all relevant actors and relations. This imperative, which 
plays out in the methodological position of limbo, certainly should not be mistaken with a 
certain ethical stance that grants political and legal rights to objects – the ontological and 
political level are separated.  
The power of assemblages lies in their ability to enroll and relate a decreasing and 
increasing number of actors in stabilized practices. The stability of any assemblage 
involves more dimensions and aspects than social theories tend to make us believe. I 
suggest probing into different mechanisms of stabilization such as the normalization of 
practices, the stabilization of facts, obligatory passage points, and a hegemonic episteme. 
Yet, the collective power is contingent. Almighty associations can become destabilized, 
even beginning from marginal positions. That assemblages are not totalities enables 
resistance. If time, space, subjectivities and so on are not constants but contingent 
stabilizations, which spring form the power effects of assemblages, framing alternative 
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futures is always possible even the most powerful assemblages.191 The contingence of 
power, thus understood, enables one to see better what world one “sings into existence” 
(Smith 2004), as we use our own authority to assemble in manifold transformative ways. 
Cosmopolitics, in brief, means that researchers have to reconsider their own interventions 
in contributing to stabilization and destabilization (Aradau and Huysmans 2010). 
This stance, however, does not suggest that the way in which this study theorizes 
innovations is indicative of a specific political program. My choice of vocabulary does 
not imply ideological bias for or against technological progress. It remains for the readers 
to draw their own conclusions. I am not subscribing to the praise of capitalist peace 
dividends (Weede 2004, Schumpeter 1919). My usage of the concept of “creative 
destruction” does not promote the goal of international technological primacy akin to the 
Cold War’s arms race. Nor am I necessarily writing in defense of criticisms against 
“neoliberalism” (Harvey 2007). Yet I have highlighted the often-violent reality of 
creative destruction and various negative effects of technological innovations that are 
often overseen or conceptually brushed aside (Sveiby, Gripenberg, and Segercrantz 
2012).  
To conclude, the central task of research is describing the multiplicity of life that is 
reshuffled through creative destruction. Instead of “telling the truth”—or deconstructing 
truth—as Cartesian traditions demand, we rather have to painstakingly report and archive 
reality (cf. Foote 1990). The task of accounting for respective processes of translations 
can be disturbing and controversial. Although this does not lead to abandoning Descartes’ 
idea of “analysis” entirely (see Chapter 6), attempts at classifying must therefore remain 
open-ended, as a matter of principle. Explorative realism is also critical ethical approach. 
Cosmopolitics, in sum, require re-representing the multitude of complex agencies and 
embedded modes of existence as the various collectives in which we live.  
10.2 Ontological expansion is promising for the discipline of IR 
Despite its neglect of a technologically transformed world, IR seemingly thrives well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 With Jacques Rancière (2008) one can emphasize the centrality of the marginal actors, the ambivalence 
of existence and agency, and the contestations over group membership. 
	   286	  
within its confines. The numbers of students interested in international studies and global 
politics, as Chris Brown (2007) highlights, are constantly rising. Isn’t it outright 
implausible that the disciplinary framework could be so mistaken? The reluctance against 
radical theoretical inventions is reasonable. And yet, summarizing the outcomes of 
interrogating IR and technological innovations leads to precisely this conclusion. On a 
positive note, we might acknowledge the relatively young age of IR—compared with 
Theology, Law, Philosophy or Physics. If the discipline is approaching “adolescence”, 
perhaps, we had better tolerate weird twists and non-conformist attitudes for good. 
However, this metaphor misses a crucial point. On a more sober note, we have to 
recognize that many of the basic premises and conceptual notions that commonly 
underpin mainstream schools of thought, guide research, and frame policy advocacy are 
murky. In spite of the widening reach of approaches to IR and multi-perspectivism 
abound ever since the third “great debate” (Lapit 1989, Holsti 1985a, Wendt 1999, 
Jackson 2011), core notions still retain a shaky empirical substance and have an under-
reflected genealogy.  
Against this backdrop, this book contributes to ongoing reflections about the 
building blocks of IR theory.192 The attempt to explore technological innovations—
conceptually and empirically—places the premises and presuppositions on which the 
Cartesian framework is based under sustained meta-theoretical and historical scrutiny. In 
particular, I took issue with a fundamental limitation of IR theory. IR theories are in a 
state of denial about the fact that material objects and hybrid associations of humans and 
non-humans vitally mediate between almost all conceivable agencies and certainly 
between those agencies meaningful to world politics. Consequently, I have argued in 
favor of expanding ontological parameters, suggesting a post-Cartesian matrix. Making 
sense of technological innovations—and other subject matters—demands treating process 
and agency as empirical questions; not as a priori given conceptual demarcations or 
theoretical or logical puzzles.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Several landmark studies began to seriously tackle the elephants in the room. These works interrogate 
common and mostly unquestioned notions such as “state”, “anarchy”, the “state of nature”, “the 
Westphalian system”, “the international system”, or “sovereignty”. See Ashley (1984), Walker (1991), Jahn 
(1999), Krasner (1999), Shaw (2004), Ossiander (2001), Vaughan-Williams (2009), and Sampson (2002). 
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Overcoming the logocentric state-of-the-art has several positive effects. For one, it 
will arguably render IR much more relevant to the actual concerns of different sorts of 
people and collectives. Carrying its insights far beyond its narrow domain, IR could 
thereby move out of the largely irrelevant position that it holds in public debates today 
(Buzan and Little 2001). The remodeling of research concerns should enables us to speak 
with a different voice and to many more and different sorts of publics and peoples (cf. 
Lawson 2008). For another, the expansion of ontological parameters enables IR 
researchers to close ranks with fellow colleagues in the neighboring disciplines, many of 
which have been exploring the multiplicity of material worlds along the “environmental 
borderlands” for a long time (Zimmerer 2007). The list comprises history, sociology, 
geography, science studies, post-colonial, subaltern, and area studies, ethnology, gender 
studies, world system approaches, and so on. Is it too far-fetched to envision a form of 
interdisciplinary collaboration through which we learn from the immensely rich insights 
of our peers? Tapping into their knowledge would catapult IR scholarship forward, 
because it could learn from various meta-theoretical debates that had been settled in other 
disciplines long ago. Indeed, much of the knowledge that is relevant to reframe central 
premises and notions of IR theories could come from other disciplines (e.g. Scott 1998, 
Alonso 1994, Carroll 2006, Mitchell 2002).  
In this sense, explorative realism favors an empirical benchmarking for theories and 
puzzles. Just as physics refers to mathematical theorems and the accumulated knowledge 
of other “natural sciences”, social science can improve its validation of knowledge 
claims. One important step is to overcome the self-inflicted disciplinary 
compartmentalization. Our self-contained concepts such as the “state”, then, would be 
brought into conversation with different bodies of empirical knowledge in anthropology, 
geography and science studies. If external sources become a legitimate or even required 
empirical reference point, then they do no longer constitute a “threat” from the outside.193 
As a result, IR might turn from a concept-importer—dependent on “external” epistemic 
communities for conceptual supplies (Brown 2007, p. 350)—into a net-exporter of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 As a side effect, IR would not just overcome its identity-fixation. Freed from its “mythical” ritualism 
(Sterling-Folker 2006) and turning inter-disciplinary exchanges from a taboo into a practical necessity, it 
would arguably become more scientific. 
	   288	  
theoretical notions and analytical puzzles. 
At the moment, what particularly makes various standard premises and concepts 
untenable is the Cartesian onto-political order, which they impose on our subject matters, 
while reinforcing inherent logocentric limitations—limitations that are both more 
extreme and implausible than most scholars would admit. As Bruno Latour reminds us,  
“to study is always to do politics in the sense that it collects or composes what the common 
world is made of. The delicate question is to decide what sort of collection and what sort of 
composition is needed… We claim that the controversies about what types of stuff make 
up the social world should not be solved by social scientists, but should be resumed by 
future participants and that at every moment the ‘package’ making up existing social links 
should be opened for public scrutiny. This means the two tasks of taking into account and 
putting into order have to be kept separate.” (Latour 2005, p. 257) 
To exemplify the explorative function of theory this study has laid out “creative 
destruction” and “assemblages” as a conceptual toolbox to navigate an offshore venture 
into post-Cartesian seas. The former resembles a foundational collector, an analytical 
concept as close to research practice as possible, while the latter is a conceptual model. 
However, putting forward a few new theoretical concepts does not suffice. The 
exploration of technological innovations rather demands a new foundational map. To 
guide orientation, obviously, this map must have distinctly post-Cartesian characteristics. 
Otherwise it would lead us into the shallow waters of dualism, which this explorative 
realist examination scrutinized and rejected. 
First of all, it claims that simply rebalancing material and ideal “factors” in a more 
appropriate manner is not enough. For a core issue at stake is exactly the increasing 
hybridization and intermingling of human and non-human agencies. At the fortunate 
confluence of a conversation gesturing towards post-Cartesianism (Wendt 2015, Poliout 
2010) on the one side, and a lively debate about materialism on the other, this study 
offers a contribution to both developments: it proposes a monist understanding that 
allows for multiple ontologies though, while a new meta-theoretical matrix renders 
intelligible what this means for IR theories. The “double-mixed zone”, particularly, is 
suited to support ontological expansion as it embraces processes of emergence and 
heterogeneous agencies in particular. This move implies, on the one hand, moving from a 
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concern with stability to a concern with stabilization. On the other hand, it invokes a 
relativist paradigm for IR, which avoids treating time, space, knowledge, artificial 
objects, and built environments as constants. Such a relativist commitment, then, opens 
up new empirical issues and concerns as well as radically different theoretical puzzles. 
Secondly, figures, graphs and other visual depictions of our subject matters are of 
central importance for ontological expansion; especially, because a poverty of pictures, 
images, and figures underpins logo-centric confusion (Mayer forthcoming). The lack of 
illustrations and framings in general and the reductionist nature of the existing examples 
in particular are also representative for the “lightness” of IR theories. In sum, IR as a 
discipline has failed to develop an imaginative depiction of our puzzles and theoretical 
concepts. Explorative realism offers an important clue in this regard. As the subject-
object distinction concerning both the status of our knowledge and our research practice 
collapses (Chapter 6), we are intractably entangled with the subject matters of our 
research. This leads, as science studies have shown, to mutual influences throughout a 
process of co-construction. In this sense, the importance of figurations cannot be over-
estimated with respect to capturing the “heavy side” of world politics. We must notice 
that when we inquire technological innovations, the materials, in turn, work their way 
into our research practices and theoretical frameworks through imaginative images, 
graphs and figures. It is thus paramount to proactively generate more of these boundary 
objects.  
Thirdly, explorative realism de-emphasizes epistemological infighting. At its core 
lies a shift towards methodological humbleness—working in the limbo of non-
knowledge. It appreciates observing and describing a reality full of fluid processes and 
contested agencies, which constitutes a challenge much bigger than inferring anemic 
models of causality or debating epistemological monocultures. Moving beyond 
epistemological debates is highly relevant, as I believe that the most pressing concern for 
our discipline lies in finding new research puzzles that make sense at all. In expanding 
our ontological parameters, we should put considerable efforts into the exploration of 
“post-international” concerns. Cynthia Enloe argues that examining human trafficking is 
not just ethically warranted. This issue commands our attention because it also contains 
unknown or neglected aspects crucial to “international politics” (Enloe 2000, p. XI ff.). 
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While not writing for an IR audience, Mark Pendergrast’s (2010) history of coffee or 
Mazan Labban (2008) and Gavin Brigde’s (2008) work on fossil resources exemplify the 
same appraoch. To support empirical research on global transformations and processes of 
emergence this book proposed a set of conceptual tools to locate and systematize cases, 
puzzles, and scales in relation to assemblages. Three open-ended classifications and three 
models of creative destruction enable the mapping of magnitudes of translations, 
changing size and topologies, altering scripts, and shifting power and authority in 
assemblages.  
10.3 Discovering post-Cartesian research puzzles 
By extension, the implications for future research are briefly outlined by five puzzles that 
illustrate the novel landscapes becoming accessible and intelligible for IR scholars. To 
take material agencies seriously while exploring multiple assemblages results in 
alternative research objects investigated within the framework of (a refashioned) IR. 
Making Things International demonstrates how different artifacts and technologies can 
be studied via assemblages without totally abandoning the “international” as an 
organizing frame as (Salter 2015). As such, to study assemblages by accounting for some 
“masses” is crucial:  
 It might be an assemblage consisting of statistical calculations, geometry, tunnels, 
drainage systems, highways, battleships, newspapers, history museums, surveillance 
drones, school curricula, clinics, universities, sniffer dogs, border walls, ethnic identity, 
official currencies, television programs, paved streets, music and uniforms, electronic 
voting machines, asylum camps, concrete, emigration practices, concentration camps, 
police officers, railway bandwidths, prison cells, leisure parks, body scanners, standard 
time zones, flags, asphalt, great fire walls … or simply what is conventionally seen as 
“nation state”. 
 It could be an assemblage of concrete, wire, cars, spouses, security personnel, bars, 
bargaining psychology, first class lounges, bribery, video communication networks, 
maidens, satellites, track-two meetings, air travel, telephones, translations and 
mistranslations, immunity, coffee, conference hotels, spies, prostitutes, cultural institutes, 
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conspiracies and deception, exposed embassy cables, hasty press conferences, prime 
ministers, drunken or with jet-leg … or simply what is conventionally treated as 
“international diplomacy”.  
 Or, we explore a rather different assemblage, entailing formula one car racing, gas 
stations, US solders protecting Iraqi oil-pipelines, rich Arabic sheiks in Davos and 
imprisoned Russian oligarchs, tanker fleets, expanding pipeline networks, boy toys, 
petro-dollars, ocean drilling, crushed EV1s, Dutch diseases, State Oils conflict with 
fisher communities in the far north of Norway, Chinese engineers in Sudan and Gabon, 
national energy balance sheets, oil theft in Nigeria and corruption scandals in France, 
rigs and ruined landscapes, the mathematics of petroleum reserves, abiotic theories of 
oil, the OPEC, oil platforms, the American Automobile Association campaigning, fuel 
price-manipulations, large harbors, energy security formula, climate skeptics and 
disclosure tricks in environmental assessments, peak-oil fears, mass auto-mobilization in 
India and Vietnam, … or simply what we would coin “hydrocarbon associations”. 
 Building on such an exploration of assemblages, the next step, then, is probing into 
the creative destruction arising from technological innovations as detailed in Chapter 9. 
The following puzzles, referring to the three models of assembling, reassembling, and 
disassembling, are suggestive of various further research puzzles: 
Creative destruction and cyborg warfare: One might explore the assembling through 
which new types of digital and autonomous weapons systems and digital-algorithmic 
infrastructures create a powerful new collective that fundamentally alters the reality we 
live in. This translation does not go without major controversies. The autonomous 
warfare, for instance, redraws the boundaries between war and peace: homeland and 
foreign turf, civilian and combatant, law and the arbitrariness of making law unilaterally, 
“sovereignty” and “justice” collapse (DeLanda 1991, Barkawi 2011). While these issues 
have been raised separately elsewhere, this puzzle poses the ontological question as to 
how creative destruction turns military assemblages into a novel war machine while 
destabilizing various other assemblages. For example, the web of drone technology, 
satellite data, and intelligence enables the US president to personally order killing attacks 
and “signature strikes” (Becker and Shane 2012), facilitating a systematical undermining 
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of the practice of sovereignty and international law. Innovations in network-centered 
warfare also remodel the “soldier”. He/she/it becomes a cyborg warrior, physically and 
mentally connected with technological automats and embedded in virtually simulated 
realities. Increasingly, non-human actors such as drones and robots acquire a prominent 
position as boundary objects in security practices and war theaters. Non-human actors 
even tend to become obligatory passage points within the emerging cyber-world in which 
humans are eclipsed from decision-making and no longer at the center of carrying out the 
globally extended security operations (Singer 2009, Der Derian 2009, Lee 2012). How 
does creative destruction relate to the collapse of the distinction between war and peace 
of which IR discourses are also part? To begin with, how have we as a discipline arrived 
at a point where we fail to challenge mass slaughter and legitimize so called high-
precision weapons while silencing that surgical strikes cause so many civilian casualties 
(Bergen and Tiedemann 2011)? Why have we fallen short calling for a stop or even a ban 
of drones and droning? How is the cyborgization of military practices related to the 
“epistemic mutations” that have altered the meaning of war, soldiers, attacks, civilians, 
sovereignty and international law? What does this imply for people living in places and in 
bodies assembled through cyborg warfare (Holmquist 2013)? What are the consequences 
of novel spatial concepts such as “ungoverned territories” that decisively pulverize 
sovereignty in the context of cyborg-warfare (Schetter 2012)? How much authority shifts 
away from human-dominated classical platforms (such as fighter jets and artillery), 
towards hybrid or purely autonomous practices of fighting? In sum, this puzzle explores 
how creative destruction is fundamentally transforming the reality of warfare and entire 
scales of world politics therewith. 
Stabilizing time and the “great divergence”: We might reframe the puzzle of “great 
divergence” and the great asymmetries of power in he world by inquiring the 
construction of time and space. This implies not to take time and space for granted as 
constants but to explore their construction, especially looking at the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. The creation of a global standard time may explain to a large extent 
why the power differentials between European empires and several other political 
assemblages could shift so rapidly between 1800 and 1850 (Hom 2010). But it remains 
largely unclear how much innovations including technical, political, philosophical, 
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scientific, and economic efforts, have assembled and stabilized a world standard time that 
has been kept stable until today. Historians and anthropologists have started this inquiry 
(Harvey 1989, Galison 2006, Kern 2003, Nanni 2012). But many questions remain 
untouched. What agencies were involved in these innovational processes? What role does 
“objective science” play in stabilizing imperial outreach (MacLoed 1993, Pyenson 
1993)? What are the obligatory passage points in this assemblage and where lie its 
silences (see Watts 1983)? In this line, Hutchings proposes the idea of 
‘heterotemporality’. With it she challenges IR and wants to ‘undermine the idea that we 
can theorise world-political time in homogeneous or unified terms’ (Hutchings 2008, p. 
155). Explorations as these, more generally speaking, are concerned with the shifting 
topology of assemblages. The true meaning of the term “great divergence”, consequently, 
is much more radical than a common understanding that a bunch of “economic”, 
“institutional” and “technical” factors account for the unlikely “rise of the West”. 
Highlighting creative destruction instead renders the fundamental chasms between 
emerging, often incommensurable realities tangible, which are experienced by many, for 
instance analyzing the nexus of modern development and so-called “environmental 
conflict” critically (e.g. Dalby 2002, Duffield 2006). This puzzle, in sum, pushes the 
reconstruction of “Western” monocultures of time to the center of theorizing in IR. Such 
a move entails an ethical and analytical stance towards global politics that keeps “time” 
fundamentally open as suggested by reflexive realism (Hom and Steele 2010). 
Technological innovations and state formation: We might take on a somewhat 
related puzzle yet involving a longer historic period in exploring the formation of modern 
states as a process of assembling. Against the prevailing attitude in IR that takes “states” 
by and large as given this involves probing into various technological innovations that 
enabled assembling “the state” (Rose and Miller 1992, Sassen 2000, Passoth and 
Rowland 2010). The huge material world of artifacts, systems and technologies is under-
researched—including for instance maps and cartography (Mitchell 2002, Branch 2011), 
the printing press and newspapers (Anderson 1996). In addition, as modern statehood 
requires navigational instruments, clocks, it was affected by the circulation of new 
scientific methods and collected “things” from the Americans (Barrera-Osorio 2010). 
How does the extension of complex material infrastructures, for example, change 
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territorial organization on a regional and global level (Duara 2006, Swyngedouw 2008)? 
How is the inside/outside of sovereignty enabled by divided temporalities (Alonso 1994, 
Weber 1998)? Today, as technological innovations evolve relentlessly, what shifts of 
power and authority take place within state assemblages (Castells 2008)? While new 
collectives were assembled through innovations such as the mobile phone, renewable 
energy technologies, deep sea drilling, hydraulic fracturing, the World Wide Web, social 
media, and digital technologies, how does this reconfigure processes of “state 
formation”? Do these innovations merely reassemble state assemblages, or, conversely, is 
a complete dissolution or replacement of state assemblages thinkable? From another 
angle, we could explore the technologically dominated assemblages such as metropolitan 
areas and “global cities”, questioning the living conditions they provide for humans, 
animals and plants at the one hand, and tracing the links to international diplomacy, 
financial accumulation, and global governance on the other (Brenner 1998, Coward 2012, 
Acuto 2013, Farías and Bender 2010, Sassen 2002). 
Assembling, disassembling, and “resource colonization”: A perspective of 
assemblages also sheds fresh light on colonization and decolonization. For example, how 
were the material remnants such as infrastructures, borders, and buildings of imperial 
assemblages reassembled? By mapping the topologies of resources, assemblages might 
show an astonishing continuance of networks and obligatory passage points over 
centuries that render the phenomenon of “weak states” intelligible (e.g. Roberts and Parks 
2007) or highlight the “new wars” from a material angle. Such a cartography would also 
call into question the practice of UN units and NGOs in former colonies in the sense that 
the fact that they work along these assemblages perpetuates a politics of expertise that 
puts a premium on “good governance” and “social” institutions without recognizing the 
very technological condition of state formation (Schouten 2013). In specific ways, this 
challenges the World Bank’s stylized puzzles of development research and blue prints 
alike. Furthermore, it challenges the theoretical and conceptual paucity that silences the 
actual relationship between “underdevelopment” and the practices of long-standing 
resource assemblages (see Bunker 1984). Unearthing this nexus on the one hand ties into 
Foucauldian accounts of colonialism focusing on the ideal-typing assemblages 
(Viswanathan and Said 1993, Mbembé and Steven Rendall 2000). On the other hand, 
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going beyond the ethnology of scripted practices, it is required to inquire into the 
topologies of material assemblages. These seem the most unknown and under-explored 
subject matters to me. However, at the same time they are utmost ubiquitous in our daily 
lives. In any way, IR should contribute to making transparent, in a symmetrical way, 
what is assembled in the vast resource assemblages: It should break with the omission of 
the former’s external effects and the controversies concerning almost every single 
resource assemblage (Peluso and Watts 2001, Shiva 1994). With explorative realism, IR 
is leaving its comfort zone of scientific monocultures to follow the fuels, raw materials, 
minerals, drugs, and food supplies. 
Rapid climate change and the construction of the arctic region: The rapid physical 
and political changes in the Arctic call for a probe into the construction of a “regional 
assemblage” (McKie 2012). The prospect of shortening the sea-lanes between Europe 
and Asia by up to 4,000 nautical miles destabilizes the existing sovereignty practices 
concerning borders, navigation, defense, and extraction (Gerhardt, Steinberg, Tasch, 
Fabiano, and Shields 2010). The Canadian government is rapidly extending its military 
presence at the American continent’s northern rim in order to control its exposed 
territorial demarcations. On the opposite side of the Arctic, Russia’s government is trying 
to secure territorial claims and the interests of its national oil companies by re-
establishing its strategic “bear bombers”, patrols and large-scale military drills (Mayer 
2012a, pp. 173ff.). While the rapid changes are portrayed as threats to national 
sovereignty (Borgerson 2008), the technological agency that enables the assembling of 
people, resources, water, and weather into new regional collectives is understudied. The 
focus on strategic rivalries silences the fate of indigenous groups—not to mention that of 
flora and fauna. Indigenous populations become marginalized despite the fact that their 
livelihood is existentially threatened (Leichenko and O’Brien 2008, pp. 91-103, Adger, 
Barnett, Chapin, and Ellemor 2011, pp. 9-13). The rapid ”opening up” of the Arctic 
resembles the construction of a region in the most fundamental sense as it involves the 
emergence and inter-linkage of several heterogeneous assemblages. Despite conflicting 
strategic interests, the governments of Denmark, Russia, and Canada agreed to solve their 
territorial disputes within international legal frameworks. Additionally, scientific 
practices and technological innovations occupy central roles: Geologists’ and lawyers’ 
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mapping the region’s continental shelves shall ascertain which nations own exclusive 
rights to exploit the potential large gas and oil deposits under International Law (Mayer 
and Schouten 2012, p. 25). Furthermore, legions of engineers, geologists, and 
geographers explore the region’s actual carbon resources and develop new drilling 
technologies fit for extreme climatic conditions. The manner in which various ideal-
typing and topological assemblages overlap and are connected to actor-networks of 
transport, shipping, and fossil resource extraction provides an extraordinary case for the 
study of region building. Not the least, this is also a seminal instance to test alternative 
designs of “inclusive” global governance (Mayer and Arndt 2012, Long Martello 2008). 
These five puzzles indicate possible attempts to overcome the “lightness” of IR. Of 
course, there are many more research directions tackling the challenge of a post-Cartesian 
mode of research. This requires, first, collaboration across disciplines to which few are 
accustomed in IR and social sciences at large. The complexity and global reach of the 
empirical materials also posits a formidable challenge to the language skills, fieldwork 
abilities, and the intercultural capacities of the researchers.194 Secondly, these post-
Cartesian puzzles exemplify a sort of theoretical perspective that is incompatible with 
instrumentalist and the state-centric ideas about the role of technologies in global politics. 
As explorative realism holds, IR is first of all responsible for a solid reporting of 
reality without convenient reductionisms. Nothing less. This is a much more formidable 
task than realizing the imperative of “parsimony” has ever been. Against 
compartmentalization and purification, post-Cartesian puzzles do not only have an added 
value in terms of improving our comprehension of global politics. Some might ask 
whether this is really relevant for policy making? The answer to this question is 
negative—if one believes that “policy relevance” refers to simply reproducing, reifying, 
or envisioning the “nation state” and the “international system” whatever these two terms 
may signify. Instead, I want to turn this question on its head. What is the value of 
“heavy” IR puzzles other than the lesson that the conventional manner of conceptualizing 
“policy” itself is by and large irrelevant, at least, with respect to the reality of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 In this line, pragmatist approaches to philosophy of science, although praising the eclectic use of 
theoretical IR perspectives (e.g. Sil and Katzenstein 2010), appear not well aware of practical and 
methodological tasks that go way beyond the disciplinary confines of IR. 
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technological innovations? For instance, it has become obvious why concerns with top-
down state-led strategies are anachronistic. Management, policy making or research 
designs that build on a control and command model of innovation is doomed to fail 
because creative destruction evolves in the context of various assemblages and is 
conditioned by shifting agencies between humans, artificial objects or some mix of both. 
10.4 Setting sails 
At the beginning of this book, I told the story of a Fishermen village. The inhabitants 
lived at the coast; yet they had never tried fishing offshore. At the risk of 
oversimplification, this metaphor points to the epistemic community of IR as it 
increasingly realizes the limited confines of its domain. Barry Buzan’s verdict that IR has 
failed as an intellectual project demands important qualifications. This book tries to 
account for the reasons of this predicament. Alternative paths must rest on a clear 
understanding of the meta-theoretical commitments that led our discipline to accept and 
legitimize a “small pond” in the first place. So why should we hedge this narrow domain? 
Why not venture out into the uncharted blue waters? One of my goals precisely was 
stimulating a conversion among those, who are interested in “offshore” strategies. 
Inquiring into technological innovations and material agency presents a particularly 
promising direction for a post-Cartesian IR agenda. The lesson from recent developments 
in history suggests that such an agenda, not at least, would also enhance the agenda of 
globalizing IR. For while history is in a metamorphosis and increasingly turns to writing 
a truly global history, the research about things, materials, and technologies plays a 
crucial role therein.195 
Every expansion is welcome. The current situation, which is seen as a crisis by 
many, ought not to lead to premature foreclosures. Rather, the recent onto-political 
inroads are but the beginning. It is reasonable to expect further extensions of what counts 
as legitimate fields/areas/sets of subject matters in IR. I agree with Peter T. Jackson that it 
is definitely too early to restrict the discipline’s ontological scope, although this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 See Appadurai (1996), Bayly (2003), McNeill and McNeill (2003), Auslander (2005) and the exchanges 
in the 2009 issue of the American Historical Review (pp. 1355-1404). 
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constitutes a routine practice of constructivist and neorealist projects (Jackson 2011). In 
this regard, a comparison with other scientific disciplines is illuminating. IR is about a 
hundred years old. Compared, say with Physics, Chemistry, or Theology, it owns but a 
short biography. In other words, we are in the early stages of our development and, 
should thus anticipate further barriers to building our epistemic identity. If Kuhn’s 
insights apply to IR we should welcome this foundational insecurity. Perhaps, ontological 
expansion is more a process of centuries than of decades, as it is the case with Physics 
that has never stopped expanding its ontological parameters. In accordance to the non-
normal condition of our discipline, “theories” performing an explorative mode play a key 
role. Debating our foundations should no longer be driven by the anxiety to get bereft of 
the status of science—nor by an “inferiority complex” as Susan Strange (1988, p.12) has 
pointed out. Instead, a comparison with other disciplines reveals that the number of 
“objects” and “processes” that is theoretically embodied by the framework of IR—not to 
mention the number of sets (of sets) of objects and processes—is still very limited.  
 Strong pull factors notwithstanding, why does IR scholarship stubbornly shy 
away from leaving behind narrow theoretical routines? Why is it so hard to convince 
ourselves to set sails? Perhaps, we are tied down by the deep-seated fear inherited from 
the “founding fathers”, many of whom have believed that it is only through a clear 
demarcation as well as a unique subject matter that IR could become a respected 
discipline of its own (Williams 2005, Guilhot 2011)? Arguably, by abandoning the pond 
that has provisioned us with a secure delimitation, we risk dissolving our discipline. This 
possibility cannot be ruled out indeed. As such, potential epistemic competitors as “world 
system theory”, ”global governance” or “international political economy” are signs on the 
wall. These strong research fields could strip off the best minds and vital funding from 
IR. Should we not simply stick to the pond in order to save the discipline of 
“International Relations”? Or, conversely, do we have to replace “IR” with an alternative 
master concept and another set of foundational notions and premises? Frankly, I think 
there is no need to come up with an answer to these questions at the present. The 
establishment of a fresh vocabulary for “IR” is less vital than our engagement with 
empirical multiplicity. 
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